Technical aspects

The following lessons concerning technical aspects were learned:

(a) During major events both the threat level and the consequences of threats may be significantly higher than the norm. For this reason, the adequacy of the security systems, even if they meet current international recommendations, should be reassessed.

(b) When installing physical protection systems in radiological installations such as hospitals, special emphasis must be made in order to ensure the functionality of the system without disturbing the proper duties of the staff (e.g. the operation of both access control and alarm systems proved highly impractical).

(c) Potential adverse consequences of sabotage are reduced by shutting down critical installations (e.g. reactors) during significant periods of the event.

(d) Countries that have entered into bilateral cooperation agreements, have installed and effectively used equipment, and have broadly enhanced border security can assist, through regional leadership, other countries in benefiting from such installations.

(e) Special provisions must be taken for the prevention and handling of false alarms and their possible consequences.

(f) In the event of an alarm, the key point is to localize quickly the person at a checkpoint, not in the crowd.

(g) Radiation detection can be integrated with standard security equipment.

(h) The optimum positioning of detectors at the entrance of the venues is one pager on the belt of the security officer and one pager under the tray, not ignoring X ray flashes and electromagnetic interference, and overnight removal and redeployment of pagers.

(i) The speed and effectiveness of quickly detecting an anomaly is enhanced if the naturally occurring radioactive material spectra for the region are catalogued and software tools and expertise to handle and evaluate many spectra are available.

3.3. Training

Training is crucial; it is impossible to overestimate its importance.

Equipment is useless if people do not know how to use it effectively. Initial training as well as ongoing refresher training is necessary to ensure that the system works. The most important recommendations concerning this issue are:

(a) Cooperative teamwork is essential, since experts with different backgrounds contribute to the project.

(b) A comprehensive, phased plan taking into account different stages and different categories of staff (specialty, tasks, etc.) should be created.

(c) Timely and convincing information to address concerns on radiation and chemical and biological agents should be provided.

(d) Theoretical and practical training on radiation, instrument usage and procedures, scheduled well in advance, should be provided.

(e) Documentation should be available on time.

(f) Established plans should be adhered to, in order to bring everything together at the right time: equipment, procedures, training facilities, materials, trainers and trainees.

(g) Exercises demonstrating the cooperation of different authorities, based on a national response plan, and small scale exercises for personnel within a single authority, should be carried out.

(h) Instrument training materials should be purchased.

4. CONCLUSION

Greece demonstrated its commitment to assigning the highest priority to security issues, and in particular to nuclear and radiological security, in its organization of last summer’s very successful Olympic Games in Athens. These games were among the most secure in the history of the Olympics. Our wish is to see other countries enhancing nuclear security, and we believe that this unprecedented cooperation project provides a model for this purpose.

The comprehensive conclusions drawn from the successful implemen-tation of security measures at the Athens Olympic Games 2004 are now available for assisting countries in their efforts to secure major public events in the future. Assistance could be provided through the Greek Centre for Security Studies, which has been established for this purpose following the Olympic Games. The GAEC is the contributor to this centre for nuclear and radiological security issues.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Greece wishes to express its gratitude to its partners in this challenging endeavour, specifically to the IAEA for its significant contribution to the programme as an important technical adviser and as an effective and efficient coordinator of our cooperation with the Member States involved, to the USDOE for its invaluable support of the programme and to all other countries that helped us organize a secure Olympic Games.

E.S. LYMAN (United States of America): The US Department of Energy has apparently revised its design basis threat twice since 11 September 2001, partly in response to concerns about the threat of improvised nuclear devices, particularly at certain facilities where there are large inventories of high enriched uranium (HEU).

There is a large amount of HEU at Canada’s Chalk River facility. I was wondering whether Canada had taken account of the improvised nuclear device threat when developing its protection strategy for that facility.

L.J. KEEN (Canada): We have carried out a complete nuclear security assessment of the Chalk River facility. As regards HEU, Canada cooperates closely with the USA, from which it imports HEU for targets for the production of radioisotopes.

E.S. LYMAN (USA): Given the possibility of a successful terrorist attack on the Indian Point nuclear power plant, followed by the exposure of people — especially children — to radioactive iodine, has New York City’s Office of Emergency Management considered predistributing potassium iodide tablets

— especially to schools?

E. GABRIEL (USA): That is one of several measures which New York City’s Department of Health is currently considering as part of our overall emergency preparedness efforts.

A. DJALOEIS (Indonesia): Were there any incidents of nuclear security significance at the 2004 Summer Olympic Games despite the precautions taken?

L. CAMARINOPOULOS (Greece): No — only false alarms.

I. GORINOV (Bulgaria): Could Mr. Gabriel say a few words about the experience of New York City’s Office of Emergency Management with ionizing radiation detectors?

E. GABRIEL (USA): Over 20 000 people in the USA — police officers, fire fighters, emergency management service workers and so on — carry handheld detectors, which are worn at the waist. These detectors are not very useful, however, as they constantly give false alarms due to, for example, the detection of radiation from persons undergoing medical procedures that use radioisotopes.

As regards portal detectors, vehicles carrying medical radioisotopes frequently trigger them. The vehicles have to be taken off the road and their papers examined, in order to determine whether there is a threat. That is a huge human resources problem. People from Brookhaven National

Laboratory are trying to adjust our portal detectors so that there is a higher probability of their detecting only certain radioisotopes.

A. NILSSON (IAEA): Mr. Gabriel referred to false alarm problems with ionizing radiation detectors. In helping Member States to establish detection systems at their borders, we have encountered such problems. In addition, we have found that many of the people using radiation detectors have difficulty in interpreting the readings.

For some years the IAEA has had a coordinated research project designed to facilitate the selection of radiation detectors, and a project report will be issued soon.

We have come to realize the importance of the acceptance testing of radiation detectors when they come from the manufacturer — often they simply do not work. For the acceptance testing, one needs people with a scientific background able to interpret the detector readings. Such people can also train customs officers, border guards and so on in the interpretation of detector readings and assist them if they still have problems.

Detectors that work properly, people who have been well trained to use them and scientific back-up are all essential for an effective radiation protection system. Having a system which one believes to be effective but in reality is not is worse than having no system at all.

Besides those elements, one needs coordination with different entities both within one’s own country and in other, particularly neighbouring, countries.

E. GABRIEL (USA): Together with the US Department of Energy and the Department of Homeland Security, we are currently conducting a programme through which we hope to determine what radiation detection equipment we should buy in future. At the same time, the federal government is working on the question of standards for such detectors.

S.D. SAGAN (USA): In his presentation, Mr. Gabriel focused on mitigation of the consequences of terrorist attacks. What about the prevention of such attacks?

E. GABRIEL (USA): I focused on mitigation largely because mitigation exercises attract more media attention. We certainly carry out prevention exercises, but they do not make for such dramatic pictures as mitigation exercises.

S.D. SAGAN (USA): Mr. Gabriel, how do you decide on your exercise scenarios?

E. GABRIEL (USA): We generally base our exercises on what the intel-ligence community is advising us what it believes to be the current thinking of terrorists. For example, we carried out an exercise at Shea Stadium, postulating a large explosion there; a few weeks later there was a large explosion, causing a

number of injuries, at another stadium. Incidentally, we expanded the original scenario for that exercise by placing suspicious looking packages in a couple of vehicles near the Shea Stadium and calling on the US Department of Energy to find the dirty bombs.

Also, we base exercises on events like the 11 March 2004 attacks on the Madrid transit system and the sarin attacks on the Tokyo transit system.

The organizers of emergency response exercises frequently overlook hospitals, but we try to involve many of the 50–60 hospitals in and around New York City in all of our exercises.

S. FERNÁNDEZ MORENO (Argentina): I believe that nuclear security culture should go hand in hand with nuclear safety culture. What has the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) done in the area of nuclear safety culture as a result of the increasing concerns about nuclear security?

L.J. KEEN (Canada): Even before 11 September 2001 nuclear safety culture in Canada had a security component, and we do not think that there are two cultures — one for nuclear safety and one for nuclear security. For example, a Canadian consultant to the IAEA on nuclear safety culture has also been doing some work in the nuclear security area. However, hiring security personnel and integrating them is a major task.

S. FERNÁNDEZ MORENO (Argentina): How often does the CNSC review design basis threats?

L.J. KEEN (Canada): Design basis threats are under constant review, in the light of information from intelligence agencies, of technological develop-ments and of changes in the nature of the work being done at different facilities.

P. SHAW (United Kingdom): Most radiation accidents have not been accompanied by an explosion — people have simply fallen ill with symptoms that have gone unrecognized for some time. The same could happen in the case of a terrorist attack involving radioactive material but no explosion or shootout. Does New York City’s Office of Emergency Management have some way of ascertaining that such an attack has taken place?

E. GABRIEL (USA): Yes, our ‘syndromic surveillance system’, which has been in place since 1998 and enabled us, for example, to identify West Nile disease in the New York City region, is programmed to identify diseases associated with overexposure to ionizing radiation. It has been proposed that the system be converted into a nationwide system.

(Session 5) Chairperson J. MacNAUGHTON

United Kingdom