V.I. PROSTAKOV
Federal Atomic Energy Agency (Rosatom), Moscow,
Russian Federation
Email: vprostakov@uziymo.faae.ru
One of the most dangerous forms of terrorism is nuclear and radiological terrorism, including threats by terrorists to use so called dirty bombs. The Russian Federation’s national security concept recognizes the possibility of a terrorist threat arising in practically any sphere of State activity. The threat of nuclear or radiological terrorism is considered an integral part in the overall problem of ensuring national security.
Without doubt, reliable physical protection of nuclear material and a reliable system of accounting for and control of nuclear material and radioactive substances play a key role in preventing and countering possible acts of nuclear and radiological terrorism. Clearly, however, the problem of combating the manifestations of nuclear and radiological terrorism cannot be solved by physical protection measures alone.
Considering that the whole threat of nuclear and radiological terrorism is conditional upon the possibility of illicit trafficking in nuclear material and radioactive substances and their illegal possession or transport in a State’s territory, across its customs boundaries or in transit across its territory, national systems for responding to the threat of terrorism must be designed as an infor-mational and logical whole integrated with the system for combating illicit trafficking in nuclear material and radioactive substances.
Generally speaking, the term ‘second line of defence’ refers to the set of measures to combat illicit trafficking in nuclear material and radioactive substances at the next level above the nuclear facility. This level can be the territory of a country or its border.
The ‘second line of defence and countermeasures against nuclear and radiological terrorism’ means coordinated actions taken by federal bodies of the executive power whose functional duties include the prevention of terrorist acts in general, and by law enforcement bodies, ministries, departments and organizations directly concerned with the use of radioactive material and substances or providing security during their storage and use. The system must have a central competent body for taking prompt decisions in assessing the
degree of potential threat and adopting preventive measures. This then makes it possible to coordinate the work of these systems at the international level.
The State system for countering nuclear and radiological terrorism must be based on the national system for countering illicit trafficking in nuclear material and radioactive substances. These must be combated jointly, using all cost effective means and methods.
Work is being done at the Federal Atomic Energy Agency (Rosatom) on establishing a conceptual profile and basic technical systems solutions for the creation of a State system for preventing and countering illicit trafficking in nuclear material and radioactive substances. The informational and logical unity of the structure of data generated and used in solving the problems of physical protection, accounting for and control of nuclear material, and countermeasures against nuclear and radiological terrorism is to be preserved.
During this work the main forms of activity and interaction of the federal bodies of the executive power, ministries, departments and organizations are being determined.
The principal aim of creating the State system is to ensure comprehensive control of the transport of nuclear material and radioactive substances in the country’s territory, across its customs boundaries and in transit across its territory, the discovery of cases of illicit trafficking in nuclear material and radioactive substances, and the conveyance of seized nuclear material and radioactive substances to a temporary storage location and temporary storage until a decision has been made as to their confiscation and disposition.
In a joint initiative of Rosatom with the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs, Federal Security Service and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and involving other concerned ministries and departments, draft provisional regulations for the State system for countering illicit trafficking in nuclear material and radioactive substances in the territory of the Russian Federation and on its State borders have been drawn up.
The draft regulations contain the main conceptual elements for organizing the fight against illicit trafficking in nuclear material and radioactive substances and establishing in the Russian Federation a State system that will bring together and organize the activities of the principal law enforcement and customs bodies, ministries and departments dealing with nuclear issues and other concerned organizations involved in the joint combating of illicit trafficking in nuclear material and radioactive substances. The draft also lays down the main tasks and functions of these ministries, departments and organ-izations, primarily with regard to the prevention of possible criminal uses of nuclear material and radioactive substances.
We are aware that creating a national system for countering illicit trafficking in nuclear material and radioactive substances is a complex and
multifaceted problem. In this connection a decision has been taken at the federal level to start work on setting up, as of 2005, a pilot scheme as a prototype element of the national system for countering illicit trafficking in nuclear material and radioactive substances. Practical experience with operating it will make it possible to formulate a concept (system profile) aimed at ensuring security from the threat of nuclear and radiological terrorism.
It is proposed that the pilot scheme should comprise all informationally interacting technically equipped checkpoints on major transport routes (road, rail and sea) and all subdivisions of law enforcement bodies at typical locations of mass congregation of people (airports, railway stations, etc.), provided with special radiation monitoring equipment and a permanently functioning operations centre (information and analysis centre).
Given the specific nature of radioactive material and substances, an important part of establishing the State system for countering illicit trafficking in nuclear material and radioactive substances is to develop radiation measuring instruments for the search, detection and identification of radioactive material and substances and to equip the structural components of the system with them. For this purpose we consider it useful in the first instance to produce vehicle based mobile radiation monitoring laboratories and handheld instruments in a concealed design for detecting nuclear material and radioactive substances. During the trial operation, mobile laboratories will make it possible to monitor most of the motorways, while handheld detectors will be supplied to the law enforcement bodies responsible for security at locations of mass congregation of people (airports, railway stations, etc.).
Analysis of likely scenarios for action of the structures in charge of detecting illicit trafficking in radioactive material has shown that equipment for the following purposes needs to be provided:
— Instruments for detecting nuclear material and radioactive substances;
— Instruments for searching for and locating nuclear material and radioactive substances;
— Instruments for identifying nuclear material and radioactive substances.
Taking into account the requirements imposed on the executive authorities by the special features of the tasks to be carried out, and to ensure the necessary prompt responses, the instruments must be of the following types: mobile, portable and concealed.
Another important element of the second line of defence is prevention of the illicit transfer of nuclear and other radioactive material across the Russian border. Detecting and preventing the illicit transfer of nuclear and other radioactive material across borders is an extremely important component of an
overall strategy aimed at not allowing these materials to fall into the hands of terrorists or criminal groups supporting them. Moreover, the conditions at borders differ significantly from those at nuclear facilities or at reprocessing or disposal facilities for these materials.
On the one hand, border checkpoints are nodes where flows of people, goods and means of transport come together, therefore 100% checking is possible at such places. On the other hand, border control structures must not hamper foreign trade or the movement of individuals for legitimate reasons, therefore the time that border control procedures may take is limited.
In the Russian Federation the function of preventing the illicit transfer of nuclear material and radioactive substances across the border lies with the customs service. This function was assigned to the customs service in 1995.
The customs control system for nuclear material and radioactive substances in the Russian Federation was developed along the following lines:
— Development of special instruments for the control of nuclear material and radioactive substances, adapted to the general technology of customs controls;
— Development of regulatory documents and control technologies;
— Equipping checkpoints and internal customs terminals with special radiation monitoring apparatus;
— Training of personnel, including instruction in special programmes.
The Russian Federation’s customs service uses various types of radiation monitoring system at checkpoints. The main systems are stationary radiation monitors for the control of individuals, baggage and postal items and for the control of motor vehicles and trains.
To achieve effective organization of the response by customs personnel to detection signals, the radiation monitoring systems have been reinforced with video observation systems. The information from these combined systems is gathered in joint response stations (automated workplaces). For the purposes of searching for, locating and identifying nuclear material and radioactive substances contained in a detected object, and also to maintain radiation safety, portable instruments are used.
As already pointed out, a fundamental role in detecting illicit transfers of nuclear material and radioactive substances is played by radiation monitors.
The Russian stationary monitors used by the customs service are fully in line with IAEA recommendations and have two detection channels — gamma and neutron — which ensures that they are effective, in particular in detecting special nuclear material. The sensitivity characteristics of the system have been verified on actual nuclear material in multiple trials, both in the Russian
Federation and in national laboratories in the United States of America. These radiation monitors have also undergone successful testing under the joint IAEA–Austrian Government Illicit Trafficking Radiation Detection Assessment Programme (ITRAP).
In establishing the State system for the prevention and countering of illicit trafficking in nuclear material and radioactive substances, special consid-eration was given to setting up a full scale information system on matters related to combating illicit trafficking in nuclear material and radioactive substances, including a number of departmental and central databases. In setting up such systems the Russian side also thinks it is useful to propose considering the possibility of combining efforts and coordinating the activities of interested parties.
It must be realized that illicit trafficking in nuclear material and radioactive substances poses a serious threat to the international community.
The situation now is such that it is necessary to develop bilateral and multi-lateral international relations to coordinate measures for the prevention and countering of acts of nuclear and radiological terrorism. International cooperation in countering nuclear and radiological terrorism is an objective necessity. In this area there are problems requiring united international efforts and coordination of activities. Accordingly the Russian side proposes at the present stage combining the efforts of the Russian Federation and other interested parties, in particular IAEA Member States, with the aim of dealing with the tasks ahead.
It is understood that the main difficulty in solving the problems lies in establishing and perfecting national systems. However, the problems are urgent and require resolution without delay. Completion of the second line of defence in the Russian Federation is considered one of the most important preventive measures in combating nuclear and radiological terrorism.
I would like to thank the staff members of the Atombezopasnost company, A. Morozov and V. Kovalchuk, and also N. Kravchenko and D.
Danko of the Russian Federal Customs Service, who gave me much help in preparing this paper.