Rumors produïts

In document 1.1.1. Objectius de la recerca (Page 68-71)

183 Cf. Richards Whispers of War, pàgina 54.

184 En els documents preparatoris de la unitat d’intel·ligència es recomana que la persona que n’estigués al càrrec “must have sufficient vision to see that the success and prestige of his Unit will depend, not on the quantity of paper bearing the Unit’s name which is turned out, but on the extent to which, without a

0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000

Rumors produïts

S [01/11/1940 01/08/1941] R (inic. 145) [01/08/1941 15/01/1942]

Q [15/01/1942 16/06/1942] P [16/06/1942 29/09/1942]

N [29/09/1942 19/02/1943] L [19/02/1943 10/08/1943]

K [10/08/1943 21/04/1944] J [21/04/1944 13/04/1945]

C [01/10/1943 11/08/1944] PA [01/07/1944 31/03/1945]

d’intel·ligència funcionà fins el 4 de juny de 1945, i va donar feina a almenys 64 persones185. Intentava fer una estimació del moment en què es trobava l’opinió pública europea, per nodrir tant la propaganda oberta com la clandestina186. Cap a la meitat de la guerra, l’agost de 1943, el PWE produïa fins a 31 informes diferents187, de periodicitat i temàtica diverses:

- 4 diaris: Outline of News and Enemy Propaganda (a les 11.30 i a les 17.30), News Digest, Axis Propaganda and the Italian Situation i Resistance Diary (quinzenal).

- 23 setmanals: International Calendar, United Nations and the Future, Propaganda Nuggets, Magazine Survey, Russian Propaganda to and about Europe, Mirror of Britain, German Propaganda and the German, Executions and Sentences for Crimes in Greater Germany, German Propaganda 1/2/3 Years Ago, Intelligence Report (de la secció italiana), Intelligence Summary (italiana), Censorship Summary (italiana), Analysis of Home Propaganda (italiana), Intelligence Report (de la secció francesa), Analysis of B.B.C. French broadcasts and American rebroadcasts, Analysis of Paris and Vichy broadcasts, Intelligence Summary – Holland, Intelligence Summary – Belgium, Intelligence Summary – Hungary and Roumania, Intelligence Summary – Bulgaria, Intelligence Summary – Yugoslavia, Intelligence Summary – Greece i Intelligence Summary – Poland-Czechoslovakia.

- 2 mensuals: Survey of the Clandestine Press i Forthcoming Anniversaries (secció italiana).

- 1 quatrimestral: Survey of Resistance in Europe

- 1 quan es requerís: Nazis in the News (sobre persones concretes d’interès)

great outflow of paper and without the presence of the Unit being obtrusive, Regions get the information they need from the right sources at the right time” (Desconegut (08.09.1942). The Organisation of Intelligence in P.W.E. II. FO 898/36. The National Archives, Kew, pàgina 2).

185 cf. Desconegut (01.06.1945). Political Warfare Executive. Directorate of Regional Intelligence. FO 898/36. The National Archives, Kew.

186 . Desconegut (06.09.1942). Organisation of Intelligence in P.W.E. FO 898/36. The National Archives, Kew, pàgina 1.

187 Cf. Desconegut (08.1943). Intelligence Documents Regularly Produced in P.W.E. FO 898/36. The National Archives, Kew.

Tanta recerca de dades reals i fiables contribuïa efectivament a alimentar en la imaginació dels creadors de rumors. El nivell de coneixement de la realitat era tant al que de vegades aconseguien crear històries que no només eren versemblants, sinó que a més l’encertaven: eren veritat. Això va passar, per exemple, en aquest cas:

U.S. Army is training parachutists ski-troops for landing in Europe188. Els responsables van decidir no aprovar-lo:

This rumour was NOT approved since it happens to be true189.

Va ocórrer amb altres, com aquell segons el qual els alemanys volien endur-se l’or de la França ocupada i estaven fent gestions per aconseguir també el de l’altra part del país190.

L’esforç de documentació era notable. Pot resultar-ne il·lustratiu un exemple referit a Espanya. Amb data 29 d’octubre de 1940, arribava a Valentine Williams aquesta descripció de la situació:

1. The Spanish people do not like the Italians, and France is hated in Catalonia and Barcelona. People are hungry and although there are public kitchens the food is poor and many prefer to beg. The people seem completely demoralized and apathetic. Among many Spaniards there is a warm feeling towards Britain.

2. German influence is widespread and their currency is accepted.

3. The mercury mines are controlled by the Germans.

4. In Madrid there is an Irish-American family named O’Brien consisting in two brothers, a sister and their mother. The sister speaks perfect Spanish and broadcasts pro-Franco propaganda from Madrid.

5. There are no curfew regulations and no rationing of electric light and power191. Una altra informació sobre Espanya –aquesta de finals de 1942- intenta ser més precisa i donar una visió general de l’actitud espanyola pel que fa als rumors:

Rumour has been given a very prominent place in the Spanish Press during the month of December 1942. Rumours have been, and indeed still are, rife throughout Spain; their import covers a fairly wide field and includes landings by Allied troops in

188 Sinclair, W. (16.01.1941). To Mr. R. Murray: at the Meeting of the J.I.C. on Tuesday the 14th January.

FO 898/70. The National Archives, Kew, número 9.

189 Ibid., número 9.

190 Així ho afirma Brooks British propaganda to France, 1940-1944: machinery, method and message, pàgines 150-151. El document original, però, no s’ha trobat als arxius.

191 Desconegut (01.10.1940). Extract from M.I.5's Daily Report (D4). FO 898/70. The National Archives, Kew.

the port of Málaga, followed by rioting and seizing of power by Left Wing elements with the approval of Allied Consulates; risings in villages taking their cue from Malaga; rising in prisons, derailing of trains and seizing of railway stations can be included in this group. The formation of Left Wing governments and ‘celebration’

rumours can also be linked.

Telephone calls, though somewhat different, may also be regarded as a form of rumour, and fall into two categories, either the threatening type “You wait; our time is coming”, or confidential, optimistic calls made to probable sympathisers. Suicides of well-known Falangists, their sympathisers of government officials are also used quite frequently as the basis of rumours, and work on the lines that the suicides have come to the conclusion that the Government is about to fall and that death is their only means of escape from a richly merited fate. Present day rumours, generally speaking, are divided into four classes; the fantastic, which are only accepted by the young and credulous; the pointless rumour which is useful only inasmuch as it tends to create confusion; the prophetic rumour which fails through lack of substance; and lastly the effective rumour which is most insidious and has some appearance of truth, shuffling names and events which although not true, might be so.

Rumour often has its root in those political jokes which are often really humorous, and go on year after year, only names being changed. They start with a basis of truth, become exaggerated, and then enter the stage of rumour based on truth, and pass on to the absolutely unfounded rumour.

Rumours have always existed in Spain and are always epidemic. They have often had calamitous effects (as in the case of the massacred monks who were said to have poisoned wells in 1831); the many rumours concerning the Royal Family in pre-revolutionary days; and that of the “poisoned sweets” which caused the events of May 1936 192.

In document 1.1.1. Objectius de la recerca (Page 68-71)