Acceptability: Social impacts of energy supply

It is commonly said that there is no pure or clean energy: every step in energy production, transport and use has drawbacks. This does not mean that all energy fuels are equally desirable. Energy supply does have positive impacts for helping Brazilian development. However, this section focuses on the relevant negative social impacts of the energy supply technologies most important for Brazil. It also touches on political arguments from

different social groups in Brazil. Environmental and health aspects are discussed in Chapter 6.

7.3.3.1. Hydropower

Brazil has been building large hydropower plants since the 1960s. By 2002, the total installed hydropower capacity had reached 65 GW. Most of the plants were built during a period when there was very little concern about their environmental and social impacts. Environmental and relocation costs were largely underestimated or not considered at all. There was no prior discussion of technological alternatives for electricity generation, or of the sizes and shapes of the lakes to be created by large dams.

People were simply informed that the dam would be constructed and that they would need to move to another place. They were, very often, inadequately indemnified for their losses in an asymmetrical process of negotiation.

Over the years, and after many bad experi-ences, people have become more concerned about the dam construction process. Grassroots rural unions, Catholic Church representatives and social–

environmental groups have begun to raise public awareness about the negative impacts of large dams and to organize themselves for resistance, strength-ening their hand in negotiations. More recently, the power sector, under social pressure, has tried to incorporate social organizations into the overall process of building a hydropower plant. At present, there is a well established organization called the Brazilian National Movement of those Affected by Dams that is active throughout the country.

The main negative impacts related to the construction and operation of hydropower plants are normally suffered by those who used to live in the area and have had to move. In most cases, the newly relocated rural populations face a substantial loss relative to their previous standard of living. This includes, in particular, Brazil’s experiences with the Itaparica, Tucuruí, Sobradinho (see Box 7.2) and Balbina hydropower projects.

TABLE 7.8. ENERGY AND INCOME GINI INDEX BY REGION, 2000 [7.1] (based on Ref. [7.8])

Region

Brazil North (urban) Northeast South Southeast Midwest

Energy Gini index 0.594 0.674 0.769 0.443 0.461 0.555

Income Gini index 0.608 0.598 0.618 0.585 0.592 0.633

12 Decree 4 102 of 24 January 2002 provided for people with low incomes registered in any Federal social programmes to receive direct income transfers from the Brazilian Government to help purchase LPG.

The case of the Balbina plant, which led to an increase in malaria in the local Indian populations and a reduction in fishing catches, and which submerged valuable premium wood and 141 archae-ological sites, illustrates some of the other social impacts associated with dam construction, beyond the immediate impacts of relocation [7.24].

7.3.3.2. Nuclear power

Angra dos Reis, where the only two Brazilian nuclear power plants are located, is 130 km west of Rio de Janeiro and 220 km east of São Paulo, Brazil’s two most populated cities.

All spent nuclear fuel is stored at the plants, and the storage facilities can be enlarged if new material needs to be accommodated. Brazil does not currently have a plan for the long term storage or disposal of nuclear waste. The emergency plan for accidents is still under critical scrutiny.

As is evident from the range of national decisions on nuclear power around the world — from nuclear bans and phase-outs to heavy reliance on and significant expansion of nuclear power — not all countries think alike. Brazil’s Constitution explicitly states that nuclear power can only be used for peaceful purposes. In Brazil, the issue of public

acceptance is often raised in connection with nuclear power, and it is difficult to predict whether the public’s acceptance of nuclear power will change in the future. No regional or national polls have been carried out to assess public opinion on the nuclear power plants at Angra or the nuclear operations in the country as a whole.

Since 2001, the Ministry of Environment has organized several meetings in connection with the possible completion of Angra III to review the dif-ferent perspectives of organized institutions and social movements. The Ministry held meetings with three stakeholder groups: entrepreneurs, research-ers and scientists, and environmentalists. The princi-pal statements from each group, which should not be taken as representative of the whole of Brazil, are shown in Table 7.9.

7.3.3.3. Coal

The coal sector in Brazil, located in the South region, faces several constraints to growth and must deal with four major issues:

●Environmental liabilities derived from mining activities in western Santa Catarina State that affect sustainability, economic development

Box 7.2. Construction of the Sobradinho Dam [7.23]

Between 1976 and 1978, a total of 70 000 people were removed from the area of the São Francisco basin flooded for the Sobradinho Dam, which has an installed capacity of 1050 MW. A giant artificial lake was formed, measuring 350 km long and 10–40 km wide, and covering 4214 km², including seven districts in the State of Bahia, in the Northeast region of Brazil. It is worth describing the Sobradinho case to reveal some social and cultural aspects that go beyond the traditional energy indicators.

The region has a typical semi-arid vegetation, called caatinga, and the area’s inhabitants normally lived next to the river, where the land was suitable for agricultural activities. At the time the dam was constructed, State officials tried to convince the local population to move to a new colony project 700 km from the proposed site. However, because of the high costs involved, the planning team had decided not to include an irrigation alternative for the new land, which would have been essential for the families being relocated away from their homes along the river.

The dialogue that took place between the officials and the local peasants was difficult. The former could not understand why the latter did not want to move to the colony, where, in the officials’ view, they would find better living conditions, with electricity, running water and sewage systems.

The peasants’ position was based on their traditional way of life, which is highly dependent on the natural and cyclical river floods. Therefore, they simply wanted to stay along the lake’s borders. Moreover, they could not believe the water would actually reach the projected limits, because they had never before seen the river flood to that extent. They also believed that the utility’s representatives were trying to mislead them so their lands could be taken over by others once the waters had receded. At the last minute, many people had to escape from the rapid, artificial flood. Of the 8619 families that had originally lived in the area, 62% stayed in the region, at the lake’s borders.

TABLE 7.9. ARGUMENTS REGARDING NUCLEAR ENERGY ACCORDING TO THREE STAKE-HOLDER GROUPS [7.25]

Entrepreneurs

(nuclear and construction) Researchers/scientists Environmentalists Safety Angra I does not have a good

operational record; Angra II is much more reliable in

operational terms. The probability of an accident is remote.

The Angra complex must improve its safety measures.

Historically there has been a lack of transparency with respect to relevant information regarding operational problems at the plants.

The Angra nuclear complex is not safe; it is mainly the Angra I plant that has presented several technical problems. The emergency plan is not reliable and has never proved workable.

Fuel cycle knowledge Brazil has the sixth largest uranium reserves in the world and has the capacity to enrich uranium domestically.

Mutual inspections between Brazil and Argentina of radioactive material and of compliance with

Non-Proliferation Treaty procedures are important.

There are problems concerning overburdening in the retired Poços de Caldas region and operational and safety problems in the new uranium mine in Lagoa Real, in Bahia State.

Technological issues Technical skills should be stimulated.

It is important to develop technological nuclear capacity for sovereignty reasons;

however, military use must be prevented.

Technological capacity should be applied for proven safe

industrial and medical uses, besides monitoring and safety.

Importance to electricity supply

Nuclear plants are important for the national electric system.

The contribution of the Angra nuclear plants is relatively small.

Other options exist.

Completion of Angra III

Angra III should be built. Additional studies are necessary. There is no ‘for’ or

‘against’ position.

Construction should not proceed in any way.

Waste A solution to the problem of waste storage will be found, but nobody knows when.

Solutions to the problem of waste storage are not yet sufficient.

There is no satisfactory solution to the problem of waste storage.

We should not transfer environmental liabilities to future generations.

Costs Angra III should be built because US $750 million has already been spent on equipment. Angra III is important to the financial health of Eletronuclear, Brazil’s State owned nuclear electric generation utility.

US $20 million is spent annually just to store the equipment already bought.

Costs and investment projections are not reliable.

Costs for finalizing the construction of the plant may be much higher than projected (currently an additional US $1.8 billion).

Nuclear plants are too expensive. Other, cheaper options are available. There is no reason to subsidize nuclear plants.

Decommissioning Funding still has to be defined. Decommissioning should be funded by tariffs.

There are serious flaws concerning decommissioning funding. No reasonable structure exists. Liabilities will be transferred to future consumers.

Environmental impacts

Nuclear energy is ‘clean’

because there are no emissions of acids or greenhouse gases.

There are positive aspects regarding atmospheric gases and negatives aspects relative to radioactive waste.

Radioactive waste represents extremely serious impacts and should be considered

unacceptable.

and the security of the local population and the workers;

●Increased unemployment resulting from the cessation of coking coal production;

●Adverse competition with fuel oil and natural gas for industrial consumption, in particular in the cement and ceramics sectors;

●Mining health impacts and safety.

In Santa Catarina State, coal mining has led to contamination of surface and underground water sources through the solubilization of metallic compounds. There are strong conflicts among economic, social and environmental interests, mainly linked to the future availability of good quality water and coal extraction activities.

The recent strong opposition to coal fired plants scheduled to be built in Paraná, São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro States demonstrates awareness concerning unsustainable energy paths based on coal. In Rio de Janeiro, for instance, local authorities authorized the construction of a 1250 MW imported coal thermal power plant.

After a complex decision process that included politicians, industry lobbies and social and environ-mental movements, in which it was proved that emissions from the plant, together with other sources, would exceed regional limits for nitrogen oxides, the initial licence was revoked and the project suspended.

In summary, some urgent measures with important social benefits are needed, such as regen-eration of the South region’s underground water supply, reuse of the water used in the processing of coal, establishment of territorial limits to mining activities in order to preserve mountains and forests that allow the refilling of the aquifer, and improve-ments in the quality of underground water in that region.

7.3.3.4. Charcoal production

In Brazil, charcoal is mostly used as an input for pig iron smelters that supply the steel industry.

Charcoal production involves hazardous working conditions and extremely precarious living conditions [7.26]. Charcoal workers face physical risks of chronic fatigue due to lifting and stacking heavy logs, with up to 12 hours of work a day, including shifts during nights and weekends, which increases the risk of accidents on the job and the

loss of emotional control. They are also subjected to fine dust and smoke inhalation, causing skin irrita-tions, conjunctivitis and serious respiratory problems such as silicosis [7.27].

More than a century after slavery was abolished in Brazil, forced labour remains widespread. Even with efforts by the Federal Government and social movements during the past decade, violations of labour laws are still common, including the use of unregistered workers, low wages and lack of freedom for workers. In some regions, mainly Pará, Maranhão, Piauí, Tocantins and Mato Grosso States, people are recruited by labour contractors called gatos (Portuguese for

‘cats’) to work in remote areas. Increasingly smaller production areas are rented to subcontractors to avoid regulation and union organizing. Children work alongside their parents in remote areas far from towns, schools and medical facilities, and workers are often prevented from leaving the work premises by armed guards. They are often forced to buy food and supplies at inflated prices at company stores and thus constantly find themselves in debt, which represents a perverse indebtedness slavery system [7.28]. In recent years, however, modern industrial scale charcoal producers have made some improvements in order to comply with social and environmental laws.

Unfortunately, indebtedness slavery still occurs in several economic activities that often lead to deforestation, such as charcoal, sugar cane and other agricultural production. The case of charcoal presented here is just one example of how poor workers are forced to submit to this system. In 1995, a Special Mobile Enforcement Group was created, associated with the Ministry of Labour and Employment, to fight against labour irregularities and abuses. Between 1995 and 2001, the group inspected 770 labour units employing some 160 000 people and found 2232 workers in conditions of slavery [7.29]. In 2003, the group, with the support of the Federal police, managed to free almost 5000 workers. Despite some improvements — such as the increase of inspections that allow the imprisonment of workforce subcontractors and gradual improve-ment in the compliance with social and environ-mental laws — much more has to be done to abolish indebtedness slavery in Brazil and to improve working conditions in some economic activities in Brazil.

7.4. ENERGY PRODUCTION AND JOB