Reconsidering Brazil’s status as an emerging power among the developing countries, a goal neglected by Cardoso’s government becomes evident in the current diplomacy towards multilateral diplomatic initiatives. That can be clearly noticed in Brazil’s efforts to create and develop IBSA (India-Brazil-South Africa Dialog Forum) and ASA (Africa-South America Summit), two initiatives that are starting concrete actions in many fields, and are [91] working toward the strengthening of South-South cooperation.
The IBSA Trilateral Forum was created to foster coordination and cooperation among the three emerging countries (India, Brazil and South Africa) in the international arena, based on their economic, political and cultural synergies, as well as on their common interests and ambitions regarding the international order – specially related to the Doha Round, on the World Trade Organization (WTO), to the UN reforms and to the construction of a New Economic Order 157. And even though it is often criticized, it is attracting much attention, partly due to the fact that its leaders keep annual meetings.
Working groups are also very active in developing activities on health, science and technology, security, trade and transport, investment and a diplomatic focus on their political potential to build a multipolar world and to improve the multilateral order. In the third IBSA Forum, held in New Delhi, in October of 2008, the leaders of the three countries reaffirmed their political engagement toward South-South cooperation, reaffirming their intention to act together in a context of international crisis, criticizing the Northern countries for
157 On this topic, see Paulo Fagundes Visentini, Marco Cepik and Analúcia Pereira, G-3 – Fórum de Diálogo IBAS. Uma experiência de Cooperação Sul-Sul, Curitiba, Juruá, 2010.
their abusive financial system and disregard toward the developing countries. In that sense, IBSA also presents itself as a most relevant mechanism of rapprochement with South Africa – which has always been its main economic partner in the continent – as well as with other African nations.
On the other hand, the first South America-Africa Summit (ASA), held in Nigeria, in 2006, was another initiative proposed by the Lula government, representing a great opportunity to improve relations with Africa in a [92] South-South context. The Summit resulted in the Abuja Declaration, ASA’s main document, in which the signatory states recognize the need to intensify cooperation within the group as an alternative to the unequal economic international order. The Summit also created an executive organ, ASACOF, whose activities will be coordinated by Nigeria in the African side, and Brazil in the South American side. The two countries have been leading the efforts towards the new multilateral mechanism that led to the first Summit.
Like IBSA, it embraces a wide range of themes, from cooperation in multilateral forums to strategic partnerships in a variety of fields – such as governance, rural development, trade and investment, infrastructure, among others. Its second summit took place in Venezuela, in May 2009.
Another important initiative was the first Summit of South American-Arab Countries (ASPA), held in May 2005, in Brasília, gathering 34 leaders from both regions including the nations of Northern Africa. The second Summit took place in Doha, Qatar, in 2009, and the third would have been held in Lima, Peru in 2010, but it was postponed due to the events of the so-called “Arab Spring” which affected the region. It is important to underline that the implementation of the ASPA Summits were criticized openly by the United States who tried to prevent its realization.
According to Alcides Vaz (2006), Eugenio Diniz (2006) and Marco Cepik (2009) 158, security gained more attention from the Brazilian government recently due to the admission that lack of enemies does not entail stability. Thus, many questions were brought
158 See Eugenio Diniz, “Relacionamentos multilaterais na unipolaridade : uma discussão teórica realista” (2006) Contexto Internacional, vol. 28 issue 2, p.
505-565 and Marco Cepik, Nota Técnica sobre o Sistema Brasileiro de Inteligência, (Centro de Gestão e Estudos Estratégicos, 2009. Online.
to the center of the national defense’s preoccupations such as terrorism, instability in the Andean region, maintenance of communications lines in the South Atlantic, control of [93] toxic and radioactive cargo, traffick of firearms and narcotics, the protection of oil and of the Brazilian maritime commerce in the South Atlantic 159.
Hence, in 2005, the new National Defense Politics 160 was launched.
It focused on disarmament, engaging in peace missions, fostering peace in the South Atlantic, collaborating with the armed forces of friendly countries and investing in technologic development opportunities in order to reduce external dependency. It also defined South America, South Atlantic and the African Western coasts as strategic regions for Brazil, besides prioritizing the countries of the CPSC. The IBSA joins the three main vectors of the new defense policy : peacekeeping and South Atlantic lines of communication ; the pursuit of commercial opportunities for the defense industry ; and technological development, in order to guarantee a stable and predictable offer of resources in the area. There is an important cooperation in this sector with South Africa, as both countries have similar interests in the area.
In this regard, the establishment of defense alliances is facilitated when the states are regional powers located in different regions, but with similar preoccupations, concerning, for instance, the protection of the oceans. It is then plain to see the interest in cooperating within the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, both with relevant geostrategic dimensions. Its importance grew recently with the discovery of energy resources such as gas and oil, especially on the Brazilian and African coast, with the Pre-Sal. Thus, it is necessary to increase regional security, reassuring the sovereignty of these states over those resources and avoiding the militarization of the area by extra-regional powers which would compromise the use of the resources for the IBSA members.
[94]
For Brazil this issue is a priority since 80% of its oil is extracted from the sea. Hence the transport issue. South Africa’s geographic position becomes even more strategic with the increasing maritime
159 Equivalent to 95% of the national commercial flows.
160 However it does not break with the national defense policy of 1996.
traffic between South America, Africa and Asia, made possible by the projection of powers like Brazil, China and India in these regions. For Brazil, the Cape of Good Hope presents itself as an alternate route to the Pacific Ocean, controlled by United States, or by Panamá Canal, already saturated. Furthermore, the Suez Canal is currently hampered by the increasing size of the vessels (already too large and heavy), and by the danger of piracy off the Somali coast. These factors have contributed to the rise in the number of oil tankers crossing the Cape of Good Hope from 30 to 50 per month a decade ago, to 90 or 100 per month currently.
Regarding its defence capabilities, Brazil ranks second only to India among the members of IBSA, but first in Armed Forces expenditure. However, 80% of the amount spent by Brazil goes to wages, pensions and debts, unlike India and South Africa. Thus, there is little investment in maintenance and modernization of equipments, contributing to the fact that Brazil has the most deficient Armed Forces of the group. This situation is even more serious in the Navy which seems inefficient even by comparison to South American forces, due to a deficit of weapons and lack of maintenance.
According to Cepik and Diniz, the only sector in which Brazil has a better situation is aeronautics, in spite of the fact that the Brazilian defense industry is virtually reduced to EMBRAER which, however, depends on imported components mainly from the US 161.
India and South Africa have a more developed production policy, the former having its own defense industry and [95] exporting, but depending on Russia, and the latter relying on a vast industry of wheeled vehicles, sensors, artillery, ammunition, and an ability to adapt their systems to the needs of other countries, as well as a government policy forbidding sales to countries in conflict, thus requiring new customers. In this regard, Brazil could benefit from cooperation with both countries adding trade possibilities and maintenance of infrastructure, human resources, training and joint action in peacekeeping missions. Furthermore, as the purchases in defense always involve a political component, strengthening relations between countries in the IBSA context can facilitate the process.
161 See Cepik, supra note 13.
Nevertheless, the advances have been less important than expected, making few progresses besides the signature of the Brazil-South Africa Defense Agreement, in 2003, the creation of the India-Brazil Joint Committee proposal, in 2007, and the implementation of the First Brazil-India Strategic Dialogue in the same year. One of the reasons for the slow progress may come from the fact that India is in a very unstable region which limits the resources it can invest in cooperation. Since this country has the biggest military capacity in the group, this tends to be a major impediment. On the other hand, Brazil is using an unusual approach in the defense area focusing on soft power and on diplomacy in order to solve questions. Hence, its interest in the group may be linked to the possibility of alignment with other countries with similar positions in multilateral forums (especially South Africa), not so much in buying and developing weapons, which may be understood as a lack of initiative.
Another issue worth noting is that the Brazilian Navy uses the concept of Amazônia Azul (Blue Amazonia) for the South Atlantic Area which covers the Special Economic Zone (of 200 nautical miles) and parts of the continental [96] shelf, with a total maritime area of 4 451 000 km² (8 5 million km²). It represents an area of particular interest for the security, the economy and for Brazilian sovereignty generally. It reaches out to the South Atlantic Ocean heading to Angola (Trinidade and Martim Vaz Islands, 1 200 km from the Brazilian coast) and to Liberia (Fernando de Noronha Archipelago and Atolls of St. Peter and St. Paul, the last 1 400 km off the Brazilian coast). The Brazilian coast is 4 941 km long, dominating most of the western shore of the South Atlantic, ending in the same south latitude as the African shore. Despite its outdated equipment, the Navy represents the most advanced strategic designs and is renewing its fleet of submarines, including a nuclear submarine.