WHAT THE PARTNERSHIP IS

In June 2002 the leaders of the G8 nations, meeting in Kananaskis, Canada, against the background of the attacks of 11 September 2001, committed themselves to preventing terrorists, or those who harbour them, from acquiring or developing chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons, missiles, and related material, equipment and technology.

They announced a series of non-proliferation principles, and an initiative to implement them, specifically a new global partnership against the spread of weapons and material of mass destruction, under which they undertook to implement a specific programme of cooperation, initially in the Russian Federation, to address non-proliferation, disarmament, counterterrorism and nuclear safety. The priority concerns that they identified were, and are, the destruction of chemical weapons, the dismantlement of decommissioned nuclear submarines, the disposition of fissile material and the employment of former weapons scientists. The G8 heads committed to raise up to $20 billion to support such projects over the next ten years, and they adopted a set of guidelines to form the basis for the negotiation of specific agreements with the Russian Federation and other countries for projects under the partnership.

They made clear that they would welcome both other contributors to the partnership and other recipients, providing that such countries were prepared to adopt the same common principles of non-proliferation and the same guidelines for the implementation of projects under the partnership.

The six principles underlying this approach remain as valid now as then, and we might just recall, in summary form, what they are:

— To promote the adoption, universalization, full implementation and, where necessary, strengthening of the multilateral treaty regime on non-proliferation, and to strengthen the institutions designed to implement these different instruments.

— To develop and maintain effective measures to account for and secure nuclear material, both while it is being produced, while it is in use and while it is being transported.

— To develop and maintain effective physical protection measures for facilities housing CBRN materials.

— To develop and maintain effective border controls, law enforcement efforts and international cooperation to detect, deter and interdict illicit trafficking in CBRN materials.

— To develop and maintain effective national export and trans-shipment controls, whether the items in question are or are not on the multilateral export control lists.

— To adopt and strengthen efforts to manage and dispose of stocks of fissile material no longer required for defence purposes, to eliminate all chemical weapons and to minimize holdings of dangerous biological pathogens and toxins, based on the recognition that the threat of terrorist acquisition is reduced as the overall quantity of such items is reduced.

Each one of these principles bears pretty directly on the issue of nuclear security.

3. IMPLEMENTATION

So what has happened since then? Inevitably, the first year was largely taken up with negotiating with the Russian Federation the terms under which projects would be implemented, based around the guidelines adopted at the summit, in a way also consistent with Russian law. That achieved, we could push ahead with implementation; this is now happening. Broadly speaking, work has centred around four principal lines of activity:

— The dismantling of nuclear submarines;

— The safe and secure storage of over 20 000 spent nuclear fuel assemblies;

— Creating new employment opportunities for former nuclear scientists and engineers, including in the closed cities;

— Contributing to the international effort required under the Chemical Weapons Convention to destroy 40 000 tonnes of Russian chemical weapons in a safe and environmentally sound way.

At the same time:

— The partnership has expanded to include new members: Australia, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, the Nether-lands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, the Republic of Korea, Sweden, Switzerland and Ukraine.

— Countries have developed new and innovative ways to work together; for example, if I might speak of my own country, while implementing projects on our own account, we have also agreed with Canada, the Czech Republic, the European Union, New Zealand and Norway to implement projects for which they have provided the funding, since we already have a framework in place, for example for the construction of a chemical weapons destruction facility at Shchuch’ye.

— At the Sea Island summit last year, the G8 leaders identified additional proliferation challenges, such as the retraining of Iraqi and Libyan weapons scientists, eliminating the use of high enriched uranium fuel in research reactors worldwide, securing and removing fresh and spent high enriched fuel, controlling and securing radiation sources, strengthening export control and border security, and reinforcing biosecurity.

Not least in the interests of time, I hope my colleagues in the partnership will forgive me for sparing you a detailed account of the projects that each country is undertaking, but it might be worth while just trying to give a snapshot of progress to date on the four main areas of work, and the scale of the outstanding challenges:

— First, submarine dismantlement in the north-western Russian Federation.

Of the roughly 250 nuclear submarines built by the Soviet Union, 193 have now been taken out of service; these include 117 from the Northern Fleet in the north-western Russian Federation, 57 of which still need to be dismantled. More than half of the remaining submarines still have spent nuclear fuel on board, which obviously represents a major environmental as well as security threat. A number of countries, including Canada,

Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, are involved in this dismantlement programme.

— However, we need also a holistic approach, which addresses the totality of the problem. The break-up of the Soviet Union left in its wake nuclear and other radioactive material spread across the Russian Federation and other former Soviet Union (FSU) countries; however, a physical protection system for nuclear weapons and material designed for a single State with a closed society, closed borders and well paid, well cared for nuclear workers has had to cope with a very different situation following the break-up of the FSU. Hence the importance of a programme to ensure that sensitive materials are protected to international standards from theft and sabotage. Programmes are in train to increase nuclear safety through the provision of technical improvements, training, and transfer of expertise and equipment, and to improve nuclear material accountancy, in order to reduce the risk that nuclear material could be lost or otherwise removed without detection.

— Similarly with the work on the spent nuclear fuel from the submarines.

We need to address all stages of the cycle, from the cradle to the grave. It is not much good protecting the spent nuclear fuel on a decommissioned submarine if you then have nowhere to store it once you get it on land.

Work is therefore in hand, for example on an interim fuel storage facility in Murmansk, in which the fuel extracted can be stored in special casks under safe and secure conditions. The Northern Dimension Environ-mental Partnership has a nuclear programme dedicated to dealing with the radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel arising from the operation and decommissioning of the former Soviet Northern Fleet.

— I should also mention briefly the important work to decommission the fast breeder reactor at Anktau and the ongoing work to construct an effective long term shelter at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in Ukraine. Discussions continue on the implementation of a programme to dispose of the Russian Federation’s excess holdings of plutonium, imple-mentation of which remains unresolved because of continuing disputes over the liability framework. This is clearly an important area in which progress needs to be made.

In other areas of the partnership work is going forward to help in elimi-nating, in the shortest practicable time, the Russian Federation’s declared stockpile of modern chemical warfare agents, contained in over four million artillery, rocket and air delivered munitions. As a State Party to the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Russian Federation needs to complete the destruction of its chemical weapons stockpile by 2012. To meet this goal, it has

sought substantial international help to build the facilities necessary for the destruction programme. Work is now under way on the construction of such destruction facilities at a number of sites throughout the Russian Federation, including Shchuch’ye, Kambarka, Kizner, Maradykovskiy and Pochep.

The fourth key area I mentioned is the redirection of former weapons scientists. Some 35 000 jobs are to be lost from the reorganization of the nuclear weapons complex in the Russian Federation by 2010, as the Russian Government implements restructuring plans for its ten closed nuclear cities; a similar process is likely to take place in many of the nuclear research institutes in the newly independent republics. A programme is under way to facilitate lasting alternative employment in the civil sector for these former nuclear weapons scientists, engineers and technicians, and to support the long term economic viability of the closed nuclear cities. The establishment of science and technology centres in the Russian Federation and Ukraine is one example of how work on this front is being taken forward.

All this has involved a substantial amount of work, by both donors and recipients. Legal frameworks have had to be established to allow project work to start. Project management infrastructure has had to be put in place, and working relationships between donors and recipients established in what is understandably a very sensitive area. Implementation has had to be got under way, in often challenging physical conditions. All this has happened.

In the process, we have learnt some useful lessons, in particular that:

— Our best hope of combating the terrorist threat is through cooperation and collaboration.

— Doing what we are doing now, networking, getting to know each other better, sharing experiences, best practice, etc., is absolutely vital and should be enhanced if we are to reduce duplication of efforts, improve prioritization and build on the acknowledged successes of the partnership and help create a safer world.

— Establishing good, effective international coordination is a long term education process but essential for progress.

— Enhanced, standardized and regular reporting of projects is an important tool in the communication process.

— Greater transparency is needed to avoid bureaucratic delays and misun-derstanding.

— Good, experienced project management is essential.

— Projects are often interdependent, and some cannot proceed until others have been completed. Donors need to ensure that they honour their pledge commitments. It is important to complete projects to time and cost if more funding is to be achieved.

— Strengthened collaboration and coordination has reduced the technical and financial risks for all involved and helped to ensure that the consid-erable amounts of taxpayers’ money from national governments is being well spent.