Essays on the economics, politics
and finance of infrastructure
Thesis presented by Salvador BERTOMEU SANCHEZ
in fulfilment of the requirements of the PhD Degree in Economics
(”Docteur en Sciences Economiques et de Gestion”)
Academic year 2020-2021
Supervisor: Professor Antonio ESTACHE
Solvay Brussels School of Economics and Management
European Center for Advanced Research in Economics and Statistics
Thesis jury :
Marjorie GASSNER (Universit´e libre de Bruxelles, Chair) Bram DE ROCK (Universit´e libre de Bruxelles, Secretary) Paula GOBBI (Universit´e libre de Bruxelles)
Germ`a BEL (Universitat de Barcelona)
Contents
Acknowledgements 6
Introduction 10
1 Unbundling political and economic rationality: a non-parametric approach tested on transport infrastructure in Spain 26
1.1 Introduction . . . 26
1.2 Some historical context . . . 30
1.3 Methodology and data . . . 32
1.3.1 Model . . . 34
1.3.2 Data . . . 36
1.4 Efficiency analysis . . . 37
1.4.1 Technical efficiency . . . 37
1.4.2 Scale efficiency . . . 42
1.4.3 The big picture . . . 44
1.5 Concluding remarks . . . 46
Appendices 48 2 On the effects of the private financial ownership of regulated utilities: lessons from the UK water sector 54 2.1 Introduction . . . 54 2.2 Background . . . 57 2.2.1 Institutional context . . . 57 2.2.2 Regulatory context . . . 60 2.2.3 Industry-specific issues . . . 61
2.3 Research question and theoretical framework . . . 62
2.4 Data and variables. . . 64
2.4.1 Leverage levels and average consumer bills . . . 64
2.4.2 Socio-economic and financial controls . . . 69
2.5 Empirical strategy . . . 69
2.5.1 Identification strategy - The leverage effect . . . 70
2.5.2 Identification strategy - The consumer bill effect . . . 72
2.6 Results. . . 73
2.6.1 Impact of de-listing on leverage levels . . . 73
2.6.2 Impact of leverage levels on average consumer bills . . . 75
2.6.3 Robustness . . . 77
2.7 Concluding remarks . . . 77
Appendices 79 2.A Water leaks . . . 79
2.B Parallel trends assumption . . . 80
2.C Treatment lead . . . 81
3 How effective has the electricity social rate been in reducing energy poverty in Spain? 82 3.1 Introduction . . . 82
3.1.1 Energy poverty . . . 85
3.1.2 Energy poverty in Spain . . . 86
3.1.3 The social electricity rate in Spain (BSE) . . . 89
3.2 Data and descriptive statistics . . . 89
3.2.1 Data . . . 89
3.2.2 Energy poverty and other outcome variables . . . 90
3.2.3 Treatment variable . . . 91 3.2.4 Control variables . . . 94 3.3 Empirical strategy . . . 94 3.3.1 Empirical framework . . . 94 3.3.2 Difference-in-differences model . . . 96 3.4 Results. . . 98
3.4.1 The impact of the BSE on energy poverty . . . 98
3.4.2 Mechanisms . . . 100
3.5 Robustness checks . . . 105
3.5.1 Alternative measures of energy poverty . . . 105
3.5.2 The effect of BSE on income poverty . . . 108
3.5.3 Comparability of the treatment and control groups: Sample restriction to households whose main source of income is pension . . . 110
3.5.4 Discussion on potential biases . . . 111
3.6 Policy evaluation . . . 113
3.7 Conclusions . . . 114
Appendices 117 3.A Data cleaning process . . . 117
3.B Eligibility to BSE: Identification of the criteria of minimum pension . . . 119
3.C Description of control variables. . . 121
3.D Descriptive statistics: hidden energy poverty . . . 122
3.E Sensitivity analysis to the energy poverty threshold . . . 123
Bibliography 124
