Chairperson: W. Renneberg (Germany) Members: M. Bahran (Yemen)
Ambassador L.F. Brooks (United States of America) A. Kotelnikov (Russian Federation)
E. Oakden (United Kingdom) R. Racana (Argentina) T. Taniguchi (IAEA) P. Thiébaud (France) Huazhu Zhang (China)
W. RENNEBERG (Germany): My impression from the presentations made earlier in this session by the panellists is that we have a fairly well developed set of nuclear security measures but differ in how we apply those measures. There has been a lot of talk about what ought to be done, and the focus should now perhaps be on how we ought to proceed.
In that connection, I wonder whether there is a need for what one might call ‘reference levels’ designed to ensure minimum standards in the application of the various measures and for security analysis guidelines.
There has also been a lot of talk about security culture, which all seem to agree is very important in the security area, just as safety culture is very important in the safety area. In the latter area, we have guidelines for safety management, and I wonder whether it would be helpful to develop guidelines for security management.
G. TSHELANE (South Africa): I believe that, within the framework of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the United States of America and the United Kingdom, at some stage, advocated the development of a treaty for controlling transfers of dual use technology. Would any of the panellists care to comment on this matter?
E. OAKDEN (United Kingdom): Controlling transfers of dual use technology without placing undue constraints on legitimate trade is a major challenge with which various countries and institutions are grappling. Much more needs to be done in order to arrive at an appropriate balance.
AMBASSADOR L.F. BROOKS (USA): I am not aware that anyone ever advocated the development of a formal treaty, and I would be surprised if anyone did. In the nuclear technology area, changes occur so frequently that — in my view — it is much better to have simply guidelines and informal groups such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group.
C.R. STOIBER (USA): There are a large number of bilateral, regional and international assistance programmes under way in the nuclear security area, and I think there is a danger of confusion due to overlapping. In my view, there is a need for those programmes to be coordinated. The question is — how? One mechanism might be a kind of clearing house through which national institutions could consult about matters such as priorities, training, equipment and standards.
AMBASSADOR L.F. BROOKS (USA): When I think about coordi-nation, I think about coordination within large governmental structures like ours and coordination at the international level.
In the USA four to five years ago different governmental entities were taking different approaches, but I think we have solved that problem.
At the international level, there is in my view a good deal of coordination.
For example, we are coordinating our efforts closely with those of the UK and the Russian Federation.
One difficulty that arises at the international level is due to the fact that some countries are less willing than other countries to deal with certain third countries. There the answer is information sharing.
As regards the idea of a clearing house, I believe that the idea of one where some participants tell others what to do and what not to do is unrealistic and that such a clearing house would probably not be welcome.
Where possible, IAEA recommendations should be followed as a kind of global standard, but we need to bear in mind that every country is unique.
E. OAKDEN (UK): In agreeing with what Ambassador Brooks just said, I would add that there is a danger of too much time being spent on formal coordination.
There is a lot of informal coordination, with people simply telephoning each other or sending each other email messages, and what worries me more than the possibility of confusion due to overlapping is the possibility of gaps.
I believe that the United Nations Security Council’s 1540 Committee is quite a good forum for identifying gaps and trying to ensure that they are filled.
P. THIÉBAUD (France): I agree with what Mr. Oakden just said about the United Nations Security Council’s 1540 Committee and what Ambassador Brooks said about IAEA recommendations. France believes that coordination at the international level should be through the United Nations Security Council or the IAEA.
For France, regional coordination at the European Union level is very important, because some of its policies relevant to nuclear security are determined in a European Union context.
Much of France’s cooperation in the nuclear security area takes place at the bilateral level, owing to the need for confidentiality regarding certain matters.
T. TANIGUCHI (IAEA): As regards coordination, the IAEA would like to see the establishment of a global nuclear security framework based on instruments such as the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and with guidelines facilitating the implementation of these instruments.
As I mentioned in my presentation, the IAEA is planning to publish a number of Security Series documents. The process of preparing these documents will be a transparent one, with all IAEA Member States invited to comment on the drafts. However, the IAEA will not be establishing security standards in the way that it establishes safety standards, which it is authorized to do by its Statute. Among the reasons for this are the importance of confiden-tiality in the nuclear security area — compared with the nuclear safety area — and the fact that in the nuclear security area one has to take account of the sociopolitical conditions in different countries and of the threat levels associated with different facilities.
At the same time, three years of IAEA experience have made it clear to us that the common aspects of nuclear security are at least as important as confidentiality and the country and facility specific aspects. This has been emphasized particularly by the law enforcement community. In my view, a balance needs to be found through the accumulation of experience.
As regards nuclear security culture, after the Chernobyl accident it was not very difficult to promote nuclear safety culture and translate it into safety management methodologies, but a lengthy ‘fermentation process’ was necessary before it became established. In my view, the establishment of security culture will require an even longer fermentation process.
W. RENNEBERG (Germany): In my view, ‘nuclear security culture’ is not a very clear concept. I think we should be focusing on nuclear security management.
T. TANIGUCHI (IAEA): In the nuclear safety area, the transition from recognizing the importance of safety culture to embedding safety culture in particular countries and facilities was not easy. I do not think that such a transition will be easy in the case of nuclear security culture, given the specifi-cities of different countries and facilities.
P. SHAW (UK): A major consideration relating to the physical security of radioactive material is the trustworthiness of personnel. How does one vet personnel in such a way as to minimize the insider threat?
M. BAHRAN (Yemen): That is a big problem, which can probably be resolved only on a case by case basis.
In Yemen, a company exploring an oilfield located in a tribal area will normally hire people belonging to the tribe in question for basic tasks such as driving, in order that the tribe may benefit financially from the activity.
However, the company will not use members of the tribe as security officers or in other sensitive positions. Resolving personnel trustworthiness issues takes a lot of time.
S.B. ABDEL-HAMID (Egypt): In the nuclear safety area, many people say that safety culture is simply a matter for technicians. In my view, however, there is a public dimension to nuclear safety culture — public awareness and support are necessary, and I believe that the same applies in the nuclear security area.
E.T. FEI (USA): In his presentation, Mr. Thiébaud mentioned the idea of guidelines for the management of high enriched uranium similar to those for the management of plutonium. Would he care to expand on that idea?
P. THIÉBAUD (France): We should like to see all States with significant stockpiles of high enriched uranium agreeing, in the interests of transparency, to accept commitments similar to those accepted by States in the case of plutonium. So, we are thinking in terms of bringing those States together in order to ascertain whether a common understanding can be reached regarding such commitments.
E.S. LYMAN (USA): In my view, there is a growing tension between the idea that the nuclear terrorism threat is an international threat requiring an international response and the idea that the physical protection of nuclear material and facilities is a purely national responsibility of sovereign States.
What does one do in the case of a State with substandard arrangements for the physical protection of nuclear material and facilities which believes that it is doing the right thing and does not want international advice? I have in mind not simply ‘marginal’ States not represented at this conference, but my own country, as I am concerned about certain aspects of its physical protection arrangements which, in my view, violate international norms. For example, only last week the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission approved a significant relaxation of the standards for the physical protection of MOX fuel at nuclear power plants in the USA.
I believe that we should move away from the idea that the physical protection of nuclear material and facilities is an exclusively national issue.
R. RACANA (Argentina): When we began developing a nuclear security programme in Argentina, we found that scientists, the police, the armed forces and others — because of their different cultures — had different approaches to the problem. It was very difficult to arrive at a common methodology, but we did so by dividing the overall nuclear process into subprocesses in such a way that groups of organizations with similar cultures could carry them out success-fully. We relied on guidelines rather than precise instructions, leaving the various organizations and groups a large measure of independence.
The approach is going to be tested early in April 2005, with a simulated attack on a vehicle carrying radioactive cobalt.
S.B. ELEGBA (Nigeria): Unlike Argentina, my country does not have a nuclear power programme, but I believe that it can learn from the experience of countries which have nuclear power programmes creating greater nuclear security challenges. I would therefore like to see such countries working together with the IAEA in the area of nuclear security culture. Further, I believe that we need standards for the security of nuclear material.
A. HAGEMANN (Germany): In his presentation, Mr. Taniguchi mentioned the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Plan of Activities. Could countries which are assisting other countries through bilateral support programmes use that plan or adapt it for their own purposes?
T. TANIGUCHI (IAEA): As I said in my presentation, the plan is designed to clarify goals and improve the coordination of bilateral and multi-lateral support programmes.
Although nuclear security is essentially a national responsibility, there is great scope for mutual learning through the sharing of experience. That is what the IAEA is aiming to promote above all.
W. RENNEBERG (Germany): I have a fundamental question — What is the most relevant deficiency in the nuclear security area?
P. THIÉBAUD (France): My answer to that question will probably not satisfy the Chairman.
In France there is no single issue that we think needs to be addressed as our top priority. In our view, we need to make progress through a multifaceted approach covering international instruments, information exchange, training and so on. We are very conscious of the fact that the strength of a chain depends on the weakest link.
W. RENNEBERG (Germany): Then what is the weakest link in the nuclear security chain?
P. THIÉBAUD (France): Again, my answer will probably not satisfy the Chairman.
In my view, the weakest link will differ from one country to another.
International guidelines are necessary, but there is no common solution for all countries.
T. TANIGUCHI (IAEA): Perhaps the weakest link is an excessive focus on small developing countries, with regard to the security of radioactive sources. There are security weaknesses in countries with large scale nuclear activities, often due to complacency. In the IAEA’s view, effectiveness is more important than efficiency at the present stage in the learning process, although the IAEA will continue its efforts to increase both.
M. BAHRAN (Yemen): As far as countries like mine are concerned, the weakest link is control at the national borders. For such countries, regional cooperation in the border control area is very important.
HUAZHU ZHANG (China): Effective border controls are very important for the prevention of illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive material.
A. KOTELNIKOV (Russian Federation): Perhaps we should not talk openly about weakest links. If terrorists know what the weakest link in a country is, that country’s nuclear security efforts may be in vain.
It is always possible to improve nuclear security through greater efforts and the acquisition of better equipment, but the associated costs will rise. So there has to be some sort of compromise.
In the Russian Federation, we have been using equipment produced by the defence industry of the Soviet Union. Although the equipment is rather old and does not look very good, it works quite well in the field, whereas some of the new equipment, although of pleasing design, does not work so well. We, with the help of some of our foreign partners, are looking into this problem.
AMBASSADOR L.F. BROOKS (USA): I agree with Mr. Thiébaud that the weakest link will differ from one country to another — also, it will differ from year to year.
The Chairman’s original question was — What is the most relevant deficiency in the nuclear security area? In my opinion, as indicated by Senator Nunn in his presentation, it is the fact that all governments have a number of other concerns to which they attach at least as much or a little more importance than to nuclear security, for reasons of national pride, economic advantage or political interest.
The participants in this conference obviously take the threat of nuclear terrorism seriously, that is why we are here, but the governments of our countries regard that threat as just one of the many things which they must deal with.
E. OAKDEN (UK): I believe that an important aspect of nuclear security is public support for the necessary expenditures and that such support will be
forthcoming only if the public realizes what the consequences of a major act of nuclear terrorism could be. We need to educate people not only about the benefits offered by peaceful applications of nuclear energy but also about the responsibility involved.
P.A. COMELLA (USA): As someone who has been involved in the effort to have the CPPNM amended, I hope that this conference will help to ensure that the Diplomatic Conference to Consider and Adopt the Proposed Amendments to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material scheduled to take place in July 2005 results in an amended CPPNM. It would create a basis on which all countries with nuclear material and facilities can establish appropriate physical protection programmes. It will also provide a coherent framework for IAEA assistance in the area of physical protection — leading to greater effectiveness and, in due course, greater efficiency.
E. OAKDEN (UK): In my view, that statement is very relevant to what Mr. Lyman said previously.
I think that we should be aiming for a network of interlocking national and international regulations and that an amended CPPNM could represent a step in the right direction.
S. FERNÁNDEZ MORENO (Argentina): There are many programmes under way in the nuclear security area, and perhaps we now need a mechanism for assessing their effectiveness and efficiency. However, such a mechanism would have to be based on a common understanding as to the problems we are facing. At this conference there have been references to acts of terrorism and sabotage carried out by non-State actors, but also to nuclear weapons prolifer-ation, which in my view has to do with States rather than non-State actors.
There appear to be two distinct sets of problems — not just one.
There is a risk that our efforts will prove to be insufficient, but there is also a risk of overreacting and suffocating activities that are legitimate and beneficial.
As regards nuclear security culture, it might be worth considering the feasibility of establishing information exchange networks like those already existing in the nuclear safety area.
D. PUIG (Uruguay): Besides strengthening of the CPPNM, I should like to see the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources converted into a convention.
A. IBRAHIM (Egypt): In my view, for the time being there is no need for a further convention. The guidelines for nuclear transfers in the IAEA’s INFCIRC/254 series of documents are sufficient.
A. STREZOV (Bulgaria): As there have been references to regional cooperation in the border control area, I would mention that in October 2002 Bulgaria and Turkey carried out a border control exercise involving the seizure
of enriched uranium. Both countries learned very useful lessons from that exercise.
I would also mention that an international technical working group of which I was a member has produced a very simple model action plan which developing countries can apply in combating illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive material.
W. RENNEBERG (Germany): In my view, the most basic problem facing us is attributable to the fact that there are, on the one hand, countries which possess nuclear weapons and, on the other, countries which do not possess nuclear weapons and therefore consider themselves to be at a political or economic disadvantage. I believe that the threat of nuclear terrorism will be with us as long as the gulf between those two groups of countries persists and that worldwide nuclear disarmament accompanied by the placing of all enrichment and reprocessing facilities under international safeguards is therefore essential.