THE NUCLEAR SECURITY PROJECT DURING THE 2004 ATHENS OLYMPIC GAMES

In order to achieve the full and successful deployment of security measures during the Olympic Games and to maintain a high level of nuclear and radiological security beyond the Games, official agreements between partners were signed, significant national funding was devoted and continuous technical and scientific support and training were planned.

The project adopted a multiarea coverage in order to leave no gaps in nuclear and radiological security; this was the first time in the world that such a full scale approach to nuclear and radiological security was implemented to protect a major international event. In the following paragraphs the basic axes of this project are presented.

2.1. First line of defence

The first line of defence aimed at the physical protection of nuclear and radiological facilities in order to prevent the theft or sabotage of radioactive material that had already been used or was stored in the country.

This project, coordinated by the GAEC, had three parts:

(a) In collaboration with the Demokritos National Centre for Scientific Research and the Ministry for the Environment, a programme started in 2002 aimed at the collection of unused radioactive sources in the country.

More than 700 radioactive sources (⁶⁰Co, ¹³⁷Cs, ⁹⁰Sr, ²⁴¹Am, ⁵⁷Co, ⁵⁷Kr, etc.) used in research, medical or industrial laboratories with a total activity of 1.4 TBq, and ten radiotherapy sources (⁶⁰Co and ¹³⁷Cs) with a total activity of 113 TBq, were collected and then exported for recycling.

In the same framework, the national waste management facility was significantly upgraded.

(b) Under the auspices of the IAEA and in the framework of the USDOE international safeguards programme, the physical protection system of the research reactor was upgraded beyond the requirements of INFCIRC/225. This upgrade included a new perimeter detection system, the installation of a new closed circuit television system using the latest state of the art charge coupled device night vision cameras, new main and backup lighting schemes and a new security control room.

(c) Under the USDOE Radiological Threat Reduction programme and in collaboration with Sandia National Laboratories, the physical protection of radiological material in Greece was enhanced. In particular, the physical protection systems of radiological installations in 22 hospital clinics and in a major industrial facility were strengthened.

2.2. Second line of defence

The second line of defence aimed at preventing radioactive material from being smuggled into the country. The GAEC, in collaboration with the IAEA and the Greek Customs Office, and under the US Second Line of Defense programme, applied state of the art technology at borders to detect illicit trafficking of radioactive or nuclear material. Specifically, 57 portal monitors and 456 pieces of handheld equipment were provided at 32 cargo and passenger entry points to the country, covering seven airports, 12 seaports and 13 land borders. The fixed systems contain gamma and neutron detectors. The handheld equipment is used for secondary control in places where fixed systems are installed, or for primary control at smaller entry points. These sets of equipment are composed of radiation pagers indicating the presence of radiation, gamma detectors to determine the radioactive source location and intensity, and spectrometers to specify the radionuclide.

2.3. Third line of defence

The third line of defence aimed at preventing dispersion of radioactive material in an Olympic venue. Radiation monitoring at venues was performed prior to and during the Olympic Games. More specifically:

(a) Radiation monitoring to find hidden strong sources in Olympic Games installations, including the Olympic village, was performed 1–2 days before the start of the Games, using specialized equipment (large volume NaI portable spectrometers, plastic scintillation detectors, radioisotope

identification devices, radiation pager alarms). Moreover, the measurement results were used as background signals for surveys that followed during the Games.

(b) Radiation monitoring at the entry points of the Olympic venues was performed continuously, in order to detect any attempts to bring radioactive material into the venues. This was achieved by permanently placing radiation pagers next to metal detectors at the gates of the venues, and by providing radiation pagers or personal radiation detectors to the security officers. In total 181 detectors and 32 identification systems were used for this purpose. During the big events the officers were assisted by GAEC scientific staff. A large number of the false alarms that occurred were due to persons who had undergone nuclear medicine examination or treatment procedures; these persons were provided with certificates issued for this purpose.

2.4. Emergency planning and response

According to its statutory role, the GAEC is responsible for emergency preparedness, advises the government on the measures and interventions necessary to protect the public and acts as the contact point for receiving information and communicating it to the emergency response systems. Since its establishment, it has participated in the Xenokratis National Emergency Plan for Civil Protection; moreover, during the Olympic Games the GAEC partici-pated in the NRBC threat emergency plan coordinated by the Olympic Games Security Division. According to this plan, the GAEC’s staff participated 24 hours a day for three months in the Crisis Management Support Group, in the response team and in the support team. The response team acts in hot and warm zones for on-scene monitoring, in zone determination and in identifi-cation and measurement of radiological contamination, issues radiation protection recommendations, and is involved with radioactive source recovery, dosimetry and decontamination supervision. In order to accomplish its tasks the following actions were realized:

(a) Collaboration with IAEA experts: scientists from the Commissariat à l’énergie atomique (CEA) in France visited the GAEC twice and provided advice and recommendations on the upgrade of its emergency response system.

(b) Infrastructure upgrading — provision, collection, checking, calibration and classification of:

(i) Measurement and detection systems (detectors, surveys, dosimeters, contamination monitors, portable spectrometers, pagers, etc.);

(ii) Protective equipment;

(iii) An independent communications system;

(iv) A mobile laboratory fully equipped with a series of detectors, spectrometers, protective equipment and a radiochemical laboratory.

(v) A specialized vehicle to collect radioactive sources.

(c) Development of a scientific library containing all recent publications relevant to nuclear and radiological safety and security.

(d) Provision, adaptation and prior use of dispersion calculation codes (Lasair, Hotspot, Hysplit).

(e) Documentation of all the procedures to be followed step by step in the event of an emergency.

(f) Training and exercises.

(g) Recruitment of additional staff.

2.5. Cooperation

This was a large scale cooperation project between several organizations.

Apart from the major partners already mentioned, the GAEC was involved with the following:

(a) Intensifying links with European and international organizations, emergency response systems and databases (ECURIE, IAEA Illicit Trafficking Database, ENATOM, etc.).

(b) Creating a network of collaborating laboratories at Greek universities or research centres countrywide; provision of training, equipment (hand-held detectors) and additional staff so as to be able to deal with an emergency in a location away from Athens.

(c) Through the Olympic Games Security Division, linking with more than 50 national organizations. Extensive cooperation in the area of intelligence between the partners helped the radiological emergency system become more efficient and effective.

(d) Staff participation in several committees, working groups, meetings, exercises and visits related to emergency response and planning.

2.6. Training

Aiming at the creation of a mechanism so that the persons involved in this project were trained to pursue their duties effectively, three paths were followed:

(a) Experts from the CEA provided training on emergency response issues to the GAEC, so as to create a nucleus for the dissemination of such knowledge in the country.

(b) Customs personnel were trained at the Hammer training facility in Richland, USA, and Pacific Northwest National Laboratories provided training to over 400 personnel in Greece.

(c) Organization of or participation in training programmes that included more than 3000 persons from the fire brigade, the International Airport of Athens, the Olympic Games Security Division, the customs service, radiological installations and the network of collaborating laboratories, as well as first responders, medical physicists and medical personnel from the main hospitals.

2.7. Sustainability

Greece attributes great importance to the sustainability of this project, so as to ensure continuously and globally a high level of radiological protection (including safety and security) in the country. For this reason, the Greek Government contributed significant national funds to the programme. All the Greek authorities involved have the appropriate personnel and technical infra-structure to support the programme. Furthermore, the GAEC contributed its knowledge to ensure a smooth operation of the systems in the future. More specifically, the GAEC has undertaken the responsibility of continuous training of customs officers, law enforcement officers and first responders, and provision of additional equipment to various authorities and institutions, as well as maintenance of the equipment used by the customs service and the calibration of all radiation detectors.

3. LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE 2004 ATHENS