CONTROL AND DETECTION PRACTICES

The early recognition of the illicit trafficking issue, and domestic cooperation among the law enforcement forces and the nuclear safety and radiological protection bodies, have contributed to preventive measures and to diminishing the number of occurrences. Since 1990 the border guards have been systematically increasing the national control and detection system at the border checkpoints, especially on the eastern border, which is also an external border of the European Union. In addition to portal radiation devices, the border guard staff is equipped with personal radiation signalling devices and more sophisticated instruments for searching for the source of radiation.

Control also rests with the manager of the metal recycling industry, who is to organize in situ metal scrap control for radioactivity and, if necessary for object identification, to request the assistance of experts in nuclear safety and radiation protection. In December 1999, the Minister for Economy issued the regulation on the Safety and Hygiene of Work when Eliminating Hazardous Material in Metal Scrap, which imposed an obligation to control radioactivity in metal scrap. The smelting case of 1992 in the Ostrowiec steel plant and inter-national pressure to produce clean metal commodities were also taken into account in establishing the control of radioactivity in metal scrap.

Since 2001 the Mobile Spectrometric Laboratory has been used for searching, locating and identifying lost or abandoned radioactive sources. The issue was an element of the international intercomparison exercise of the

SMAGALA

166

Mobile Spectrometric Laboratories held in Turawa, Poland, in September 2003.

The task of the participating teams was to estimate the distance to the hidden radioactive sources of unknown isotopic identity and activity. Four radioactive sources were used during the exercise (⁷⁵Se, ¹³⁷Cs, ¹⁹²Ir and ⁶⁰Co).

4. EMERGENCY RESPONSE MANAGEMENT

Management of radiological emergencies involving radioactive sources of unknown origin rests with the regional and local administration. For a potential radiological emergency involving radioactive sources, the user of such sources and the governor of the province³ are obliged to prepare an emergency response plan for the facility and the region, respectively, and to verify the plan by testing and exercises.

In the event of a radiological emergency caused by an unknown perpe-trator, the service which first obtained the information or detected the radioactive source secures the emergency site and notifies the president of the NAEA through the 24 hour National Emergency Service and the governor of the affected province through the 24 hour Crisis Management Service in the province. If the governor finds it indispensable, he or she is to request assistance from the president of the NAEA, defining the scope of this assistance.

A demonstration exercise of the system of response to incidents of illicit trafficking in nuclear and radioactive materials was held on 28 September 2004 at the border crossing in Bobrowniki and its surroundings in the Podlasie province in Poland. The exercise was the last element of activities within the PECO project (Pays Europe Centrale Orientale, a programme of assistance to the central and east European countries) related to its final product, a handbook for the response system RITNUM (Response to Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear Material), developed on the basis of the model action plan by the Central Laboratory for Radiological Protection (CLOR), Polish executor of the project. In conformity with an agreement signed in 2001 by the president of the NAEA and the director of the Institute for Transuranium Elements (ITU) in Karlsruhe, representing the European Commission, the handbook is subject to verification through the conducting of a field demonstration exercise.

It was found appropriate to accept a scenario that would verify the collab-oration and competence of various services for two related sites of incidents — a border crossing and an area which is not directly controlled by border guards,

3 Poland is administratively divided into 16 provinces.

POLISH EFFORTS AGAINST ILLICIT TRAFFICKING IN RADIOACTIVE SOURCES

167 i.e. not located in the border zone. The exercise was held with the use of samples of real nuclear and radioactive materials that had been taken over in a similar incident in the past. The quantity and activity of the nuclear and radioactive materials were selected in such a manner that the materials did not emit ionizing radiation that would be dangerous to participants in the exercise or to observers. Safety conditions planned by CLOR were formally approved by the NAEA in the form of an administrative decision authorizing the use of such materials in the exercise (Notification No. R-7611). The incidents provided for a possibility of combining radioactive materials with explosives or explosive devices as well as with ‘blocking of the object’ by a group of criminals.

The exercise was hosted by the Voivod (governor) of Podlasie and organized by CLOR in collaboration with the NAEA and the Podlasie Voivodship (province) Office in Bialystok. The entities participating in the exercise were services of Podlasie province, in accordance with the accepted scenario of the exercise. The exercise was joined and supported by the 24 hour National Emergency Service, CLOR specialists in the areas of categorization of nuclear and radioactive materials and measurement of environmental contam-ination, and a transport team from the Radioactive Waste Management Plant in Swierk. The exercise was observed by representatives of authorities and services from Podlasie, central administration, specialist institutions and public mass media, as well as invited foreign representatives from the European Commission, including ITU, and from the IAEA, the European Police Office (Europol), the Republic of Belarus and the United States of America. Jointly the practical activities of the services were observed by a group of over 100 persons representing 31 national institutions and five international organiza-tions or foreign countries, as well as by a group of journalists from the public mass media of Podlasie.

The scenario of the exercise assumed two related incidents:

— At the border crossing, after receiving information from the police of a planned illicit transport of nuclear and radioactive materials through Poland’s eastern border, an officer of the border guards, after activation of his personal radiation signalling device, stopped a vehicle suspected of carrying radioactive materials or of radioactive contamination. In a search of the vehicle, a metal object emitting ionizing radiation was found, along with two small metal pieces (pellets) with an increased level of radiation, hidden in a pallet of transported goods.

— About 30 km from the border crossing, on an abandoned farm from which the objects found at the border crossing in Bobrowniki were collected, it was suspected, on the basis of the account of the detained driver, that persons staying there were armed and that other radioactive,

SMAGALA

168

nuclear and explosive materials of illicit origin might be stored on the premises.

In the first case the responders were border guards and customs service personnel, with assistance from the province Sanitary Epidemiological Station.

In the second case the Podlasie governor activated the emergency response plan with all local services involved and with the police being the main player.

In both cases the assistance of the president of the NAEA was requested.

In a summary discussion of the exercise, an evaluation was performed and preliminary conclusions were drawn, which included, inter alia, the following:

— There was close conformity of the procedures of specific services with the law in force and with provisions of the handbook developed for the response to illicit trafficking in radioactive materials.

— The categorization of radioactive materials during the exercise was made with very simple equipment, ‘minispectrometers’, based on scintillation detectors, with resolution insufficient to identify a mixture of radioactive or nuclear materials. This was due to the existing limitations in the availa-bility of measuring equipment for such tasks.

— The experience gained will also be used by other institutions, such as the NAEA, to introduce appropriate amendments to the existing bilateral agreements between the services and the NAEA.

5. CONCLUSIONS

— A consolidated action and cooperation between all institutions involved in prevention, detection and response with respect to orphan sources or illicit trafficking in radioactive sources leads to effective prevention and elimination of hazards.

— The PECO project has contributed to Polish developments in combating illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials.

— The applied procedures should be verified in practice with the use of the real materials.

— The increased awareness of the law enforcement forces and well protected borders might be the explanation for the diminishing numbers of occurrences at the borders.

POLISH EFFORTS AGAINST ILLICIT TRAFFICKING IN RADIOACTIVE SOURCES

169 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Handbook for the Response to Illicit Trafficking or Inadvertent Movement of Nuclear and Radioactive Materials in Poland, CLOR, Warsaw (2004).

ISAJENKO, K.A., LIPINSKI, P., Exercise Turawa 2003, 2002–2003 Research and Operational Activities, CLOR, Warsaw (2004).

Report on Hands-on Workshop on Response to Illicit Trafficking or Inadvertent Movement of Nuclear and Radioactive Materials in Poland, Bobrowniki, 2004, CLOR, Warsaw (2004).

SMAGALA, G., TANCZYK, R., “Domestic cooperation in combating illegal nuclear traffic: Experience of the Emergency Service Centre”, Measures to Prevent, Intercept and Respond to Illicit Uses of Nuclear Material and Radioactive Sources (Proc. Int.

Conf. Stockholm, 2001), C&S Papers Series No. 12/P, IAEA, Vienna (2002) 442.

DISCUSSION

G. SMAGALA (Poland): As a representative of the Central Laboratory for Radiological Protection, which is responsible for licensing and control of sources, I would like to provide some additional information and clarification.

Poland is currently amending its Atomic Law to implement the European Union Council Directive No. 2003/122/Euratom of 22 December 2003 on the control of high activity sealed sources and orphan sources. The NAEA — the regulatory and control body — has delegated the responsibility for searching for orphan sources to the border control agencies and local governments. The governor of each of Poland’s 16 provinces is responsible for preventing incidents involving orphan sources and for mitigating consequences should such incidents occur. The role of the NAEA is to provide assistance if local capabilities cannot cope.

R. CZARWINSKI (Germany): (1) Do the 16 administrative regions each have their own responsibility for the safety and security of radioactive sources?

(2) Is the radiation emergency centre also the contact point for issues concerning radioactive sources?

T. DZIUBIAK (Poland): (1) No, only the President can issue authoriza-tions. (2) Yes, as of this year.

171