SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONAL SECURITY OF RADIOACTIVE SOURCES PROJECT

While providing support for regional partnerships as a general policy direction, the Australian Government was particularly mindful of the security threat and the international recognition of the value of regional partnerships when it funded the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO) in May 2004 to lead a three year regional project to enhance the appropriate security of radioactive sources and, consequently, to ensure the continuing benefits of proper source utilization. The Regional Security of Radioactive Sources (RSRS) project has a wide scope that includes the technical, administrative and regulatory aspects of security associated with the management¹ of dangerous² radioactive sources. The project’s regional scope covers 11 Southeast Asian countries, including seven IAEA Member States (Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam) and four current non-Member States (Brunei, Cambodia, East Timor

1 Management means the administrative and operational activities that are involved in the manufacture, supply, receipt, possession, storage, use, transfer, import, export, transport, maintenance, recycling or disposal of radioactive sources [4].

2 Dangerous radioactive sources means those defined as Category 1, 2 and 3 in Ref. [7].

and Laos). A companion programme covers the South Pacific Island States, including Papua New Guinea. A complementary project to address Australian national source security activities is being implemented by the Australian regulator, the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency.

The RSRS project’s objective for Southeast Asia is to prevent, or to minimize the probability and impact of, unauthorized access or damage to, or loss, theft or unauthorized transfer of, radioactive sources by:

(a) Assisting countries in the region to identify, and to secure, orphan and poorly controlled radioactive sources;

(b) Improving the security arrangements for radioactive sources through sustaining improvements to regulatory infrastructure and user practices and advice on physical and equipment upgrades.

Cooperation and collaboration is occurring with government authorities in all regional countries, with the IAEA and with the US IRTR programme.

Several planning and consultation meetings with participants from Southeast Asian countries, the USDOE and the IAEA have been conducted since the Australian project’s initiation in June 2004. These meetings were aimed at both (i) providing the participating countries with an understanding of the objectives and capacities of the RSRS project, the IAEA Action Plan for the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and US IRTR programmes, in order to seek opportunities to harmonize approaches and activities, and (ii) identifying regional and national activities and future needs. Emphasis has been placed on country self-assessment, with peer review and evaluation identifying practical needs and actions to improve and sustain the appropriate control and security of radioactive sources throughout their life cycle.

5. CHALLENGES

The RSRS project outcomes are primarily concerned with ensuring that the relevant practical knowledge and experience — the ‘how to’ — is transferred to, and implemented sustainably in, all Southeast Asia (and in the South Pacific in the companion programme). Owing to the region’s diversity, each country, national organization or user may have quite different methods and varying levels of resources to achieve successful outcomes. In a regional sense, the RSRS implementation programme is providing the impetus for countries to share their practical knowledge and propose appropriate solutions to the common issues being faced in source security. A range of methods that take account of regional diversity is being employed. These include establishing

and maintaining information and coordination networks, holding practical regional training courses and technical workshops, developing and peer reviewing national documents, including by adapting available information on model source security standards or regulatory inspection and user requirements, and peer reviews of regulatory and user practices during technical assistance activities and expert missions.

In establishing the regional source security partnership for Southeast Asia, the factors and challenges being addressed include:

(a) Managing the implications for regional cooperation that arise from the fact that national action plans and programmes for radioactive source security contain sensitive information and are rightfully the responsibility of national authorities to develop, implement and maintain.

(b) Striving to avoid unnecessary overlap or duplication of programmes regarding radioactive source security, through communication and coordination of plans and activities of all stakeholders with complementary programmes and objectives (such as the IAEA, the US IRTR and regional countries).

(c) Optimizing the efforts of the pool of expertise available through careful scheduling of regional or national activities.

(d) Prioritizing activities based on the participants’ needs, managing the possibly limited expertise available and recognizing that there is a range of other important activities involving similar personnel from the region.

(e) Recognizing, respecting and managing cultural and language differences to facilitate and encourage identification and sharing of source security issues and experience and using an information network of expertise and contacts to address needs and requirements as they arise.

6. FUTURE DIRECTIONS

A number of issues arise as to the future directions for regional partnership projects. These include:

(a) The need to continue to build on the networks, trust and goodwill that exist.

(b) The recognition that, for global threats, regional partnerships provide local implementation of international guidance and probably should be considered the norm for such implementation rather than the exception.

(c) Avoidance of overlap with other initiatives by careful planning and communication as a continuing requirement to ensure effective use of resources.

(d) The goal to ensure sustainability of the achievements in all countries and to develop mutual assistance that will last over the long term.

(e) The need to consider whether current international agreements, such as the Code of Conduct, are sufficient. A number of Member States seek more specific guidance on establishing a security system, and there is insufficient guidance at this level. Following a period of gaining experience, decisions should be made on what further guidance is needed and whether a more binding international agreement is warranted.

(f) Regional source security partnerships, which offer the opportunity for extension to security of other facilities and other areas, for example research reactors and waste stores, while recognizing the constraints of confidentiality of information.

In conclusion, adopting global standards and effective local implementation are crucial in combating threats to all countries. Working collaboratively, openly and with serious intent in regional partnerships allows countries to participate in a focused way, while addressing clearly the specific problems in the region. Australia encourages all countries to be involved.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The authors gratefully acknowledge the active participation of all regional countries and the expertise within their national authorities and of their users, and the support and assistance of the IAEA and the USDOE, which led to the success of this Southeast Asian regional partnership for radioactive source safety and security.

REFERENCES

[1] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, The Radiological Accident in Samut Prakarn, IAEA, Vienna (2002).

[2] ANDREONI, A., FERGUSON, C., Radioactive Caesium Seizure in Thailand:

Riddled with Uncertainties, Research Story of the Week, 17 July 2003, Monterey Institute of International Studies (2003), http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/

030717.htm

[3] RIDWAN, M., “Physical protection of significant radioactive sources: An Indonesian perspective”, Security of Radioactive Sources (Proc. Int. Conf.

Vienna, 2003), IAEA, Vienna (2003).

[4] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, IAEA/CODEOC/2003, IAEA, Vienna (2003).

[5] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Action Plan for the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, GOV/2003/47-GC(47)/7 Annex 1, IAEA, Vienna (2003).

[6] ELBARADEI, M., “Nuclear proliferation and the potential threat of nuclear terrorism”, paper presented at the Asia–Pacific Conference on Nuclear Safeguards and Security, Sydney, 2004.

[7] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Categorization of Radioactive Sources, IAEA-TECDOC-1344, IAEA, Vienna (2003).