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Muhammad Shaaban, S. (1995). The metamorphosis of power in the Middle East after peace with Israël (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). Université libre de Bruxelles, Faculté des sciences sociales, politiques et économiques, Bruxelles.

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UNIVERSITE LIBRE DE BRUXELLES

Faculté des Sciences Sociales, Politiques et Economiques

Section des Sciences Politiques

THE METAMORPHOSIS OF POWER m THE MTODLE EAST

AFTER PEAGE WITH ISRAËL

S. MUHAMMAD SHAABAN

Dissertation présenté en vue de l'obtention du

"Doctorat en Sciences Politiques - Relations Internationales"

Sous la direction du Professeur Robert Anciaux

UNIVERSITE LIBRE DE BRUXELLES

Faculté des Sciences Sociales, Politiques et Economiques

Section des Sciences Politiques

THE METAMORPHOSIS OF POWER JN THE MIDDLE EAST

AFTER PEAGE WTTH ISRAËL

S. MUHAMMAD SHAABAN

Dissertation présenté en vue de l'obtention du

"Doctorat en Sciences Politiques - Relations Internationales"

-

Sous la direction du Professeur Robert Anciaux

INDEX

INTRODUCTION CHAPTER ONE

CHAPTER TWO CHAPTER THREE CHAPTER FOUR CHAPTER FIVE 199

CHAPTER SIX

CHAPTER SEVEN CHAPTER EIGHT CHAPTER NINE CHAPTER TEN

CHAPTER ELEVEN CHAPTER TWELVE

Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations after the Accord of Oslo

Jordano-Israeli Peace Treaty The Syrian-Israeli Impasse

Multilatéral Negotiations

Casablanca Economie Summit and Prospects of Middle East Régional Co-operation

The Metamorphosis of Power in the Middle East and the Rôle of Foreign Powers

Egypt Iran Turkey

Saudi Arabia and Gulf Co-operation Council States

Israël

Prospects of Post-Peace Relationships in the Middle East

CHAPTER THlRTEEN Conclusion

1

37 98 132 162

244 309 374 415

450 487

566

626

ANNEXES: 1- Framework of Peace in The Middle East (The Camp David Accords)

2- Déclaration of Principles On Intérim Self- Government Arrangements (Oslo Accord)

and the Exchanged Letters

3- Agreement on the Gaza Strip and The Jéricho Area

4- Treaty of Peace Between The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and The State of Israël 5- Israeli-Palestinian Intérim Agreement On the

West Bank And The Gaza Strip (Oslo Two) 6- Joint Communique of the Arab Summit

Conférence (Cairo, 21-23 June 1996)

CHAPTER SEVEN

E G Y P T

"No more wars" was the famous call in 1977

by President Al-Sadat, a pledge which has been

honoured by Egypt ever since and which was the

real start of peace between Israël and its Arab

neighbours. Al-Sadat's "shock diplomacy", his

decision to visit the Arabs' arch enemy, Israël,

in its den, in Jérusalem, and to address the

Knesset, offering the olive branch, were acts of

political acxxmen and rare insight which hâve

proven that he was ahead of his time by at least

fifteen years.

President Husni Mubarak came to power in

1981 and confirmed since the first day that

Egypt would honour its Ccunp David commitments.

He pursued calm and wise diplomacy to bring

Egypt back to Arab folds after it had been

ostracised because of concluding a peace treaty

with Israël. By late 1989, Egypt had regained

its leadership rôle in the Arab world; Arab

réconciliation was almost complété except for

Syrien-Iraq! relations and President Mvibarak was

working on that when Saddam Hussayn upset ail

aspirations and calculations by invading a

"sister" Arab country, Kuwait. The Iraqi

invasion of Kuwait put the entire Arab nation in

an unprecedented predicament. It suddenly upset

ail the principles, values and norms entrenched

in inter-Arab relations. The Iraqi invasion put

the entire région on the brink of an abyss and

thus posed grave dangers to the entire Arab

order and the future of Arab solidarity.

At the domestic level, the governing System

has shifted from one-party authoritarian rule to

limited démocratisation since the mid-1970s

permitting the relatively open expression of

views on domestic and international issues.

Egypt shifted towards the rule of law under

President Mubarak, but executive control remains

tight. The contradictions inhérent in the

concept of "democracy in doses" may undennine

efforts to extend political reform.

"Power remains tightly held by the

executive which utilises the dominant political

party, the rsunified bureaucracy, and pervasive

security organs to implement and enforce its

policies... Mubarak has emphasised the

importance of the rule of law on the basis of

the constitution. He has upheld freedom of the

press and multiparty political process.

Nevertheless, démocratisation has distinct

limits. Military and security forces remain the

key institutions underpinning the régime".si

The Gulf war was one of the reasons

besides the breakdovm of the Soviet Union and

the end of the cold war, which had moved the

Middle East peace process forward. Egypt was at

the forefront, together with the United States,

in mediating between the Arab countries and

Israël to begin negotiations in earnest with a

view to concluding peace agreements between

Israël and each of its Arab neighbours. With the

signing of the Déclaration of Principles between

the FLO and Israël, the latter began to push for

régional économie intégration even before any

progress in the negotiations on the Syrian,

Jordanian or Lebanese tracks.

Since September 1993, there hâve been

lively discussions in Egypt, among

intellectuels, partisans and politicians, about

the "Middle East System", the "Middle East

Common Market", and what has corne to be known as

"Middle Easternism", suspected by a majority of

Arab çpiarters to be a new entity intended to

supplant "Arab Nationalism" espoused and

initiated by President Abdul-Nassir of Egypt in

the fifties. Scores of seminars and workshops

hâve been held to debate this new call by

Israël, nurtured by the United States and

encouraged by the Européen Union.

The continuing heated debate in Egypt on

"Middle Easternism" boils down to three

conflicting trends of thought;

1- The first trend siabmits that discarding

the sensitivities of the past is possible and it

calls for a new language of discourse which

influences and is influenced by the new peace

environment, not only through passive

acguiescence in the fait accompli but also

through a positive ambition which envisages the

possibility of absorbing Israël in the Arab

cultural arena. This approach, advocates of this

trend argue, will mitigate the political

aggressiveness which accompanies Israël's dream

of expansion and of "Greater Israël".

2- The second trend can be described as

isolationist and pessimist. It argues that

Israël has existed as a spearhead o£ world

économie monopolies, thus leading overall

actions and controlling the rhythm o£ Arab

response so that it may be mere reactions

calculated beyond its free will.

3- The third trend siibmits that Israël is

torn between its Western-oriented cultural

affiliations and its Arab geo-strategie

situation. Hence, an Arab forceful reality can

impose its options so that a non-passive, maybe

an active interaction with Israël, will be

possible within a technical framework that does

not bypass the parameters of Arab culture. Such

a pattern of relationship présupposés that

certain conditions will hâve to précédé this

interaction naunely, an Arab political and

économie solidarity, promotion of democracy in

Arab States and setting the pace of peace phases

and Arab positions in such a way that will

prevent Israël from penetrating an Arab unified

position on a comprehensive settlement of the

Arab-Israeli conflict.

As development s hâve shown, a mixture of

the first and third trends has been pursued,

tempered now and then, forward or backward, by

developments of negotiations between Israël and

each of Syria and the Palestinien authority.

Jordan has signed a peace treaty with Israël and

is going for full normal relations with it in

ail fields. As for Egypt, it has been following

a middle course: moving from "cool peace" with

Israël to more normalisation and more co-

operation in bilateral infrastructure.

agricultural and gas projects. both by the

government and the private sector, and

insistence that full normalisation and régional

co-operation towards a "Middle East System"

should only begin after comprehensive peace has

been achieved. Egypt also insista that the

envisaged System should cover the, political,

security and économie orders.

As far as the Middle East peace process is

concerned, Egypt continues its constructive

efforts, as a régional power, as an Arab

country, and as a country that maintains normal

relations with Israël and the United States and

good relations with Arab countries, to assist

ail parties to reach comprehensive peace in the

Middle East, based on Security Council

resolutions 242 and 338 and on the principle of

"land for peace". For Egypt, comprehensive peace

can only be achieved on the basis of this

principle which ensures Israël's withdrawal from

the Arab territories occupied in 1967, including

East Jérusalem, enables the Palestinien people

to réalisé self-détermination and guarantees

security for ail peoples in the région. An

essential component of comprehensive peace

should be Israël's withdrawal from South Lebanon

in accordance with Security Council resolution

425.

Towards this end, Egypt has made spécial

efforts and contacted ail parties concerned in

support of the Palestinien Authority in ail

fields, including timely disbursement of

international financial assistance to the

Palestinien Authority and Territories and the

speedy redeployment of Israeli forces out of

Gaza and the West Bank and the holding of

élections in the Palestinien Territories. Egypt

is egually in close contact with ail parties

with a view to accelerating progress on the

bilateral tracks of negotiation. Egypt also

participâtes actively in the meetings of the

multilatéral working groups on refugees, the

environment, water, économie co-operation and

arms limitation.

At the Economie Summit in Casablanca (3 0

October-1 November 1994), Egypt made clear that

comprehensive peace and co-operation in the

Middle East are governed by three factors;

1- A just and comprehensive settlement of

the Arab-Israeli conflict on the basis of the

principles of the Madrid Conférence.

2- Peace requires military balance in the

Middle East, the création of a zone free from

ail weapons of mass destruction in the région

and agreed egual and comprehensive arrangements

on arms limitation to which ail countries of the

région should be committed.

3- After comprehensive peace is achieved,

the Middle East should work diligently for an

économie development that should benefit ail its

peoples.

As far as Egypt's relations with the Arab

countries are concerned. Egyptien foreign policy

pays maximum attention to the attainment of Arab

solldarity based on authentic Arab traditions.

This objective is the essence of Egypt ' s Arab

policy and it guides ail its moves and

positions. To achieve this objective, Egypt

follows several paths which converge towards

this lofty goal:

1- Establishing a new pattern of bilateral

relations with Arab States: Egypt views the

development and enhancement of bilateral

relations as the cornerstone of the Arab

multilatéral édifice. Egyptian diplomacy has

worked to knit these relations into regulated

contractual frames through joint committees that

cover wide and varied areas of bilateral co­

opération: political, économie, trade, financial

and technical, thus opening the door for

businessmen and entrepreneurs to participate

actively in the development of these relations.

Egypt is thus placed on the threshold of a new

era in which it is linked to Arab States with a

closely-knit, concrète, multi-faceted and

unprecedented fabric of reciprocal interests in

practical terms to ensure the welfare of ail

Arab peoples and to translate emotional and

cultural unity into intimate forms of modem

civilised exchange s.

2- Harnessing Arab collective action;

Despite the crack in Arab solidarity produced by

the Gulf war, Egypt has not lost its enthusiasm

but increased its efforts to reinforce the

League of Arab States and update its Charter and

to settle Arab différences under the éunbit of

the League.

3 - Development of the Arab League and

enhancement of Arab solidarity: Egypt believes

that collective action should be based on true

Arab values and principles of righteousness, law

and legitimacy. The Dékmascus Déclaration was

inspired by the need to assert good neighbourly

relations. respect of the sovereignty and

territorial integrity of States, non-

intervention in internai affaire of others, the

obligation to résolve international conflicts by

peaceful means, rej action of use or threat of

force, respect of the right of States to

sovereignty over their natural resources and

considering économie growth as an intégral part

of comprehensive Arab security since it

constitutes an indispensable condition for

political and social stability.

4- Steady and alert action to liguidate ail

spots of tension, to résolve conflicts and

overcome difficulties, whether through bilateral

action, international multilatéral co-operation

or régional and international organisations.

The Arab world was surprised when it

suddenly saw a new direction of Egyptien foreign

policy demonstrated by a diplomatie move towards

the Arab Maghrib. In November 1994, Egypt was

invited, at its own reguest, to attend the 16th

meeting of the foreign ministers of the Arab

Maghrib Union. Then, Egypt applied to join the

Union as 'observer'. The move raised varions

régional and international reactions. The

surprise also baffled the media, political

parties and intellectuals in Egypt. Several

questions were raised about the reasons, the

timing and the possible repercussions and

résulta of the new Egyptien direction.

Reactions to the Egyptien move reflected

three main trends:

1- A reserved trend which argues that the

expérience o£ sub-régional groupings in the Arab

World has shown that they usuelly end in failure

or at best remain iinable to implement the

objectives set out in their respective statutes.

According to the advocates of this trend, the

expérience of the Arab Maghrib Union is no

exception to this rule. Despite the elapse of

seven years since its establishment, the Maghrib

Union has achieved nothing in coping with common

issues such as acute économie crises,

accumulated foreign debt or growing extremist

and terrorist currents. Worse still is the fact

that tensions and disputes between its members

threaten the very existence of the Union. The

advocates of this trend suggest that Egypt had

better focus on consolidating its bilateral

relations with each and every Arab country. Such

course o£ action would strengthen Egypt's

position and make it a pôle which attracts ail

Arab countries to it.

2- An opposing trend which interprets the

Egyptien move as an extension of the policy of

axes at a time when Arab-Arab relations need

réconciliation between its parties. They add

that Egypt's status as merely an observer and

not as a full member of the Union compromises

Egypt's political, historical and cultural

weight in the Arab world. They say this move

will be at the expense of the Arab League and of

attempts to reactivate its rôle. They regard the

Egyptian move as a vaçfue reaction to# or a

disappointment at graduai attempts by Arab Gulf

States to renege on the Damascus Déclaration.

3- A supportive trend which regards Egypt

as part of North Africa and as a géographie

extension of the Maghrib with prospects for

close économie co-operation and co-ordination of

policies to deal with increasing extremism and

terrorism in that sxxb-region. Advocates believe

that the Egyptian direction is a positive step

towards strengthening the Western flank of

Egyptian diplomacy in view of the spécial

attention given to the Maghrib by European

countries and common security concerna in the

two sub-regions. They further argue that there

is no conflict between the new direction and the

rôle of the Arab League, specially that the Arab

League Charter encourages svib-régional Arab

groupings as they can bolster collective Arab

solidarity which is one of its objectives.

In the Arab world, the eighties witnessed

the establishment of three sub-regional groupe:

Gulf Co-opérâtion Council (GCC) in May 1981,

Arab Co-operation Council (Egypt, Iraq, Jordan

and Yemen) in February 1989 and Arab Maghrib

Union (Algeria, Mauritania, Morocco, Libya and

Tunisia) also in February 1989. Then in 1991,

following the Gulf War, the Damascus Déclaration

was signed. The circiunstances in which each of

those groupings was established defined the

objectives that member States would seek to

achieve. This was the criterion that led a

certain country to join a spécifie grouping and

not another. The priorities of each of those

groupings led to wide différences between the

orientation of each, rendering them more

compétitive than intégral. The priorities of the

Arab Co-operation Council, for excunple, were the

consolidation of the capabilities of Arab

security against présent and future threats,

then came the promotion of commercial exchange

and the freedom o£ labour movement. The Arab

Maghrib Union aimed at creating an économie bloc

to deal with the European Conununity. The

priorities o£ the Déunascus Déclaration were to

reach a kind of collective régional security.

As spécifie circumstances or conditions

changed, the rationale behind a given grouping

was no longer viable. So, it either collapsed,

as was the case o£ the Arab Co-operation Council

after the invasion by Iraq of Kuwait, or it was

thrown in the throes of death as is the case of

the Damascus Déclaration until recently.

Several developments hâve taken place,

régional ly and international ly, and led to a

change in the political map and régional

balances in the Middle East. The collapse of the

Soviet Union has left the United States as the

only superpower which began to rearrange the

international stage according to defined

criteria. The United States has managed over the

past few years to size down the rôle o£ Europe,

to curb Japan, to try to tame China and to

impose an international hegemony under the cover

of UN legality. To the Middle East, the United

States has brought the idea o£ a "Middle East

System" to be accepted and implemented in the

post-peace era and to cope with the growing

pattern o£ large économie blocs. The direct

e££ect o£ this System is the dissolution o£ the

Arab world into a larger new entity including

neighbouring States. I£ the strategie goal o£

Great Powers in the past was "to split the

Arabs", that goal has been adapted to be

"dissolving the Arabs". Some even believe that

in a Corning stage, the goal will be to abolish

the Arab System which has existed since 1945 and

consequently to relegate Egypt's leading rôle.

Within such a scénario, Egypt's decision to join

the Arab Maghrib Union would aim at asserting

its leading rôle, while rejecting any attempt to

dissolve the Arab entity, through revitalising

the Union as a component of a larger Arab

grouping, the Arab League.

The conséquences of the peace process on

inter-Arab relations and the "blind rush" or

"panting" by some Arab countries to normalise

fully with Israël has angered several Arab

coxintries which advocate waiting until

comprehensive peace is achieved. The Egyptien

position at the Casablanca and Amman conférences

that the establishment of a Middle East économie

community cornes after comprehensive peace is

achieved echoes this Arab feeling. It was no

coincidence that Egypt's decision to join the

Maghrib Union came only weeks after the

Casablanca Conférence. Again, the idea of a

"Benelux" between Israël, Jordan and the

Palestinien Territories, and perhaps at a later

stage, Lebanon and even Syria, makes some

believe that Israël wants eventually to demolish

Arab foundatlon atones in the Mashriq which

constitute a militarily advanced sub-region

comprising Egypt, Syria and Iraq. Egypt's

decision to join the Maghrib Union can also be

read as an attempt to instil new life in that

Union so that it can become a strong Arab

grouping which would attract other neighbouring

Arab countries in order to abort any Israeli

attempt to create non-Arab sub-groupings.

Another fallout of the peace process is

the possible décliné in the spécial US-Eçryptian

relations. This vision is based on the fact that

US aid to Egypt was committed to help maintain

the Camp David Accords. Since the scope of the

peace process has expanded to include several

other Arab countries, it is naturel that Egypt's

share of this aid will be reduced as the number

of récipient co\intries in the région will

increase. Furthermore, the new Congress with a

Republican majority was expected to review US

foreign aid according to new criteria which

sooner or later would reduce Egypt's share. The

Egyptien direction could then be interpreted as

an attempt to strengthen Egyptien-Européen

relations to balance Egyptian-US relations in

order to offset any losses. This could be

achieved through the bilateral Egyptien-Européen

level (concluding a new bilateral association

agreement). At the multilatéral level, it could

be achieved through the Maghrib Union and the

European-Mediterranean forxims.

Moreover, the Maghrib région is witnessing

a growing Islamic extremist current in Algérie,

Mauritanie, Morocco, Tunisie and Libye (with

Sudan as its alleged centre) at varying degrees.

Since the Maghrib is the géographie extension of

Egypt and it lies within the immédiate scope of

Egypt's national security, it is believed that

another goal for Egypt's joining of the Union is

its increasing conviction that fighting

extremlsm and terrorism is a collective

responsibility of the coimtries of the snb-

region. The optimiim vehicle to confront this

current would be the Union with its présent

legal institutions.

One tends to believe that Egypt ' s move to

join the Maghrib Union has not been triggered by

its despair of the Mashrig or the Gulf. Egyptien

national security is indivisible and does not

distinguish between the s\ib-regions of the

Middle East. Egypt has major interests in the

Mashrig and Gulf sub-regions: some two million

Egyptiens work in those two sub-regions and they

are a major source of Egyptien national income

as represented by their remittances to their

feunilies and their investments in Egypt. Egypt's

interests in the Maghrib are also vital:

opportxinities for close économie intégration,

consolidation of Arab-European relations and the

presence o£ one and a half million Egyptlans In

Maghrlb countrles.

The mlnl-Arab summlt between Egypt, Saudl

Arable and Syrla In Alexandrie In December 1994

réfutés any allégations that Egypt "Is golng

West" at the expense o£ the East. As explalned

In a prevlous chapter, the mlnl-s\jmmlt almed at

a pan-Arab réconciliation and the strengthenlng

o£ the umbrella Arab régional organisation, the

Arab League. Two other Arab mlnl-siammlts between

Egypt, Jordan and the Palestinien Authorlty on 5

Jvine 1996 and between Egypt, Saudl Arable and

Syrla two days later and then a pan-Arab siimmlt

In the same month, were meant to enlarge the

scope o£ Arab réconciliation and co-ordlnatlon

and to form a unlfled front In view of the

vlctory of a Llkud-led government In Israël wlth

expected tougher positions on peace negotlatlons

wlth Arab countrles.

Egypt'B attempts to hâve normal and good

neighbourly relations with Iran hâve not been

successful. Desplte several bilateral meetings

between the foreign ministers of the two

countries in the margin of UN General Assembly

in New York or of meetings of the Organisation

of Islamic Countries (OIS), the Iranien domestic

power struggle has obstructed normalisation.

Although Egypt acknowledges Iran's interests in

the Gulf as a major régional power, it does not

condone Iran's occupation of three United Arab

Emirates islands or Iran's recruitment and

training of and financial support to terrorist

Afghan Arabs, especially Egyptiens, to carry out

terrorist and subversive acts in their

respective coxintries on Iran's behalf. "Egypt is

totally against Iran's policy of exporting

révolution to other Middle East Muslim countries

or its attempts to fill the vacu\xm in the Gulf,

after Iraq's defeat, at the^^expense^of^ its-Arab—

Gulf neighbours

Since the Gulf War, and more specifically

after the breakdown of the Soviet Union and the

end of Turkey's rôle as the buffer against

Commvinist spread in the Middle East, Turkey has

opened up to its major actors; Egypt, Israël and

Saudi Arabia. Exchanged visits between Egyptian

and Turkish leaders and senior officiais took

place, specially during 1994, as a

reconfirmation by Turkey of its Middle East

affiliation and an attempt to balance off its

often tense and uncertain relations with Iran

and Syria. Turkey has also intensified trade,

investment and joint ventures with Egypt.

Egypt maintains good and friendly relations

with most co\intries of the world in ail

continents. Its relations with Africa are strong

and they date bâck to pr e - iïid^^ndence when'

almost ail African libération movements had

offices in Cairo. Egypt offers technical

assistance to some thirty-five African countries

in the form of experts in économie,

agricultural, educational and health fields.

President Mxibarak was elected as Chairman of the

Organisation of African Unity (OAU) twice within

four years, a precedent in OAU history and a

proof of the confidence of African countries in

Egypt and its policies in the interest of the

Continent.

Egypt also maintains good political and

économie relations with Asian and Latin American

co\intries, most of which are members of the

Group of 77 and the Non-Aligned Movement. It has

particularly sought to benefit from the

expérience of Asian industrialising tigers in

économie and industrial development.

The Mëâi terranean rëgi^ ' is ^one~of 'Egypt ' s

three main strategie depths (besides the Arab

and Middle East dimensions). President Mubarak's

proposai in 1991, before the European Parliament

in Strasbourg, to establish a Mediterranean

forum from the covintries on both sides of the

Sea echoed the importance Egypt attaches to its

Mediterranean affiliation. The Mediterranean

Forum ceume into being in July 1994 when ten

foreign ministers of European and Arab

Mediterranean countries met in Alexandrie to

launch the Forum. The first formai ministerial

conférence of the Forum was held in France in

March 1995 with more new member States

participating. The Forum is intended to be a

mechanism for dialogue and co-operation between

its members in political, économie, security and

environmental fields.

Egypt*s relations with European Union

member States date back to the nineteenth

c en t U r ÿ\ Egypt ma în ta i li s a t r ong p oli t i c al—and-

economic relations with ail European Union

members and it has sought to further strengthen

those relations by negotiating a new

association agreement with the Union for the

establishment of free trade within a Euro-

Mediterranean free trade area. Egypt also counts

on the Union's support of the Middle East peace

process and its active participation in régional

économie co-operation efforts.

Egypt has traditionally maintained strong

political, military and trade relations with

East European countries and since the end of the

cold war, it has sought to renew trade,

scientific and économie co-operation agreements

with ail East and Central European States

except Fédéral Yugoslavia because of its

position of the Bosnien crisis.83

us - Egy^ïân relations hâve gone through-

several ups and downs slnce the fifties. When

Gamal Abdul-Nassir led Egypt's révolution

agalnst the monarchy and Brltish colonlalism in

July 1952, he sought to build bridges with the

United States. Things worked ont for a few

years, the peak of which was démonstrated when

Eisenhower warned the British, the French and

the Israelis to withdraw from Sinai after the

"tripartite aggression" took place against Egypt

following Abdul-Nassir's nationalisation of the

Suez Canal in 1956. However, when Egypt refused

to join Western endeavours to establish military

alliances in the Middle East, such as the

Baghdad Pact in 1955, and because of Abdul-

Nassir's call for Arab Nationalism "from the

Atlantic to the Gulf", the United States turned

against Egypt and pressured the World Bank not

to finance the Aswan High Dam which Abdul-Nassir

considered as a major project in the interest of

Egypt's economy. Abdul-Nassir was never a

COTmvuîîisôr a Màrxist, but Re was obliged to

turn to the Soviet Union to seek arms and

finances for the High Dam. Since that time, US-

Egyptian relations became at their lowest ebb

vintil 1975. However, the US losses were far

greater than Egypt's. The Soviet Union managed,

through its friendship with Egypt, to infiltrate

in several Arab and African countries when the

United States was still suffering from the

Vietnam syndrome and the hésitation by any US

President to send American troops on missions in

foreign countries.

US-Egyptien relations went through an

upturn in the mid-seventies after the 1973 war

between Egypt and Israël and the decision by Al-

Sadat to re-normalise relations with the United

States and to negotiate a peace treaty with

Israël. The Camp David accords in 1978 and the

Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israël in 1979

were a turning point in US-Egyptian relations.

The Iranian révolution in rate~’i979-and -the end -

of the Shah's régime increased Egypt's strategie

importance as a major régional power. President

Carter "rewarded" Israël and Egypt by granting

both the largest portion of US foreign aid ($

3.2 billion and $ 2.2 billion annually

respectively) in military and économie

assistance. The honeymoon lasted throughout Al-

Sadat's rule until President Miibarak ceune to

power in 1981.

President Mvibarak was a cadet at the Air

Force Academy when Abdul-Nassir was the Symbol

o£ Egyptian nationalism and patriotism.

"Charisma" was an epithet attributed to few

leaders such as Nehru and Abdul-Nassir. Mubarak

has always been likened to Abdul-Nassir in his

straightforwardness, sense of righteousness and

staunch patriotism. The United States wrongly

believed that Mubarak could be a US lackey and

it began to test him through a wrong move. I

personaliy remember â secret meeting in l'982

between the US Assistant Secretary of State for

the Middle East Nicolas Valiotis and Usséuna Al-

Baz, the political adviser of Presidents Al-

Sadat and Mubarak. I attended this meeting at

Abdeen Presidential Palace where the American

délégation included military top brass and CIA

officiais. They came with a blue print for a US

military base to be established at Ras Benas

which is close to the Gulf and Iran. Al-Baz

listened for three hours to the présentation of

the US délégation whose plan for a base included

pre-positioning of military equipment, a

skeleton permanent US force and a closed base

with no admission to Egyptian army officers.

After attentive listening by Al-Baz and

bewildered Egyptian azoned forces and

intelligence représentatives, Al-Baz, on behalf

of President Mubarak, lashed out at the head of

the American délégation while cordially calling

him by his first name. Al-Baz said that Egypt

was not a~ÛS prôtectorate or ëv^n an ally. Egypt

was a friend but it had its own interests and it

was strange that the US expected Egypt to

approve the establishment of a US military base

on its territory while it had denied that to the

Soviet Union despite the latter's invaluable

support to Egypt for over twenty years.

Al-Baz also chided the US for not

appreciating correctly the psychology of the

Egyptien people who would vehemently reject such

a blatant intrusion. He further explained that

it was only one year before that time that Al-

Sadat had been assassinated and that Islamic

extremist anti-US undercurrents were lurking. He

also made clear that Egypt's consistent policy

had been the rejection of any military alliances

or axes in the Middle East.

The head of the US délégation produced a

copy of a le t ter sent by President Al-Sadat to

President CaFter âbdûtT Egypt's~wiriingness to-

provide ail "facilities" to the United States

"in emergency circumstances". Al-Baz replied

that Egypt would honour any commitment made by

an Egyptian head of State but that the United

States had either misread or misinterpreted Al-

Sadat's letter which Al-Baz himself had been

instructed to draft. There was a great

différence between "facilities" and "a military

base". Egypt had granted facilities to the

United States when it wanted to moxint an

operation in Téhéran to liberate US hostages at

the US embassy in 1981. Al-Baz concluded that

Egypt's terri tory was not for leasing and told

the head of the US délégation to report that

back to Washington vinequivocally.

The meeting was adjourned for two hours for

consultation among the US délégation members and

with Washington. When the meeting resumed in the

late afternoon, it was short and businesslike.

The îîead of US“lièrë^t:ioîr~apologised- for—their

' mi sunder standing' of the situation and said

Washington was satisfied with the continuation

of Egyptian "facilities" in "emergency

circumstances".

I wanted by telling this anecdote to

underline two facts: first, the United States,

in its foreign policy, often exercises the

"arrogance of power" and second, it always

"takes its friends for granted" and does not

distinguish between a 'friend' and an 'ally'.

Egypt has been a 'friend' of the United States

but never an 'ally'. Furthermore, s orne US

"strategie allies" such as Israël, hâve. on

several occasions. refused to abide by the

'dictâtes' of alliance.

Egypt's policy in the eighties sheds more

light on the perimeters of its foreign policy

and the démarcation line between its "national

inter es and its s'f Fi^dsHip^"”. The ^ear ly

eighties witnessed the aggravation of the cold

war between the two superpowers, the United

States and the Soviet Union, which had reached

its peak after Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.S4

The late eighties witnessed the end of the cold

war and bi-polarity and the early nineties

heralded the breakdown of the Soviet Union and

the Marxist-Socialist régimes in Eastern Europe.

In both cases. Egyptien foreign policy was

confronted with complex problems on how to deal

with them and to maximise possible gains and

limit probable risks.

In the early eighties, Egypt had to re-

establish a degree of balance in its relations

with both superpowers. When President Mubarak

took office in October 1981, he had inherited a

serions tension in Egypt's relations with the

Soviet Union. This tension had led Egypt to be

party to tRe c ôld war ^ith a net lo s s as i t-

became fully dépendent on the United Stated with

a relatively limited freedom of movement to

assert its position regionally and

internationally. Within this context, it was

difficult for Egypt to assume an active rôle in

restoring its leadership rôle which had been

curtailed as a resuit of Arab ostracism

following the Camp David accords. Its industrial

capabilities had also been adversely affected

after it lost Soviet technical expertise which

had built an important part of those

capabilities.

Egyptien foreign policy had to put an end

to the détérioration in Egyptien-Soviet

relations êunid dire c ircums tances. The Reagan

Administration considered the Soviet Union as

"the evil empire". Any Egyptien move towards

Moscow could jeopardise Cairo-Washington

relations. So, Mubarak moved cautiously and

^eTduâlïÿ~ôn~tKat course. Hë^began'by asking-for

some Soviet experts and technicians for Egyptian

factories. Then, he restored Soviet-Egyptian

diplomatie relations to ambassadorial level

after they had remained below that level for

some time. Egypt managed to maintain its

"spécial relationship" with the United States

until Gorbachev céune to power and eventually the

Soviet Union broke dovm and the United States

became the only superpower.

Egyptian foreign policy had to deal with

the new situation in light of the fact that,

with the breakdown of the Soviet Union and the

end of the cold war, the United States' need for

the strategie position of Egypt was no longer

the same as before. This transformation did not

apply to Egypt only but also to Israël and

Turkey, ail of which played the rôle of "buffer"

against Soviet influence in the Middle East. New

challenges Ccune up before Egyptian foreign

poïïcy. S orne were ~ “r ël a t ed to the -new—

international situation and the accompanying

différences of viewpoints between Egypt and the

United States over some régional and

international issues. One major issue for Egypt

was the vagueness and ambiguity of US position

of Isléunic extremism in the région. The US

embassy in Cairo got in touch with Egyptian

extremists in Egypt in 1991 to "familiarise"

itself with their thoughts. Such contacts hurt

the Egyptian government. The memories of the

Shah of Iran and Carlos in the Philippines, "the

US allies" who were forsaken by their ally, the

United States, came up clear and resounding.

Also the issue of US économie and military aid

to Egypt projected itself in the minds of

Egyptian decision makers. Amid ail those

iincertainties and suspicions dealings, Egyptian

foreign policy generally managed to maintain the

"spécial relationship" with Washington and to

avoid that différences in viewpoints lead to

lukewarm relations. Nônetheless^ Egypt—did- not---

renounce its ovm viewpoints and it thus

succeeded in maintaining its indépendant policy

and interests.

The invasion o£ Kuwait and the need by the

United States of major régional actors to be

part of the international alliance against

Saddam Hussayn reaffirmed the indispensable rôle

of Egypt for the United States, ss

President M\ibarak tried to solve the crisis

in an Arab context by calling for an Arab siimmit

in Cairo ten days after Saddam's invasion of

Kuwait but he failed in convincing the Iragi

president to withdraw from Kuwait. The summit

decided, at the reguest of Saudi Arabia, to send

Egyptian and Syrian troops to Saudi Arabia to

defend it against any possible Iragi incursion

on its territory. So, a majority of Arab

countries had already sanctioned Arab military

présence ilïT Saudi Aralsla in impiesientation of -

the joint defence pact signed by Arab League

member States. Egypt had therefore taken this

decision as a matter of principle even before

the United States began to mobilise an

international military alliance. Had Egypt

chosen a different course of action, it would

hâve been extremely difficult for Saudi Arabia

to ask for US military presence on the sacred

territory where the two most venerated Muslim

shrines exist.

The Gulf war has proved to the United

States that, despite the end of the cold war,

Egypt can still play a major régional rôle in

safeguarding one of US principal interests in

the région, oil. The peace process in the Middle

East was facilitated by the conséquences of the

Gulf war but Egypt played a pivotai rôle in

persuading the PLO to be forthcoming. Several

meetings were held in Cairo, prior to the Madrid

Coïïf ërence and inimedïatëly ter “the ' end of the

Gulf war, between Egyptian and PLO officiais to

study US proposais for launching the peace

process. The Egyptian rôle in convincing the PLO

to go to Madrid cannot be overestimated. The

trust cherished by the PLO and its leadership in

Egypt had much facilitated PLO approval to go to

Madrid/ even though at the beginning only

représentatives froni the Occupied Territories

were allowed to represent the Palestinien

people.

History repeated itself when, after the

Oslo accord and the Jordanien-Israël! peace

treaty, the United States again wrongly believed

that it could ignore Egypt as a principal

régional actor in the post-peace régional

économie co-operation set-up or in the new

Israeli-American-tailored "Middle Easternism".

As mentioned before, the United States had

apparently chosen Morocco and Israël to be its

proxïës ïïî“imp 1 emenfing^the~ new design. “Egypt ' s

position at the Casablanca économie sixmmit was

unequivocal: no Middle East common Market before

comprehensive peace. A concerted campaign in the

US media against Egypt began less than two weeks

after the Casablanca summit.

It was clear in mid-November 1994 that

there was an orchestrated press campaign in the

United States against the domestic situation in

Egypt, its political régime and its president.

Although the United States is a free and open

country and it is difficult to interpret one or

several articles in some papers as reflecting a

semi-official or an official orientation, the

publication of similar articles in important and

celebrated papers and magazines within a limited

time span could be interpreted either as a

reflection of a general trend pursued by one or

more US decision-making circles or of an

orientation by spécifie pressure groupe in the

iSïited ^Stâtës^^ for ^spécifie goals^---In either -

case, such articles carry spécifie "messages" of

warning.

In the span of four days, the 'Washington

Post', the weekly magazine 'US News and World

Report' and the monthly magazine 'The Atlantic'

attacked Egypt for its relations with Libya and

spoke of the "érosion" and "détérioration" of

Egypt. The common denominator in the Washington

Post's article and the two "reportages" by the

two magazines was the call for the price of what

Egypt receives in military and économie aid, a

price that would promote American interests even

to the détriment of Egypt's économie, strategie

and security interests.

Whatever the goals behind this acrimony,

those articles called for a pause and a

response, not only at the official or inter-

governmental level, but also at the level of the

È^gyptian press and pübric~ 'opinions;—As much—as—

such articles could eventually influence

American public opinion and écho a certain

orientation for or influence on decision makers

in the United States, national, semi-official

and opposition papers in Egypt made it a point

to send a clear message to the American media

and decision makers expressing Egyptien views

and reaction to this campaign. Some Egyptien

papers also wanted to enlighten the Egyptien

piiblic opinion on the sense and goals of that

campaign; others, especially opposition papers,

sought to provoke the indignation of the public

opinion against the United States.

The gist of what Egyptien papers wrote in

response to those articles was:

1- The articles and the views expressed in

them smell of the spirit of "arrogance" of which

William Fulbright had warned the Americans and

strongly condemned American behaviour as a

superpower ^Kich orders an<i“others hâve to obey^

The new international set-up, not known to

Fulbright, places the United States at its peak

and it is natural that a new pattern of "the

arrogance of power" will flourish after the

recent Congress élections and the rise of the

extreme right.

2- Those articles could not distinguish

between US interests and those of its friends.

Long-standing friendship between two countries

means that there are conunon inter est s but it

does not exclude that each has other interests

of its own which may be different from the

interests of the friend.

3- The articles in the American press were

characterised by over-simplification or even

"naiveté" in the way they interpret, or rather

misinterpret, domestic conditions in Egypt and

several political values such as democracy or

hnman rights which are dealt with in rigid

patterns across the board, with no regard to

'tlîëir social—and~ cultural—context-;—The-history-

of US relations in the past few décades has

shown that most of its Third World friends were

always distant from the democracy which the

United States sought to preach or to transfer to

them.

4- Those articles are sélective in dealing

with dômes tic conditions and they rely on

"rumours", "bazaar" and "café gossip" more than

on spécifie information or genuine political

analysis. The fact that some of those articles

were written by vétéran and well-known

journalists or writers does not mean that their

conduct is above suspicion or that their

préjudice does not govern their sélective

approach.

The criticism contained in those articles

which projected US-Egyptian différences focused

on four main issues: Egyptian-Libyan relations,

Egypt's stance of nuclear prolifération in the

Middle East, arrangements—for—économie- co­

opération in the Middle East and the domestic

situation in Egypt. An élaboration of Egypt's

attitudes towards those issues will highlight

some of the main pillars of Egyptian foreign

policy.

1- Egyptian-Libyan relations: Some quarters

in the United States apparently seem to believe

that there is an Egyptian violation of the

international ban against Libya because of the

Lockerbie issue. Those quarters seem to judge

that Egypt supports the Libyan régime and does

not heed US interests and feelings and that the

United States should warn the Egyptian

government of the risks of such conduct.

Egypt has observed the international

sanctions against Libya. However, Egypt's

strategie interests in Libya certainly differ

from those of the United States. Therefore, the

conditions, manner and limita of the application

b“f“"tHë^baiT^sertainly' dif fer from what the United

States wants to dictate with no regard to the

spécifie Egyptien position. Libye is an Arab and

an African neighbouring country with common

bovindaries on Egypt's western f rentiers. This

fact entails strategie and security concerna and

interests for Egypt. Egypt has some half a

million Egyptien workers and professionals in

Libye where they earn their living and send

remittances to their féunilies in Egypt. So, in

actuel fact, they feed some two million mouths

in Egypt. The United States does not hâve such

interests in Libya. Egypt and Libye hâve several

bilateral contractuel agreements which regulate

économie and trade relations and which are the

main source of income for a large n\xmber of

Egyptian businessmen and companies. This is not

the case for the United States although several

US businesses still hâve dealings with Libya.

FurthermoreT ~Libya—is—si-feuated—^within—the---

immédiate circle of Egyptien national security.

Given the turbulence on the western géographie

depth of Egypt caused by extremism in Algérie,

and given the fact that Egypt has been fighting

the murderous acte of Afghan-Egyptien

terroriste, Egypt needs close co-operation with

Libye to prevent the infiltration of those

terroriste from Libyan territory across the

common borders. In addition, Libye remains a

buffer against the extension of Islêunic

extremism from west to east.

For ail these reasons, Egypt has intervened

with Libya on several occasions to convince the

Libyan leadership to co-operate with

international efforts in discovering the

culprits in the Lockerbie affair. Libya's

approval to hand over the two Libyan suspects to

be tried by Scottish judges in the Hague, an

offer so far rejected by the United States and

Br^xtain", côunè as^a resuit^of—Egypt ' s -médiation- ---

efforts to résolve the problem. The calm and

persuasive approach that Egypt followed with

Libya during the past four years, unlike the US

threatening approach, has led to drastic changes

in Libya's policies. Libya has ceased to deal

with terrorists or to support terrorist

organisations. It has pledged to do that and it

has honoured its commitment. To the best of my

knowledge, Egypt's efforts in this regard were

not even acknowledged by the United States

although I recall being told by senior British

Foreign Office diplomats that they very much

appreciated Egypt's efforts to that end,

especially after Libya had decided to stop

providing financial and military support to the

Irish Repviblican Army (IRA). Through Egypt's

good offices, Libyan and British officiais met

twice and Libya handed the British invaluable

information about the details of its past

assistance to the IRA.

'ArthbiTglî Egÿp t has ^consis tent ly pur sued^

this policy o£ safeguarding its national

interests without infringing relative Security

Council resolutions on Libya, some individuels

in the United States are seeking to misrepresent

facts in order to discrédit Egypt.

2- The second and more controversial issue

between Egypt and the United States relates to

Egypt's position of nuclear prolifération in the

Middle East. Israël possesses nuclear weapons

(Estimated at 200 nuclear heads by Janes's in

1994) and is not signatory to NPT. Egypt does

not possess nuclear weapons and is signatory to

NPT. Two important issues hâve led to the

controversy: the first is the treaty on banning

Chemical weapons which Israël has willingly

signed but Egypt refused to as it links its

signing to Israël's accession to NPT. The second

issue was the NPT extension and review

conférence in April 1995. It was vinderstood that