ACROSS BORDERS
D. DANKO
Federal Customs Service of the Russian Federation, Moscow, Russian Federation
The threat of illicit trafficking of fissionable and radioactive materials (FRM) across borders can be minimized by the implementation of two tasks:
— Carrying out constant radiation control at customs checkpoints;
— Preventing smuggling (contraband) during legal shipments of radioactive sources and nuclear materials.
The following may provide indications of a possible attempt at illegal transport of FRM through the customs border:
— Presence of radiation danger signs on external packaging.
— Transport through the customs border of protective containers and objects made of protective materials such as lead, concrete and poly-ethylene.
— Transport through the customs border of a large legal shipment with a high level of ionizing radiation, which may be used as a cover. Some examples of such shipments are shipments of scrap metal, granite and ceramic goods.
— Results of verification of accompanying cargo and customs documents.
— Obtaining of on-line information.
— Triggering of radiation control equipment.
Statistics show that, of the cases of illegal FRM transport discovered, 95%
are revealed by technical means.
RADIATION CONTROL WITHIN CUSTOMS CONTROL
Taking into account the volume and character of the tasks to be solved, the level of customs personnel training and the category of the technical facilities, radiation control within customs control has the following stages:
DANKO
108
— Primary radiation control;
— Additional radiation control;
— Advanced radiation inspection;
— Practices and procedures carried out by specialized organizations authorized for activities in this field.
Primary radiation control
The purpose of primary radiation control is to reveal goods and transport vehicles with high levels of ionizing radiation in comparison with the natural radiation background during the movement of goods and transport vehicles into the customs control zone.
The main way of realizing such control is the use of stationary radiation monitors with gamma and neutron channels for the detection of FRM.
The criterion for classification of a checked object as having a high level of ionizing radiation is the stable and not false triggering of a radiation control device, which is confirmed by the use of a second radiation control device.
Additional radiation control
The purposes of additional radiation control are:
— Determination of the reasons for the triggering of the stationary radiation monitor;
— Search and localization of objects with a high level of ionizing radiation in goods and transport vehicles;
— Measurement of radiation parameters, including the levels of surface contamination by alpha and beta emitting radionuclides;
— Evaluation of the radiation danger posed by the objects.
Additional radiation control is carried out by customs personnel who have undergone special training.
For additional radiation control, search instruments with gamma and neutron channels, as well as verified dosimetric and radiometric equipment, should be used. In the search mode, measurements should be made from as close as possible to the object. The recommended speed of the instrument movement should be about 10–20 cm/s.
PREVENTION OF ILLICIT TRAFFICKING ACROSS BORDERS
109 Advanced radiation inspection
The purpose of advanced radiation inspection is the localization and primary identification of materials contained in the object.
Advanced radiation inspection is carried out by the personnel of the FRM customs control service of a customs station.
For the execution of advanced radiation inspection, verified spectro-metric equipment should be used. During the execution of customs control, the major role is assigned to customs personnel who control the movement of goods and transport vehicles into the customs control zone and carry out customs inspection.
One should take into account the fact that customs personnel making decisions on releasing goods and transport vehicles are not specialists in the sphere of nuclear physics. However, the possibility of making a wrong decision should be minimized. Thus the most important element is a clear written procedure for the primary actions to be taken in a case where facts may indicate a possible attempt at illegal transport of FRM through the customs border.
The primary actions which are performed by customs personnel in the case of triggering of a radiation monitor include:
— Localization of the object in the customs control zone;
— If there is an opportunity, a second use of the primary radiation control equipment, with the purpose of obtaining assurance that the alarm is stable and not false;
— Control of cargo and customs documents;
— Placement of the object in a specified section of the customs control zone and provision of security;
— Performing an additional radiation control with the purpose of determining the reasons for the triggering of the primary radiation control equipment;
— Search and localization of material with a high level of ionizing radiation in goods and transport vehicles;
— Measurement of radiation parameters and evaluation of the radiation danger.
In the case of triggering of radiation monitors on the neutron channel, additional radiation control is realized with the use of portable equipment with detectors of neutron radiation.
DANKO
110
CONCLUSION
The way to increase the effectiveness of customs control of FRM at State borders is to create a multilevel system of actions to be performed by various specialized customs organizations on the basis of the results of radiation control of goods and transport vehicles. A multilevel system implies a number of centres for collection of information about the results of radiation control:
checkpoint, customs station, regional customs department, federal customs service.
The effectiveness of customs control of FRM will be increased by the following:
— Full control of customs personnel actions of a specialized customs organ-ization;
— The possibility for recommendations, including recommendations from government organizations, to be submitted to higher customs organiza-tions, giving a full account and evaluation of all the information obtained.