A. GUERREIRO
Ministry of External Relations, Brasilia, Brazil
Email: ajvg@mre.gov.br
We convene today against a backdrop of disturbing developments that have taken place in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation over the past 15 years. Every nation on Earth holds high stakes in the promotion of these twin goals; however, whichever way we choose to set our sights, we find today that confidence is eroding in the process agreed upon and generally entrusted with fostering those objectives for four decades.
The views I would like to convey to you are therefore not exclusively those of a developing country. For all our countries are at various stages in the development process of peaceful nuclear applications, especially as concerns the production of energy for a post-Kyoto world.
On the issue relating to nuclear material reaching unauthorized actors, we should do our utmost in order to prevent theft or the unaccountability of radioactive material. Having said that, I am not convinced that non-State actors can on their own develop nuclear weapons or any other explosive nuclear device without the help of a State. The question therefore is one of ensuring that security measures are effective and implementable. I leave it to others more knowledgeable than myself to dwell on this issue during the forthcoming days of this conference.
Nevertheless, the matter that I have chosen to focus on has the potential of creating a rift, as if one more were needed, between those countries that are more fully developed, in the economic sense, and those, like my own, that are still climbing the steep learning curve of late industrialization, and many of those that, although at present in the lower rungs of development, may have to turn eventually to the peaceful applications of nuclear energy to increase their chances of achieving a modicum of prosperity and decent living conditions for their populations.
To foster the development of peaceful nuclear applications was a central part of the bargain struck at the creation of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. This bargain brought forth the IAEA and the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and later created the
political conditions for that treaty to become a permanent, quasi-universal regime.
Lately, however, concerns with non-proliferation have tended to monopolize everyone’s attention, to the detriment of the necessary balance that presides over that bargain. No issue is as central in that regard as the nuclear fuel cycle.
The crux of the matter here seems to be increasingly diverging views as to what the bargain is about. For those countries still struggling with climbing the slope of the learning curve of mastering that cycle, their efforts are protected by the “inalienable right” to develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.
Not every country, it should be added, has chosen to master the fuel cycle, or can afford to do so. Even so, it would seem that for some of those other countries that have already mastered that cycle, to allow any others to imitate them implies an unacceptable risk of diversion for nuclear weapon programmes.
The concern that peaceful nuclear programmes may be used as a cover for nuclear proliferation is shared by all. However, the proposals that have been made to counter this shared concern tend, on the one hand, to ignore the successful track record of the system of safeguards now in place for non-nuclear-weapon IAEA Member States, and, on the other hand, wrongly blame the NPT for alleged loopholes that are assumed to render it ineffective to combat nuclear proliferation.
The recurring allegations that the IAEA has failed in its efforts to check proliferation by means of its safeguards system cannot be substantiated. We know now that Iraq conducted an illegal nuclear programme, that Libya tried to obtain nuclear weapon technology and that Iran failed to declare nuclear activities for nearly two decades: all of this was uncovered under the aegis of the comprehensive safeguards system now in place.
Similarly, a level headed view of the facts proves NPT bashers to be wrong. In the 1960s it was projected that by 2000 about 30 States would be nuclear armed. The number is currently ten — that is, the five States that had crossed the nuclear weapon threshold before 1970 and another five States that are known to have nuclear weapons, or are suspected of having them, or are generally held as having the technical expertise and the political will to produce such weapons. Whatever interpretive flavour one may choose, the fact is that three out of five of those States adamantly refused to join the NPT regime, while one of the five has recently walked out of it, after years of less than subtle manoeuvres to hide its proliferation intentions.
Where does that leave us? Not surprisingly, a discussion based on flawed premises will not take us very far. I would like to point out major flaws in some of the proposals being fielded nowadays to curtail the dissemination of the
nuclear fuel cycle. Indeed, the current debate on the nuclear fuel cycle is inconsistent from the political, technological and legal standpoints. These inconsistencies may ultimately jeopardize the efforts of the international community in combating nuclear proliferation.
— To wilfully deny access to technology in order to curtail the number of countries that may conduct peaceful uranium enrichment activities unduly interferes with a process that has evolved naturally, as a result of market forces. Worse, this interference has the potential to disrupt and even reverse present trends. I refer here to the considerable number of countries that have mastered the technology of uranium enrichment but that have decided on their own to suspend its practical implementation or not to implement it at all, as a result of purely domestic considerations.
One may not discard the possibility that, faced with the prospect of prohi-bitions, embargoes or confiscation, many of these countries may choose to revisit their former decisions and to resume their activities in the field of enrichment.
— Prohibition or outright confiscation would create a new cleavage between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have nots’, which was admitted, as a very particular exception, in the case of nuclear weapons under the terms of the NPT bargain. Such a development would lead to a regrettable scenario, in which the goodwill of the international community would have led to the creation of a monopoly on the development of nuclear technologies to the sole benefit of those parties that currently lead the field.
— To offer guarantees of a steady flow of nuclear fuel to those parties that foreswear their NPT given rights is unrealistic to the point of naivety. It would be very unlikely for a State to relinquish its energy security and to transfer it to a cartel that would thus be institutionalized. It would also seem improbable that countries such as the United States of America would be willing to hand over the management of their enrichment or reprocessing facilities to international organizations.
— The current debate ignores the political and strategic dynamics of nuclear proliferation. Beyond strategic considerations caused by regional circum-stances (e.g. the Middle East or South Asia), one should include that the continuing relevance of nuclear arsenals in the military doctrine of certain countries, as well as the news of the impending development of new weapons and of de rigueur rationalizations to justify their use, even against non-nuclear States, are some of many sources of concern that may ultimately make it increasingly attractive to militarize a nuclear programme.
The debate on ways to check nuclear proliferation is a crucial one, especially in light of the risks posed by the possibility that nuclear material, equipment or technologies may fall into the hands of terrorists. Here are some issues that I believe merit close consideration in order to move our agenda forward:
— Nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament are two sides of the same coin. It would be unthinkable to implement a sustainable non-proliferation strategy, in the long run, in the absence of accompanying measures in the field of nuclear disarmament that are both concrete and multilaterally verifiable.
— The universalization of the NPT and its full and balanced implementation are necessary conditions for our efforts to attain sustainability.
— Strengthening domestic and international control of transactions involving fissile material and associated technologies is a must. In this context, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 is especially relevant, as it points the way to a workable control system.
— Non-proliferation should be approached in a holistic manner. Besides trying to understand the sources of proliferation dynamics, and to reduce tensions by diplomatic means, and strengthening domestic and interna-tional controls on transactions, it is also necessary to detect, monitor and lawfully forestall financial transactions and flows associated with illicit nuclear activities. In this context, best practices from other fronts, for example fighting international organized crime syndicates and illicit drug trafficking, could be harnessed in order to penetrate and dismantle the clandestine networks involved with dual use technologies.
— It should also be pointed out that we must correct the distortions that impair our ability to focus the current debate on nuclear technology development and utilization. Until recently, the main focus of debate was defined by the types of use of nuclear technology (i.e. military use or use for peaceful purposes). The current debate, however, has migrated to focus on assessing the user — that is, a spurious cleavage has begun to set in that attempts to distinguish between ‘responsible’ and ‘irresponsible’
States, a cleavage that ultimately only yields an increasing degree of arbitrariness in the system. Responsibility and irresponsibility relate to the historical record of compliance or failure to comply.