DESCRIPTION OF THE PROBLEM

We are facing a multifaceted problem characterized by the coexistence and combination of different possible scenarios. Although the threat of malicious acts involving radioactive material is global, there is a need for each country to assess and establish its own credible threat scenarios in order to adopt the measures that better address them, aiming at achieving a reasonable level of protection without imposing an undue burden on the beneficial uses of radioactive sources.

To identify the regulatory approach to possible malicious acts, consider-ation should be given to the following facts:

(a) There are still a significant number of orphan sources that could not only be found by innocent people or be subject to inadvertent movements, but also could be taken by people with a malicious intent.

(b) The existence of illicit trafficking of radioactive and nuclear material and the possibility that this material will be used with a malicious intent.

(c) Attempts to acquire such material or to sabotage a relevant installation with the aim of harming or terrorizing people or to cause disruption.

We consider that there is not a ‘one fits all formula’ to address these realities, but the existence of robust regulatory infrastructures and concerted actions taken at the international level certainly reduce the likelihood of malicious acts involving radioactive material. Measures to respond to such acts, in particular those associated with nuclear terrorism, should be commensurate with those credible threats that each country has established. A stepwise approach is advisable, in particular to recognize that it is not possible to protect radioactive material from all possible threat scenarios associated with potential

malevolent intents. The variables involved are infinite, thus the addition of security measures to the various uses of radioactive material should be based on definitions of credible situations, taking into account the risks associated with the sources. In this context, emphasis should be given to the prevention of and response to such events for high level radioactive sources.

3. ACHIEVEMENTS AND LESSONS LEARNED

Since the 1950s Argentina has established a control infrastructure based on knowledge of the risk associated with the deleterious effects of ionizing radiation, and an international philosophy for their assessment and limitation was developed. Registration, licensing and control of radioactive sources from the cradle to the grave have been essential features of our regulatory system. In this context, safety and security have always been closely related concepts.

As the nuclear regulatory authority with federal competence in radiation protection, nuclear safety, safeguards and physical protection, the Nuclear Regulatory Authority of Argentina (ARN) has established standards and regulatory requirements. It is also responsible for issuing licences and permits for any activity involving radioactive material and for controlling and verifying that these activities are performed in full compliance with ARN standards.

3.1. Nuclear security

With regard to nuclear security, the ARN has adopted a systematic approach at the national level based on the extrapolation of some physical protection criteria to the use, storage and transport of certain radioactive materials. It has also actively participated in the international efforts towards increasing nuclear security worldwide. On the other hand, the ARN considers that the IAEA’s promotion of the use of knowledge management techniques to develop process flows, map safety knowledge and encourage knowledge sharing and the establishment of regional nuclear and radiation safety networks to preserve and strengthen existing knowledge and expertise in these fields is important. Prominent examples are the Asian Nuclear Safety Network, established in the framework of the IAEA’s Programme on the Safety of Nuclear Installations in South East Asia, Pacific and Far East Countries, and the American Radiation Safety Network in the framework of the Ibero-American Forum of Nuclear Regulators. The results to date are most encouraging and suggest that this pioneering work should be extended to other regions and eventually to a global safety and security network.

Moreover, since the very beginning, Argentina has been involved in the preparation and process of approval of the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and is in full compliance with the criteria established in the Code of Conduct. This was also made clear when Argentina ratified its commitment to the Director General of the IAEA to support and follow such guidelines.

3.2. Import and export of radioactive material

The ARN is empowered to ensure that the import and export of radioactive material are made in agreement with the criteria established in the Code of Conduct, and in particular with the guidelines for the import and export of radioactive sources. These guidelines will enter into force towards the end of 2005 or beginning of 2006; however, Argentina has already implemented them fully.

3.3. Registered radioactive sources and material

Registered radioactive sources and material are under regulatory control, thus their illicit use would be prevented by this system, or, in the event of a breach involving those materials, there is a response scheme to allow the imple-mentation of rapid remedial actions. Despite the low probability of illicit trafficking in the region, we cannot exclude it; therefore it has been necessary to adopt measures of ‘security’ in addition to those of existing radiation safety.

In addition to this scenario, the possibility of malicious acts such as robbery, theft or sabotage to facilities with high radioactive inventories still exists, and the same is true in the case of the transport of radioactive material with a significant activity within national territory. A case under study by the ARN is the transport of ⁶⁰Co, as Argentina is one of the main producers of this radionu-clide and normally makes transports that involve inventories of the order of 55 TBq (1.5 × 10⁶ Ci). The measures adopted are similar to those of physical protection for the transport of nuclear material. In the case of installations handling high radioactive inventories (Class I installations, according to the classification in Ref. [1]), the ARN has established additional security measures based on its approach to physical protection.

3.4. Emergency preparedness and response

Originally, the ARN was the organization that defined the requirements for regulations in the prevention of and preparation for response to radio-logical and nuclear emergencies, and advised the acting municipal, provincial

and national official organizations. In addition, the ARN always had its own

‘on call’ specialized operative groups able to respond to emergency situations involving radioactive sources, to act when the capacity of a facility was exceeded or in emergencies that took place in public (e.g. in transport related accidents). In Argentina an average of ten annual interventions in minor emergencies have occurred in the past 40 years, and the ARN has participated directly, accompanying the intervening security forces (fire, police, gendarmerie, prefecture, etc.).

In the area of emergency preparedness at relevant nuclear facilities, the ARN not only established the requirements and advised the acting official organizations, but also controlled and participated actively in emergency drills for more than 20 years. In 1997, when the Nuclear Act was enacted, the ARN was assigned the function “to direct the emergency actions during nuclear emergencies in the off-site area”. From then on, the ARN began to organize, act in and direct nuclear emergency drills in which the coordinated actions of all the civil organizations and security and armed forces are carried out, all led by a centralized command led by an ARN operations head. For this new function the ARN follows the guidelines established in Ref. [2].

3.5. Specific training courses

Training courses and seminars at the national and regional levels are of great importance, not only for operators but also for the different control and security organizations. In this context it should be noted that the ARN has planned intensive training programmes at the national and regional levels (i.e.

through the Security Commission of MERCOSUR). These courses are delivered in cooperation with the IAEA, ICPO-Interpol, Department of Energy, National Customs Agency, national response forces and the intelli-gence community.

3.6. Conclusion

In summary, we can say that the ARN is executing different activities in the fields of prevention, legislation, response, training and exchange of information to further enhance the physical protection of nuclear material and the security of other radioactive material. We have come to the conclusion that the most effective approach to nuclear security in the prevention, early detection and response to illicit or malicious acts involving radioactive material is realized through the existence of a robust regulatory infrastructure in each country, a permanent exchange of information and contact between the nuclear regulatory body, customs authorities, intelligence agencies and security forces,

parts of a systematic process that implies knowledge and assumption of respon-sibilities by all the participating institutions, working in a coordinated manner.

4. A BROADER ARGENTINE PERSPECTIVE ON