American rule in Moroland began with the arrival of troops at Jolo in May of 1899. The troops could hardly be spared from the war in the north, but there was concern that the Sulu Sultanate would make common cause with the Filipino insurgents against the United States. General Otis felt obliged to establish the American presence in Sulu before the Spanish troops had been completely withdrawn. The concern was justified on two counts: 1) the Spaniards, giving up all hope of being relieved by the Americans, had already turned over Siasi to the government of the Sultan and were preparing to turn over Jolo as well;12 and 2) the Filipino insurgents had actually initiated correspondence with the Sultan of Sulu looking toward some sort of alliance.13 On January 18, 1899, President Aguinaldo addressed a letter to his “great and powerful brother, the Sultan of Jolo,” pledging that the Philippine Republic would “respect absolutely the beliefs and traditions of each island in order to establish on solid bases the bonds of fraternal unity demanded by our mutual interests.” Aguinaldo gave the Sultan the “highest assurance of friendship, consideration and esteem.”
At the end of May, the President’s cousin, Baldomero Aguinaldo, who commanded the “Southern Region” of the Philippine Republic, wrote the Sultan authorizing him to establish in all the rancherias (the territorial domain of a datu or sultan) of Mindanao and Sulu a government in accordance with decrees of the Republic.
The Sultan was requested to report the number of his forces and the results of his efforts.
He was advised that “if in this war … we secure our independence and … are successful in preventing the enemy from gaining foothold, the grateful country will always render a tribute of homage and gratitude to your memory.” The Sultan gave no response to these appeals – possibly because neither he nor his advisers could see any real gain in allying themselves with their traditional enemies, the Christian Filipinos.
Since the Americans could not risk the eventuality of a Moro alliance with the insurgents, they moved to occupy Sulu. An eye-witness account of the transfer of Jolo from Spanish to American hands was penned by Pvt. Needom N. Freeman of “H”
Company, 23rd Infantry:
I learned that the commanding officer, who was an old man had been there twenty-eight years. In the evening at two o’clock [sic] the Spanish flag on the block-house was hauled down by the Spanish soldiers and the Americans unfurled to the breeze the Stars and Stripes. The Spanish seemed to be very much grieved, the officers wept; the Americans were jubilant. Everything passed into our hands, and the various responsibilities of the place with all its dangers
12 Otis in ARWD (1899), I, Part 4, p. 133.
13 See Worcester, I, pp. 227, 229-230 from which the quotations from the Aguinaldo letters below are taken. The letters are found in the Philippine Insurgent Records.
also passed to us. The natives, who belong to the Moro [sic] tribe, are treacherous. Guards were put on duty at once …14
Orders for the occupation of Sulu were logical and plain: relieve the Spanish forces; gradually extend American jurisdiction over the Sultanate; and do this in such a manner as to cause a minimum of friction with the people, for no reinforcements could be expected for a long time. Soon after the arrival of the troops, detachments were sent to man the abandoned Spanish posts at Siasi and Bongao. In command of the latter post was Capt. Sydney A. Cloman who early decided that the “rules of the game” were going to be changed for the American soldiers in Bongao:
I had learned something of the Spanish regime at Jolo, and my first thought on seeing Bongao was that we would have no use for the block house, except as a store house. We would not shut ourselves within its walls and permit the Moros to yell nightly about the place and fire at it, accustomed as they were to this innocent diversion. Furthermore, we were not going to be shut up even on Bongao Island. While we were on the subject of changing the rules of the game, they might as well understand that we were going about the group as we pleased and that we would have to be protected from their present idea that the white man was fair game wherever found. Carrying out this principle afterward caused some loss of life, but before I left there the new rules were fairly understood …15 The American occupation of Sulu raised certain questions of international import.
It was discovered that the territorial limits of the cession delineated in the Treaty of Paris included the bulk of the Sulu Sultanate but did not include the islands of the Cagayan de Sulu group, the island of Sibutu and certain other smaller islands which in Spanish times were considered part of the Sultanate. In an additional treaty with Spain, signed in Washington on November 7, 1900, the United States acquired title to “any and all islands belonging to the Philippine Archipelago, lying outside the lines described in Article III”
of the Treaty of Paris. Spain received a payment of $100,000 for relinquishing her claims on these islands.16
There were other islands, considered part of Sulu, where Dutch and British flags flew, which necessitated diplomatic negotiations between the United States and these nations. The island of Miangas (Palmas) at the southern extremity of Sulu, for example,
14 Quoted in Horace P. Hobbs, Kris and Krag: Adventures Among the Moros of the Southern Philippines (1962), p. 43. The Spanish commanding officer could not have been in Jolo 28 years – the Spaniards had a government in Jolo for only 22 years (since 1876) and according to Vic Hurley (p.282) the last military governor was Col. Luis Huerta who served from 1896 to 1899.
15 Sydney A. Cloman, Myself and a Few Moros (New York: Doubleday, Page & Co., 1923), p.9.
16 The text of the “Treaty for Cession of Outlying Islands of the Philippines, November 7, 1900” is found in Forbes, II, Appendix VIII.
was visited by Gen. Leonard Wood, first Governor of the Moro Province, in January 1906. He was surprised to find that island under the de facto government of the Dutch East Indies authorities. The United States and Holland disputed the island until April 1928, when the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague ruled in favor of Holland.17 Moreover, the Protocol signed in 1885 by Germany, Great Britain and Spain gave the first two powers certain commercial privileges and preference in the Sulu Archipelago (as well as on Balanguingi Island and in the port of Sandakan). After Spain ceded the
Philippines to the United States, Germany and Great Britain asserted that their
commercial rights in Sulu remained in effect. But Charles A. Magoon, Law Officer of the U.S. War Department’s Division of Insular Affairs, advised those powers “that upon the cession of the Sulu Archipelago by Spain to the United States the treaties of Spain respecting trade with the islands ceased to exist.”18
The arrival of the Americans was an unpleasant surprise to 30-year old Sultan Jamal-ul Kiram II, who had recently returned from a pilgrimage to Mecca. At the time, he was in Siasi whence he had gone to receive the place officially from the Spaniards.
He had expected to have Jolo surrendered to him as well. It appears, however, that some of the datus on Jolo Island were not an amicable terms with him so they virtually
welcomed the American troops. A few datus called on Captain Pratt, expressed their friendly intentions and pledged loyalty to the United States. When Captain Pratt returned the calls, he and his officers were hospitably entertained and the Sultan’s mother,
Pangyan Inchy Jamila, also graciously received them at her residence at Maimbung.19 The Sultan, disappointed at the turn of events, lingered at Siasi where he had established a police force and garrison. He did not respond to an invitation to call on the American officers. He did nothing actively to oppose the new occupation, but neither was he
17 Forbes, I, pp. 79-80. See also Report of the Governor of the Moro Province, 1906, p.31.
18 U.S. War Department, Division of Insular Affairs, Reports on the Law of Civil Government in Territory Subject to Military Occupation by the Military Forces of the United States, by Charles A. Magoon
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1902), p.302. See also S.K. Tan, “Sulu Under American Military Rule, 1899-1913” (M.A. thesis, University of the Philippines, 1966), pp. 58-60. (The thesis has been published in the Philippine Social Science and Humanities Preview, XXXII/1, 1967, but all references to it in the present study cite the original typescript.) This was a strong ruling indeed considering that it was (and is) a principle of international law that succeeding governments honor the international agreements entered into by preceding governments.
19 The American authorities seemed determined to reciprocate and maintain the friendship of the influential Sultana. Thus in 1901 we find General W.A. Kobbe presenting her with a large, silken American flag on behalf of the U.S. Government “as a mark of our personal esteem and the high appreciation in which you are held by the American people.” See letter of Major O.J. Sweet to Sultana Inchy Jamila, June 20, 1901, in Hugh Lenox Scott Papers (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress), Container 55. (Henceforth this collection is referred to as Scott Papers.) That same year, Major Sweet wrote to the Sulu dowager that the new government steam launch in use at Jolo had been named “Sultana”
in her honor and “I express the hope that she may render us as good service as ever as the Sultana of Jolo.”
See ARWD (1901), I, Part A, p.341.
friendly.20 Possibly persuaded by the good behavior of the Americans and their promises not to interfere with the religion of the Moros, the Sultan issued a cautiously worded warning in a proclamation to his subjects, the substance of which was as follows:
The Americans have come here in exchange for the Spaniards, they are a different people from the Spaniards, and it will not be good to “juramentado”
against them. They did not come to take our lands, religion or customs. They leave us our laws, and if you love yourselves and your country avoid coming to blows with the Americans, because they are like a matchbox – you strike one and they all go off.21
It is possible, though by no means certain, that later the Sultan was further influenced to acquiesce in the presence of the Americans by a communication from Sultan of the Ottoman Empire, who was recognized as the Caliph of Sunni Islam. Nathan Straus, the American Minister to Turkey, reported in September of 1899 that he had an audience at the Sublime Porte regarding the possible Moro resistance to the American occupation of Moroland:
Having referred to this subject, he (the Sultan of Turkey) said immediately following my audience with him … he had telegraphed to Mecca, it being the time of the annual pilgrimage, his wishes that the Moslems in the Philippines should not war with the Americans, nor side with the insurgents, but should be with our army, and that, as I assured him (the Sultan), the Americans would not interfere with their religion and would be as tolerant toward them as he was toward the Christians in his Empire. He added … that he was glad that there had been no conflict between our army and the Moslems, and that he certainly hoped their religion would in no manner be interfered with. I replied of this he could certainly feel satisfied, that religious liberty was the chief corner stone of our political institutions.22
In June the President of the First Philippine Commission, Dr. Jacob Schurman, visited Sulu to study local conditions. Dr. Schurman succeeded in interviewing the Sultan and sought to get him to agree to a renewal of the agreement made with Spain in 1878. The sovereignty of the United States would be substituted for that of Spain. The Commission apparently was seeking to accomplish by diplomacy what the United States was not prepared to impose by military means. The Sultan hesitated. He wanted better terms, but Dr. Schurman refused to consider anything beyond the limits of the Treaty of
20 General Otis in ARWD (1899), I, Part 4, p. 133.
21 “The Sulu Treaty … and Other Domestic Relations” (Washington: Insular Division, May 24, 1901, typescript), p. 6. A copy of this paper is deposited in the Bureau of Insular Affairs Division of the National Archives in Washington, D.C., BIA Records file No. 980.
22 Quoted in Clifford N. Smith, “A History of the Moros: A Study in Conquest and Colonial Government”
(Unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Chicago, 1948), p. 64.
1878. In the end, the Sultan reportedly made a verbal agreement to acknowledge American sovereignty according to the same terms provided in the 1878 treaty.
Schurman cabled Washington recommending a plan for making similar agreements with other Moro chieftains. President McKinley, who had entertained doubts as to the
sovereignty of Spain over the Sulu Sultanate, promptly directed that a formal agreement be made with the Sultan.23
The tactful behavior of Captain Pratt and his officers together with the diplomatic spade-work of the Schurman Commission did much to prepare the way for the
negotiations with Sultan Jamal-ul Kiram II conducted by Brig. Gen. John C. Bates, U.S.V., during July and August of 1899.24
THE BATES AGREEMENT
Arriving in Jolo about mid-July, General Bates carried with him rather explicit instructions form General Otis, the Military Governor of the Philippines:
The United States has succeeded to all the rights which Spain held in the Archipelago, and its sovereignty over the same is an established fact. But the inquiry arises as to the extent to which that sovereignty can be applied under the agreement of 1878 with the Moros … The Moros acknowledged, through their
23 J.G. Schurman, Philippine Affairs: A Retrospect and Outlook (New York: Scribners, 1902), pp.15-18.
See also Dorothy Rogers, “A History of the American Occupation and Administration of the Sulu Archipelago, 1899-1920,” (Unpublished M.A. thesis, University of San Francisco, 1959), pp. 12-14,22.
Dr. Schurman’s role in the shaping of initial U.S. policy towards the Sulu Sultanate is by no means universally recognized and, in most accounts of the American occupation of Sulu, is completely ignored.
He claimed that the Bates Agreement was based on his recommendation (Report of the Philippine
Commission, 1900, I, p.101), but James A. LeRoy says: “It [Schurman’s role] also is now quite uniformly recognized to have constituted a hindrance rather than a help toward consistent governmental policy.”
Schurman’s personal efforts in the Philippines were frequently denigrated by many of his contemporaries because of his strong anti-imperialist convictions. James A. LeRoy, The Americans in the Philippines, II (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1914), p.118.
24 Perhaps this is the place to mention that Thomas H. Haynes, an Englishman who lived briefly in Jolo in the 1880’s and who was a friend of Sultan Badar-ud Din II claims to have drafted, on behalf of the Sulu Sultanate, an “Appeal” to the President of the United States for a formal accord of protection. The draft was prepared in 1899 in both English and Malay and sent out to the Sultan for signature from the author’s home in Great Britain. According to Haynes the Appeal was adopted and dispatched by the Sultan. This writer has found no mention of such a document anywhere else but in Haynes’ pamphlet, The Philippines and the Sulu Sultanate (London: Baines & Scarsbrook Ltd., 1927), p. 8. However, the pamphlet is so filled with historical inaccuracies (including the author’s obvious ignorance of the fact that Jamal-ul Kiram II was the ruler on whose behalf he drafted the Appeal, and that he was still the Sultan in 1927 – see p. 17) that doubt is cast on the credibility of many of its allegations. The pamphlet is in general criticism of American policy in Sulu.
accepted chiefs, Spanish sovereignty and their subjection thereto, and that nation in turn conferred upon their chiefs powers of supervision over them and their affairs. The kingly prerogatives of Spain, thus abridged by solemn concession, have descended to the United States, and conditions existing at the time of transfer should remain. The Moros are entitled to enjoy the identical privileges which they possessed at the time of transfer, and to continue to enjoy them until abridged or modified by future mutual agreement between them and the United States to which they owe loyalty, unless it becomes necessary to invoke the exercise of supreme powers of sovereignty to meet emergencies. You will therefore acquaint yourselves thoroughly with the terms of the agreement of 1878 and take them as a basis for your directed negotiations.
Probably you will discover that the Sultan and datos are laboring under the mistaken impression that Spain, upon withdrawing recently her military forces from the islands, reconveyed sovereignty to them. This claim on their part is mentioned in the memorandum citing the action of the United States troops at Jolo, and may be seriously entertained by them because of the reported Spanish action in placing them in possession of Siasi accompanied by promises to likewise turn over Jolo.
If they seriously entertain such an illusion it will require tact and adroitness to dispel it, and a discussion of the United States’ benevolent intentions, and its wish to establish friendly relations with them in order to carry out those intentions, should precede any decided attempt at correction.
… It is greatly desired by the United States … for the welfare of both the United States and the Moros, that mutual friendly and well-defined relations be established … The United States will accept the obligations of Spain under the agreement of 1878 in the matter of money annuities, and in proof of sincerity, you will offer as a present to the Sultan and datos ten thousand dollars, Mexican, with which you will be supplied.25
The American authorities in 1899 seemed to be unaware of the significance of their seeking to step directly into the shoes of the Spaniards in Moroland. What they had in mind was to get Moro acknowledgement of the fact that the United States had
succeeded to the status of sovereign in Moroland. But the Americans did not seem to understand that the Treaty of 1878 had been, from the view point of the Sulu Moros, nothing more than a modus vivendi with Spain, the limits of which the Moros were constantly testing. The emoluments paid by Spain to the Sultan were regarded by him as something in the nature of tribute in exchange for his “co-operation” in keeping the Sulus peaceful. Again from the Moro viewpoint, the United States in 1899 was seeking to occupy exactly the same irritating position that Spain had held in Sulu but which the
25 Treaty with the Sultan of Sulu, Senate Document 136, 56th Congress, 1st session (Washington: 1900), pp.
3-5.
Americans little realized that in seeking to step into Spanish shoes they were likely also to inherit Spain’s problems with the Moros.
Whatever the Sultan may have said to Dr. Schurman in June, a month later he dragged his feet in negotiations with General Bates. It was difficult indeed for the Sultan and his followers to understand how the Americans had any claim to sovereignty over Sulu or how it was possible for Spain to “sell” or cede their territory without their knowledge. The situation was delicate and the American authorities were apprehensive that the Sultan might yet ally himself with the rebellious Filipinos in the northern islands and might even inspire the Moros of Mindanao to do likewise. The Americans wished to get the signatures of the Sultan and his more powerful datus on a paper which expressed their acknowledgment of United States sovereignty. They sought to do this without so antagonizing the Moros as to drive them into an alliance with Filipino insurgents or rising in rebellion on their own volition.
For over a month General Bates coaxed and cajoled. The Sultan tried various delaying tactics, including feigning illness. Some of his followers made threatening noises to frighten the American troops in Jolo. But the discipline of well-armed soldiers, the sight of modern naval vessels and the earnest and tactful manner of General Bates eventually won out. On August 9, the Sultan presented a draft of an agreement in which he promised to do what he could to prevent piracy, to surrender runaway Americans to American authorities, to fly the American flag with his own in Sulu, and so forth. In exchange, the Americans were to pay the Sultan and his chief datus monthly stipends (ranging from $50 to $700 per month): occupy no territory in Sulu without permission;
desist from interfering in Sulu region, law and commerce; surrender runaway Sulus to Sulu jurisdiction; and protect Sulu against European aggression, etc.26 This document was unacceptable to the American authorities for it nowhere explicitly stated Sulu’s acknowledgment of United States sovereignty. The United States was determined to have nothing less than sovereignty over the entire territory ceded by Spain in the Treaty of Paris. More negotiation followed. Finally, General Bates presented a draft agreement which proved acceptable to all parties and was duly signed in triplicate (in English and Tausug texts) on August 20, 1899.27
26 In effect, the Sultan of Sulu was suggesting an arrangement similar to that worked out between the British and various Sultanates in Malaya. It was also akin to the “subsidiary system” which the British employed in India with respect to buying the good behavior of the hostile Bhutanese and others.
27 Cf. “The Sulu Treaty … and Other Domestic Relations,” pp. 2-7. See also, Hurley, pp. 153-159; Tan, pp. 42-43; and A. Savage Landor, Gems of the East (New York: Harper & Bros., 1904), pp. 176-184. The Agreement was sometimes called a “treaty” though that was somewhat of a misnomer since it was not, from the American viewpoint, an international agreement requiring approval by the Senate. During the negotiations General Bates himself corrected the Sulu representatives who used the word “treaty,” by saying “I would not call it a treaty, but an agreement.” (Senate Document 136, 56th Congress, 1st session, p. 37.) Cf. Forbes, II, p. 15.
The Bates Agreement (see Appendix B for the text) was composed of some 15 articles which provided that the United States was to be recognized as the sovereign power over the Sulu Archipelago, though the American authorities were to fully respect the rights and dignities of the Sultan and the datus. The Moros were assured that their religion and customs would not be interfered with. The United States was permitted to occupy such places in Sulu as the public interest demanded, but with due compensation to the owners whose property was taken. The Sultan and his datus agreed to co-operate in the suppression of piracy. The people of Sulu were to have free, unlimited and undutiable trade in domestic products with any part of the Philippine Islands. Crimes of Moros against Moros were to be tried under the Sultan’s jurisdiction but all the other cases were to be tried by United States authorities. The importation of firearms and other war materiel was forbidden except by license of the Governor General of the Philippine Islands.
Article X, which was to raise many eyebrows in the United States, provided that
“Any slave in the Archipelago of Sulu shall have the right to purchase freedom by paying to the master the usual market price.”28 The salient article of the Agreement was number XIII, which stated that “The United States will give full protection to the Sultan and his subjects in case any foreign nation should attempt to impose upon them.” This article, for all intents and purposes, established the Sulu Sultanate as an American protectorate rather than a territorial possession. The fourteenth article stated specifically that the United States would not sell any part of the Sulu Archipelago to any foreign nation without the Sultan’s consent. And Article XV provided from the payment of monthly salaries (in Mexican dollars) to the Sultan ($250) and members of his Ruma Bichara (from $15 to $75).
The document was duly forwarded through channels to President McKinley who conditionally confirmed and approved the Agreement on October 27, 1899.
… subject to the action of Congress provided for in that clause of the treaty of between the United States and Spain which provides, `The civil rights and the political status of the native inhabitants of the territory hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by Congress,’ and with the understanding and reservation, which should be distinctly communicated to the Sultan of Jolo, that this agreement is not to be deemed in any way to authorize or give consent of the United States to the existence of slavery in the Sulu Archipelago, a thing which is
28 This provision was not something new to the Sulu Moros – it incorporated a practice long observed by them and which was embodied in the Shari’ah of Islam.
The “action” of Congress (i.e., the U.S. Senate) referred to meant one of three things: amendment of the Agreement, total rejection of it, or no action at all. The Senate chose the latter course and simply requested a copy of the Agreement and all
accompanying reports, mainly to satisfy itself that the President was not giving approval to slavery. President McKinley forwarded the requested documents on February 1, 1900, explaining that he was doing so at the Senate’s request. This action was in conformity with the general practice of the Government in submitting its agreements with the Indian nations occupying or governing portions of the territory subject to the sovereignty of the United States.30
On April 9, 1900, General Bates notified the Sultan and the datus that the Agreement had been confirmed by the President except for Article X regarding the practice of slavery. This subject would be reserved for a future conference. No mention was made to the Sultan of the fact that the U.S. Congress could amend or reject the Agreement. Congress tacitly (though not explicitly) approved the Agreement in the Philippine Government Act of 1902, when it adopted a policy of governing the Moros along lines similar to the American government of the Indian tribes.
The U.S. Army was not sure how the Sultan would react to the disavowal of Article X and on April 13, Maj. Owen J. Sweet, the Military Governor of Sulu, told the Sultan not to worry. The U.S. Government was just, but opposed to slavery. The U.S.
would not ignore the pecuniary interests of the Sultan and his slaves. And some method would be found in the future to end slavery without a financial loss to the Sultan. In April 1900, the Sultan accepted the Agreement in good faith. It was inviolable as far as he was concerned and capable of being changed only through “mutual consent of the parties in interest.” He was unaware that from the American viewpoint it could be brushed aside and ignored by the law-making power of the United States without his knowledge or consent.31
The Bates Agreement governed the relations between the United States and Sulu from 1899 through the formation of the Moro Province in 1903. From the beginning the
29 Secretary of War to General Otis, October 27, 1899, in Senate Document 136, 56th Congress, 1st session, p. 109. Despite this condition, President McKinley was charged in Congress and by his Democratic opponent (William Jennings Bryan) in the 1900 Presidential Campaign, of upholding slavery in Sulu. See letter of George W. Honey to Elihu Root (Secretary of War), September 22, 1900, in National Archives, BIA Records, file No. 980-13. See also Congressional Record, 56th Congress, 1st session, pp. 1114-1116.
30 Ibid., p. 1395.
31 Annual Report of the Philippine Commission, 1903, Part I (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1904), p. 492; and Brig. Gen. George W. Davis in ARWD (1902), IX, pp. 495-496.
American authorities were unhappy with the Agreement though it seemed to serve its real purpose in neutralizing Sulu with respect to the Philippine-American War.32 As far as the Sultan of Sulu was concerned he probably felt in the beginning that he was under no greater restraint from the Americans by virtue of the Bates Agreement than he had been under the Treaty of 1878. His monthly income (increased by $50) continued, and he may have imagined that conditions would remain much as Captain Pratt had described them on May 20, 1899, the day after the U.S. troops landed:
The situation, in so far as determined from our limited experience is as follows:
Spain possesses the small walled town known as Jolo. The governor has complete control within the walls. There are no civil courts, no civil officers.
Outside the walls the Sultan of Jolo and Borneo is the ruler. Spain pays him
$200, Mexican, per month. At present he is not on the island, but is visiting one of the neighboring islands about 30 miles south. He has recently retuned from Mecca, and now dresses in European costume. Spanish soldiers seldom go beyond the range of the outlying blockhouses. The relation between the natives (Moros) and Spain is not altogether harmonious.33
The Sultan was due for a rude awakening. In time he would discover that the Americans took their sovereignty in dead earnestness, and would call Moros who ignored it to bloody account. The Americans were also in for a surprise. They were to learn that an Agreement with the Sultan and some members of his Ruma Bichara was not ipso facto an agreement with all of the powerful datus of Sulu, some of whom pursued a personal “foreign policy.”
32 See Brig. Gen. W. A. Kobbe in ARWD (1900), I, Part 3, pp. 256-257 for a thinly veiled critique of the Bates Agreement.
33 Quoted in the report of General Otis, ARWD (1899), I, Part 4, p. 133.
