M. BAHRAN
National Atomic Energy Commission, Sana’a, Yemen
Email: Director@natec.gov.ye Abstract
The National Atomic Energy Commission (NATEC) of Yemen has been in existence only for the past five years, yet its achievements have been phenomenal. Apart from border control, nuclear and radiological security in Yemen is arguably among the best in the world. This paper highlights the challenges and achievements of Yemen within its region.
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Brief history of nuclear and radiological security in Yemen
Since Yemen has no nuclear material, nuclear security in Yemen means radiological security, apart from the issue of illicit trafficking of both nuclear and radiological material.
Prior to 1999 there was no infrastructure in Yemen either in radiation protection or in nuclear and radiological security. The intelligence authorities were responsible for such security matters. In 1999 a presidential decree was issued establishing the National Atomic Energy Commission (NATEC), which is responsible for nuclear and radiological security among other matters related to atomic energy. Since the establishment of NATEC, apart from border control Yemen today is arguably one of the leading countries as far as radio-logical security is concerned. This means that all of Yemen’s radioactive sources are under strict control.
1.2. Yemen’s 11 September
Yemen had its own war against terror in terms of enhancing its security systems in all fields, including the radiological field, but interestingly enough, as far as nuclear security is concerned, Yemen started before 11 September 2001, as NATEC’s efforts in this regard started in 2000.
On 12 October 2000 in the Yemeni port of Aden the United States Navy destroyer USS Cole was attacked, and a number of security questions were raised, including those on radiological security. At this point NATEC began establishing Milestone Zero1. After less than a year the events of 11 September 2001 occurred, at which point Yemen began its integration into the interna-tional efforts.
On 6 October 2002 another disaster took place, similar to the attack on the USS Cole, in which a French oil tanker was attacked off the coast of Yemen
— this was a message that nothing is invulnerable. NATEC’s understanding since then is that every radiological source in any facility with whatever use should be registered, licensed, inspected and secured.
2. STATUS OF NUCLEAR SECURITY IN YEMEN
Before highlighting the achievements, we need to talk about the challenges facing NATEC in respect of nuclear and radiological security.
2.1. Challenges
Yemen’s long coast is a security problem, especially for a developing country, although Yemen has been working on enhancing its maritime security since 2000. It recognizes the maritime threat and understands that the threat is not just in attacks on passing ships or oil tankers but also in their possible use as tools for smuggling nuclear and radioactive material, which is also an interna-tional issue.
Yemen recognizes the huge responsibility and the need for cooperation between countries. Yemen has been assisted by donor countries in launching its coastguard in all its requirements, from acquiring boats to providing training for the staff.
The next step is to integrate nuclear security with the coastguard, which means to arm and train the coastguard with handheld radiation monitors in order to integrate nuclear and radiological security into our maritime efforts.
Here NATEC is only steps away from achieving this goal and is hoping to do so in cooperation with the IAEA and donor countries.
It should also be borne in mind that Yemen has long land borders, which NATEC is also planning to control. Yemen is participating and assisting in all international efforts that strengthen border controls, but this is a big challenge.
1 This was prior to graduating from the Model Project Milestones 1 and 2.
The long land borders with Saudi Arabia and Oman need to be sealed in order to prevent illegal activities, including any possible illicit trafficking of nuclear or radiological material. NATEC hopes to do this in cooperation with its neighbours.
2.2. Accomplishments
Yemen so far has a small number of high risk radioactive sources, which are all under possibly the most strict regulatory control on Earth. In Yemen, all licensees must, among many things, adhere to the security group requirements in IAEA-TECDOC-1344 and IAEA-TECDOC-1355. In addition, the licensee must adhere to the national regulations, which require a security manager (officer) in every licensed facility who personally signs the licence application form and becomes accordingly liable (including possible imprisonment) for any breach of security under his or her jurisdiction. NATEC registers, authorizes, licenses and duly inspects all non-exempt radioactive material from the point it enters until it leaves the country. This is done by a radiological security department within NATEC, which is legally authorized, staffed and equipped.
Yemen has no capability for managing radioactive waste. No non-exempt radioactive material is allowed to stay in the country after the expiration date of its licence (unless renewed).
2.3. Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources Yemen has been one of the main sponsors and promoters of the Code. It has been among the leading parties working towards its promotion.
Yemen believes that implementing the Code globally will be beneficial for the whole international community. In fact, it sees the Code as the basis for further international development on the subject and it will fully continue to support it.
2.4. Nuclear security progress in the region
The region of West Asia and the Horn of Africa has made good progress in the past five to ten years; in fact, West Asia has had the best accomplish-ments within the IAEA Model Project for Radiation Protection Infrastructure, at least in establishing Milestones 1 and 2. This makes our region ready to establish a whole security programme, which will be good for the countries in the region.
However, more needs to be done in the region both in taking every radioactive source under regulatory control and making sure that the region’s
borders are secure. This latter point is a major challenge and a tougher problem, which needs efforts and assistance from all parties, especially the IAEA and donor countries.
Yemen has had the best achievements within the West Asia group, going from zero in 1999 to being a leader in the field of radiological safety and security today. This will make Yemen a centre of excellence for organizing and developing nuclear security aspects in the region.
3. CONCLUSION: LESSONS LEARNED AND PROPOSALS FOR THE FUTURE
Although achievements have been made, the question still remains: can radioactive sources fall into the wrong hands? The answer is always yes, but we can make that possibility smaller, and we must not fail at any time, as terrorists have to succeed only once.
We should expect anything, from a clean bomb to a dirty one (although, strictly speaking, there is no such a thing as a clean bomb); anything could happen, and new methods would be used. The big powers should continue their assistance to developing countries to enhance their nuclear security tools.
The world of today is facing common threats, and problems will not be solved unless common efforts are exerted; because of this we would like to stress the importance of regional cooperation. Our goals should be twofold: to decrease the production of dangerous material and to decrease the chances for minds to be made dangerous. The international community should take into account deeper issues regarding some underlying grievances of the people of our region, most importantly the Middle East peace process.
National, regional and international efforts must not only be coordinated but also integrated if we are to overcome the challenges ahead of us.
3.1. A proposal
On 8 December 1953 it was said: ‘Atoms for peace’. Now, on 16 March 2005, we suggest a new slogan to go hand in hand with the previous one: ‘Peace for atoms’.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
I thank the men and women of NATEC and the IAEA for the progress that has been made, and M. Mansoor for help in preparing this paper.