AND RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS
N. KRAVCHENKO
Federal Customs Service of the Russian Federation, Moscow, Russian Federation
The threat of illicit trafficking of fissionable and radioactive materials (FRM) across borders can be minimized by the implementation of two tasks:
— Carrying out constant radiation control at customs checkpoints;
— Preventing smuggling (contraband) during legal shipments of radioactive sources and nuclear materials.
In practically all countries, the customs control of legal shipments of radioactive sources and nuclear materials has been limited to the following:
— Within the framework of export control, the customs inspector formally verifies the licence for FRM import/export against the information provided in the cargo customs declaration.
— FRM customs examination is limited to cargo package recalculation and verification of seals.
Examples from the experience of the Russian Customs Service are described below.
In 1995, at the Pulkovo customs checkpoint (St. Petersburg), an attempt at smuggling of radioactive materials was prevented. The Mayak production centre at Chelyabinsk was shipping 192Ir in two containers to the United Kingdom. According to the customs declarations, the radioactivity was 8460 Ci 1 and the mass of 192Ir was 13.32 g. The actual values were 16 390 Ci and 25.7 g.
Five cases of contraband were proven to have taken place during the fulfilment of the year’s allotment. On three occasions, delivery of 192Ir was carried out under the name of another isotope.
A second example occurred in 2001, when a metallic container for radioactive material transport, type 2835 А, was delivered by air from the
1 1 Ci = 3.7 × 1010 Bq.
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United States of America to the Russian Federation. No radioactivity was declared, i.e. the container was declared to be empty. However, at the Koltsovo airport customs zone (Ekaterinburg, Ural Region), a stationary radiation monitor was in operation. The dose rate at the surface of the container was measured with a handheld instrument and was found to be 107 μSv/h.
Preliminary identification carried out by the customs officers with a gamma spectrometer showed that the container contained 192Ir with an activity of 6.7 × 107 Ci. An investigation is in progress and the customs service of the USA is kept informed.
These facts testify to the necessity of customs examination of FRM which is limited to measurement (without opening of the container) and of the comparison of the actual characteristics and parameters with those declared in documents.
The FRM characteristics and parameters which are important for customs control are: FRM name; isotope composition, for nuclear materials;
and activity, for radioactive materials. The measurement of the actual FRM characteristics and parameters without opening the container is only possible by using special technical means — spectrometric equipment.
FRM customs clearance and customs control in the Russian Federation are organized as follows.
(a) FRM customs clearance is carried out only by those customs control points authorized to do so, these organizations having the necessary expertise and being equipped with the special spectrometric instrumen-tation required for FRM examination.
(b) FRM customs clearance is carried out only on the condition of presen-tation of documents prepared according to the customs law and rules, including an indication that the material to be cleared is not on the list of materials whose transport is prohibited, and on the condition that the requirements for the safe transport of FRM are fulfilled.
(c) Examination of radioactive goods is carried out only by experts of the FRM customs control service of a customs station, with observance of radiation safety measures.
(d) For the purpose of checking the declared FRM parameters without opening the transport container, the Russian Customs Service uses gamma spectrometers linked to an electronic database on transport containers certified for use in Russia (model, thickness of shielding and material of the design, recommended point of measurement) that provide accuracy of measurement and reliability of FRM parameter identification that are sufficient for customs purposes.
PREVENTION OF SMUGGLING DURING LEGAL SHIPMENTS
105 The problems facing us are:
(1) Containers of foreign manufacture are not included in the transport container electronic database of the gamma spectrometers.
(2) The IAEA now has the PACTRAM transport container database;
however, the format of this database is not appropriate for customs purposes.
In this connection, the Russian Customs Service has addressed the IAEA with the proposal to organize work on the creation of an international transport container database and its maintenance in an up-to-date condition.
Such a database will allow the accuracy of parameter measurements and the reliability of FRM identification to be increased in the case of shipments in foreign transport containers.
The Russian Customs Service has offered to distribute technology for performing FRM customs examination without opening the container. Such technology should become an instrument for prevention of smuggling (contraband) during legal FRM shipments.
The Russian Customs Service has further offered to cooperate with efforts of the IAEA and national organizations on modernization of the PACTRAM international transport container database with the aim of entering into the database information useful for customs purposes. The electronic version of this database should be suited for use in the software of the gamma spectrometers of manufacturers from various countries.
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