of repression of political dissent and - human rights and peacebuilding

persecution of Islam in the public space

base in Kant. Six people were killed and several

others were arrested in the operation. However, some analysts noted the lack of sufficient evidence that the suspects belonged to ISIS. Also in July, the first ISIS propaganda video aimed specifically at the Muslim population of Kyrgyzstan was released, calling for it to join the caliphate. The attorney general said that around 500 Kyrgyz citizens are fighting with ISIS in the Middle East. Several people detained during the anti-terrorist operation in July escaped from prison in October after killing some guards. Five of them were re-arrested immediately (three of whom died in police custody) and two others were killed by the police in a shootout in late October that also claimed the lives of two civilians and a police officer on the outskirts of the capital. In another episode, two suspected members of the organisation Jaishul Mahdi were shot dead by security forces in an operation in the capital. Suspected members of other organisations were arrested throughout the year, like Hizb ut-Tahir, which the government accuses of supporting al-Qaeda and ISIS. Many of the arrests and searches took place in Osh (south) and other southern areas.

Moreover, Rashot Kamalov was arrested in February.

A well-known imam from the town of Kara-Suu (Osh region, Ferghana Valley), with 20,000 inhabitants, he was accused of encouraging the population to join ISIS, whereas critical groups alleged that his arrest was politically motivated, given his sermons against corruption and institutional violence.

Meanwhile, the country continued to experience cross-border tensions linked to the lack of border demarcation and intercommunity disputes over access to resources. Thus, one border guard was killed and several others were wounded in an incident at a border post near the border with Tajikistan early in the year.

Furthermore, clashes broke out between people from Tajikistan and Kyrzgyzstan in a neighbouring area for several days in August as tensions escalated around a crossing area. Several people were hurt

and property was destroyed in the episode.

Kyrgyzstan held parliamentary elections in October without incident, leading to a coalition government with the Social Democratic Party (28% of the votes), the Kyrgyzstan Party (13%), Onuguu-Progress (9%) and the Ata Meken Socialist Party (7%). The Respublika–Ata-Zhurt bloc won 20.26% of the votes. Acting Prime Minister Temir Sariev was designated the head of government once again after the elections. Sariev had replaced Joomart Otorbayev after Otorbayev’s resignation in April amidst criticism of his role in the problems reaching an agreement with the

Canadian company Centerra Gold on the controversial Kumtor gold mine. In international news, Kyrgyzstan joined the pro-Russian Eurasian Economic Union in May and ended its cooperation agreement with the United States in July.

Tension from various sources rose significantly in the Central Asian country. Repression increased against the political opposition and the opposition Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) was banned in August.

Previously the only Islamic party authorised in ex-Soviet Central Asia, it had participated in the peace agreements in 1997. The government alleged that the IRP had

violated the party law by lacking sufficient representation throughout the country.

This was preceded by an intense campaign to pressure and delegitimise the party, including its exclusion from Parliament following the legislative elections in March, which the opposition considered fraudulent and the OSCE electoral observation mission claimed did not comply with free and fair electoral standards. Moreover, in March government loyalist imams across the country demanded that the IRP be banned, claiming that it encouraged conflicts.

In a context of harassment, IRP leader Muhiddin Kabiri fled the country after the elections. Shortly after the government banned the party in August and in the wake of some acts of violence that the government blamed on the IRP, in September the Supreme Court ruled that the IRP should be included on the country’s list of terrorists.

Around a dozen notable IRP members were arrested Tajikistan

Intensity: 2

Trend: ↑

Type: Government, System, Resources, Territory

Internationalised internal Main parties: Government, political opposition

(Islamic Renaissance Party), social opposition (regional groups Gharmis and Pamiris), former warlords, Islamist groups (Hizb-ut-Tahrir, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan [IMU]), Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan Summary:

The tension in Tajikistan is largely related to the armed conflict that took place from 1992 to 1997 between two main groups marked by strong regional divisions: on the one side, the opposition alliance of Islamist forces and anti-communist liberal sectors (centre and east of the country) and, on the other side, the government forces, which were the heirs of the Soviet regime (north and south). The 1997 peace agreement involved a power-sharing deal, which incorporated the opposition to the government. In its post-war rehabilitation phase, the problems facing the country include regional tensions (including the growing hostility of the Leninabadi population in the north of the country towards its former allies in the south, the Kulyabi, the dominant population group in power since war ended), the presence of some non-demobilised warlords and former opposition combatants in parts of the country, the increasing authoritarianism of the regime, corruption, high levels of poverty and unemployment, tensions with neighbouring Uzbekistan, instability related to the border shared with Afghanistan and the potential threat of armed Islamist groups.

in mid-September. Despite these measures, the IRP announced that it would continue with its activities without going underground and without adopting any armed strategies. However, some experts cautioned that the new scenario was uncertain. The party was banned in a general context of state repression of Islam in the public space. In addition to the pressure on the IRP, harassment continued against followers of the opposition political group G24, which was banned in 2014. Its leader, the entrepreneur Umarali Quvatov, was murdered in Istanbul in March. The elimination of the political opposition inside and outside Parliament (no opposition party managed to win a parliamentary seat in the elections in March) was accompanied by new measures to roll back democracy during the year.

Notable among them was Parliament’s decision in December to award the title of Leader of the Nation to Tajik President Emomali Rahmon, which gives him lifelong immunity and executive powers when he retires, including veto power over decisions of state and other privileges.

The episodes of violence in September that were blamed on the IRP were another source of conflict during the year. In September, a group of armed men linked to former Deputy Defence Minister Abduhalim Nazarzoda attacked a police station, an arms depot and a security post near the capital, Dushanbe, and another nearby location, leaving around 20 people dead. In response, the authorities launched a special operation that extended as far as Romit Valley and in which Nazarzoda was killed. The operation ended with 20 other fatalities and 130 people arrested. According to the government, Nazarzoda had acted on the orders of the IRP, though the party denied the accusations. Twenty-three senior IRP officials were arrested in October on charges of terrorism, incitement to religious and racial hatred and attempting to seize power by force, linking them to the attack in September. Some analysts pointed to economic factors and power struggles in the violence in September. Another source of tension was linked to the activity of local and regional Islamist organisations, including armed groups. The authorities arrested dozens of suspected members of illegal groups, including Jamaat Ansarallah, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Jabhat al-Nusra and Hizb ut-Tahrir. In April, alarms were sounded when the commander of the OMON special forces, Gulmurod Khalimov, defected and reappeared in two videos that announced that he had joined ISIS, urging battle against the governments of Tajikistan, the United States and Russia and accusing the Tajik government of repressing the practice of Islam. At the end of the year, the Tajik minister of the interior stated that 500 Tajik citizens are fighting with ISIS in Syria and Iraq. Meanwhile, Tajik government warnings increased over the deterioration in the situation in northern Afghanistan, which borders with Tajikistan. Russia announced that it would deploy military combat and transport helicopters to the Russian base in Tajikistan.

East Asia

42. See the summary on China (Tibet) in chapter 3 (Peace processes).

China (Tibet)

Intensity: 1

Trend: ↓

Type: Self-government, System, Identity Internationalised internal

Main parties: Chinese government, Dalai Lama and Tibetan government-in-exile, political and social opposition in Tibet and in neighbouring provinces and countries Summary:

In 1950, one year after emerging victorious in the Chinese civil war, the communist government of Mao Tse-tung invaded Tibet and over the course of the following decade increased its military, cultural and demographic pressure on the region, putting down several attempted rebellions, in which thousands of people were killed. Faced with the brutality of the occupation, in 1959 the Dalai Lama and tens of thousands of people fled from Tibet and went into exile in several countries, especially in Nepal or the north of India, where the government in exile is based. In the last few decades, both the Dalai Lama and numerous human rights organisations have denounced the repression, demographic colonisation and attempted acculturation of the Tibetan population, part of whose territory enjoys autonomous region status. Dialogue between the Dalai Lama and Beijing has been derailed on several occasions by the Chinese government’s accusations concerning the alleged secessionist objectives of the Dalai Lama. The outbreak of violence that occurred in 2008, the most virulent in recent decades, interrupted dialogue once again and eroded trust between the parties significantly. The wave of self-immolations that began in 2009 in several Chinese provinces with Tibetan areas provoked a harsh response from Beijing, along with a distancing between the Chinese government and the Tibetan authorities in exile, which are accused by the former of inciting the protests.

Human rights violations continued to be reported in Chinese regions inhabited by the Tibetan community during the year, along with mutual criticism between Beijing and the Tibetan government in exile, which was especially intense following the celebration of the 50th anniversary of the creation of the Tibet Autonomous Region, and various kinds of protests against the Chinese government, including self-immolations with fire. Although the possibility of resuming negotiations between the Chinese government and the Tibetan government in exile⁴² seemed to have revived at certain points during the year, on several occasions Beijing criticised the so-called Middle Way proposed by the Dalai Lama, which consists of explicitly renouncing Tibetan independence while guaranteeing greater powers in important matters for the survival and promotion of Tibetan identity. Beijing thinks that this proposal contradicts the Constitution and the Law on Regional National Autonomy and is using the concept to conceal an intention to establish a semi-independent regime with weak central government control over approximately one fourth of Chinese territory (the Tibet Autonomous

China – Japan

Intensity: 2

Trend: ↓

Type: Territory, Resources International Main parties: China, Japan Summary:

The dispute between China and Japan (and to a lesser extent, Taiwan) over the sovereignty and administration of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands (as they are known in Japanese and Chinese, respectively) in the East China Sea dates back to the early 1970s, when the USA, which had administered the islands since 1945, ceded control of them to Japan.

The dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, which have high geostrategic value and are estimated to possibly hold huge hydrocarbon reserves, is part of the troubled historical relationship between China and Japan since the early 20th century due to the Japanese invasion of China in the 1930s and the Second World War. In 2013, China’s unilateral declaration of a new Air Defence Identification Zone that included the disputed islands, as well as both sides’ unilateral actions before and afterwards, significantly raised bilateral and regional tension around a historical dispute that had been managed relatively peacefully since the early 1970s but which, according to some analysts, could potentially provoke a military incident between the two countries and destabilise the region.

Region and Qinghai province, two prefectures in Sichuan and one prefecture in the provinces of Yunnan and Gansu, respectively). In addition to explicitly requesting that he abandon the Middle Way, Beijing blasted the Dalai Lama’s comments indicating that he did not wish to have a successor and that the Buddhist tradition of reincarnation should come to an end. The government considered these statements by the Dalai Lama a double betrayal of his homeland and his faith and declared that the government should be the one to approve and ratify the reincarnation of the current Dalai Lama, who turned 80 years old in 2015. Some analysts have indicated that the Chinese government wants to control the reincarnation process for political purposes. After the death of the 10th Panchen Lama, the second-highest Tibetan religious authority, in 1989, a dispute arose between the Dalai Lama and the Chinese government regarding the procedure and legitimacy of the election of the new Panchen Lama.

Finally, the person elected by the Dalai Lama according to Tibetan tradition (Gedhun Choekyi Nyima) and his family were detained, with no further news about their whereabouts, and Beijing chose Gyaltsen Norbu in his place, who has on various occasions received indifferent and even hostile treatment from the Tibetan community, which thinks he is a tool of the government. In fact, in June Gyaltsen Norbu called for national unity and social stability and urged the Tibetan community to boost its appreciation for China.

Many complaints about the human rights situation were reported during the year. In March, a coalition of 175 Tibetan organisations urged the International Olympic Committee not to designate Beijing as the host of the 2022 Winter Olympic Games on the grounds that repression and human rights violations have worsened since the 2008 Summer Games. Later, as part of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to the United States, an alliance of various NGOs sent a letter to US President Barack Obama to denounce the deterioration of the human rights situation and publicly disclose that between mid-July and mid-August alone, over 250 lawyers and human rights activists had been arrested, although most of them were later released.

In September, during the 30th session of the Human Rights Council meeting in Geneva, the United States and other European countries condemned the human rights situation in China, especially in Tibet and Xinjiang. In this regard, relations between China and the United States experienced some strained moments during the year due to Obama’s praise of the Dalai Lama during his visit to the United States early in the year and because of a US congressional delegation’s trip to Tibet in November, during which its members repeated the importance of human rights and the freedom of expression and of religion. Self-immolations with fire and other forms of anti-government protest continued to occur in 2015, which intensified on key dates (like the anniversary of the Tibetan uprising, the Dalai Lama’s birthday and the 50th anniversary of the creation of the Tibet Autonomous Region). Finally,

the first round of the elections to choose the Tibetan prime minister and Parliament in exile (45 seats) was held in October, with only the approximately 150,000 Tibetans living outside China enjoying the right to vote.

This is the second time that elections have been held since Dalai Lama abandoned his position as head of government to focus on his spiritual responsibilities in 2011. According to the results made public in early December, over 45,000 people participated in the elections, which were won by current Prime Minister Lobsang Sangay with over 66% of the vote.

The second round will be held on 20 March 2016.

Though the military and diplomatic tension between China and Japan in their dispute over the Senkaku/

Diaoyu Islands (in Japanese and Chinese, respectively) eased substantially, and many confidence-building measures were taken to improve bilateral relations, various sources of tension remained between both countries. In December, Japanese government sources confirmed its intention to deploy aircraft and anti-ship batteries in the chain of around 200 islands in the East China Sea that stretch from Japan to Taiwan and to boost its military presence in the area by 20% over the next five years until reaching nearly 10,000 troops.

According to some analysts, these Japanese government plans are due in part to US pressure on some countries to counter the growing influence of China in the region and to exercise greater control over its access to the eastern Pacific Ocean. In addition to control over access to the eastern Pacific and the definition of areas of interest between the United States, Japan and China in the region, the installation of military batteries and

Japan declared its next five years until

reaching nearly 10,000 troops

the deployment of additional troops in the

archipelago also stem from the dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, and especially from China’s growing activities to explore and exploit gas and oil reserves in the East China Sea. As such, in July Tokyo declared that the installation of oil platforms in the region posed a threat to Japanese interests, partially due to the possibility of China setting up military radar on the platforms or using them as bases for helicopters or drones, and a breach of a 2008 agreement by which both countries pledged to jointly exploit the hydrocarbon reserves in the region. Meanwhile, China said that it was fully within its rights to prospect for oil

under its territorial waters, whereas Tokyo argued that Japan and China have not delimited their maritime border in the region and that the current line is equidistant between both countries and merely serves as a de facto border. Regarding the regional situation as a whole, Beijing harshly criticised the new defence cooperation guidelines announced by the United States and Japan in April, which provide for greater Japanese involvement in global issues and more explicit US assistance before certain threats; the joint statement by Japan, the United States and Australia denouncing China’s aggressive policies in the South China Sea regarding new building and territorial claims; and Japan’s growing closeness with countries that maintain territorial disputes with China in the South China Sea, like the Philippines and Vietnam.

The relations between both countries were also affected by historical and symbolic issues, by the criticism of the new military strategy being developed by Shinzo Abe’s government and by the dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Regarding the first point, some Japanese ministers (and Abe’s wife) visited the Yasukuni temple, where Abe also made an offering. The Yasukuni temple holds the remains of some of the main figures responsible for war crimes committed by Japan during the Second World War, described as martyrs by some senior officials in the Japanese government. Also controversial was Abe’s speech during the commemoration of the 70th anniversary of the end of the Second World War, in

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