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Thèse de doctorat/ PhD Thesis Citation APA:

Muhammad Shaaban, S. (1995). The metamorphosis of power in the Middle East after peace with Israël (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). Université libre de Bruxelles, Faculté des sciences sociales, politiques et économiques, Bruxelles.

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(2)

UNIVERSITE LIBRE DE BRUXELLES

Faculté des Sciences Sociales, Politiques et Economiques

Section des Sciences Politiques

THE METAMORPHOSIS OF POWER IN THE MIDDLE EAST

AFTER PEAGE WITH ISRAËL

S. MUHAMMAD SHAABAN

Dissertation présenté en vue de 1'obtention du

"Doctorat en Sciences Politiques - Relations Internationales"

Sous la direction du Professeur Robert Anciaux

Année académique 1995-1996

Tome 3

(3)

UNIVERSITE LIBRE DE BRUXELLES

Faculté des Sciences Sociales, Politiques et Economiques

Section des Sciences Politiques

THE METAMORPHOSIS OF POWER IN THE MIDDLE EAST

AFTER PEAGE WITH ISRAËL

S. MUHAMMAD SHAABAN /

Dissertation présenté en vue de l'obtention du

"Doctorat en Sciences Politiques - Relations Internationales"

Sous la direction du Professeur Robert Anciaux

Année académique 1995-1996

Tome 3

(4)

INDEX

Page

INTRODUCTION 1

CHAPTER ONE Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations after

the Accord of Oslo 37

CHAPTER TWO Jordano-Israeli Peace Treaty 98

CHAPTER THREE The Syrian-Israeli Impasse 132

CHAPTER FOUR Multilatéral Negotiations 162

CHAPTER FIVE Casablanca Economie Summit and Prospects of Middle East Régional Co-operation 199 CHAPTER SIX The Metamorphosis of Power in the Middle

East and the Rôle of Foreign Powers 244

CHAPTER SEVEN Egypt 309

CHAPTER EIGHT Iran 374

CHAPTER NINE Turkey 415

CHAPTER TEN Saudi Arabia and Gulf Co-operation

Council States 450

CHAPTER ELEVEN Israël 487

CHAPTER TWELVE Prospects of Post-Peace Relationships in the

Middle East 566

CHAPTER THIRTEEN Conclusion 626

BIBLIOGRAPHY 648

(5)

ANNEXES: 1- Framework of Peace in The Middie East (The Camp David Accords)

2- Déclaration of Principles On Intérim Self- Government Arrangements (Oslo Accord) and the Exchanged Letters

3- Agreement on the Gaza Strip and The Jéricho Area

4- Treaty of Peace Between The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and The State of Israël 5- Israeli-Palestinian Intérim Agreement On the

West Bank And The Gaza Strip (Oslo Two) 6- Joint Communique of the Arab Summit

Conférence (Cairo, 21-23 June 1996)

(6)

CHAPTER TWELVE

PROSPECTS OF POST-PEAGE

RELATIONSHIPS IM ISM MIDDLE EA3T

With ail the hope - pimctuated by frequent

downturns - surrounding the ongoing Middle East

peace process, the final settlement will not end

turmoil in the région. One tends to foresee

challenges of a new kind for several countries

in the région, most probably with a far-reaching

impact world-wide. The phased settlement over

the next few years may still deal with issues

like security, territory, normalisation and

économie co-operation but the conflict will

mainly take place within coiintries of the

région. Human rights, democracy and popular

participation in the économie and political

(7)

arena will put many Middle East countries before

serious challenges. Several Arab governments

used the Arab-Israell conflict as a façade to

hide behind and to perpetuate régimes of

dictatorship or authoritarian rule. Foreign

powers even encouraged and supported such

régimes in order to ensure the continuation of

the flow of oil to the West and to avoid an

upheaval in the région if anti-Western or

radical régimes

Ccune

to power. Growing demands

for political and économie reformation will put

pressure on présent régimes which may succumb to

this pressure or be tempted to maintain the

status guo. So, change will not be a luxury but

a pressing demand for almost ail governments in

the Middle East. The région is no exception to

demands for political participation which hâve

spread world-wide. The révolution in

communications over the past decade has turned

the World into a global village.

(8)

"Arab rulers face serious dilemmas. One

dilemma involves the fact that governments hâve no choice but to libéralisé, since they no

longer hâve the économie and strategie resources

with which they can buy acquiescence. . .

Governments seek to defuse pviblic discontent and

pressure for democracy by marginally widening

the area of public debate, allowing limited

forms of collective action, and reducing

restrictions on the public sector. Those

measures, however, encourage processes that

incubate political forces independent of the

State...Another dilemma involves the dynamic

interplay of Isléimist movements and government

politics. If governments forbid Islamists open

expression of their views, they will be driven

underground and become increasingly

antisystemic. But if they are allowed to

participate in the public arena, they can mobilise, gain popularity and try to change the

System...A third dilemma involves the issue of

(9)

whether governments can take the wind out of the

sails of Islamist movements by meeting their demande to overhaul corrupt économie système,

provide employment, and foster moral societies.

If the rulers could institute siibstantive

reforms, then the social base of Islamist

movements might retract and they would remain a

minority opinion. Nonetheless, governments are

likely to lack the funds and political will to

meet even the minimal material demanda of the

pviblic, and so the Islcunists, as the principal

opposition movement, can galvanise support on the basis of économie discontent".

12 9

The région has recently witnessed domestic

changes or crises that may well spill over in

neighbouring States. The Iranien révolution in

1979 was spurred by discontent with

authoritarian rule and économie disparities. The

second Gulf war in 1991 split the Arab world and

17Q

- GARNHAM, D. & TESSLER, M., op. cit., p.224.

(10)

until today there is a sense of loss of

identity. Calls are rife for closing Arab ranks

politically, economically and security-wise

before a rapprochement with non-Arab countries

in the région: Iran, Israël and Turkey.

Already, there are attempts in some Gulf

States to introduce or revive some form of

popular participation but peoples of the région

hâve been asking for more than cosmetic changes.

The pace of change in the Middle East may be

graduai and prolonged unlike recent upheavals in

Eastern Europe. The Islamicist phenomenon will

be the main axis of change as it has an appeal

for the grass roots and for several other

segments of the society. Islamicists's views,

tac tics and demanda are diverse. So, one does

not expect to hâve an identical or even common

modela in ail Arab States. Indeed, some

Islamicists seek to supplant their national

régimes and to replace an authoritarian rule

(11)

with another, whereas others call for popular

polltical participation through élections.

Scattered minority groups in some Arab

countries are calling for reforms, protection of

hijinan rights, économie libéralisation and free-

market économies. In several cases, these groups

form hiunan rights organisations or act under the

umbrella of trade unions or professional

syndicates: lawyers, doctors, engineers... etc.

and ”think tanks" and research organisations.

They belong either to the middle class, the

intelligentsia or among professionals with a

Western academie éducation. They exist mainly in

the relatively open Arab countries such as

Egypt, Jordan , Lebanon and the Palestinien

Territories. *‘That there is now a sentiment

widely shared throughout the région that the

nations of the Middle East face a severe crisis

at once économie, social, cultural, and

political, only makes the discussion of h\iman

(12)

rights more acute, slnce many Middle Easterners

believe that hard thinking about basic social options is now impérative and that the very

nature of their societies hangs in the balance.

These people naturally hâve serions

disagreements about how to proceed and upon what

basis to act."i3o Arab political and religions

culture rejects the imposition of Western

democracy which the West wants to see in the

Middle East. This type of democracy may be

suitable for the West but some of its aspects

are alien and unacceptable to this Arab

culture. 131

The situation was aptly summarised by

Ambassador Robert Pelletreau, US Assistant

Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affaire:

”The Middle East présents unique challenges to

the growth and acceptance of démocratie

principles. In ail too many cases, authoritarian

- DWYER, K.: Arab Voices: The Human Rights Debate in the Middle East, Routledge, London, 1991, p. 2.

- KEDOURIE, E.: Democracy and Arab Political Culture, Frank Cass, Essex, 1994, pp. 6-8.

(13)

régimes hâve blocked the path to free élections,

impeded freedom of speech and association, and iindermined respect for basic human rights...

Régional conflict and instability also hâve been

contributing factors to the limited political

openings... Across the Middle East, those who

embrace démocratie ideals are often sgueezed

between radical forces with extremist agenda and

besieged State authorities bent on preserving

their rule" .

¹³²

One can see winds of change, both dômes tic

and external, blowing over Middle East

countries. It is expected, however, that some

régimes, mainly in the Gulf, will resist change,

probably through repression and continuation of

autocratie rule. Some Arab countries will start

or enlarge the process of économie

libéralisation. Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco

and Tunisia are the major examples in this

- in United States Information Service Wireless File, 24 October 1995.

(14)

category. They hâve corne to réalisé that

integrating their économies within the global

World economy is a must, otherwise they will be

marginalised. Those countries hâve signed or are

negotiating association agreements with the

European Union with a view to establishing a

free trade area with Europe.

Economie libéralisation paves the way for,

or is concomitant to further dômestic changes,

foremost among which is political participation.

Clashes will arise between interest groups,

whether those that resist change because they

hâve vested interests in maintaining the status

guo, or those who want to reap the benefits of

change. Economie libéralisation also entails

freer flow of information and freer movement of

individuals and ideas. The new groups of the

economically free society whose économie power

rises will ask for political power-sharing to

safeguard and boost their interests. This will

(15)

necessarily lead to political reformation or

transformation.

"The llmited démocratisation in the Middle

East and the challenge posed by Islamist

movements hâve implications for the foreign

policy of governments in the région. Given the

lack of accountability of the régimes and the

relative autonomy of government decision-making,

foreign policy positions and actions need not

reflect underlying pviblic support. If a

government diverges too radically from public

viewpoints, it might be challenged by counter-

elites or mass protests...Moreover, governments

can use foreign policy to distract public

attention from domestic problème: criticism of

Israël and the US may be encouraged, whereas

public protests over domestic issues can be

crushed" .

- GARNHAM, D. & TESSLER, M., op. cit., p. 225.

(16)

One can thus foresee an upheaval hitting

the covintries of the Middle East with varying

degrees of intensity and rapidity. However, it

wlll be a complex and ramified process

comprising the State, moderate Islamicists and

libérais and will range from outright

confrontation to dialogue and co-existence. The

rôle of the outside world will condition many of

the changes expected to take place in the

région.

Having made a prognostication of possible

future domestic changes in the région, I will

now attempt to deal with prospects of Arab-Arab

relations. The Arab world, with 240 million

people, more than two-thirds of the Middle East

population, has gone through many ups and downs

over the past fifty years.

Throughout recent history, Arab countries

hâve corne together only when there was actual or

(17)

imminent danger. They hâve yet to educate themselves that they should corne together, not

because there is an imminent danger or threat

but because the world is undergoing a drastic

change and embarking on a new era of more

intertwined international relations. However,

this is easier said than done. Although Arab

countries share the same language, religion and

traditions, they hâve so far failed to form an

Arab common market or to emulate the European

Union whose member States hâve managed to corne

together despite their diverse languages and

cultures.

134

Any attempt to study the présent Arab- Arab

'crisis' has to take into account that the

crisis is an extension o£ previous uninterrupted

Arab crises that date back to the beginning of

the twentieth century. The First World War was

accompanied or followed by false promises or

134

KORANI, B. & DESSOUKI, A.: The Foreign Policies of Arab States:The Challenge of Change, Westview Press, London & Boulder, 1991, pp.170-178.

(18)

illusions entertained by some Arab leaders. The

political, économie and security decisions were

les s in the hands o£ Arab rulers than with

foreign powers. The Arab world was thus unable

to translate the principles of unity of

interests and destiny. The League o£ Arab States

itself began with a British strategie thought

about a new Arab System after the Second World

War. Had Great Britain not pushed for this idea,

the establishment o£ the League would not hâve

been possible. At that time, decisions on common

Arab issues were instigated or blessed by

foreign powers. Any other Arab decisions that

céune as resuit of or a response to pressure from

Arab public opinion, without an explicit or

implicit approval of foreign powers, were doomed

to failure. The major example was the Arab

decision to engage in the Palestine war against

Israël in 1948. The resuit of that war was an

additional reason for more Arab différences that

hâve continued until today.

(19)

When those forelgn powers realised the

nationallst trends o£ Géunal Abdul-Nassir's 1952 révolution in Egypt, they exercised tremendous

pressure on him in order to maintain their

control over the Arab world. Abdul-Nassir was

then obliged to turn to the Soviet Union and the

Middle East became a main arena o£ cold war

skirmishes between the East and the West.

Therefore, conflict and contradictions arose

between those two powers over the Arab world and

it was not possible to establish an Arab common

market between competing Arab régimes.

The 1979 Camp David treaty o£ peace between

Egypt and Israël, the second 6ul£ war in 1991,

the signing o£ the Oslo accord between Israël

and the Palestiniens and the signing o£ the

Jordanien-Israeli peace treaty were ail

milestones in the aggravation o£ différences

between Arab States. The policy of "dual

containment" pursued by the United States

(20)

against Iraq and Iran and attempts by Washington

and Tel Aviv to forge a new Middle East System hâve contributed to deepening différences within

the Arab world.

Egypt's "spécial relationship" with the

United States imposes certain restrictions on

its free movement or its endeavours towards pan-

Arab réconciliation. However, Egypt is the only

Arab country which can strike a balance between

dealing with the emerging Middle East System and

maintaining a reasonable degree of freedom in

its political action to lead the Arab world.

There are attempts to persuade Egypt to discard

its efforts towards establishing an Arab siib-

system in favour of a Middle East System.

Nonetheless, Egypt believes that it can move

simultaneously in both directions. So, it cannot

ignore the importance of pan-Arab réconciliation

with a view to galvanising a common Arab

(21)

position which would accept "Middle Easternism"

on Sound bases.

In October 1995, some Gulf States, in

particular Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates,

for the first time since the 1991 Gulf war, made

public their views on the necessity for "lifting

the embargo imposed on the Iragi people".

Addressing a gathering of new foreign

Ambassadors accredited to the Emirates, the Emir

of the UAE, Sheikh Zaid said "No doubt that

Saddam (Hussayn) has made many mistakes, but he

is a human being. . . our brethren in Kuwait are

also mistaken when they reject rapprochement

with Arab countries which seek réconciliation

with them.."i35 The Emirates' leader made this

statement following indications that Iraq and

Iran were trying to mend fences and normalise

relations between them. Iran occupies three

Emirates islands and any alliance between the

in Al-Hayat newspaper, 17 October 1995.

(22)

two Middle East countries subjected to the US

policy of "dual contaiiunent" will constitute a

threat to the interests, let alone the security,

of the Emirates.

Again, Bahrain witnessed, in late 1994 and

early 1996, some domestic uprlsing which It

accused Iran of instigating. In late October,

1995, a bomb exploded in a mosgue in Saudi

Arabia and claimed the lives of seven people.

Two bomb blasts against US military personnel in

Saudi Arabia in November 1995 and J\me 1996

respectively, claiming the lives of some 25

people, marked a new development in the

activities of Islamist terroriste inside Saudi

Arabia. Among other things, those attacks

against US military personnel are a message to

the Saudi rulers that there are extremist

éléments which will not condone the presence of foreign military officers on the sacred land of

Saudi Arabia. Fear by some Arab States of an

(23)

unholy alliance between Iraq and Iran has

introduced a new conciliatory language of

discourse towards Iraq by some Arab leaders.

Kuwait was still the exception, responding to

those calls by insisting that Iraq had not yet

implemented relevant UN resolutions,

particularly on Kuwaiti prisoners held by Iraq.

One may conclude that, despite attempts by

some local and external powers to thwart any

pan-Arab réconciliation, there are reasonable

prospects for normalisation of relations between

most of the Arab States. Suspicion of Iran's

intentions in the Gulf and the spectre of

Islamic extremism and of Israël's intentions in

the région after peace may speed the pace of

such réconciliation. So, Arab countries may

again corne together because of the new dangers

or threats which are looming in the horizon.

(24)

At the siib-regional level, key States in

the Middle East currently predominate in

different parts of the région: "Saudi Arabia in

the Arabian peninsula, Turkey and Iran in the

northern tier; Syria and Israël in the centre;

and Egypt at the jiincture with Africa. Each has

been and will continue to be concerned about its

own separate defences. None seems ready to

integrate their defences with any of the other

major players, though some of them hâve begun to

develop doser security co-operation with

immédiate neighbours, as in the case of Syria

with Lebanon, Saudi Arabia with the smaller GCC

States, and Egypt with Libya".i36

Extremism and terrorism threaten to throw

the Middle East into fathomless troubles if

their genuine causes are not uprooted. One major

cause is the instigation of terrorism by third

countries which recruit, train and finance

- Hollis, R.: Seeds of ConfUct in the Middle East, The Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, London, 1992, p. 70.

(25)

terroriste and extremists to stir trovible in

neighbouring countries and to export ideas alien

to the true letter and spirit of Islam. Those

instigating countries allégé that they are the

custodians of Islam and that their 'version' of

Islam has to be spread ail over the world.

beginning with the Muslim countries in the

région. A second important element is the

practice by some Western countries of giving

refuge to terroriste and extremists who hâve

been sentenced in their respective countries for

crimes and murderous acte. Those terroriste

still plot and conspire against their native

countries and Western receiving States condone

their malicious action. There is fear that those

terroriste will imdertake sabotage and

subversive acte inside the receiving States

themselves. A vivid testimony was the explosion

of the New York World Trade centre and more

recently the sériés of explosions in Paris by

Algerian terroriste, the assassination of

(26)

Israël! Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and the

explosion of the Egyptien Embassy premises in Islam Abad in November 1995. Another cause is

poverty in several countries of the région.

Those covintries should better life conditions

for the poorer and vulnérable groupe of the

society who could represent a fertile ground for

destructive ideas preached by extremists.

On the other side, there is a rise in the

mobilisation of Jewish extremists, both inside

Israël and in some Western countries, especially

the United States. These groupe entertain the

dream of Biblical Israël, reject any peace with

the Arabs and fight any trend towards the

sécularisation of Israël by dint of Western

culture and values. They killed many Arab

citizens over the years and their first Israël!

victim was Yitzhak Rabin.

(27)

Fundeumentalism' is a terni popularly used to

descrlbe strict adhérence to Christian doctrines

based on a literal interprétation of the Bible.

This usage dérivés from a late-19th-and-early-

20th-century transdenominational Protestant

movement that opposed the accommodation of

Christian doctrine to modem scientific theory

and philosophy. With some différences among

themselves, fundamentalists insis t on the

inerrancy of the Bible. The term

"fxindamentalists" has recently been used to

describe members of militant Muslims who call

for a return to the ' fundamental ' tenets of the

Qur'an. For Muslim fundcunentalism, it cornes,

among other things, as a reaction to some

aspects of Western culture which are contrary to

the teachings of Isléim. Whereas fundamentalists

only practise religion and do not resort to

violence as a means of spreading their beliefs,

extremists, who espouse 'extreme'

interprétations of a given religion may resort

(28)

to violence to achieve their objectives and

together with terroriste, they use abominable means which are contrary to the tolérant spirit

of the three Abrahéunian religions: Judaism,

Christianity and Islam. Some Western media does

not distinguish between fundamentalists,

extremists and terroriste and wrongly use the

umbrella term of 'fundamentalists' to describe

the three categories, thereby putting the good,

the bad and the ugly in one basket.

At the régional level, the call for 'Middle

Easternism' moved from the stage of preaching

and promotion to actual but graduai

implémentation. Israël's strategie économie

vision for the post-settlement era is based on

multi-pronged moves within a vast offensive

strategy. The core of this strategy is that

Israël must be an active party and an essentiel

component of the new économie fabric of the

région through well-planned strategie schemes

(29)

which could pass as innocent economlcally

bénéficiai régional projects. One can trace

these schemes as follows:

1- Dividing the Arab économies into

isolated units penetrated by Israël through some

Arab-Israël! projects in which Israël plays a

major effective rôle;

2- Consolidating the status of the

Palestinien economy as inextricably

complementary to the Israël! economy, inter

alla, through separating it from its naturel

depth, i.e. the Jordanien economy;

3- Establishing a triangular économie

grouping between Israël, the Palestinien entity

and Jordan on the model of the Benelux in an

attempt to bypass the Iraq! économie depth of

Jordan. This triangle can act as the spearhead

of an Israël! économie control over the Arab

Mashriq;

4- Establishing économie and financial

Israeli-Gulf and Israëli-Maghrib relationships

(30)

which would penetrate the network of Arab-Arab

économie and financial relations.

In sum, the Israeli scheme aims at

intensifying Arab-Israeli économie relations and

eroding Arab-Arab intertwined économie relations

in order that the Israeli economy may become the

main catalyst o£ commercial, financial and

technological interactions in the région. The

scheme envisages the execution of trans-Arab

régional projects in which Israël is a common

denominator such as motor-ways, pipelines and

joint tourist projects, ail of which bring the

countries of the région doser. The scheme was

clearly detailed in the projects submitted by

Israël during the Casablanca and Amman économie

summits in 1994 and 1995 respectively.

However, several Arab States or large

segments thereof are reluctant to engage in such

a wide-ranging enterprise prior to the final

(31)

resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. VUiat the région has so far seen is a settlement, i.e.

a partial solution whereas what the Arab

countries expect is a comprehensive resolution

of the conflict. 'Settlement' deals with the

outcome of the conflict whereas 'resolution'

deals with its sources; the first takes place at

the State level whereas the second combines the

civil society and State levels. 'Settlement' is

based on bargaining and trade-offs but

'resolution' seeks to terminate the causes of

conflict.

At the présent juncture, a partial

settlement has been reached between Israël and

the Palestiniens; no settlement has been reached

with Syria and Lebanon, and no resolution has

been reached globally. In other words, issues

like non-proliferation of weapons of mass

destruction, conventional weapons and Jérusalem

(32)

will prevent a comprehensive resolution of the

confllct.

The prospects of a Middle East régional

System are in line with intégration schémas in

varions parts of the world. In the Middle East,

however, after long years of animosity and

mis trust, a whole new set of approaches hâve to

be made and new convictions hâve to be

inculcated. The prerequisites for a

comprehensive 'resolution' of the conflict are;

1- A political settlement on ail tracks of

negotiation between Israël and each of Syria,

Lebanon and the Palestiniens;

2- The establishment of a Middle East

security order. This will be the second step

towards establishing a new Middle East System.

Such a security order could be achieved in

tiers. The first tier may be an Arab security

order. It could then be open for non-Arab Middle

East actors after they hâve gualified to be part

(33)

of that order. Israël and Iran can join that security order once each or both solemnly

déclaré that they hâve no territorial daims and

that they would join the club of non-nuclear-

weapon States. "The future of nuclear

prolifération in the Middle East dépends

primarily on two broader and opposing régional

developments: progress towards the establishment

of a new régional order built upon the political

settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and on

political, social and technological developments

in States (e.g. Iran) which are outside the

peace process, even acting to undermine it...The

présent situation, therefore, is a mixture of good and bad possibilities".

137

Although the West considers Turkey as the

main military launching pad and advanced base in

the région, domestic politics and troubles may

compromise such a rôle. Turkey may not be able

- INBAR, E. & SANDLER S., op. cit., p. 50.

137

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to exercise an influential rôle in the région in

the near future, and it will hâve to set its geopolitical and économie priorities before it

can State whether the Middle East cornes as a top

priority. It can then focus its attention on the

région, weighing the advantages and

disadvantages, probable risks and potential

compétition or co-operation with Iran and Israël

as well as the prospects of political and

économie co-ordination with Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria. The signing in February 1996 of a

Turkish-Israël! military co-operation agreement

may be the start of military s\ib-régional

alliances which could bode ill for the Middle

East.

The Middle East is now in a State of flux

in both diplomatie and strategie contexte. Much

diplomatie effort has been put into the peace

process to reach a détente between Israël and

the Arabs. This effort also influences the

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strategie relationship between the parties. Yet

both contexts are affected by the developments outside the pure inter-State Arab-Israël!

relationship, such as prolifération of nuclear

weapons and missiles, as well as a surge in the

appeal of Islamic fundamentalism. Under the

existing conditions and circvimstances, the best

the States in the région can aspire to is the

establishment of a security régime.

"An important component of this régime

would be arms control. The cardinal éléments of

a régime require agreements on joint policy

processes guided by agreed principles,

vérification mechanisms and decision-making

procedures. Such a régime would require co

ordination by an institutional infrastructure...

The linkages between the varions issues of the

arms race - conventional, nuclear and Chemical

weapons and missiles - hâve created a

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predicament that calls for the establishment of

a security régime" .

3- The third step which can start with or

soon follow the previous step will be the

conclusion of sub-regional économie agreements

that will eventually encompass ail countries of

the région. Already, there are many bilateral

agreements for économie co-operation and

réduction or removal of tariff barriers. "A

Middle East Economie commvinity" will be a meditim

or long-term objective that bilateral and sub-

regional agreements may lead to.

Iraq will remain out of any arrangements

until it follows a clear-cut policy of good

neighbourliness and respects the sovereignty and

territorial integrity of its neighbours and the

resolutions of the United Nations. It is not

unlikely that Egypt and/or Syria may seek to

reintegrate Iraq in the Arab fold if Israël,

f-tfl

- Weitt, pp. 182-183.

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Turkey or Iran seeks to turn the balance of power in the région or impose a sort of hegemony.

In brief, comprehenslve peace is the first

step, followed by a régional securlty order.

Normalisation of political relations and the

establishment of économie relationships and

interactions follow. The cumulative effect of

those interactions will gradually lead to co

opération, co-ordination and eventually économie

intégration and probably to a treaty or treaties

embodying ail aspects of a System: political,

économie and military which will produce the

final shape of a régional System.

The parties may not necessarily stick to a

rigid order of the previous steps but there are

possibilities for small-scale joint économie

projects which will introduce and prove

confidence-building. Already at the Amman

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économie summit in October 1995, many joint

Project proposais were signed between

businessmen from within and outside the Middle East. The pattern drawn out above corresponds to

that which Europe followed after the Second

World War: political issues were resolved first

between the Allies after the surrender of

Germany and Japan, then the Atlantic military

alliance represented by NATO came into being and

finally économie co-operation started with the

1955 coal and Steel agreement which later

developed in the création o£ the Européen Common

Market until the Maastricht Treaty was signed

some forty-five years after the end of the War.

So, it was an evolutionary not a revolutionary

process and the same is expected, or rather,

hoped to happen in the Middle East. Already

during the Amman Economie summit, it was évident

that a certain degree of flexibility

characterised the attitude of many previously

resisting parties which hâve agreed that

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régional économie co-operation can go hand in

hand with negotiations on the political

settlement and contacts on régional security

arrangements.

However, certain caveats hâve to be

highlighted:

1- Régional économie arrangements pre-

reguire that ail parties should be able to

engage in a direct dialogue. The engagement of

the private sector in transactions cannot be

guaranteed unless it feels reassured and that its investments, deals and contracta are

safeguarded. Incomplète peace and the

possibilities of an impasse in the peace

negotiations will always place psychological

constraints on Arab businessmen. Conseguently,

they would not enter into huge contracta and

businesses with their Israeli counterparts.

Potential Arab investors know that the issue of

Jérusalem is still in the balance; they know

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that the issues of settlements, water and the

final status of the Palestinien territories hâve

not been resolved. So, with ail high hopes, they

will be reluctant or cautions and will think

twice before concluding any sizeable business

contracts with Israël.

2- The same applies to foreign businessmen

who are considering getting involved in joint

ventures on sub-regional or régional projects.

The same imcertainty, in the absence of a

comprehensive resolution of the conflict, may

dissuade them from getting involved. It is a

basic économie promise that "capital is

cowardly." In the absence of a safe environment,

it does not take risks.

3- Negotiation on régional or économie

arrangements always cornes as a "package deal"

with a general and comprehensive régional

outlook. However, for several Arab countries,

Israël, both at the Casablanca and Amman

économie s\immits offered a ' short-sighted'

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package which makes of Israël the centre and o£

ail others the 'satellites'.

4- Attempts by Israël to make a Middle East

"Benelux" as the core of régional économie co

opération is an erroneous start. Arab countries

consider such a scheme as an Israeli plan to

dominate its immédiate neighbours (Jordan and

the Palestinien territories) first, in view of

their fragile and siibordinated économies, and

then, at a later stage, to move to other non-

contiguous Arab States. This view regards the

Israeli scheme as one of hegemony, expansion and

domination and not co-operation. It has been

suggested that Israël's bombardment of Beirut's

infrastructure during its clash with Hizbullah

in April 1996 was meant to undermine the

potentiel of Beirut to return as the financial

capital of the Middle East.

5- The Israeli conception of régional

économie arrangements envisages the termination

of the rôle of joint Arab économie and financial

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mechanisms such as development funds, banks and

Arab économie institutions and the establishment of new mechanisms for régional co-operation.

This raises fears and suspicion on the part of

interested Arab parties.

The post-peace era in the Middle East is

potentially important to interested outside

parties, whether they be oil consinners in Asia,

Europe and the US or neighbouring countries who

fear the social and political fall-out from

expected change. Foreign powers face difficult

choices in the Middle East: whether to maintain

their support for brittle authoritarian régimes

or to push for political reforms; whether each

of those powers should enhance and consolidate

their presence in the région or avoid criticism

at home and possible severe compétition with

other interested foreign powers.

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One tends to believe that the West will be tempted to opt for the status quo. It has done

that for a long time during the cold war to

ensure régional stabillty and consolidation of

its ovm interests. Even if the West pushed for

reforms, it would be realistic about its pace.

Authoritarian rule takes time to transform into

democracy. To precipitate things could lead to

the anarchy that several Eastern European States

are today going through because of Western

impatience for an upheaval and not a smooth

change.

On the issue of compétition between Western

powers over the Middle East, Since US President

Eisenhower's objection to the tripartite

aggression by the United Kingdom, France and

Israël against Egypt in 1956 and the US

Présidentes theory of "filling the vacuum"

following the withdrawal of British colonialiste

from the East of Suez, the United States has

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decided to counter Soviet attempts to infiltrate into the région. The United States has since

continued to regard the Middle East, especially

the Gulf région, as a major sphere of influence.

The second Gulf war was a golden

opportunity for the United States to establish a

strong and active strategy in the Gulf, where

one-third of World oil reserves exist. The

breakdovm of the Soviet Union has facilitated

this strategy. According to William Quandt, the

objectives of US policy in the Middle East from

Johnson to Bush were to contain Soviet influence

in the région, oil and Israël's security

.139

The policy of dual containment against Iraq and

Iran is meant to safeguard US two vital

interests in the région: Gulf oil and the

security of Israël. So, "the United States is

following a spécifie strategy to implement its

139 QUANDT, W.; Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967, The Brookings Institution & University Press of California, Washington DC, 1993, pp. 20-33.

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policy of dual containment. The strategy is

composed of three éléments:

1- Reinforcing the défensive capacity of

each of the Arabian Gulf States;

2- Strengthening the collective capacity of

the Gulf States through the Gulf Co-operation

Council;

3- Maintaining a strong US défensive

capacity in the région through the pre-

positioning of eguipment and the presence of

allied Western troops in the Gulf. Today, the

alliance has 200 fighter planes and a number of

air-bases and naval presence in some Gulf

States" . 140

The United States has corne to réalisé that

the Middle East does not begin and end with the

Arab-Israeli conflict and that there are other

sources of instability, foremost among which are

Iran and Iraq whose aggressive practices and

pp. 40-41.

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radical idéologies place them at odds with Western interests in the région. The United

States and its European allies are thus shoring

up relations with moderate allies in the région

such as Egypt and the Arab 6ul£ States, while

simultaneously isolating radical régimes such as

Iraq, Iran and Libya. "Policy makers in the

United States hâve placed Saudi Arabia and other

Arabian Gulf States as one of US national

security spheres, where it Controls one third of

World oil reserves 141

The United States has managed to influence

decisions in the UN Security Council to its

advantage and that of other Western powers.

Decisions made at the Council "that reflect the

interests of the West are presented to the world

as reflecting the desires of the world

commun!ty. The very phrase 'the world commun!ty'

has become the euphemistic collective noun

141- ELNAYRAB, M. : The Origins of USSaudi Relations, in Arabie, Madbouli Printers, Cairo, 1994 , pp. 102-105.

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(replacing 'the Free World') to give global legitimacy to actions reflecting the interests

of the US and other Western powers."i42

Resolutions adopted by the Council against some

Middle East countries such as Iraq or Libya were

adopted by consensus in the absence of a Russian

or even a Chinese veto. So, the US has, since

the breakdown o£ the Soviet Union, a free hand

to move in any part of the world after obtaining

a resolution from the Security Council to give

legitimacy to its actions before the Congress

and the international commun!ty.

The United States believes that the West

will hâve to find a way to straddle its need to

co-operate with its friends among the moderate

Arab régimes and open a better dialogue with the

Islcunicists or fundëunentalists. It believes that

"There are no grounds to assiime that the

Islamicists are inherently unable to co-operate

Mî

- HUNTINGTON, S.: The Clash of CMlizations? Foreign alTairs, Vol.. 72 No. 3, 1993, pp. 39-40.

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with the West, despite their rhetoric, as they try to gain political power in their varions

coiintries" .

143

In my opinion, here lies one of the

grievous mistakes of US foreign policy. Some of

the Islamic extremists responsible for the

explosion of the World Trade Centre in New York

were either former CIA agents or éunong those

with whom the United States had established a

dialogue. Furthermore, the expérience of US

dialogue with Algérien Islamicists was no

better. President Miibarak was right when he

warned Western countries who gave political

asylum to terroriste or extremists that they

would suffer from a boomerang and his warnings

were vindicated in countries like the United

States, Denmark and France. Again, the

flourishing Jewish extremist organisations in

the United States were partially responsible for

143- MURPHEY, R.: Is the West too Complacent about the Middle East? ^Colloquium), The International Economy Publications Inc., Washington DC, 1994, pp. 7-11.

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nurturing extremist trends and movements inside

Israël and the assassinatlon of Yitzhak Rabin

was yet another exéunple of how far extremlsm

could go in undermining prospects of régional

and World peace and that fight against

international terrorism should be co-ordinated

at a global level, with the United Nations fully

involved and supported by its member States to

eradicate this phenomenon.

The United States has defined its policies

in the Middle East as follows:

1- To devote the necessary long-term

diplomatie and financial resources to help

ensure the success of the Arab-Israeli peace

process;

2- To sustain the collective will of the

West (and Russie) to maintain the current UN

embargo on Iraq, despite efforts by some States

to weaken it;

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3- To confront Iran's weapons ambitions and

desire for régional domination by tougher

économie policies, however tempting the Iranien

market is for several Western countries;

4- To ensure that nothing the West does

weaken Israël's military edge or strategie

advantage, since Israël remains the strongest

ally in the région;

5- To safeguard oil resources in the Gulf

and their free flow to Western importing

countries;

6- To support US business interests in the

région;

7- To combat terrorism and check the spread

of weapons of mass destruction;

8- To urge the introduction of démocratie

principles - rule of law, économie reform, free

élections and hviman rights - in the Arab

World. 144

- Ibid, p. 16.WI.J

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In late October 1995 the US Congress approved a bill asking the US administration to

move the American embassy in Tel Aviv to Jérusalem not later than 1999. The decision

raised fresh suspicions about the US rôle as an

"honest broker" in the Middle East peace

process. The decision was criticised by ail Arab

countries as it pre-empts the status of

Jérusalem which Israël and the Palestinian

Authority hâve agreed to discuss during the final phase of negotiations. The Republican

majority in the Congress pushed for the adoption

of the decision for domestic élection purposes

but in so doing it has embarrassed the Clinton

administration and hurt the credibility of the

US before the Arab and Muslim States.

If the United States continues to seek

becoming the singular foreign player in the

Middle East, it will antagonise other foreign

powers who hâve interests in the région. For

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Europe the Mlddle East is the closest neighbour. Both share the Mediterranean banks

and geographical proximity has rendered the Mlddle East of vital Importance for stability in

Europe. So, Européen interests in the région are

strategie and not transient. Besides security

and stability, Europe has major économie

interests in the région which is its major

trading partner. It was not surprising,

therefore, that the European Union chose to

présidé over the multilatéral working group for

économie co-operation in the Middle East. In the

light of the Copenhagen Plan of action of 1993,

responsibilities among European Union member

States were distributed as follows:

A- Germany assîmes co-ordination in the

field of régional trade;

B- France co-ordinates projects in

communications and télécommunications: roads,

railways, ports and civil aviation;

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C- Italy préparés feasibility studies for

gas pipes projects from Egypt to Gaza and

Israël;

D- The United Kingdom co-ordinates co

opération in banking and capital markets;

E- Spain co-ordinates co-operation in the

agricultural field;

F- Austria undertakes the study for

electricity-grid networks in the région.

The feeling by Middle East countries that

the Européen Union' s rôle was diminishing and

that Europe was focusing on East Europe and

leaving the Middle East peace process to the

United States has led the Européen Union to

reaffirm its interests in the Middle East and

the Southern Mediterranean régions. By the year

2000, the European Union will hâve concluded

free-trade agreements with most of the

Mediterranean countries in the hope of forming

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together, by the year 2010, the largest free-

trade area in the world.

One can therefore observe the inkllngs of

compétition between the United States and the

Européen Union over the Middle East. It was

obvions at the Casablanca and Amman économie

summits that the United States wanted to play

the major rôle in pushing régional économie co

opération. For excimple, at Amman, the United

States supported the establishment of a régional

bank for the Middle East whereas the Européen Union refused the proposai and suggested that a