La veritat, sagrada; la mentida, ¿legítima?

Dans le document 1.1.1. Objectius de la recerca (Page 51-54)

BRITÀNICA (1939-1945): R UMORS I BBC

2.2.2. La veritat, sagrada; la mentida, ¿legítima?

D’acord amb els Arxius del PWE, el primer d’aquests cursos tingué lloc el 1943118. La primera de totes les lliçons que es conserven és la de Propaganda to the Enemy, a càrrec de A. R. Walmsley. Enumera unes regles d’or de la propaganda, que recorden el manual de l’any 1938, i són:

- Ocultació de l’objecte (“Concealment of object”): “your enemy is far less likely to do what you want him to do if he sees that you want him to do it”

- Ocultació de l’origen (“Concealment of origin”): “your enemy is far less likely to do what you want him to do if he sees that it is you who want him to do it”

- Màxima autoritat (“Maximum Authority”): “attribute what you are saying to the highest authority you can find”

- Màxima aparença de veritat (“Maximum appearance of truth”): “keep the appearance of propaganda out of your news” i “propaganda should not look like propaganda”

- Màxim interès per l’audiència, màxim valor de repetició (“Maximum Interest:

maximum repetition-value”): “The best propagandist for us is the enemy himself”

- Màxima freqüència (“Maximum frequency”)

Totes aquestes regles es resumeixen en dues regles generals:

- “Never think only on the primary effect”

- “Never think about propaganda in metaphors”119

117 Tingué lloc entre el 13 de març i l’1 d’abril de 1944. Cf. PWE Training School (1944). First Anglo-american Brondesbury Course [carpeta]. FO 898/100. The National Archives, Kew.

118 La reunió del Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee de dimarts 29 de desembre de 1942 s’informa d’un memoràndum presentat pel PWE on es parla de la PWE Training School, que s’havia establert (Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee (29.12.1942). Minutes of a Meeting... HS 8/307. The National Archives, Kew).

119 Totes les cites provenen de Walmsley, A. R. (28.04.1943). Propaganda to the enemy. FO 898/99. The National Archives, Kew L’enumeració es repeteix, amb paraules molt similars, a Maschwitz, A. E.

Weapons of Political Warfare: Broadcasting (Elementary Lecture). FO 898/99. The National Archives, Kew.

Però, ¿Com fer compatible aquesta aspiració amb la presència constatable de difusió d’engany per mitjà de les activitats dirigides pel mateix PWE? L’equilibri el troba el redactor d’unes notes per a una lliçó sobre escriptura propagandística:

Truth and Falsity

The general rule to follow on this topic is the exact opposite of the view which some people have that propaganda consist in manufacture of lies for political purposes. People who hold this view are probably thinking chiefly of the German propaganda machine. But even in this case the view is wrong. German propaganda is always built on some foundation of fact. Moreover, German propaganda is essentially opportunist; apart from the job of building up a fanatical national spirit inside Germany itself, its chief aim has been to divide, weaken and demoralise communities outside Germany. Allied propaganda -both long- and short-term- is in the main constructive, and works within the framework of a general policy –that of liberating the occupied countries and restoring democratic rights, and, however vaguely this may be conceived, establishing a co-operative world of free peoples.

Since this is its aim, Allied propaganda must begin by gaining -and deserving- the good faith of its listeners and readers. Therefore, even in exploiting a particular opportunity, falsehood should always be avoided. This is not a question of morality so much as a question of expedience. If your friends once lost faith in you, you would be useless as a propagandist, and the only way of ensuring that this does not happen is not to tell lies. Therefore, with one exception, your propaganda should never contain falsehoods, however tempting the use of these may be at a particular time. Even where facts are particularly difficult or depressing, it is much wiser to face up to them boldly and to interpret them -in the light of long-standing factors and deep-rooted hopes and convictions- in such a way that your readers can feed:

“Well, we know the worst. At least we have been told the truth, and difficult though the situation is, there is still a way out of it”.

Propaganda to the enemy, however, is more opportunist than propaganda to one’s friends: it is more like a series of tricks, blows in the dark, false-friendly approaches –followed by let-downs. It is, in fact, the equivalent (in words and reports and rumours) of guerrilla warfare. And this has a bearing on the factors of truth and falsity. The one rule in dealing with the enemy is not to be found out.

Never state as a fact anything which he can prove to be untrue. Plausibility is essential. Remember that the best way to put across a lie is on the back of a truth.120

En aquest sentit, alguns professors no tenen inconvenient en ensenyar pràctiques manifestament desinformadores. El Major A. E. Maschwitz, per exemple, va donar una lliçó sobre emissions radiofòniques clandestines121, conegudes en el llenguatge intern del PWE com Research Units (RU)122. Era l’activitat negra que posteriorment tindria més anomenada. En un document intern, eren definides així:

120 Desconegut (02.1944). Reference Notes for Lecture 3: Propaganda Writing. FO 898/101. The National Archives, Kew, pàgina 2.

121 Maschwitz Weapons of Political Warfare: Broadcasting (Elementary Lecture).

122 Cf. Garnett The Secret History of PWE: The Political Warfare Executive, 1939-1945, pàgina 33.

An R.U. is a shortwave broadcasting station, which, though situated in Great Britain, and controlled by P.W.E. in accordance with the current policy of H.M.G., purports, implicitly or explicitly, to be working in the country which it addresses, in the circumstances of danger and difficulty which such a situation would entail. Its special appeal to an authority with its audience derive in large part from this fiction123.

Entre aquestes ràdios clandestines es trobava, per exemple, una que suposadament emetia des d’Alemanya els discursos d’un capellà catòlic que parlava sis dies a la d’aquells anys, i això es dedueix també del material que es conserva en els Arxius126. Les seves emissores clandestines “were greatly feared and respected by the German authorities”127.

En un d’aquests cursos del PWE, el que feia número 9, un professor de nom mr. Jaffé impartí una lliçó sobre “Rumour”. Malauradament, no se’n conserven els apunts128. Sí que es conserva una referència a rumors en una classe de Walmsley:

One of the greatest successes of propaganda is to make the enemy pass on our own message as if it originated in himself. Hence the violent attacks by Dr Goebbels on the “rumor-mongers” in Germany who spread stories derived from the B.B.C.

123 Cf. Desconegut (08.04.1943). R.U's for Occupied Countries. FO 898/65. The National Archives, Kew, pàgina 1. Per un resum de les RUs posades en marxa i el número de programes emesos vegeu Howe The black game: British subversive operations against the Germans during the Second World War, pàgines 267-272.

124 Lockhart i Young The diaries of Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart (1939-1965), pàgina 26.

125 Delmer, Sefton (1904-1979). Nascut a Berlin de pares australians i educat a Alemanya i a Oxford.

Treballà en el Daily Express de Lord Beaverbrook’s des del 1927. Cap de la delegació a Berlin d’aquest diari entre 1928 i 1933. Va ser el primer periodista britànic en entrevistar Hitler. Reporter durant la Guerra Civil espanyola (1936-38). Reclutat el 1940 pel SOE per a bastir la xarxa d’emissores clandestines i difondre falsos rumors en territoris ocupats per l’enemic. Reporter d’afers internacionals del Daily Express entre 1945 i 1959.

126 Vegeu, per exemple, la carta de Major General Alec Bishop, director general adjunt del PWE –sota les ordres de Lockhart- amb ocasió de la finalització de les activitats de propaganda negra, el 1945: Bishop, Alec (30.04.1945). Carta a Sefton Delmer. FO 898/61. The National Archives, Kew. En una carta posterior, el mateix Bishop afirma que Delmer ocupava, en acabar la guerra, el càrrec de director d’Special Operations.

127 Rushbrooke, E. G. N. (20.05.1945). Carta a sir Robert Bruce Lockhart. FO 898/61. The National Archives, Kew.

128 Cf. PWE Training School (1944). Syllabus for Course No. 9. FO 898/100. The National Archives, Kew La sessió estava prevista pel dia 18 de setembre, a les 9 hores.

Investigations, like those of Professor Bartlett, into the form in which rumours get passed on, tell us, as indeed common-sense alone would do, that a “story” if it is to live must be couched in the terms and written in the framework familiar to the group in which it is to be spread129.

Dans le document 1.1.1. Objectius de la recerca (Page 51-54)