c. Reflexió i teorització

In document 1.1.1. Objectius de la recerca (Page 60-67)

Així com tots ells tenien habilitat per escriure cròniques periodístiques o novel·les, no sembla que tinguessin una formació específica per aquesta nova tasca de fabricació de sibs. Entre els arxius es conserva poc material de caire teòric o metodològic. Garnett, cronista del PWE, denunciarà l’absència d’una aproximació científica al fenomen que els ajudés a encertar millor en els criteris emprats per elaborar rumors: pesaven més els objectius concrets de les parts interessades (exèrcits i ministeris)162. En la seva opinió, el PWE sofrí l’absència d’un especialista a temps complet que combinés un enfocament científic amb una imaginació brillant.

La crítica a la manca de reflexió que fa Garnett en el seu informe mereix un matís. Si es repassa tant la correspondència com els materials que es conserven en els Arxius relacionats amb l’activitat de l’UP, certament haurem de concloure que no es troba cap mena de manual de fabricació de rumors. Malgrat això, el dia a dia del comitè va donar oportunitat per deixar fixades algunes experiències sobre com gestionar-los i explicacions detallades sobre els diferents aspectes del procés. Aquestes anotacions, posades una al costats de l’altra, reflecteixen una perspectiva i una comprensió molt concreta i particular del fenomen.

National Archives, ). Fins i tot abans encara –el juny de 1941- l’UP era presidit per Chambers (Chambers Memorandum to Heads of Regional Sections (Mr. Ingrams, Mr. Adams, Mr. Barry). ). D’aquesta renovació intermèdia i de l’equip presumiblement previ al que ell anuncia com a primer, Garnett no en diu res.

160 Mirar HS 3/215.

161 Cf. Metherell, J. K. (20.03.1943). Nota. FO 898/69. The National Archives, Kew.

162 Cf. Garnett The Secret History of PWE: The Political Warfare Executive, 1939-1945, pàgina 212.

La principal proposta de sistematització teòrica que es troba als Arxius, i que no passa de ser una mena de memoràndum d’ús intern, fou feta per John Barry. Amb data 2 d’agost de 1941 presenta un Plan for Improving Sib Production163:

A. Creation of Sibs

There are three principal types of propaganda media at present employed by S.O.I. They are (1) leaflets, (2) radio, (3) Sibs.

The first essential if propaganda is to be efficient is that the propaganda put out for any region through each of these media must be base on the Propaganda Plan for that region. Therefore, propaganda developed through Sibs must be conducted with full knowledge of propaganda by leaflets and radio. It follows that the authority for the production of Propaganda Sibs for any territory must lie in the hands of the Regional Head for that territory.

But, just as a Regional Head requires the services of a skilled Make-up for the layout and production of his leaflets (...) so likewise, if the quality of Sibbing is to be improved, the Regional Heads will require the services of somebody with the very specialised type of mind required for Sib production. There should be somebody available at S.O.I. 164 to give his whole time –under policy guidance from the Regional Heads- to the creation of Sib projects; the strategy of Sibbing; the study of the past history of Sibbing, both commercial and political; the study of the Sibbing done by the enemy in this war and of his methods of Sibbing. All these are subjects that should be further explored to develop the instrument to its full potential.

It is proposed therefore that two principles should be recognised, (1) Sibbing should be linked with the Propaganda Plan of each region. (2) There must be a whole-time specialist at S.O.I. devoting all this time to the study of this valuable and as yet almost unexploited medium, in order to improve its quality. As the expert on Sibbing, he would accompany Brigadier Brooks to the J.I.C. each week to answer queries regarding Sibs presented for approval. The presence of this whole-time technical expert at the J.I.C. would probably be the best way to educate the Foreign Office and the Services to take Sibbing more seriously than they do at present.

(Note:- There are of course, certain types of Sib which are not propaganda Sibs;

in the current production of the U.P. Committee at S.O.I. about 95% of all Sibs created are Propaganda Sibs. But there are a residual 5% which need not be tied into the Propaganda Plans of regions, because they are formed to achieve certain specific results either for the Services or the Foreign Office. In essence they are not concerned with influencing the minds either of the General Staff of the enemy or of the enemy’s governing circles. The expert appointed by S.O.I. to improve the quality of Propaganda Sibs would probably also be the best person to create and draft the Sibs for the Services or the Foreign Office, because he would have more experience in the technique of this medium than anyone else in the country. Through their

163 Barry, John (02.08.1941). Plan for Improving Sib Production. FO 898/70. The National Archives, Kew Sabem que John Barry és l’autor per referència que en fa David Bowes-Lyon en nota a Reginald Leeper (Bowes-Lyon, David (05.08.1941). Nota a Reginald Leeper. FO 898/70. The National Archives, Kew).

També ho confirma Garnett (pàgina 213). L’exemplar del memoràndum de Barry que es conserva als National Archives va, però, sense signatura. Barry era un comandament intermig del SOE, cap d’una àrea sota la responsabilitat del director d’operacions. Cf. Desconegut Organigrama del S.O.E.

164 Llegeixis SO1. És com figura en la resposta que rebrà aquest pla en una carta posterior. Vegeu Hambro Carta a David Bowes-Lyon.

contact with him at the J.I.C., the Services and the Foreign Office would soon realise the value of this expert technical efficiency in creating Sibs for their purposes, and would probably be anxious to give him weekly directives.)

B. Creation of News as Part of Sibbing

Sibs must not be thought of as confined to the very limited province of oral dissemination. Suppose the Head of the German section at S.O.I. decided on grounds of Propaganda policy that it would be a good thing to create all round the world, and in Germany itself, a belief that the Army were about to seize power in Germany, then the function of the Sib expert would be to plan not merely whispers for agents, but, more important still, whole series of plausible stories for the newspapers in the Americas and other neutral areas. He would suggest certain statements to be made on the subject by prominent people in neutral countries, and, perhaps, in this country. He would probably also suggest other schemes –such as an interview with American press representatives by somebody who had just escaped from enemy-occupied territory. All this would be what is technically known as “news creation”, something far wider than oral dissemination. Only if Sib projects are considered in this broad way will the Sib machine ever be developed to its full potential165.

C. Distribution of Sibs

The quickest and surest medium for getting Sibs into enemy or enemy-occupied territories, and the one that ensures them the widest circulation, is the radio. There are three radio channels for getting Sibs into the territories we wish to penetrate: (1) the R.U.s; (2) the open B.B.C., requoting from neutral sources, so as not to damage the reputation of the B.B.C. for veracity; (3) such other broadcast media as we are able to influence.

In a fully developed Sib machine these will always be the most important channels of Sib distribution.

The next most efficient means of Sib distribution is probably that which develops spontaneously once a News Creation campaign is launched. For example, if a News Creation campaign were started in the Americas for some particular Sib project, the news would, to a considerable degree, filter back of itself to enemy or enemy-occupied territories –for example by letters back from America to Europe, by telegrams from press agents back to Europe, through attachés, etc.

But, in addition, it is essential to have agents to plant Sibs for oral distribution on people entering the regions we are trying to influence. It would be useful to have a report on the effectiveness of this method of distribution in the light of the present fluid situation.

One of the most important functions of the U.P.Committee, with the advice of its Sib expert, will be to see that the various channels of distribution, such as those John (20.02.1942). To Mr. Leeper, Mr. Bruce Lockhart, Brigadier Brooks, Mr. David Stephens. FO 898/12.

The National Archives, Kew i Stephens, David (23.02.1942). To Mr. Barry. FO 898/12. The National Archives, Kew).

decide that through the S.O.I. agent in America, a Sib should begin on W.R.U.L. 166 to be quoted on the B.B.C, and later produced on an R.U. (...)167.

Un altre intent de sistematització arriba mig any després de l’escrit de Barry de la mà de David Bowes-Lyon168, que explica a David Stephens, secretari del PWE, el funcionament de l’UP el 7 de febrer de 1942:

(...) The object of propaganda rumours is in no sense to convey the official or semi-official views of H.M.G. by covert means to officials in the countries concerned.

It is rather to induce alarm, despondency and bewilderment among the enemies, and hope and confidence among the friends, to whose ears it comes. If a rumour appears likely to cheer our enemies for the time, it is calculated to carry with it the germs of ultimate and grave disappointment for them.

Rumours vary immensely in their degree of credibility, the wideness of their diffusion and the type of audience for which they are designed; but they have these factors in common, that they are intended for verbal repetition through all sorts of channels, and that they are expected to induce a certain frame of mind in the general public, not necessarily to deceive the well-informed.

(...) It should be emphasised that the method of dissemination is essentially oral, and this is the most difficult form of propaganda for enemy security services to deal with.

Rumours are not deliberately placed in the Press and Radio in Europe, although they have from time to time appeared in the newspapers or broadcasts, having picked up by correspondents or commentators.

In the U.S.A., however, a news agency has been used to place them in the Press of the American continent; but here again the newspapers were quite unaware that the material was in any way inspired.

(...) Rumours are the most covert of all forms of propaganda. Although the enemy may suspect that a certain rumour has been started by the British Government, they can never prove it (...)169.

En un document de desembre de 1942 se situa el rumor com una de les dues maneres clandestines de generar històries, de fer allò que en anglès es diu story-telling:

story-telling may be through rumour or gossip, or by the creation of high grade

“leakages”. The word “leakage” is now in use to mean information communicated

166 Referència a la Christian Science Station (cf. Garnett The Secret History of PWE: The Political Warfare Executive, 1939-1945, pàgina 136).

167 Barry Plan for Improving Sib Production.

168 Bowes-Lyon, David (1902-1961). Germà petit de la Reina Mare. Assistent de Leeper als Country Headquarters. Era press officer del Minitry of Economic Warfare, des d’on va passar a cap de la missió del PWE a Washington entre 1942 i 1944. Lockhart afirma d’ell que tenia molta empenta, una ment fèrtil en idees, habilitat administrativa i coratge i capacitat de prendre decisions. Garnett jutjà negativament la seva tasca als Estats Units.

169 Bowes-Lyon, David (07.02.1942). Political Warfare Executive. Rumours. FO 898/69. The National Archives, Kew.

to the enemy in such a way that it will appear to him to genuine leakage of secret information. It is customary to use “rumour” for low-grade buzz and “leakage” to mean a story passed by a high-grade method with the object of deceiving the enemy’s General Staff170.

Finalment, en un informe anònim de 30 de març de 1943, amb l’experiència de gairebé tres anys de fabricació de rumors, l’UP en fa una descripció succinta.

Defineixen rumor com “news items i) of whose accuracy we are not certain ii) which we have invented”171.

Després de la definició, la qüestió clau: com poden ser efectius?

The effectiveness of our rumours depends on their being accepted as genuine, accurate news and information by those whom they are intended to affect.

Prerequisites for the credibility of rumours are

i) that their source should be considered authoritative on the particular subject of the rumour

and/or

ii) that the rumour should be based on a general truth already accepted by the target of the rumour172.

Tothom havia de complir amb els prerequisits, però les diferents RU podien expressar-se de forma ben diferent:

It is possible for several different R.U.s to work on the same rumour campaign without giving the appearance of collusion –especially if they belong to different regions. The listener’s attention is usually absorbed by the speakers’ political attitude, and provided this is different, it is possible for two R.U.s to spread the same rumour, one attacking and pretesting against the situation reported, the other praising and applauding it, but both reporting the same situation173.

L’objectiu final –the ambition-

is to frame news and rumours in such a way that the Germans believing it and acting on it will act against the interests of their country’s war effort –without necessarily being sympathetic to ours or even indifferent to their own174.

170 Desconegut Memorandum on Deception Organisation and Methods. pàgina 2. Aquest document és de la London Controlling Section. La paraula leakage recorda el projecte de filtracions massives de documents a Internet conegut com Wikileaks.

171 Desconegut (30.03.1943). Most Secret. Political warfare by rumour... FO 898/71. The National Archives, Kew, pàgina 1.

172 Desconegut Ibid., pàgina 1.

173 Desconegut Ibid., pàgina 1.

174 Desconegut Ibid., pàgina 1.

El SOE, en un dels seus cursos d’entrenament fa una altra sistematització sobre la construcció de rumors, que aporta força elements innovadors:

Construction

i. Satisfaction of current mood. A good rumour will appeal to the current desires and feelings –the type of thing people want to hear. It must be timed to fit into the mood. It is useless to spread a defeatist rumour after a German victory or reassuring speech.

ii. Appeal to feelings rather than intellect. Emotional longings (end of war, leave);

confirm suspicions (party orgios, might of allied arms); superstitious instincts (prophecies); pornographic instincts (relations of ...[illegible] and German women);

fears and grievances (bombing, Russian front).

iii. Basis of truth. Mixture of truth and fiction lends plausibility. (E.g. “The news of the R.A.F. bombings has been played down so as no to lower morale” (true)

“because the new explosive they are using is causing widespread nervous breakdowns; the lunatic-asylums are full” (fiction).)

iv. Must not be too long. Easily repeatable and not liable to over-exaggeration.

Danger of figures.

v. Authoritative source. Appears to bear the hall-mark of authority. (E.g. “a police agent told a man I met...”)

vi. Must be dramatic –worthy of repetition. (E.g. “a ward-maid from the Stettin lunatic asylum, who has just come home, says that the inventor of Pervitin shot himself when he discovered that all who take it go slowly mad or become impotent”)175.

L’eficàcia d’aquestes mesures es manifesta en el grau de credibilitat que els rumors obtenen sobre el públic objectiu. I en van tenir, gràcies a aquestes tàctiques i també a la política informativa dels nazis: “German abuse in news services has resulted in considerable success of rumour tactics”176.

Un exemple d’una ràdio clandestina (R.U.) eficaç en la difusió de rumors és Soldatensender Calais. Simulava ser nazi, i –d’acord amb l’opinió expressada en un document intern del Servei de Seguretat del Reichsfuehrer Schutzstaffel (SS) de Munich- va acabar essent font d’informació de referència per a la població bavaresa.

Aquest document de les SS, de 18 de març de 1944, fou descobert pels britànics en acabar la guerra, i van guardar-ne una traducció en els Arxius. Els seus principals passatges il·lustren l’eficàcia de les indicacions teòriques tot just repassades:

175 SOE (01/1944). Methods of Morale Warfare. HS 7/52. The National Archives, Kew, pàgina 3. Els altres mètodes són: Clandestine Newspapers, Tracts, Anonymous Letters, Chain Letter, Slogans, Stickers, Stencils, Fortune Tellings, Sympathetic Conversation i “Isolation” Tactics.

176 Ibid., pàgina 3.

Since October 1943 increasingly frequent references are being made by the population to the transmissions of the radio station which calls itself Soldatensender Calais and concerning whose nationality people were not clear.

The chief effect of the station’s news transmission, which have been described as psychologically excellent, emerges from its practice of giving absolutely unexceptionable information, which has also been carried verbatim in the German News Service and mixing in with it a number of isolated, more or less tendentious items. This has caused large portions of the population to believe that Soldatensender Calais was a German station, perhaps one of the many Soldatensenders started up in the occupied territories also without anything about them being officially communicated to the population. That the reports of the Soldatensender Calais often had a sharpness otherwise nowhere to be found in the German News Service was in some cases explained by the population on the following lines: “After all they cannot present the soldier at the front with the same propaganda as they sell us at home. They have to be more honest with the soldiers at the front”.

(...) Since the New Year observers in Munich and in the provinces point out with all urgency that the transmitter has caused the greatest unrest and confusion among the population by news concerning the situation at the fronts and at home and that the population is showing ever-increasing trust in the station’s news service as its reports have shown themselves more or less correct. There is general agreement that the majority of the opinions expressed among the population concerning the situation at the front are derived from the news of the Sender Calais (...).

Politically responsible observers demand with increasing urgency that action should be taken against this station with all means at our disposal, above all that the population must be enlightened as to its character as an enemy station. As this had not been done so far, the population feels it has the right to listen to the station (...)177

Què és el bon rumor? El rumor, en guerra, és un caramel enverinat. Així el qualificarà Garnett passada la guerra:

The really good sib is a poisoned sweetmeat – it is sugar-coated and the deadly dose is not immediately evident. It will be remembered that early in the war, the Ark Royal was bombed and a GAF [German Air Force] pilot was later decorated for sinking the ship which had, however, only been damaged. Considerably later the Ark Royal was actually sunk. This placed the German Propaganda Ministry in the dilemma of having to repeat its claim or ignore a success. A perfect example of the ideal poisoned sweetmeat sib was then put out by PWE to the effect that both the first and second claims to have sunk the Ark Royal were true, the explanation being that Britain had broken the Anglo-German Naval convention by building a duplicate of the Ark Royal before the war.

The really good sib is a poisoned sweetmeat – it is sugar-coated and the deadly dose is not immediately evident. It will be remembered that early in the war, the Ark Royal was bombed and a GAF [German Air Force] pilot was later decorated for sinking the ship which had, however, only been damaged. Considerably later the Ark Royal was actually sunk. This placed the German Propaganda Ministry in the dilemma of having to repeat its claim or ignore a success. A perfect example of the ideal poisoned sweetmeat sib was then put out by PWE to the effect that both the first and second claims to have sunk the Ark Royal were true, the explanation being that Britain had broken the Anglo-German Naval convention by building a duplicate of the Ark Royal before the war.

In document 1.1.1. Objectius de la recerca (Page 60-67)