IAEA safeguards agreements

The IAEA safeguards system [14] comprises an extensive set of technical measures through which the IAEA Secretariat independently verifies the correctness and the completeness of the declarations made by States about their nuclear material and activities. The detailed oversight of a State’s nuclear related activities provided by international safeguards can make an important contribution to preventing criminal or unauthorized acts by confirming that all relevant material is being used only for its intended purpose. The activities conducted by the IAEA, as an expert, independent, multilateral organization, can also help national authorities develop their own practices and procedures to prevent diversion of such material.

In broad outline, safeguards activities comprise three functions:

accountancy, containment and surveillance. Accountancy means that States report the types and quantities of relevant material to the IAEA, and the IAEA then verifies the accuracy of these reports. To implement this obligation States need to establish an efficient and effective State system of accounting for and control of nuclear material (SSAC) covering all relevant material.

Containment and surveillance involve technical measures, such as seals on containers that hold nuclear material and the use of cameras to record movements in controlled areas of the nuclear facilities of States and other sites.

Safeguards measures are implemented pursuant to agreements negotiated between individual States and the IAEA. These very detailed documents set

out relevant principles, procedures and requirements. The following discussion summarizes the most relevant aspects of safeguards that may be useful to persons dealing with the detection of and response to criminal or unauthorized acts involving nuclear and other radioactive material.

3.2.5.1. Safeguards agreements

One set of measures involves verification activities performed at facilities or other locations where States have declared the presence of nuclear material.

These measures are conducted pursuant to an agreement negotiated between the IAEA and the State in which safeguards are to be implemented.

Safeguards agreements have taken several different forms, depending on whether a particular State is party to the NPT, whether it is classified as a nuclear weapon State or non-nuclear-weapon State under the NPT and other factors. However, because most are non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the NPT, traditional safeguards have been implemented in all but a few States under IAEA INFCIRC/153, Structure and Content of Agreements between the IAEA and States required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [14]. This document has been used by the IAEA as the basis for negotiating comprehensive safeguards agreements, which cover all relevant nuclear material in a non-nuclear-weapon State. The essential feature of such an agreement is the State’s detailed declaration of its relevant nuclear material and activities to the IAEA. In the past, safeguards under INFCIRC/153 agreements were focused primarily on verifying that declared material and activities were being used for their intended purposes and not being diverted for activities related to the development of nuclear weapons.

A number of provisions in INFCIRC/153 have particular relevance for the detection and response to criminal or unauthorized acts involving nuclear material. Paragraph 8 indicates the information to be provided by a State to the IAEA. Paragraph 34 also indicates information to be provided on the transfer of certain types of material. Paragraphs 91 through 97 of the document — comprising a section titled ‘International Transfers’ — contain detailed require-ments for a safeguards agreement to cover transfers of relevant material both into and out of a State. These requirements include a provision for special reports (Article 97) in the event of unusual incidents that may lead a State to believe there may have been loss of nuclear material. Of course, an incident resulting from the detection of an unauthorized act involving safeguarded nuclear material would be covered by this provision.

3.2.5.2. Additional protocol

After disclosures in the early 1990s that some States covered by INFCIRC/153 agreements were conducting activities relevant to weapons development outside their declared programmes, an initiative was mounted to strengthen the IAEA safeguards system. The initiative to move beyond existing safeguards measures was endorsed by the IAEA Board of Governors, beginning in 1992. Such strengthened measures fall into two categories. The first comprises those measures to be implemented under the legal authority conferred by existing safeguards agreements. The second includes measures to be implemented under the complementary legal authority conferred by additional protocols concluded between States and the IAEA on the basis of the Model Additional Protocol. The protocol is contained in IAEA INFCIRC/540 [15]. In general, safeguards measures provided for in the Model Additional Protocol go beyond previous arrangements by:

— Requiring the State to provide broader information including: detailed information on nuclear fuel cycle activities not involving nuclear material;

periodic updates of information; information on intended processing of material; exports and imports; and other matters.

— Introducing complementary access to locations identified by the IAEA.

— Enabling improved inspector access, including such measures as granting multiple entry visas, eliminating visa requirements and simplifying inspector designation.

— Recognizing the IAEA’s right to use state of the art communications technologies between IAEA inspectors and Headquarters or IAEA regional offices.

With regard to the detection and response to an unauthorized act, the additional protocol requires reporting of exports and imports of both nuclear material (Article 2.a.(vi)) and equipment and non-nuclear material (Article 2.a.(ix) and Annex II). Reference should be made to the provisions of the additional protocol regarding specified material, equipment and non-nuclear material. In summary, the reporting requirements cover items associated with:

— Reactors and equipment for reactors;

— Non-nuclear material for reactors;

— Processing irradiated fuel elements and equipment especially designed or prepared, for this purpose;

— Fabrication of fuel elements;

— The separation of isotopes of uranium and equipment, other than analytical instruments, especially designed or prepared for this purpose;

— The production of heavy water, deuterium and deuterium compounds and equipment especially designed and prepared for this purpose;

— The conversion of uranium and equipment especially designed or prepared for this purpose.