IAEA assessment of illicit trafficking in 1997

The Director General’s report of 1997 [29] noted that the primary respon-sibility for combating illicit trafficking of nuclear material and radioactive sources rested with the Governments of Member States. However, many States had noted that measures were also required at the international level. A number of Member States had agreed to report to the IAEA any incident of illicit trafficking in nuclear material or radioactive sources.

During this early recording period, the majority of the incidents reported to the IAEA involved radioactive sources and natural and low enriched uranium (LEU). Of the 168 cases recorded in the IAEA Illicit Trafficking Database (ITDB) at the end of July 1996, only 9% of the cases involved nuclear material such as high enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium. However, continuing reports indicated deficiencies in the legal, administrative and

technical arrangements in some Member States for adequately controlling nuclear material and radioactive sources.

The IAEA judged that the potential for smuggling large quantities of weapons grade nuclear material was low. However, it concluded that addressing the detection of criminal or unauthorized acts involving small quantities also remained a priority, particularly in the context of non-prolif-eration, as larger quantities of nuclear material could be accumulated from small consignments and the detection of small quantities could be indicative of security issues at the facility of origin. The IAEA also recognized that the uncontrolled movement of other radioactive material had resulted in fatal ionizing radiation exposure to individuals and had to be considered as a serious risk to public health.

It was generally agreed that the problem of criminal or unauthorized acts involving nuclear and other radioactive material should be addressed primarily through prevention. A combination of measures for safety, security, physical protection, accountancy and control (including the control of cross-border movements) was needed for an overall protective system. Elements of such a system that needed to be enhanced were identified as follows:

— A legal basis for nuclear material control and radiation safety;

— The physical protection of nuclear material;

— SSACs;

— Safety and security of radioactive sources;

— Control of transboundary movements of nuclear and other radioactive material;

By the end of 1997, the IAEA was engaged in a range of activities to combat illicit trafficking:

— Nuclear and radiation safety legislation. The IAEA had contributed to the efforts of Member States to establish basic national legislation on radiation safety. These contributions were made primarily through technical cooperation projects, with the necessary legal and technical expertise provided by other parts of the IAEA.

— Illicit Trafficking Database. Beginning in 1995, the IAEA had established and maintained the ITDB [30] containing confirmed reports of incidents received from participating States supplemented by information collected from open sources. The ITDB covers both nuclear and other radioactive material (see additional information in Section 4.1.5).

— Physical protection of nuclear material. The IAEA had established an expert advisory service for physical protection, known as the

Interna-tional Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS). Through this service, the IAEA arranged, upon request, reviews of Member State physical protection systems.

— SSACs. The IAEA had been coordinating activities and tasks conducted by donor States in their support of SSACs in the NIS. For that purpose, coordinated technical support plans were established on the basis of needs that had been identified by the recipient States, by the donor States and during fact-finding missions organized by the IAEA.

— Radiation safety. Within the framework of the IAEA’s radiation safety activities, an interregional technical cooperation project known as the Model Project on Upgrading Radiation Protection Infrastructures was launched with the objective of strengthening the “radiation safety infra-structure of a number of selected Member States” in order to comply with the International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources (BSS) [31]. In 2000, the IAEA issued a publication in the IAEA Safety Standards Series, Legal and Governmental Infrastructure for Nuclear, Radiation, Radioactive Waste and Transport Safety [32], which specifies the requirements related to the legal and governmental infrastructure necessary for, amongst other things, the safety of sources of ionizing radiation, radiation protection, the safe management of radioactive waste and the safe transport of radioactive material.

— Prevention, detection and response. With the assistance of Member States and international organizations, in 2002 the IAEA issued three technical publications on the prevention of [33], detection of [34], and response to [35] illicit trafficking or inadvertent movement of radioactive material.

— Training. The IAEA organized training courses on physical protection, transport and illicit trafficking and a train-the-trainers course on the prevention of illicit trafficking. The Secretariat also organized several training courses on physical protection and SSAC.

— Information exchange. The IAEA arranged for a group of representa-tives of several international organizations concerned with illicit trafficking and its consequences to meet during 1995 and 1996 to discuss ways in which relevant intergovernmental organizations could benefit from each other’s experience and assist States in their efforts to combat illicit trafficking in nuclear material and radioactive sources.

— Analytical services. The IAEA was asked to provide assistance in the classification of two separate incidents of illicit trafficking of nuclear material. On-site measurements were made and, in one case, additional analysis of seized nuclear material was performed at the Agency’s Laboratories, Seibersdorf.

During the period 1998–2000, the incidence of reported and confirmed illicit trafficking incidents in the ITDB showed an increase. To some extent, this increase is attributable to improved State reporting due to enhanced detection capabilities, a greater awareness of the problem and a growing readiness on the part of States to share information. IAEA training has greatly contributed to these improvements (see Appendix I).