of the decomposition of the USSR) and which ended in a peace treaty that did not resolve the status of Chechnya, the conflict re-appeared in 1999, in the so-called second Chechen War, triggered off by some incursions into Dagestan by Chechen rebels and attacks in Russian cities. In a pre-election context and with an anti-terrorist discourse, the Russian army entered Chechnya again to fight against the moderate pro-independent regime which arose after the first war and which was, at the same time, devastated by internal disputes and growing criminality. In 2001 Russia considered the war as being finished, without an agreement or a definitive victory, and in 2003 favoured a state of autonomy and a Chechen pro-Russian administration.
However the confrontations continued in following years, although in the form of low-level violence. In parallel, there was a Islamisation of the Chechen rebel ranks while the
insurgency was increasingly of a regional nature, especially affecting neighbouring Dagestan. Furthermore, the civilian population faces serious human rights violations, largely committed by local security forces.
In the political arena, South Ossetia and Russia signed a treaty of alliance and integration in March, which was blasted by the Georgian government and was in line with the agreement signed between Russia and Abkhazia,52 though it went even further in some aspects of relations between Russia and South Ossetia. It covered economic, commercial, security, defence and other issues, and contemplated the integration of the customs services of South Ossetia and the Russian Federation. Moreover, South Ossetian security force units will form part of Russia’s security and defence forces. International stakeholders like NATO also criticised the treaty, describing it as destabilising behaviour by Russia. Another source of
tension was the announcement made in October by the office of the presidency of South Ossetia regarding its intention to hold a referendum on annexation by Russia. This announcement was made after a meeting that month between South Ossetian President Leonid Tibilov and the Russian president’s representative for relations between Russia and the territories of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia, Vladislav Surkov. However, Russia denied that it had addressed the issue of the referendum during the meeting and said that Russia recognised South Ossetia as an independent state, implicitly ruling out the desire for such a vote. In his presidential election campaign in 2014, Leonid Tibilov had promised to hold a referendum.
Meanwhile, South Ossetia set up more obstacles for NGOs, including international entities like International Alert.
Part of the insurgency of the northern Caucasus joined ISIS, including the
top rebel leader in Chechnya
The levels of lethality associated with the conflict in Chechnya fell when compared to the increase the year before, while the recent pattern continued whereby the Caucasus Emirate insurgency shifted its allegiance to Islamic State (ISIS), the armed group prevalent in Syria and Iraq. With the change in loyalty of some northern Caucasian commanders, including Chechens, in late
2014 and early 2015 as a precedent, the top leader of the insurgency in Chechnya, Aslan Byutukayev (also known as Khamzat), announced that he had joined ISIS in June.
This change was in line with much of the rebel ranks, while the top leaders of the Caucasus Emirate remained opposed to ISIS. That same month, an Islamic State spokesman announced the creation of the northern Caucasian branch of the armed group and of Caucasus Province (Wilayat al-Qawqaz), divided into several areas (Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia and another province uniting Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachay-Cherkessia). Dagestani rebel leader Abu Mohammed al-Kadari (Rustam Asilderov) was appointed the top leader of the entire Caucasian insurgency loyal to ISIS. In July, Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov warned that no ISIS bases or militancy will be permitted on Chechen soil.
People were arrested who were allegedly going to join Islamic State during the year. In December, a video made by this group, allegedly filmed in the Syrian city of Raqqa, showed the beheading of a Russian-Chechen man accused of being a spy for Russia. In the video, ISIS threatened Moscow with carrying out attacks on Russian soil. Kadyrov threatened the perpetrators of the beheading with death.
In addition to the insurgents’ changes in loyalty, low-intensity violent incidents continued to took place in Chechnya. There were reports of bomb attacks, special anti-terrorist operations and arrests of suspected combatants, as well as some forced disappearances. Even so, the number of people killed (at least 15) and wounded (15) in the conflict still dropped compared to previous years (at least 52 killed and 65 wounded in 2014, 39 killed and 69 wounded in 2013, 82 killed and 92 wounded in 2012, 95 killed and 106 wounded in 2011 and 127 killed and 123 wounded in 2011, according to figures from the independent portal Caucasian Knot). Prominent events in 2015 included an explosion that killed three people near a dam close to Grozny in February, after which around 100 people were arrested and interrogated.
In early October, three combatants were killed and three agents were wounded in a special operation in a district in Grozny. The Chechen president claimed that those killed had been trained in Syria and were preparing serious attacks. Meanwhile, the authorities continued applying pressure on the Salafist Muslim population, including arrests and searches of mosques. In turn, two
52. See the summary on Georgia (Abkhazia) in this chapter.
53. Russian Justice Initiative and Chechnya Advocacy Network, Submission from Russian Justice Initiative and Chechnya Advocacy Network Concerning the Russian Federation’s Compliance with the CEDAW Convention in the North Caucasus. CEDAW 62th Session, 13 October 2015.
Russia (Kabardino-Balkaria)
Intensity: 3
Trend: ↓
Type: System, Identity, Self-government Internal
Main parties: Federal Russian government, government of the Republic of Kabardino-Balkaria, armed opposition groups Summary:
The violence and instability that characterise the Federal Republic of Kabardino-Balkaria are related to the armed groups that since the turn of the 21st century have been fighting against Russian presence and defending the creation of an Islamic emirate, along with other armed movements in the North Caucasus, and reflecting the regionalisation of the violence that affected Chechnya in the 1990s. The network of groups that operates in Kabardino-Balkaria, Yarmuk, began operations in 2004 although it was in 2005 when it began to show its offensive capability, with several simultaneous attacks on the capital that claimed dozens of lives and led in turn to the intensification of the counter-insurgent operations of the Russian and local authorities. Periodical insurgent and counterinsurgent attacks are launched, the extortion of the civilian population is carried out by rebel forces and human rights violations are committed by the armed forces. Since 2012 insurgent violence has been declining. There are also underlying tensions linked to the influence of religious currents not related to the republic, problems of corruption and human rights violations, and the disaffection of the local population towards the authorities Sufi mausoleums were set on fire in November, and some local activists interpreted the attacks as a reaction by Salafist groups to repression against their community.
Moreover, tension increased between the Chechen and federal authorities. The Chechen president authorised the security forces to shoot and kill non-Chechen security agents operating in Chechnya without local authorisation.
This announcement came shortly after the killing of a Chechen man by federal police officers in the capital, Grozny, in April. Furthermore, a former senior Chechen security force official, Zaur Dadayev, the second-highest ranking member of the Chechen ministry of the interior’s Server Battalion, was arrested in Ingushetia in March along with other Chechen citizens in conjunction with the killing of Russian opposition politician Boris Nemtsov in Moscow in February. Kadyrov defended Dadayev, calling him a “patriot”. Meanwhile, the atmosphere of serious human rights violations committed by President Kadyrov’s regime continued, as persistently reported for years by local and international human rights organisations. Among other events, the headquarters of the Local Committee against Torture suffered attacks in the capital. A women’s rights activist was kidnapped near Grozny in October and later released. In a shadow report released for the CEDAW Committee in October, the NGOs Russian Justice Initiative and the Chechnya Advocacy Network denounced the violations of women’s rights in the northern Caucasus, including in Chechnya.53
The low-intensity violence affecting Kabardino-Balkaria due to the conflict between the Islamist insurgency and the security forces decreased, although attacks and special operations continued to take place, leaving dozens of people dead, while schisms opened within the rebels. Part of the rebel ranks of the Caucasus Emirate active in Kabardino-Balkaria and other neighbouring republics pledged allegiance to the armed group Islamic State (ISIS), which is fighting in Syria and Iraq.
However, in line with the top leader of the insurgency in the northern Caucasus, Aliaskhab Kebekov, who is very critical of ISIS, the leader of the branch of the Caucasus Emirate in Kabardino-Balkaria, Zalim Shebzukhov, remained loyal to Kebekov and the Emirate and opposed to ISIS. Meanwhile, in June ISIS announced the creation of Caucasus Province (Wilayat al-Qawqaz), divided into several areas (Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia and another province uniting Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachay-Cherkessia). Episodes of violence included a special security force operation in the capital, Nalchik, in November, which claimed the life of a suspected ISIS leader in the republic, Robert Zankishiev, and wounded his wife and a police officer. Fourteen insurgents were killed in two special operations in the outskirts of the capital in late November. The National Counter-Terrorist Committee said that the rebels were members of ISIS, while pro-Caucasus Emirate media outlets denied that they belonged to the organisation. Violent clashes and attacks occurred throughout the year. According to the toll kept by the independent portal Caucasian Knot, at least 47 people lost their lives in 2015, figures similar to those from the previous year, when at least 49 people were killed, although with considerably less impact in terms of the number of people wounded. The body counts marked a pattern of decrease in the armed conflict when compared to previous years (92 killed and 31 wounded in 2013, 107 killed and 49 wounded in 2012 and 129 killed and 44 wounded in 2011) in a republic with just over 800,000 inhabitants. However, the conflict heated up in the closing months of the year, with various violent incidents, leading to a certain call of alarm due to the risks of potential escalation in the short or medium term.
South-east Europe
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Intensity: 1
Trend: ↑
Type: Self-government, Identity, Government Internationalised internal
Main parties: Central government, government of the Republika Srpska, government of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Federation, high representative of the international community
Macedonia
Intensity: 1
Trend: ↑
Type: Government
Internal
Main parties: Government, political and social opposition
Summary:
Macedonia gained independence from Yugoslavia in 1991 peacefully, in contrast to the wars that affected the former Yugoslavia in the 90s. However, the process of independence and the new constitution generated Tension increased between the government and the
authorities of the Bosnian Serb entity, the Republika Srpska, and between the latter and Euro-Atlantic institutions. At the start of the year, the Bosnian Serb ruling party SNSD began a boycott of Parliament in protest against the new state government, from which it was excluded following the agreement after the October elections between Bosnian and Croat parties and Bosnian Serb opposition parties. One source of tension revolved around threats of secession from the SNSD.
Thus, in April the party adopted a resolution urging the holding of a referendum on the independence of the Republika Srpska in 2018 if the region does not receive greater autonomy. In July, the Bosnian Serb legislature approved holding a referendum on the jurisdiction of the Office of the High Representative and the state tribunals in the territory of the Republika Srpska. The announcement prompted criticism from the state and other countries and the Serbian government urged the Republika Srpska to reconsider its decision. In July, Bosnian representatives in the Parliament of the Bosnian Serb entity invoked a clause on protecting vital national interests in an attempt to block the referendum, but the Constitutional Court rejected their allegations. Even so, in September the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council affirmed that the plans for a referendum could jeopardise the rule of law in the country and the international community’s High Representative Valentin Inzko stated that the referendum would violate the Dayton Peace Agreement of 1995. In a context of rising political tension, in September state political representatives and representatives of the Bosnian Serb entity began EU-facilitated talks and reached an agreement for a package of judicial reforms, even though the Bosnian Serb authorities said that they would continue with their plans for a referendum. Moreover, in December, Bosnian Serb President Milorad Dodik threatened that if state legislation to reform the Constitutional Court were not approved, all political representatives of the Republika Sprska would withdraw from all state institutions.
This warning came shortly after a court ruling on the Summary:
The former Yugoslav republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, inhabited by Bosnians, Serbs and Croats, was caught up in a war between 1992 and 1995 (during the break-up of the Yugoslav Federation) in which the country’s Serbian political elite, with support from Serbia, as well as Bosniak and Croatian political figures, mobilised their respective populations and forces on the basis of ethnic issues and political plans for self determination which were mutually incompatible. The Dayton peace agreement led to the creation of a fragile state divided into two entities: the Republika Srpska (with a Serb majority and 49% of the territory); and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (with a Bosniak and Croatian population and 51% of the territory), both of which enjoyed wide-ranging powers, including military power. Political tension among the nationalist elites of the three communities, and between these elites and the international bodies with the mandate of overseeing the implementation of the agreements, along with the legacy of the impact of the conflict on the population and country, remain active sources of conflict.
unconstitutionality of the holiday commemorating the day that the Republik Srpska was created. Also during the year, there were disagreements and tension within the Bosnian Croat entity, including the departure of the social democratic party Democratic Front from the coalition government with the Bosnian party SDA and the Croat party HDZ in early June.
Meanwhile, some violent incidents were reported during the year. For example, one police officer was killed and another was wounded in an attack on a police station in the city of Zvornik (Republika Srpska) in April, allegedly carried out by an Islamist militant. The arrest of around 30 Bosnians in the Bosnian Serb entity in May raised alarm among the Bosnian political class, which warned of the risks that alleged terrorist attacks could be used as a way to hold the Bosnian population hostage. The Bosnian Serb authorities threatened to develop their own intelligence service. Regarding security, in July the ministers of the interior of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro stated that ISIS posed a real threat to the Balkan region, which would require regional cooperation from the security services. In October, the police of the Republika Srpska announced that they had broken up a terrorist plot to attack a hotel in a city in northeastern Bosnia. In November, two soldiers were shot dead in a suburb of Sarajevo in an incident whose reasons were unknown. At the end of the year, around 10 people were arrested who were suspected of having links to ISIS and other armed groups accused of planning attacks in the country. Regarding other sources of tension, some intercommunity incidents took place during the year. For instance, Serbian Prime Minister Aleksandar Vucic was attacked with stones and other objects for participating in the ceremony marking the 20th anniversary of the genocide in Sbrenica, an incident that was criticised by Bosnian President Bakir Izetbegovic. Several hundred people also paid tribute to the Bosnian victims of Sbrenica in the Serbian capital, Belgrade. Vucic visited Sbrenica again in November.
Moreover, the city of Prijedor, in the Republika Srpska, witnessed a rise in violent intercommunity incidents at various times of the year, which led to a meeting between representatives from different communities and the local authorities to find solutions and defuse the tension.