Increasing the likelihood of apprehending perpetrators

Reducing opportunities for crime will also increase the risk that culprits will be caught because a smaller window of opportunity for theft or diversion will make it easier for authorities to detect the commissioning of a crime.

Additional measures can also be imposed to increase the likelihood that a culprit will be caught.

The three principal methods to increase the chances of catching a culprit are to:

— Have in place a rapid notification system to cater to any instance of loss of control;

— Have an effective monitoring programme;

— Use nuclear forensics and attribution to identify the source of detected material.

9.6.1. Sharing information

A first measure involves information sharing. An effective notification process, under which all law enforcement bodies and regulatory authorities are informed immediately of the loss of control of nuclear or radioactive material, allows these agencies to move into a heightened alert status to actively pursue recovery of missing material and the arrest of perpetrators. To be effective, the notification process must match the speed and ease of modern travel and communication systems. It must also be tailored to both the national situation and the possibility that criminal or unauthorized acts involving nuclear and

other radioactive material will extend across national borders. In this regard, existing notification procedures of Interpol, Europol and WCO can provide rapid dissemination of information to law enforcement agencies worldwide.

9.6.2. Increasing detection capability

A second method is to increase the chance of detection using radiation monitoring equipment. Most facilities handling nuclear and other radioactive material, such as nuclear plants or laboratories, have in place radiation detection systems mainly as a control measure for safety reasons. Having radiation monitors at the exit points of a facility or installation increases the chances of early detection, registering when a culprit tries to leave the facility illicitly carrying such material.

Many States have instigated radiation monitoring programmes at border crossing points, airports and maritime ports of entry. This entails the use of both portable equipment and the installation of fixed radiation monitors which basically serve to screen all personnel and vehicles for radiation when passing through a monitoring point. If nuclear or radioactive material is transported through a radiation monitoring station, this activates an alarm and results in the deployment of an immediate response by border control or other law enforcement personnel.

Certainly from the perspective of public transport, whether by sea, land or air, it is vital to prevent unauthorized nuclear and other radioactive material from being carried onto aircraft, trains, buses or ferries, where passengers are normally seated in close proximity to each other for a prolonged period of time.

The health risks associated with an unauthorized act involving nuclear and other radioactive material will increase substantially if the material is brought onto public transport. This can result from many people spending extended periods of time in close proximity to radioactive material being transported in an unsafe manner.

9.6.3. Nuclear and classical forensics

Nuclear forensics and attribution are used to assign responsibility for the intended or actual use of nuclear or radioactive material and devices in criminal acts or acts that threaten national and international security. Nuclear forensics include the collection of isotopic, chemical and physical evidence for determining the source of material used in criminal or unauthorized acts involving nuclear and other radioactive material, including those individuals involved in the unauthorized diversion of such material. Nuclear forensics combine elements of both classical — or traditional — forensics that normally

have been a part of criminal investigation and radiation measures and radio-chemical analysis. Traditional elements may include fingerprint, hair, fibre, and DNA analysis. Radiological forensics includes determining the major and minor isotopic content of material, major and trace element concentration, and physical data including textural and morphological features. The two elements complement each other. It is essential to characterize seized samples while preserving all forensic evidence. Attribution will guide response to the detection of criminal or unauthorized acts involving nuclear and other radioactive material, including any potential prosecution. Nuclear attribution combines many aspects of investigation, including results from nuclear forensic sample analysis, understanding of radiochemical signatures and environmental signatures, knowledge of the production of nuclear and radiochemical materials and their usefulness for nuclear or radiological devices, and information from law enforcement and intelligence sources.

Nuclear forensics and attribution are relatively new concepts. Owing to the complex requirements that call for capabilities from both classical and nuclear forensics, only a small number of States have the resources and capabil-ities to conduct this combined examination. For this reason it is important to promote international cooperation in nuclear forensics in order to handle it in a systematic manner and to share expertise. To this end, the IAEA has developed in cooperation with the International Technical Working Group on Nuclear Smuggling (ITWG) a common framework to pursue nuclear forensic investigations and best scientific approaches to the collection and interpre-tation of nuclear forensic evidence.

It is important to recognize that any nuclear forensic capability has to be well planned and organized in order to ensure that any evidence that is collected is admissible in a subsequent prosecution. Forensics can be quickly compromised if evidence is not collected early and stringent procedures are not used. Any national response programme should address this problem. It is recommended that a forensic evidence management team (FEMT) be established that consists of qualified individuals and that will aid in the recovery of evidence from the scene. It is advisable that these professional include law enforcement officials, radiological assessors and environmental experts. The FEMT will also have the responsibility for trace evidence. All equipment and resources used in the evidence have to be subject to a programme of quality control to eliminate the possibility of cross-contami-nation. First response personnel and their leaders are responsible for ensuring that no cross contamination takes place due to bad operational practice (e.g.

such as not changing gloves). In cases where forensic facilities that include laboratories are to be used in an investigation, a documented quality control programme must be in place in accordance with all rules of evidence.