Dans cette thèse, nous avons formulé un certain nombre de propositions ayant pour objet l'amélioration du marché des bois bruts et, avec lui, la compétitivité de la lière forestière française. La nécessité d'une modernisation de ces marchés ne fait aucun doute. Cependant, celle-ci ne saurait, à elle seule, solutionner les problèmes que connaît au-jourd'hui la lière bois. L'inquiétude exprimée par les acteurs de cette industrie quant à l'allocation de la ressource (et qui s'étend par conséquent aux mécanismes qui l'assurent) est d'autant plus forte que la disponibilité de cette dernière apparaît incertaine à moyen terme. Or, comme nous l'avons souligné dans le premier chapitre, la majorité des bois qui sont consommés par l'aval sont issus des forêts publiques. Avec plus des deux tiers de la surface forestière française, il est évident que les dicultés suscitées par la mobilisation des bois ne sauraient trouver de réponse sans la participation des propriétaires privés. An de solutionner les problèmes de compétitivité que connaît la lière, l'amélioration de ses marchés amont doit donc être complétée par une importante réexion autour de l'organisation de l'ore privée. Sur ce point notre travail de thèse propose succinctement un certain nombre d'éléments, notamment à travers le benchmark allemand, qui pourront nourrir de futurs travaux.
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