SLM-MM) pledged to promote the protection
and the rights of
children
the mission, describing the peacekeeping efforts of the Sudanese government in Darfur as insignificant. Mulet said that the second phase of the government’s Operation Decisive Summer, supported by paramilitary forces, aims to end the rebellion by military means, which is causing serious damage and displacement among the civilian population. The Sudanese government denied that the government was behind the violence and the displacements and blamed them
on tribal clashes and rebel attacks. As such, Sudan asserted that the UNAMID mission was over. However, on 29 June, the Security Council decided to extend the UNAMID mission for another year. By late September, UNAMID had reported 218 casualties since its deployment on 31 July 2007. Finally, in a parliamentary session on 19 October, Sudanese President al-Bashir
announced his plan for a referendum on the status of the region of Darfur scheduled for April 2016, as envisaged in the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD). The announcement sparked criticism from parliamentary opposition groups and civil society organisations (such as the Darfur Civil Society Organisation), which had demanded a delay in the referendum because the conditions are not in place and holding it could trigger clashes and greater social polarisation.
Sudan (South Kordofan and Blue Nile)
Start: 2011
Type: Self-government, Identity, Resources Internationalised internal
Main parties: Government, armed group SPLM-N, Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF) armed coalition, PDF pro-government militias, Rapid Support Forces (RSF) paramilitary unit, South Sudan
Intensity: 2
Trend: =
Summary:
The national reconfiguration of Sudan after the secession of the south in July 2011 aggravated the differences between Khartoum and its new border regions of South Kordofan and Blue Nile, which during the Sudanese armed conflict supported the southern rebel forces of the SPLA. The need for democratic reform and an effective decentralisation, which would permit the economic development of all the regions that make up the new Sudan, are at the root of the resurgence of violence. The lack of recognition of the ethnic and political plural nature, within which political formations linked to the southern SPLM are included, would also be another of the causes of the violence. The counter position between the elite of Khartoum and the states of the central Nile region, which control the economic wealth of Sudan, and the rest of the states that make up the country are found at the centre of the socio-political crises that threaten peace.
The violence in the areas of South Kordofan and Blue Nile was variable throughout the year, ranging from a first
half marked by clashes to an end of the year with lower levels of violence, which was connected to the ceasefire declared by the government of Sudan to facilitate the peace talks. The first six months were marked by the boycott of the SPLM-N in the presidential election and clashes between the rebels and the Sudanese Armed Forces, especially in the towns of al-Jineziya and Um Turuq-Turuq in February; in Kalogi (north of the capital of the state of South Kordofan) in March; and in the city of Dilling (in South Kordofan) in mid-April, which coincided with the start of the election.
In May, clashes between the authorities and rebels continued. The paramilitary group RSF claimed that it had regained control of two areas in the state of South Kordofan. There were two major clashes in June. In the first, the SPLM-N ambushed a military convoy, killing six soldiers and injuring more than 25 in the town of Rashad, South Kordofan. The second occurred on 12 June, when Sudan launched air strikes over the town of Wed Abuk, in the state of Blue Nile, causing numerous civilian fatalities according to the SPLM-N. Data from OCHA show that the conflict had deteriorated the living conditions in the region in June, affecting the humanitarian crisis in the country and indicating that there are over 749,000 people in an emergency situation. The UN also estimated that until late June, violence had displaced about 378,000 persons in the regions of South Kordofan and Blue Nile, 20,000 in the Abyei area and 238,936 refugees in neighbouring South Sudan. In July, the SPLM-N accused the Sudanese Army of using cluster bombs in Thabo County (South Kordofan). This was confirmed by a report of the Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, which provided evidence of the use of these weapons by the Sudanese Army. The situation of violence changed during the third quarter largely because the rainy season began in South Kordofan and Blue Nile and preparations for the National Dialogue had started. In September, the government of Omar al-Bashir announced a ceasefire and amnesty to enable armed movements to participate in the National Dialogue. The start of negotiations and the announced ceasefire reduced fighting in the region until December, when clashes resumed that coincided with the beginning of the dry season and deadlock in the peace talks.41
Finally, the SPLM-N became the first African non-state actor to sign a commitment aimed at protecting children in situations of armed conflict when it signed the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment protecting children in Geneva on 29 June. The text is an initiative promoted by the organisation Geneva Call and was developed to allow armed groups that are not recognised as parties to international treaties to ratify agreements on the protection of minors. The SPLM-N underlined its commitment to protecting civilians, saying that it was open to receive a UN commission of verification. This The SPLM-N became
the first African non-state actor to sign a text aimed at
protecting children from the effects of
armed conflicts
41. See the summary on Sudan (South Kordofan and Blue Nile) in chapter 3 (Peace processes).
42. See the summary on Ethiopia (Ogaden) in chapter 3 (Peace processes).
was not the first agreement that the SPLM-N signed based on humanitarian standards and the Geneva Convention, since it also confirmed the ban on anti-personnel mines in 2013.
Horn of Africa
Ethiopia (Ogaden)
Start: 2007
Type: Self-government, Identity Internationalised internal Main parties: Government, ONLF, OLF,
pro-government militias
Intensity: 1
Trend: =
Summary:
Ethiopia has been the object of movements of a secessionist nature or of resistance against the central authority since the 1970s. The ONLF emerged in 1984 and operates in the Ethiopian region of Ogaden, in the south east of the country, demanding a greater level of autonomy for the Somali community that lives in this region. On various occasions, the ONLF has carried out rebellious activities beyond Ogaden, in collaboration with the OLF, which has been demanding greater autonomy from the government for the region of Oromia since 1973. The Somali government has supported the ONLF against Ethiopian, which it confronted for control over the region between 1977 and 1978, a war in which Ethiopian defeated Somalia. The end of the war between Eritrea and Ethiopia in 2000, led to the increase of the government operations to put an end to the rebel forces in Ogaden. Since the elections that were held in 2005, the confrontations between the armed forces and the ONLF increased, although in recent years the intensity of the conflict has declined.
There were no major changes in the situation of violence, insecurity and lack of respect for human rights in Ogaden. The violent actions and information claimed by the insurgency could not be confirmed. In February, peace talks between the government and the ONLF resumed (while various media outlets reported an escalation in the fighting) although there were no reports of new contacts throughout the year.42 In early June, the ONLF said in a press release that two of its representatives, Sulub Ahmed and Ali Hussein, were released in Moyale, a town on the border between Kenya and Ethiopia. The pair had been kidnapped by the Ethiopian government in Nairobi in January 2014 and were later moved to Ethiopia. According to separatist sources, the Ethiopian government released both delegates after much diplomatic effort exerted by the government of Kenya and members of the international community. The ONLF hailed the release as a positive step. Meanwhile, the Ethiopian prime minister declared that the government was planning to start exporting and using natural gas from the Ogaden region. These statements were swiftly contested by the ONLF, which accused the government and its Chinese partners of
committing human rights violations that could be classified as genocide by collectively punishing part of the civilian population with starvation, summary execution, gang rape and forced displacement.
One of the most prominent events took place between late May and early June, when paramilitary groups of the Ethiopian Regional Administration in Ogaden, known as the Liyu police, carried out a military operation in different places near the Ogadeni district of Shilaabo, executing hundreds of civilians and burning several villages, according to the armed group. The villages affected included Lababaar, Xaadh Xaadh, Xindhowreed and others near Barmagoog and the Somali border region of Galmudug. This time, the Ethiopian government’s silence was breached when the governor of the neighbouring Somali region of Galmudug and Somali government authorities confirmed on 1 June that at least 50 people had died (including 11 women, as well as children and elderly persons) and dozens had been wounded in attacks between a Somali clan militia and the Ethiopian Liyu police on Somali soil, near the border. In September, it emerged that the al-Shabaab Somali armed group had captured and executed two ONLF officials in May as they travelled from Baidoa, which is controlled by the Somali Federal Government, to Ogaden. This is not the first time that the jihadist insurgency has executed ONLF members.
Eight members of the ONLF, including the secretary of defence, had previously been executed. The ONLF condemned the incident and said that it is not involved in the conflict and has always kept its distance from the war in Somalia. According to several sources, some Somali militia groups and corrupt local governments get favours from Ethiopia in exchange for providing information on or even detaining ONLF members and Ogadeni refugees who could be tortured or executed by the Ethiopian Army. Finally, a meeting was held in Oslo on 24 October by five political and military movements opposing the Ethiopian government, which announced the formation of the People’s Alliance for Freedom and Democracy (PAFD), including the ONLF.
Somalia
Start: 1988
Type: Government, System
Internationalised internal
Main parties: Federal government, pro-government militias and warlords, USA, France, Ethiopia, AMISOM, EUNAVFOR Somalia, Operation Ocean Shield, al-Shabaab, Eritrea
Intensity: 3
Trend: =
Summary:
The armed conflict and the absence of effective central authority in the country have their origins in 1988, when a