Amendment to the CPPNM

In 1999, a process of developing possible amendments to the CPPNM was undertaken under the auspices of the IAEA. A group of experts was convened in several meetings for this purpose. One result of the experts’ work was the development of a set of ‘objectives and fundamental principles’ for physical protection. The 12 fundamental principles were endorsed both by the IAEA Board of Governors and the General Conference in 2001, with a recommen-dation that States apply them in their national regulatory systems. In July 2005, an Amendment Conference conducted in Vienna adopted an Amendment to the CPPNM [16], which strengthened the CPPNM significantly. The areas covered by it include:

— Extension of its scope to cover nuclear material in domestic use, storage and transport;

— Protection of nuclear material and facilities from sabotage;

— Creation of new offences for smuggling and certain group activities;

— Clarifying national responsibility for physical protection;

— Protection of confidential information;

— Incorporating the objectives and fundamental principles of physical protection;

— Adding relevant definitions;

— Expanding the scope of punishable acts.

Under Article 20.2 of the CPPNM, a proposed amendment enters into force 30 days after the date on which two thirds of the Parties have ratified or accepted the amendment. Given the large number of Parties to the CPPNM, there could be a significant delay in reaching the two thirds figure. However, two legal aspects are relevant to application of the amendments prior to their formal entry into force. First, by signing the amendment, a State may not take action that would defeat the object and purpose of the amendment prior to entry into force. Also, CPPNM Parties — either together or individually — could agree to provisional application of the amendments prior to formal entry into force.

3.2.8. Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident

The Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident was adopted on 26 September 1986 and entered into force on 27 October 1986 [17].

Negotiation of the Convention was undertaken in the wake of the Chernobyl accident, with the aim of ensuring that States provide relevant information about nuclear accidents as early as possible in order that transboundary radio-logical consequences can be minimized.

The Convention has relevance to the detection of and response to criminal or unauthorized acts involving nuclear and other radioactive material because the circumstances of such acts may precipitate serious incidents involving the potential or actual release of radioactive material and which could possibly have an impact across national boundaries. Thus, the Convention constitutes part of the international framework for responding to radiological emergencies that could result from criminal or unauthorized acts.

The key features of the Convention are summarized below:

— Article 1 sets the scope of the Convention to accidents in which a release of radioactive material occurs or is likely to occur and which has resulted or may result in transboundary release with radiological consequences for another State. It also details the facilities and activities to which the Convention applies as being:

(a) any nuclear reactor, wherever it may be located;

(b) any nuclear fuel cycle facility;

(c) any radioactive waste management facility;

(d) the transport and storage of nuclear fuels or radioactive waste;

(e) the manufacture, use, storage, disposal and transport of radionuclides for agricultural, industrial, medical and related scientific and research purposes;

(f) the use of radionuclides for power generation in space objects.

— Article 2 provides for Parties to the Convention to notify other States and the IAEA of any nuclear accident, its nature, time of occurrence and exact location. It also makes it incumbent upon Parties to the Convention to provide information, which will aid in minimizing the radiological consequences of the accident in those States affected.

— Article 3 allows for notification of other nuclear accidents not specified in Article 1, where again the aim is to minimize an accident’s radiological consequences.

— Article 4 details the function of the IAEA following its receipt of any notification of a nuclear accident and calls for the IAEA to immediately inform any States which may be physically affected, and also inform relevant international intergovernmental organizations. The IAEA will also provide details of any information it receives in relation to an accident.

— Article 5 specifies the type of information and data to be supplied when a notification is made and provides for the information to be updated at appropriate intervals.

— Article 6 makes it incumbent upon the notifying State to respond promptly to any request for information or consultation by other States affected with a view to minimizing the radiological consequences of the accident.

— Article 7 provides for Parties to make known to other Parties and to the IAEA their competent authorities and points of contact responsible for issuing and receiving notifications and information relating to a nuclear accident. It also provides for the IAEA to maintain an up-to-date list of national authorities and contact points and stipulates that Parties have the responsibility to promptly notify the IAEA of any changes in those points of contact.

— Article 8 provides for the IAEA to render assistance upon request in investigating the feasibility and establishment of a radiation monitoring system. This provision is intended to cater specifically to situations in which a given State Party to the Convention without nuclear activity borders a State that has an active nuclear programme but that is not a Party.

3.2.9. Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or