Locke’s preservation of “others” or the common good in the Second Treatise100

Some references in the Second Treatise demonstrate Locke’s concern for the preservation of

”others” or the “rest of mankind” above the mere preservation of the self. I divide this subsection into the concern for the good of others within the state of nature and after the creation of societies. It will include modern relevant debate.

3.4.2.1 Within the state of nature

The traditional interpretation of Locke uses pieces of Locke’s texts to justify the argument that Locke supports a theory of self-preservation alone. According to Macpherson, Locke suggests that “self-preservation” is the “first practical principle.”⁵³⁶ I reply that this specific reference (Locke 1.86) is taken from the First Treatise—but Locke’s text on property is mainly within the Second Treatise, in which it is almost impossible to find the fundamental basis of self-preservation without a link to the necessary preservation of the rest of mankind.

In any event, this is not a contradiction because Locke says “Every one, as he is bound to preserve himself, …so by the like reason, when his own preservation comes not in competition, ought he, as much as he can, to preserve the rest of mankind…’ (Locke II, 6, emphasis added).

Kendall (1965) joins Macpherson and others: “The [Lockean] law of nature is, in short, a law which commands its subjects to look well to their own interests.”⁵³⁷ Among others, Strauss (1953) and Cox (1960) support this view and see Locke as a protector of pure self-preservation.⁵³⁸ For Strauss (1953), Locke’s natural law duties only apply in cases where our own preservation is not in conflict. In other words, any obligation ceases to exist if self-preservation is threatened. In Strauss’s words, “The desire for happiness and the pursuit of happiness have the character of an absolute right, of a natural right. There is then a natural right, while there is no natural duty.”⁵³⁹ He then emphasis that “[s]ince happiness presupposes life, the desire for life takes precedence”; as such, he claims that for Locke, “[t]he most fundamental of all rights is … the right of self-preservation.”⁵⁴⁰Cox (1960) agrees and adds the word “only” when it comes to the preservation of others according to Locke: “A man is bound to preserve the rest of mankind as much as he can, but only where his own preservation comes not in competition.”⁵⁴¹ In fact, Locke does not use the word “only.”⁵⁴² I admit that to Locke, reason dictates that being born creates a right to self-preservation: “natural reason, which tells us, that men, being once born, have a right to their preservation” (Locke II, 25).

“…[F]or no man or society of men, having a power to deliver up their preservation, or consequently the means of it, to the absolute will and arbitrary dominion of another;

when ever any one shall go about to bring them into such a slavish condition, they will

536 Macpherson, (1962), 229; Locke I, 86.

537 Kendall, (1965), 1167.

538 Strauss, (1953), 165-166, 202-251; Cox, (1960), 76-80. See also Kendall, (1965), 77. For further detail, see p.

100 and p. 189.

539 Strauss, (1953), 226-227.

540 Strauss, (1953), 227; see 239 note 113.

541 Emphasis added. Cox, (1960), 83.

542 Kilcullen, (1983), 327, noting that Cox, (1960), 83 added the word “only” to Locke’s text.

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always have a right to preserve, what they have not a power to part with; and to rid themselves of those, who invade this fundamental, sacred, and unalterable law of self-preservation, for which they entered into society...” (Locke II 149, emphasis added) However, I argue that the fundamental law of self-preservation relates to the prohibition of its abuse by the government. Locke’s references to the law of self-preservation are insufficient to negate the repeated comments regarding the correlating obligations to preserve the rest of mankind. I argue against Macpherson and followers that the Second Treatise as a whole focuses not only on the preservation of the self but also that the state of nature requires as an obligation to preserve others (if there is no conflict between the two): “Every one, as he is bound to preserve himself, and not to quit his station wilfully, so by the like reason, when his own preservation comes not in competition, ought he, as much as he can, to preserve the rest of mankind…’ (Locke II, 6, emphasis added).

Locke continues and says that no one may impair the preservation of others, including life, liberty, health, body, or possession. It is to be protected by natural law, which is given for mankind’s mutual security. Further,

“The first power, viz. of doing whatsoever he thought for the preservation of himself, and the rest of mankind, he gives up to be regulated by laws made by the society, so far forth as the preservation of himself, and the rest of that society shall require; which laws of the society in many things confine the liberty he had by the law of nature.”

(Locke II, 129, emphasis added)

Locke also mentions the “right of self-preservation, … by the right he has of preserving all mankind, and doing all reasonable things he can in order to that end…’ (Locke II, 11, emphasis added). So man must do whatever is reasonably necessary to preserve others.

Further,

“A man, as has been proved, cannot subject himself to the arbitrary power of another;

and having in the state of nature no arbitrary power over the life, liberty, or possession of another, but only so much as the law of nature gave him for the preservation of himself, and the rest of mankind.” (Locke II, 135, emphasis added)

Again, the law of nature gives the power of the preservation of self as well as the “rest of mankind.” Locke then writes that no human law is valid that contradicts natural law or the fundamental law of nature—the preservation mankind as a whole. “[A]nd the fundamental law of nature being the preservation of mankind, no human sanction can be good, or valid against it” (Locke II, 135, emphasis added).

Tully (1980) also uses this reference to recognize the importance Locke places on the common good. Government is bound by natural law to promote the common good. This guarantees for all members of society a comfortable subsistence and the ability to enjoy the fruits of their labour:

“Locke describes the natural end of political society as the public good: ‘Their power in the utmost Bounds of it is limited to the public good of the society. It is a power, that hath no other end but preservation’ [Locke II, 135]. Common good, good of society or community and good of the public are various synonyms he uses to describe the purpose for which a common wealth is instituted.”⁵⁴³

543 Tully, (1980), 162-163 and 166-169.

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Tully also says that for Locke, the morality of self-interest without a corresponding duty is absurd because it is based “in men’s appetites and natural instincts rather than in the binding force of law.”⁵⁴⁴ He claims that a property theory based solely on self-interest is doomed to create conflicts: “[I]f the private interest of each person is the basis of that law (natural law), the law will inevitably be broken, because it is impossible to have regard for the interest of all at one and the same time.”⁵⁴⁵

Shrader-Frechette (1993) points out an erroneous argument as well: “To argue that Locke sanctions unlimited accumulation without concern for the needs of other persons, thus denies what is explicit in Locke. He claims that ‘the end of government is the preservation of all’

[Locke, II, 159, emphasis added] and that ‘the Law of Nature stands as an Eternal Rule’.”

(emphasis added)⁵⁴⁶ I join this and argue that it is error to ignore Locke’s repeated references to the obligation to respect others above the self. Locke’s references to his state of nature notes this obligation as well as his concern for the common good after the creation of society.

Locke repeatedly emphasises “the preservation of himself, and the rest of mankind. … being the preservation of all of his society, that is, all mankind in general” (Locke II, 171, emphasis added).⁵⁴⁷ The preservation of both self and society is required. All mankind in general is to be preserved.

Dunn (1984) emphasises Locke’s concern for the public good.⁵⁴⁸ Dunn (1969) also claims that for Locke, self-preservation is not sufficient. “Locke did continue to take seriously the problem of preserving rationality for the lives of all men. It was because self-preservation was in Locke’s eyes so grossly inadequate as a continuing human end that he could not abandon the majority of mankind.”⁵⁴⁹

Ashcraft (1986) is also certain that Locke places labour above self-preservation. It is the same action that adds value in the moral “collective sense” to the “benefit of life” or the “common good.”⁵⁵⁰ Labouring for the common good contributes to the individual and ensures no individual is harmed. Locke’s notion of labour as the “fulfillment of God’s intentions not only contributes to the common good, but it does no particular injury to any other individual.”⁵⁵¹ Ashcraft also points out that labour must be limited to the advancement of the public good—

the “obligation of doing something” to carry out the precepts of “the law of God” to labour for the benefit of mankind. So labour is never detached from the advancement of

544 Tully, (1980), 101-103, 213, 215.

545 Tully, (1980), 211.

546 Shrader-Frechette, (1993), 212 (referencing Locke II, 135).

547 Sec. 171 says; “[S]o as (according to the best of his reason) may most conduce to the preservation of himself, and the rest of mankind. So that the end and measure of this power, when in every man's hands in the state of nature, being the preservation of all of his society, that is, all mankind in general, it can have no other end or measure, when in the hands of the magistrate, but to preserve the members of that society in their lives, liberties, and possessions; and so cannot be an absolute, arbitrary power over their lives and fortunes, which are as much as possible to be preserved; but a power to make laws, and annex such penalties to them, as may tend to the preservation of the whole, by cutting off those parts, and those only, which are so corrupt, that they threaten the sound and healthy, without which no severity is lawful. And this power has its original only from compact and agreement, and the mutual consent of those who make up the community.” (Locke II, 171, emphasis added). The preservation not only of self but of all society is required.

548 Dunn, (1984), 52.

549 Dunn, (1969), 260 (emphasis added).

550 Ashcraft, (1986), 268.

551 Ibid. p. 264–265.

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the public good.⁵⁵² Ashcraft also discusses Locke’s concept of labour, and how it “fulfil[s] the divine injunction given to all individuals to labor—and to labor, moreover, for the common good.” He cites Locke’s correspondence, which notes that “everyone, according to what way providence has placed him in, is bound to labor for the public good, as far as he is able, or else he has no right to eat.”⁵⁵³ This is another demonstration of Locke’s view that each has a duty to the rest of mankind. Everyone’s duty is to labour in accordance with his own capacities, for the public good.

These references may be relevant later, but they are unnecessary here. The Second Treatise itself cannot be read properly without nothing the clear repetition of the obligation to preserve others: “[W]hen his own preservation comes not in competition, ought he, as much as he can, to preserve the rest of mankind” (Locke II, 6, emphasis added. See also Locke II, 11, 129, 135, 159, 171 references after the creation of society).

Ashcraft uses Tyrrell to support his argument: “All the laws of Nature, or Reason…are intended for one end of effect, viz, the common good and preservation of mankind.”⁵⁵⁴ Yet again, there seems to be no reason to cite anyone other than Locke himself on this point.

Ashcraft also agrees that the law of nature is directed towards the preservation of mankind.

Ashcraft recognizes that labour for the good of the whole is a naïve way to see human motivation. Locke is “not interested in individual motivations”; rather, it is the motivation for the good of the common or the “moral and social” uses of labour:⁵⁵⁵

“[A]n individual would have the benefit of mankind in mind as the outcome of his enclosure and cultivation of land can, at best, be said to be rather naïve reading of human motivations. But Locke is plainly not interested in individual motivations for property development; rather, what concern him are the moral and social uses to which property (and labor) can be put.”⁵⁵⁶

I join Ashcraft against Macpherson, Strauss, and their followers in saying they contradict Locke’s own references of concern and obligation to preserve others and reverse his words, saying he argues for self-interests only. Locke’s clear intention for the common good can also be seen from Ashcraft interpretation of Locke’s state of nature,⁵⁵⁷ his use of money,⁵⁵⁸ and his view on the waste of land. ⁵⁵⁹

Another modern and important corroboration is Simmons’s (1989) comparison of Locke’s state of nature to that of Hobbes’s.⁵⁶⁰ As seen above,⁵⁶¹ Locke’s state of nature is very

552 Ashcraft, (1986), 270.

553 Ashcraft, (1986), 268, emphasis added, citing Locke’s, (1690-1698), Letter to William Molyneux, 332.

554 Emphasis added. Tyrrell, (1681), Patriacha non Monarcha, 15 (LL 2999), cited in Ashcraft, (1986), 264-265.

555 Ashcraft, (1986), 266.

556 Ashcraft, (1986), 266, emphasis added. Ashcraft, (1986), adds that those who have much fortune are not liberated from the obligation of the natural law to labour for the “benefit of mankind”; “[t]hose who inherit ‘a plentiful fortune’ may be ‘excused from having a particular calling in order to their subsistence in this life but they are not excused from being ‘under an obligation of doing something’ in order to carry out the precepts of

‘the law of God’ to labor for the benefit of mankind.’”Ashcraft, (1986), 270, emphasis added.

557 See references to Ashcraft’s state of nature on p. 87.

558 See references to Ashcraft’s use of money on p. 40.

559 See references to Ashcraft’s waste of land on p. 222.

560 See p. 73.

561 See the moral state of nature on p. 77.

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different from that of Hobbes and his followers. In Hobbes’s state of nature, humans are driven only by self-motives and needs. Locke argues that humans have natural rights and obligations (the moral state of nature) for the good of others. Modern authors agree that in comparison to Hobbes, Locke’s state of nature has valid legal claims and obligations.⁵⁶² I join Simmons’s conclusion that Hobbes and Locke differ in various ways. Mainly, Locke presents a somehow more “moral” picture of the state of nature, including individuals with “full-blown moral rights and obligation.”⁵⁶³ His words make this clear (Locke II, 6, 128, 7).⁵⁶⁴

It is clear that Locke suggested more than mere self-preservation, obliging men, if not in conflict, to preserve all mankind (Locke II 6, 134, 182). Locke’s Second Treatise is based on the concern for the common good within the state of nature and under the government and focuses on the limitations of the natural law, its purpose, the duty of charity, and a sincere love for others.

According to Locke II, 145, one is to treat the “rest of mankind” (repeated twice) as one body.⁵⁶⁵ For Locke, the law of nature provides safety, peace, better preservation, and mutual security of mankind “in general.” The law of nature is a law for mankind as one community or as a “whole species.”⁵⁶⁶ Locke writes that the bounds of natural law are there to guarantee that no one is harmed so that all humankind is preserved. Mankind is again described as one community “distinct from all other creatures” (Locke II, 128).⁵⁶⁷

Another example of Locke’s concern for the general good⁵⁶⁸ and the law of reason’s purpose is in his words on the “general good” of humanity, or “those under that law”; “prescribes no farther than is for the general good of those under that law” (Locke II Sec. 57, emphasis added).⁵⁶⁹ Locke demonstrates again and again that he is motivated by the common good and preservation of the whole.

I join Ashcraft’s conclusion that

“to suggest that Locke ever sets men free from their natural law obligations such that wealth may be accumulated solely because individuals desire to do so and without any social constraints on its employments is to reserve completely the thrust of his argument in the Second Treatise, not to mention the political rational … claim to represent the common good against the arbitrary self-interest of an individual.”⁵⁷⁰ Locke’s concern for morality is further demonstrated in the role he gives governments and how he clearly limits their arbitrary power so as to protect and preserve individual rights to life, liberty, and possessions.

562 Simmons, (1989), 465; Kilcullen, (1983), 328.

563 Simmons, (1989), 465.

564 See an additional modern view on Locke’s morality and a possible peaceful state with moral obligations on p.

73, p. 79, p. 82, and following. The modern debate is discussed in the chapters on reason and limits.

565 See more detail on p. 99.

566 Analysed on p. 99.

567 Analysed on p. 99.

568 See citation on p. 64.

569 In the state of nature, concern for the good of others exists in Locke’s explanation that no one can invade the share of others or “ingross” anything “to the prejudice of others” (Locke II, 31); “whatever is beyond this, is more than his share, and belongs to others. Nothing was made by God for man to spoil or destroy... and ingross it to the prejudice of others; especially keeping within the bounds, set by reason” (Locke II, 31, emphasis added).

The share of others cannot be destroyed.

570 Emphasis added. Ashcraft, (1986), 266.

105 3.4.2.2 Preservation of others within governments

Macpherson (1962), Strauss (1953), and their followers interpret Locke’s text as a “defense of expanding property rather than the rights of the individual against the state.”⁵⁷¹ Strauss (1953) adds that for Locke, the first aim of the government is the protection of the “different and unequal faculties of acquiring property.”⁵⁷² Macpherson’s interpretation makes Locke a defender of the preservation of the self. Macpherson explains that Locke sees “an emerging capitalist society, (which) does not exclude but on the contrary demands the supremacy of the state over the individual.”⁵⁷³ He explains that for Locke, the transfer of individual rights to the limitless power of the state is a requirement and that owners of property “do not need to reserve any rights as against civil society, since civil society is constructed by and for them, and run by and for them.”⁵⁷⁴ Macpherson then concludes that the state is governed by property owners for the benefit of other property owners, which justifies a society divided by class.⁵⁷⁵ To further support his argument, Macpherson points to Locke’s examples of limitations on government in the interest of property. This for him demonstrates the first priority of material property in Locke’s eyes.⁵⁷⁶ But Locke’s definition of property tells a different story.⁵⁷⁷ Locke clearly referred to the protection of property in the wider sense, including person and liberties.

Locke says in a confusing passage that government cannot take liberties or property without consent because its purpose is the preservation of property: “Thirdly, The supreme power cannot take from any man any part of his property without his own consent: for the preservation of property being the end of government . . .” (Locke II, 138, emphasis added).

Another confusing reference is the comment on “the end of government itself, which is the public good and preservation of property” (Locke II, 239, emphasis added).

The government is to preserve property in the wider sense—including life, liberties, health, and possessions (Locke II, 6) for the public good. It cannot refer only to material possessions.

“By property I must be understood here, as in other places, to mean that property which men have in their persons as well as goods” (Locke II, 173, emphasis added).⁵⁷⁸ More clearly,

“By property I must be understood here, as in other places, to mean that property which men have in their persons as well as goods” (Locke II, 173, emphasis added).⁵⁷⁸ More clearly,