2015, with alleged ISIS cells claiming responsibility for various bomb attacks
69. Bruce Riedel, “Saudi Arabia’s mounting security challenges”, Al-Monitor, 28 December 2015.
70. See the summary on Iran – USA, Israel in this chapter.
71. See the summary on Yemen (Houthis) in chapter 1 (Armed conflicts).
Yemen (south)
Intensity: 2
Trend: ↑
Type: Self-government, Resources, Territory Internal
Main parties: Government, secessionist and autonomist opposition groups from the south (including the South Yemen Movement/al-Hiraak al-Janoubi) Summary:
Yemen is the result of a problematic process of unification that in 1990 joined together the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) in the north and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) in the south. Since then, the balance of power has tilted northwards and President Ali Abdullah Saleh (leader of the former YAR since 1978) has held office ever since.
The fragile political balance established with the creation of the new state led to the outbreak of civil war in 1994, from which the northern forces emerged victorious. The situation remains tense and in recent years demonstrations protesting against discrimination towards the south have intensified, especially concerning control over resources. There have also been clashes with the security forces. The southern protest movement is not structured around a single organisation but rather it is composed of groups with a variety of agendas, whose demands range from greater autonomy to secession, which are exerting pressure to achieve a new north-south relationship within the framework of the transition process that began in Yemen at the end of 2011.
to enhance his military leadership, especially since it had become clear that the Saudi adventure in Yemen would not end as quickly as predicted.69 Throughout the year, the Saudi authorities also conducted a campaign to arrest hundreds of people accused of belonging to or presumably linked to ISIS. Over 400 people were reportedly arrested in July alone.
Meanwhile, international human rights organisations like Amnesty International drew attention to the significant increase in the use of the death penalty in the country, reaching its highest level in the last two decades. During 2015, Saudi Arabia executed at least 157 people, some for crimes like drug trafficking (63 people were put to death for this crime in 2015, according to data collected by Amnesty International).
Serious incidents that took place in September as part of the pilgrimage to Mecca (an accident with a crane and a stampede) killed over 1,000 people and had a major impact, since the Saudi monarchy derives much of its political legitimacy from its custodianship of the Muslim holy sites. Amidst questioning about management of the crisis in Mecca and other issues like the fall in oil prices, the security situation and the war in Yemen, some members of the royal family criticised King Salman and called for a change in leadership. In two letters, a senior Saudi prince demanded the king’s removal, stating that he was unable to govern and that his son Mohamed bin Salman was really leading the country behind the scenes. These letters called on 13 children of Abdulaziz Ibn Saud, the founder of the Saudi state, to join together to remove the king and
establish new leadership. The incidents in Mecca also heightened the tension between Saudi Arabia and Iran, as Tehran demanded accountability and called for an investigation into the events, in which over 400 Iranian pilgrims lost their lives.
Both countries have already been facing off over their aspirations of regional influence and their support for rival groups in the armed conflicts in Syria and Yemen. The strained relationship between Riyadh and Tehran was also
affected by the fate of the Shia cleric Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr, an influential leader of the Shia minority in Saudi Arabia. The Saudi Supreme Court upheld the death sentence against the cleric in October and his execution in early 2016 raised bilateral tension between both countries, as well as between Shia and Sunnis across the region. Finally, Saudi Arabia warily watched the rapprochement between the United States and Iran during the talks that let to the signing of the nuclear agreement in the middle of the year.70
Throughout 2015, the dynamics of tension in southern Yemen were directly influenced by developments in the rest of the country, which led to an institutional crisis and a significant escalation of violence, in addition to the armed intervention of an international coalition headed by Saudi Arabia in late March.71 During the first few months of the year, faced with the advance of the Houthis from their stronghold in the north towards the centre and south of the country, as well as the political crisis stemming from the ouster of President Abdo Rabbo Mansour Hadi, pro-independence groups in the south decided to reject the authority of the central government.
Therefore, after the non-formalised resignation of Hadi, who later claimed that he was still president and denounced the Houthis for carrying out a coup d’état, the Aden Security Council announced that it would no longer obey orders from Sana’a. In February, Hadi managed to escape from the house arrest imposed on him by the Houthis and sought refuge in the southern city of Aden. From there, he tried to bring together loyalists to face the northern militia, which has acted in collusion with parts of the circle of Hadi’s rival, former President Ali Abdullah Saleh. However, some observers
72. See the summary on Yemen (AQAP) in chapter 1 (Armed conflicts).
73. Farea al-Muslimi, The Southern Question: Yemen’s War Inside the War, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 8 July 2015.
and analysts underscored that the level of support that Hadi could obtain in the southern part of the country was unclear, as even though he is from the south, he is considered a politician closely tied to the elites of the north. Faced with the advance of the Houthis and following an attack on the presidential palace in Aden, Hadi ended up seeking refuge in Saudi Arabia and demanded international intervention, which was led by Riyadh. In the following months, different southern groups organised to resist the Houthi militias and Aden became one of the key scenes of hostilities. With the support of coalition air strikes and ground troops, armed forces loyal to Hadi and southern militias managed to expel the Houthis and regain control over the strategic port of Aden at mid-year, although this control was contested during the second quarter by the actions of jihadist gunmen from groups like ISIS and AQAP.72 In fact, AQAP took advantage of the instability in the country to expand its control in Hadramawt (southeast) and to launch attacks in other southern governorates like Abyan and Al Bayda.
In this context, media reports noted that the fighting with the Houthis was providing military experience to the young people of the south, many of which present themselves as members of the southern resistance
and flaunt southern emblems from the time before the unification of Yemen in 1990. Other analysts highlighted the changes in foreign support for certain southern groups and attempts by both Riyadh and Tehran to win backing from some of them as part of the conflict between the Houthis and Hadi. In this regard, some southern groups that had received some degree of support from Iran thus far, like al-Beidh, one of the most organised groups in the Southern Movement, oscillated between Tehran and the Gulf countries in search of support. Saudi Arabia, which has traditionally forged alliances with northern groups, also sought to expand its influence in southern Yemen, especially after the Houthis took control of Sana’a.73 However, once southern territories were regained, some tensions emerged between members of the Southern Movement recruited by Riyadh and Hadi’s circle over the designation of authorities in areas liberated from the Houthis. Like every year, mass demonstrations returned in October to coincide with the anniversary of the south’s independence from British rule in 1967.
The demonstrations were the first massive demand for southern independence since the Houthis had retreated from Aden and other southern governorates, where it became clear that southern groups do not intend to continue fighting against the northern insurgency, but are focusing their aspirations on southern independence.
158 Alert 2016
Philippines
Israel - Palestine Morocco Western Sahara Colombia
Senegal CAR Burundi Mozambique
Sudan
Libya
South Sudan
Ethiopia
Eritrea
Mali DR Congo
India
Afghanistan Pakistan Thailand
Armenia Azerbaijan
Kosovo
Ukraine SerbiaMoldova Georgia Turkey Yemen
Myanmar
CyprusSyria Countries with formal or exploratory negotiations in 2015
Map 3.1. Peace processes
Mapa_procesos2016i.pdf 1 11/07/2016 10:38:16
3. Peace processes
• During the year four peace negotiations were resolved satisfactorily: Central African Republic, Sudan (Darfur) SLM-MM, Mali (CMA-Platform) and South Sudan.
• Three conflicts reported explorations to start a formal negotiations process: Colombia (ELN), Pakistan (Baluchistan) and Syria.
• 17.9% of negotiations progressed well or were resolved (seven cases); 30.7% experienced significant difficultures (12 cases) and 43.6% failed (17).
• The Government of Mali signed a preliminary proposal for a peace agreement drafted within the framework of a mediation process led by Algeria. On 15th May the first Peace and National Reconciliation Agreement was achieved.
• As for the conflict in the Central African Republic, the Forum for National Reconciliation was held successfully, and at the end of the year presidential elections took place, although the country was still immersed in a climate of fragility.
• In South Sudan, the proposed peace agreement from the IGAD-Plus was ratified by all stakeholders involved in the conflict. The parties agreed to a permanent ceasefire and signed a transitory security agreement whereby the Government and the SPLA-IO rebels agreed the terms for a partial demilitarisation of the capital Juba. Towards the end of the year, however, both parties continued to accuse each other of breaching the ceasefire.
• In Colombia negotiations continued with the FARC. On 15th December the full content of the Agreement on the Victims of the Conflict was disclosed, the general highlights of which had been announced in September. The president and “Timochenko” agreed also to complete the negotiations before the 23rd of March 2016. In turn, the ELN guerrilla ended its exploratory phase and agreed a negotiation agenda with the Government for the beginning of 2016.
• In India, the first round of conversations started between the Indian Government and the faction of the Assam opposition armed group that is favourable to the negotiations, ULFA. The leader of ULFA-Pro Negotiations, Anup Kumar Chetia, was released from prison.
• In Thailand (south), conversations took place between the Government and a platform, known as the Majilis Syura Patani (Mara Patani, the Patani Advisory Council), which brings together six insurgent organisations. A series of informal meetings started between the parties in Kuala Lumpur, facilitated by the Government of Malaysia.
• In Cyprus, the peace process was resumed in May after seven months of impasse. Confidence-building measures and technical committees were also implemented.
This chapter analyses the situation of 39 contexts of negotiation or exploration, including a follow-up of the agreements with the MILF and the MNLF (Philippines), since they encountered serious difficulties to be implemented.
17.9% of the negotiations studied (seven cases in total) worked well, including the ones that were successfully resolved; 30.7% of negotiations encountered serious difficulties (12 cases); and 43.6% were unsuccessful (17 cases), meaning the overall balance is very negative, even when negotiations were set to resume in some countries in 2016. In the cases of Baluchistan (Pakistan), the armed group ELN in Colombia and in Syria there were conversations and exploratory contacts that may consolidate during 2016. During the period from 2008 to 2013, the average percentage of negotiations that failed at the end of the year was only 17.3%.
Good (3) In difficulties (12) Bad (17) At an exploratory
stage (3) Resolved1 (4) Cyprus
India ([Nagaland]
[NSCN-IM]) India – Pakistan
Colombia (FARC) India (Assam) (ULFA)
Moldova (Transdniestria) Myanmar
Philippines (MILF) Senegal (MFDC) Serbia – Kosovo Sudan (Darfur) Sudan (Kordofan &
Blue Nile [SPLM-N]) Sudan (National Dialogue) Thailand (south) Ukraine (Donbas)
Afghanistan (Taliban)
Armenia – Azerbaijan (Nagorno Karabakh) Burundi
DR Congo (FDLR) Ethiopia – Eritrea Ethiopia (ONLF)
Georgia (Abkhazia & South Ossetia) India (Nagaland) (NSCN-K) Israel – Palestine Libya
Morocco – Western Sahara Mozambique (RENAMO) Philippines (NDF) Philippines (MNLF) Sudan – South Sudan Turkey (PKK) Yemen (Houthis)
Colombia (ELN) Pakistan (Baluchistan) Syria
CAR
Mali (CMA-Platform) South Sudan
Sudan ([Darfur] SLM-MM dissidents)
Table 3.1. Status of the negotiations at the end of 2015
1. In negotiations that have formally been finalised there may be problems in the implementation of agreements, and they may even fall apart at a later stage, although initially this means the peace negotiations have been successfully resolved.