on 10 September the Constitutional Court issued the final list of candidacies approved to run in the elections.
Ten of the 33 candidacies submitted were approved, including those of Ouattara and Affi N’Guessan, the latter of which represented the FPI during the party’s internal crisis, although the wing headed by Aboudramane Sangaré refused to recognise him as a presidential candidate. The possibility of Ouattara’s re-election led to new protests by the opposition, with some people killed and dozens wounded in different parts of the country. The presidential election was finally held on 25 October and the team of international observers from ECOWAS reported that it took place in an atmosphere of peace and transparency. Voter turnout was 54.63%.
Alassane Ouattara won handily, with 2,118,229 votes (83.66%), while his rival Affi N’Guessan only won 9.3%, according to data provided by the Independent Electoral Commission (CEI), ruling out a runoff round.
On 2 November, the Constitutional Court validated the results and confirmed Ouattara’s re-election.
Moreover, in relation to the different judicial processes open after the post-election crisis in 2010, during the first quarter a national court sentenced Simone Gbagbo, the wife of former President Laurent Gbagbo, to 20 years in prison. She was found guilty of threatening the security of the country, disrupting public order and organising armed groups. The trial of her husband, the former president, will begin at the International Criminal Court (ICC) on 28 January 2016 along with the trial of the former minister of culture and leader of the Young Patriots, Charles Blé Goudé. Both men have been charged with crimes against humanity. Meanwhile, some local activists warned of the risks of a perception of bias in the transitional justice process by focusing on the leaders of one of the groups, the supporters of Gbagbo, but not on all. In August, the organisation Human Rights Watch (HRW) published a report asking the ICC to expand the number of investigations into the post-electoral violence, looking not only
into cases of violence committed in the capital, Abidjan, but also into those that occurred in the provinces. It also asked the body to expand its investigations into the other side participating in the violence.
Finally, in the case opened in France against Michel Gbagbo, the son of the former president, over illegal arrest and mistreatment in 2011, on 5 December the judge issued an arrest warrant for the president of the National Assembly of Côte d’Ivoire, Guillaume Soro, after he repeatedly refused to respond to various court summons. This sparked protest among the Ivorian authorities because Soro
has diplomatic immunity. Finally, in terms of security, some violent incidents took place throughout the year in the west, in the area bordering Liberia. Early in the year, two soldiers lost their lives in an attack against security forces in the village of Dahyoke. On 2 December,
Political tension rose in the country around the electoral period, with different opposition demonstrations in which scores of people were wounded. In March, the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI) announced the dates of the elections, with the presidential election coming on 11 October and the local elections in the first quarter of 2016. As dialogue between the government and the opposition remained stalled, the opposition harshly criticised the schedule, announcing measures of pressure such as a boycott on Parliament and refusal to recognise the electoral commission and the local authorities, as well as a call for demonstrations in the streets. Various opposition protests had previously been organised during the first quarter of the year, including mobilisations in the city of Labé against reforms affecting the civil service that wounded around 50 people in early February. After months of tension, demonstrations and clashes, in which the government and the opposition opened a dialogue to discuss issues related to the electoral law, on 20 August an agreement was signed to guarantee greater representation for the opposition in local governments and to reform the CENI and update the census.
The agreement between the government and the opposition helped to lower tensions and ensured that the presidential election would be held in a more stable atmosphere. On 1 September, the Constitutional Court published the definitive list of eight candidates for the elections, including current President Alpha Condé, of the
Guinea
Intensity: 1
Trend: ↑
Type: Government
Internal
Main parties: Government, Armed Forces, political parties in the opposition, trade unions Summary:
The army took advantage of the death of President Lansana Conté in December 2008, after more than two decades in power, to carry out a new coup d’état and form a military junta.
The holding of elections in 2010, won by the opposition leader Alpha Condé, paved the way for a return to the democratic system. However, the elections were marred by violence and by the coming to the fore of identity-related tensions between the country’s main ethnic communities. The country remains unstable due to the lack of a strategy for national reconciliation and obstacles to the reform of the security sector, with an army that is omnipresent in Guinean political activity.
Rally of the Guinean People (RPG) party, and opposition leaders Cellou Dalein Diallo of the Union of Democratic Forces of Guinea (UFDG), Sidya Toure of the Union of Republican Forces (UFR) and Lansana Kouyate, candidate of the Party of Hope for National Development (PEDN).
After an election campaign marked by accusations between the different parties and pre-electoral violence that claimed the lives of over 10 people, on 11 October six million Guineans went to the polls for the first round to elect the new president. The election was held in a tense climate, with the national borders closed, traffic restricted and no prominent incidents reported. The EU and the AU sent observer missions to ensure transparency and smooth operations on election day. Around 19,000 members of the security forces were also deployed. Bakary Fofana, the president of the CENI, released the election results on 17 October. With turnout at 68%, Alpha Condé won with 57.84% of the votes, compared to 31.45% gained by his direct rival Cellou Dalein Diallo. The opposition did not recognise the results, claiming fraud and demanding that the election be repeated while calling on the people to demonstrate peacefully. However, the EU observation mission said that the election was free, transparent and valid, and that the irregularities encountered and the organisational difficulties did not invalidate the results.
The Constitutional Court confirmed Condé’s victory on 1 November, ratifying the CENI’s results. The year ended with popular demonstrations and the opposition’s rejection of the election results, which did not prevent the new government from taking office between 14 and 21 December. Condé appointed Mamady Youla to be the new prime minister.
Guinea-Bissau
Intensity: 1
Trend: ↑
Type: Government
Internationalised internal Main parties: Transitional government, Armed
Forces, political parties in the opposition, international drug trafficking networks
Summary:
The history of Guinea-Bissau since it achieved independence from Portugal in 1974 is scattered with violence and coups d’état that have prevented the country from achieving political stability as well as thwarting all attempts to implement democracy. The strong influence of the armed forces on the country’s politics and the confrontation between parties that represent different ethnic groups constitute a major hurdle to achieving peace. The breakdown of the stability pact signed in 2007 by the main political parties represented another lost opportunity for ending the spiral of violence that dominates political life. The growing impact of international drug trafficking networks in West Africa further complicates the crisis. The assassination of the president, Joao Bernardo Vieira, in March 2009, marked the start of a fresh period of instability. In April 2012 the Army carried out a new coup after the first round of the legislative elections when the candidate of the PAIGC, the party in power, won and was questioned by the opposition, despite of the backing from international observers. After the coup, a new transition period started.
Guinea-Bissau experienced a year marked by political tension between the president and the prime minister.
The first quarter of the year was characterised by the permanent crisis between President José Mario Vaz and Prime Minister Domingos Simões Pereira, which led to Pereira’s dismissal by the president in August. Pereira’s dismissal opened new tensions and a major political crisis in the government. On 20 August, the president appointed Baciro Djá to be the new prime minister.
However, with votes from part of the ruling party, the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC), Parliament opposed the appointment and passed a resolution demanding Dja’s resignation and Pereira’s return. It also accused the president of staging a constitutional coup. On 8 September, the Constitutional Court declared Djá’s appointment unconstitutional. That same day, President Vaz accepted the Court’s decision and removed Djá from his position. The PAIGC proposed Carlos Correia, who had previously been vice president, and he was appointed prime minister on 17 September with the mediation of ECOWAS. The UN Security Council congratulated the country for selecting Carlos Correia as prime minister and said that it was a major step towards achieving political stability. At the same time, it praised both the government for respecting the Constitution and the country’s internal regulations and the military for not interfering. The commander-in-chief, General Biague na Ntan, had already announced that the military would refrain from intervening in political affairs on 10 August, just after the beginning of the crisis. ECOWAS recommended that the authorities of Guinea-Bissau should revise the Constitution and its semi-presidential system, since it has generated much instability between presidents and prime ministers.
Correia’s arrival did not end the political tension, since President Vaz refused the new government cabinet that he proposed, leading to new mediation by ECOWAS.
Finally, the tension was resolved by the appointment of the new cabinet by decree on 12 October. The new government presented its programme to Parliament on 23 December, but it was rejected by the opposition and by part of the PAIGC, forcing the government to resubmit it in early January to begin governing.
Niger
Intensity: 3
Trend: ↑
Type: Government, System
International
Main parties: Government, political opposition (Coordination of Forces for Democracy and the Republic) and social
opposition, armed group MUJAO, armed group Those Who Sign in Blood, armed Nigerian Islamist group Boko Haram, regional force (MNJTF) Summary:
The elections in January and May 2011 restored the democratic system in the country after the military junta
complied with the timetable set for returning power to civilians. A coup d’état in 2009 toppled the government of Mamadou Tandja after he began a series of constitutional reforms to hold on to power. Despite the normalisation of the situation in the country, instability persisted in the north due to the presence of cells belonging to the Algerian armed group AQIM and especially along the border with Nigeria owing to the impact of the armed activities of the group Boko Haram, which stepped up its attacks on Nigerien soil while the government joined the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) to battle the insurgency.
The political situation was marked by the growing impact of the conflict with Boko Haram (BH) in the country, especially in the region of Diffa, as well as by the political and social tensions stemming from the announcement of elections planned for February 2016.
Niger started out the year embroiled in the humanitarian crisis caused by BH’s attacks in the Diffa region, located in the southeastern part of the country, which forced the government to request international aid due to the arrival of around 150,000 refugees from Nigeria and to declare a state of emergency in the area. On 6 February, the Nigerien Army responded forcefully to the rebels’
attacks at the start of the year mainly in the cities of Bosso and Diffa, killing at least 100 insurgents. Niger joined the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) to combat BH in all countries in the region (Chad, Nigeria, Benin, Niger and Cameroon), with the national Parliament approving to send 750 soldiers in February.
BH responded by stepping up its attacks in the countries participating in the MNJTF and on 25 April the group attacked the Nigerien military base on Karamga Island in Lake Chad, killing 50 Nigerien soldiers, 26 civilians and 156 insurgents in the first major battle of the year. In reaction, on 30 April the Nigerien government launched a military operation in the Lake Chad region, giving the residents 72 hours to evacuate the area.
The action displaced 25,000 civilians. In early May, the government reported the arrests of 643 people in February and March who were suspected of collaborating with BH. In the following months, the situation dragged on with no major changes, accentuating the crisis in Diffa. The year ended with a decrease in attacks by the Islamist group BH, although insecurity persisted in the regions bordering the Nigerian states of Yobe and Borno.
The data provided by OCHA on the impact of the conflict on the forced displacement of people in 2015 estimated that around 66,000 people were Internaly displaced and that close to 64,000 refugees from Nigeria had reached Nigerien soil.
Regarding the domestic political scene, on 29 July the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI) announced the dates for holding the presidential election in 2016, with the first round on 21 February and the runoff round on 20 March. It also set local elections for 9 May. The announcement was criticised by the opposition due to the lack of agreement on the dates proposed. On 13 September, the Nigerien Democratic
Movement (MODEN) nominated Hama Amadou to be its presidential candidate. Amadou has been president of the National Assembly and was in exile in France to escape charges of child trafficking in the country. He returned to the country on 14 November to run in the presidential election and was arrested upon his arrival in Niamey. The end of the year was marked by the rise in political tension between the government and the opposition. Nigerien President Mahamadou Issoufou declared the arrest of nine military officers and some civilians and journalists accused of plotting a coup d’état.
The opposition blasted this announcement, questioning whether the government was trying to manipulate the political atmosphere prior to the election.
35. See the summary on Nigeria (Boko Haram) in chapter 1 (Armed conflicts).
Nigeria
Intensity: 3
Trend: ↓
Type: Identity, Resources, Government Internal
Main parties: Government, political opposition, Christian and Muslim communities, farmers and livestock raisers, community militias
Summary:
Since 1999, when political power was returned to civilian hands after a succession of dictatorships and coups, the government has not managed to establish a stable democratic system in the country. Huge economic and social differences remain between the states that make up Nigeria, due to the lack of real decentralisation, and between the various social strata, which fosters instability and outbreaks of violence. Moreover, strong inter-religious, inter-ethnic and political differences continue to fuel violence throughout the country. Political corruption and the lack of transparency are the other main stumbling blocks to democracy in Nigeria.
Mafia-like practices and the use of political assassination as an electoral strategy have prevented the free exercise of the population’s right to vote, leading to increasing discontent and fraudulent practices.
In addition to the situation of war in the northern part of the country between troops from Nigeria and other neighbouring countries and the armed group Boko Haram,35 the political situation in Nigeria was also marked by tension linked to the different elections in the country during the first quarter of the year, as well as by intercommunity violence in various regions and the escalation of tension in southern regions (Igboland and Niger Delta). Pre-electoral tension and violence rose considerably early in the year, forcing the government to postpone the presidential and federal parliamentary elections planned for February to 28 March and putting off the elections for governors and state parliaments until 11 April. The decision was announced on 7 February by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), purportedly for security reasons. It then claimed that the intensification in security operations against BH