There is little doubt that Canada’s future economic, political and security objectives are at stake in the Americas – especially since it is our geographic home and where many of our core foreign policy interests are directly affected. 240 Moreover, Canada has a tremendous opportunity, as a leading member of the OAS, to really “punch above its weight” in the Americas. And there is no better time to do so as
240 By way of illustration, Canada now has some 68 trade commissioners for Latin America and only 25 for the entire African continent. See Campbell Clark, “Africa sets its eyes on a brighter future, but Canada’s vision is as murky as ever” Globe and Mail, May 12, 2010, A1.
U.S. President Barack Obama, who visited the region in March 2011, moves to position the United States in a more favourable light in the hemisphere. After all, we have many natural advantages that are simply not available to the U.S. (including a lack of historical baggage of intervention and a general perception of having no hidden agenda), and this puts us in an enviable position to capitalize on enhancing our hemispheric linkages. (It is also true that Canada’s enhanced role in the Americas could pay important diplomatic dividends in Washington as well. 241) But to do so effectively and prudently, politicians and policy-makers in Ottawa need to craft a much better thought out plan of action or strategy.
Prime Minister Stephen Harper, and most likely any future Prime Minister of Canada, has obviously placed important emphasis on our relations with the Americas. In part, this is because much of the region has embraced democratic pluralism, free market liberalism and exhibited signs of a growing middle class among its 600 million people (many of them young). As his government’s 2009 core statement on the region explained : “The Americas are and will remain a foreign policy priority for Canada. Canadians have much to gain by being involved in the region, and they also have much to contribute.” 242 In fact, as the 2009 document went on [156] to state :
“Canada is a country of the Americas. By geography, history and multi-faceted relationships between states, in terms of trade, immigration and cultural and social exchanges, the Americas is a region of strategic, domestic and international interest for Canada.” 243 To be sure, Canada stands to reap huge benefits from a political/diplomatic, economic, strategic and people-to-people standpoint. But first, we need to properly prepare the terrain. 244
241 Former Canadian diplomat, Colin Robertson, makes this same point in his piece, “Embracing The Americas, Starting With Mexico”, May 2011, Policy Options, pp. 40-44.
242 DFAIT, supra note 2.
243 Ibid.
244 When the new grouping of countries – the so-called Community of Latin American and Caribbean States – met for its February 2010 inaugural gathering in Mexico, only Canada and the United States were not invited to attend. Perhaps it was nothing. But perhaps it was a sign that Canada needs to make its presence more widely felt in the region. See also, Jeff Davis,
“Two Years Into the Americas Strategy” Embassy Magazine, April 29,
As for Harper’s overall Americas strategy, particularly in light of his May 2011 majority government victory, more work obviously needs to be done. Clearly, some steps have been taken to strengthen Canada’s standing in the region, including visits to the region by the PM and Governor General, senior ministers and deputy ministers, and representatives from civil society. But the centrepiece thus far appears to be the signing of free trade deals and investment pacts with a handful of countries to date, with some still in the works. On the downside, our response to the 2009 Honduran crisis, our frosty relations with countries like Cuba, Venezuela and Bolivia, the imposition of a visa requirement for Mexicans, and a less than vigorous posture within the OAS, all point to an Americas strategy tainted by ideological blindness, overly commercial interests, and overarching Canada-U.S. considerations. In short, Mr. Harper needs to take off his (extremely narrow) ideological blinkers, and adopt a more balanced and pragmatic approach to the region.
Like Mr. Trudeau’s early 1970s gambit, the Harper approach lacks sufficient financial resources and staff allocations, the necessary political will and staying power, and a far more nuanced approach to the region. Put another way, the Harper government has tended to create needless divides in the region (such as free traders versus [157]
non-free traders, or democrats versus non-democrats), deliberately starting petty diplomatic fires with the Cubans or Venezuelans, and exhibiting a seeming unwillingness to listen to civil society groups throughout the region, and regional specialists who disagree with Mr.
Harper’s views. Indeed, one can scarcely point to Canada’s image, profile and prestige being substantially elevated under the Harper policy thrust. 245 It is hard to argue convincingly that Canada has succeeded in making itself a part of the Americas firmament any more than it has under previous Canadian governments going back to the 1970s.
Harper, of course, is certainly not the first Prime Minister to over-promise and under-deliver (to say nothing of under-funding, since no
2010, p. 13.
245 The key assumptions underpinning why Canada has moved to embrace the Americas is covered, though in critical tones, in Jean Daudelin, “Foreign policy at the fringe : Canada and Latin America”, International Journal, 2003, vol. 58, issue 4, pp. 638-39.
new money was allocated to underpin his Americas strategy) when it comes to the Americas, as evidenced by Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau’s singling out of Latin America in his only foreign policy review, Foreign Policy for Canadians. Brian Mulroney, for his part, crafted a strategy for the region (largely under the tutelage of then-Foreign Affairs Minister Joe Clark), and finally brought Canada to the OAS table as a full-fledged member. Jean Chrétien, though lukewarm about the Americas, did bring his Team Canada concept to the region in search of new trade markets and a counterweight to the United States. But there has been no major breakthrough so as to entrench Canada in this hemisphere for the foreseeable future. Indeed, there has been lots of talk and declaratory policy about enhancing Canada’s engagement with the region. But it has mostly been empty rhetoric (often ideologically tinged) and trade-fixated, where deeds have not matched our flowery rhetoric, and where there has been precious little in terms of appreciable follow-through. 246
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In part, Canada needs to get back doing what we do best – that is, by applying middle power diplomacy to the Americas through talking less and listening more, fashioning pragmatic and well-conceived policy ideas, avoiding (ideologically-based) division and finding a consensus or middle ground, and striving to build bridges and unite governments around common themes of interest. Stated differently, the last thing that Canada needs is an Americas policy driven primarily by rigid ideological considerations and trade/investment deals that benefit local élites. Of course, no one is suggesting that any of this is going to be easy, let alone cost-free. But that is the price of studious policy neglect and deficient political will over the decades.
Surely it is time, though, to put an end to triumphantly “discovering”
the Americas every ten years or so. In a word, Canada must, for reasons of national interest and community-building, become a permanent fixture in our own hemispheric neighbourhood. In the end, an Americas strategy should not just be fine words and breathless
246 This comment is not intended to disparage the work of previous Canadian Foreign Affairs Ministers like Allan MacEachen, Barbara McDougall, Lloyd Axworthy and Bill Graham on hemispheric affairs. The fact remains that they did not make the Americas a top priority deserving of sustained foreign policy attention.
intentions cobbled together in a glossy brochure. What really talks is money and political will. Sadly, those are still in short supply where Canada’s approach to the Americas is concerned.
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Communautés atlantiques / Atlantic Communities : asymétries et convergences.