Locke’s original grant to the whole of humanity in “common”

For Locke, the original grant of God to mankind is in common to all humanity. Locke explains that the grant of earth “in common” can be discovered by both natural reason and also by divine revelation.

“Whether we consider natural reason, which tells us, that men, being once born, have a right to their preservation, and consequently to meat and drink, and such other things as nature affords for their subsistence: or revelation, which gives us an account of those grants God made of the world to Adam, and to Noah, and his sons, it is very clear, that God, as king David says, Psal. cxv. 16. has given the earth to the children of men; given it to mankind in common.” (Locke II, 25, emphasis added)

He further repeats that the original grant by God to mankind was “in common…all the Fruits it naturally produces, and Beasts it feeds, belong to Mankind in common, as they are produced by the spontaneous hand of Nature; and nobody has originally a private Dominion, exclusive of the rest of Mankind, in any of them, as they are thus in their natural State” (Locke II, 26, emphasis added). “God gave the world to men in common; but since he gave it to them for their benefit, and the greatest conveniences of life they were capable to draw from it” (Locke II, 34, emphasis added). This common stock is given for the benefit of humanity and for their

“greatest conveniences.”

Locke appears to use Pufendorf’s example of picking up an acorn (Pufendorf 4, 4, 13) to argue the necessity of an earlier mutual agreement for certain rights in property:

“He that is nourished by the acorns he picked up under an oak, or the apples he gathered from the trees in the wood, has certainly appropriated them to himself. No body can deny but the nourishment is his. I ask then, when did they begin to be his?

when he digested? or when he eat? or when he boiled? or when he brought them home? or when he picked them up? and it is plain, if the first gathering made them not his, nothing else could. That labour put a distinction between them and common: that added something to them more than nature, the common mother of all, had done; and

717 Emphasis added. See Straumann, (2006), 344-345.

718 Pufendorf , (1672), De Jure naturae , Vol. IV, Lib. 9, Cap. 2.

719 Pufendorf, (1672), De Jure Naturae, Vol. II, Lib. 4, Cap. 4, Para. 5.

720 Pufendorf, (1672), De Jure Naturae , Vol. IV, Lib. 4, Cap. 5, Para. 4, emphasis added.

721 Pufendorf, (1672), De Jure naturae, Vol. IV, Lib. 4, Cap. 14; Vol. IV, Lib. 4, Cap. 9.

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so they became his private right. And will any one say, he had no right to those acorns or apples, he thus appropriated, because he had not the consent of all mankind to make them his? Was it a robbery thus to assume to himself what belonged to all in common?

If such a consent as that was necessary, man had starved, notwithstanding the plenty God had given him.” (Locke II, 28, emphasis added)

To Locke, no consent is necessary for certain property rights in the state of nature; otherwise, men would starve to death. The first gathering makes an object one’s “own” as it implies a bodily movement—labour.

It is unnecessary to expound upon modern authors who agree that the world is given in common; Locke’s own words make it indisputable that the world and its natural resources are given “in common” to all. There is, however, an interesting modern debate on this terminology. Tully refers to a “positive” and “negative” community. Tully holds that it is a positive community:

I. The world belongs to no one and each has a liberty right to make use of it (negative community (Pufendorf)), or

II. The world belongs to everyone and each has a claim right to make use of it (positive community (Grotius)).

In comparison to Pufendorf, in Grotius’s state of nature, all men possessed everything in common. Everyone could have possessed whatever they desired and could consume. It was an injury to deprive one of that possession.⁷²²

“God gave to mankind in general, dominion overall the creatures of the earth, from the first creation of the world; … All things, as Justin says, formed a common stock for all mankind, as the inheritors of one general patrimony… An example of a community of goods, arising from extreme simplicity of manners, may be seen in some nations of America, who for many ages have subsisted in this manner without inconvenience. The Essenes of old, furnished an example of men actuated by mutual affection and holding all things in common, a practice adopted by the primitive Christians at Jerusalem, and still prevailing among some of the religious orders.”⁷²³ Grotius confirms that dominion is given in common to all, “to mankind in general.” For Grotius, the first grant to humanity was in common to all mankind, “a common stock for all mankind.” Grotius uses Cicero and others as support. He claims that the original relationship between men and the natural world was a kind of positive community. Everyone had an equal right to the earth’s natural resources. For private property to be introduced, a universal agreement to dissolve this original right was necessary. This universal agreement is usually referred to as the general “compact theory.” Grotius notes, “God had not given all things to this individual or to that, but to the entire human race, and thus a number of persons, as it were en masse, were not debarred from being substantially sovereigns or owners of the same thing” (emphasis added).⁷²⁴

For Pufendorf, on the other hand, nothing belonged to anyone—it was a negative community in which no property rights were possible before mutual obligation. No external objects could

722 Grotius, (1625), War and Peace, Bk. II, Ch. 2, Sec.1, Para. 5.

723 Grotius, (1625), War and Peace, Bk. II, Ch. 2, Sec. 2, Para. 1, emphasis added.

724 Grotius, (1609), Mare Liberum, Ch. 7, Para. 24.

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be added to the suum cuique tribuere without human agreements.⁷²⁵ Pufendorf writes,

“[T]hings are said to be negatively common, as considered before any human act or agreement had declared them to belong to no one rather than to another. In the same sense, things thus considered are said to be No Body’s, rather negatively, than privatively, i.e. that they are not assigned to any particular person, not that they are incapable of being so assigned.” (emphasis added)⁷²⁶

Unlike Grotius, Pufendorf argued for a negative community⁷²⁷ where nothing belongs to anyone. For Pufendorf, without human agreement, men could use nothing at all. Pufendorf supports his argument with the common use of animals, which do not have rights in property as they are unable to make agreements. He demonstrates that animals use and consume things (Genesis, Book of Creation, ch 1, Sec. 30)⁷²⁸ with no right of property. If an animal puts something aside for the future, the others are not prevented from taking it. An animal

“takes for his own nourishment everything he first happens upon. And even if any one of them has stored up some things for his future use, others are not prevented from seizing them, for the reason that there is no convention among animals which confers a special right over a thing to the one that first got it.” (emphasis added)⁷²⁹

Pufendorf explains that the possessors do not have rights in the fruits that they seize but merely the liberty to posses them. Possessors are thus unprotected from second possessors’

exercising the same liberty.

Dunn (1984) confirms the leading modern interpretation that Locke’s state of nature is a positive community like that of Grotius. The world was given to humans in common for their self-preservation.⁷³⁰ Simmons (1992) argues that the world belongs to everyone. and everyone has a right to use it.⁷³¹ Simmons adds that the type of community is irrelevant; to Simmons even if it were a negative community, appropriation would not demand consent. He explains that no one could argue harm if one takes that over which others have no claim.⁷³² I object to Simmons and agree with Tully (1980) here that it is important to demonstrate that it is a positive community because if it were a negative community, there would have been no

“great difficulty” to solve for Locke in the first place.⁷³³ For Tully, it is important to know that

725 Pufendorf, (1672), De iure Naturae, Vol. IV, Lib. 4, Cap. 9. See also Pufendorf, (1672), De iure Naturae, Vol. IV, Lib. 4, Cap. 14. Pufendorf analyses the origins of property and its obligations in De iure Naturae, Vol.

IV, entire Lib. 4-5, including the rules related to its transference under De iure Naturae, Vol. IV, entire Lib. 6-13.

726 Pufendorf, (1672), De iure Naturae, Vol. IV, Lib. 4, Cap. 2.

727 Tully, (1980) uses the term “negative” or “positive” community to distinguish between the possibility that the world belongs to no one and each individual possesses a liberty right to make use of it (negative community) and the possibility that the world belongs to everyone and each has a claim right to make use of it (positive community). Tully, (1980), 80-98.

728 See Genesis reference on p. 252

729 Pufendorf, (1672), De iure Naturae , Vol. IV, Lib. 4, Cap. 5.

730 Dunn, (1984), 37.

731 Simmons, (1992), 241.

732 Simmons, (1992), 241. Simmons adds that a distinction must be made within Locke as to the “common,”

referring either to outside the legal political territory, the original communal state, or the wilderness in America (Locke II, 49). Here, he says, consent is not required from the other commoners. The other “commons” is within some legal territory as the “land that is common in England” being the “joint property of this country or this perish” (Locke II, 35). This commons must follow the “law of the land” and requires the consent of all fellow commoners since that is “left common by compact” can only become private via another compact (Locke II, 35).

733 Tully, (1980), 80-98; Tully, (1995), 111.

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it was a positive community to understand how Locke solved the “great difficulty.”⁷³⁴

Simmons distinguishes possibilities of the positive common⁷³⁵ and concludes that Locke means a divisible positive community whereby each possesses only a claim of right to an

“equal share.” “[E]ach person has a (claim) right to a share of the earth and its products equal to that of every other person. Each may take an equal share independent of the decisions of the other commoners; each has property in the sense of a claim on an equal share (but not possession of or a claim on any particulars share).”⁷³⁶ According to Tully (1995), Simmons’s definition is too broad, covering “more indices than the text warrants.”⁷³⁷ Tully mentions that in other places in Simmons’s text, Simmons distinguishes between “access” and “share” and calls a “right of preservation and self-government” “a moral power…to make property in up to a fair share of what God has given us.”⁷³⁸ Tully points out that this formulation is not identical to the others and creates some difficulties.⁷³⁹ Tully concludes that Simmons’s definition of the common is too broad in entitling access to materials for labour for the purpose of preservation, even without a natural claim of right.⁷⁴⁰ Tully then argues that Sreenivasan’s definition better suits Locke’s need: “[T]he right is an inclusive right of access to the materials, provided in common by God, for the purposes of actualizing—in

734 See Great Difficulty below p. 140.

735 Simmons, (1992) distinguishes among “positive” commons:

1. Negative community: as per Pufendorf and Hobbes in which no one has a protected right to anything in the world but a mere liberty to use (also supported by Rapaczynski, (1987), 181-85; Kelly, (1988), 284;

Waldron, (1988), 155; Ryan, (1984), 29-30; Perry, (1978), 51-52, 78).

2. Joint positive community: as seen in Grotius, where everyone holds a joint property right to the world (see Thomson, (1976), 664-65, cited in Simmons, (1992), 238 ).

3. Inclusive positive community: supported by Tully, where each has an inclusive use right to the common for support and comfort (Tully, (1980), 122-29).

4. Divisible positive community: Simmons’s own understanding whereby each possesses only a claim right to an “equal share” (Simmons, (1992), 238, emphasis added).

736 Simmons, (1992), 238, emphasis added.

737 Tully, (1995), 112.

738 Simmons, (1992), 240, emphasis added.

739 Tully, (1995), argues five objections against Simmons’s definition of “fair share”:

I. Tully mentions that Locke uses the term “share” while specifically measuring the person’s entitlements in proportion to their labour and non-spoilage. This for Tully does not take Locke’s right to be an innate natural right (Simmons, (1992), 283,emphasis added.). I argue that for Locke, labour explains property rights within the state of nature as an innate natural right.

II. Tully mentions there is no evidence of a natural right to an “equal” share, and inequalities do not seem to violate rights of others in the state of nature. Emphasis added. I argue by equal both Simmons and Locke mean equal opportunity to self-Government (Locke II, 54. See p. 80).

III. Tully further argues that a “right of claim” for a share for the “earth and its products” is actually stronger than Locke’s intended right. Tully notes that the original community within Locke I, 41, I, 87 and Locke II, 25 is “considerably below this robust claim right.” For Tully, these passages specify only a claim right limited to the necessary means of labour for self-preservation and convenience (Tully, (1980), 122, emphasis added). I argue that for Locke, also comfort is allowed (p. 137-138).

IV. For Tully, if “each may take an equal share independent of the decisions of others,” there is no “great difficulty” to solve because non-consensual appropriation is the initial condition within Locke.

Emphasis added. I argue that for Locke, property is based on labour. Consent is only an added ground for better protection.

V. If “but not possession of or a claim on any particular share” is interpreted as no one has any private property, then it is harmless “for this is the problem.” If otherwise, it means, as Sreenivasan, (1995) argues, that if no one has “a claim on any particular share,” then it is “false.” This because for Locke, everyone has a claim to any piece of earth first appropriated (which is the difficulty) (See Tully, (1995), 111-112; Sreenivasan, (1995), 37-38). I agree on this.

740 Tully, (1995), 112.

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consumption, but through labour—the prior right to preserve oneself.”⁷⁴¹ I do not develop this discussion here but simply note its existence. In general, I follow Simmons’s definition, which gives each individual an equal fair share claim of right to the common within a positive community. It better suits Locke’s view because the common is limited. The definition of Simmons thus covers situations where there is no more material property in common. I cannot agree with Tully’s definition since to him everyone has a mere inclusive use right. But for the purpose of this thesis, it is sufficient to say that Locke supports a positive community like Grotius whereby the world belongs to everyone and each has a claim of right to make use of it. I do agree with Tully against Simmons that it is important to demonstrate that it is a positive community because to ignore it leaves no “great difficulty” that is the basis of Locke’s labour theory.⁷⁴²

In an interesting modern comparison of both predecessors of Locke, Schlatter (1951) mentions that Pufendorf’s state of nature removes the need for Grotius’s universal consent as

“men had no joint or overlapping rights in the state of nature, it was not necessary to assume that those rights must have been extinguished by universal consent.”⁷⁴³ But unlike Pufendorf, for Grotius, certain property rights for self-preservation could be appropriated in the state of nature without a prior need for agreement before the transition to private property right by agreement.⁷⁴⁴ This is related to the immediate consumption of objects that men could find within the common that required an uninterrupted physical possession (using caves for dwelling and wearing skins of wild animals for clothes). As Grotius puts it, this possession is for “the fruits which the earth brought forth of its own accord, without toil ‘in a period when men were content’ to dwell in caves, to have the body either naked or clothed with the bark of trees or skins of wild animals.”⁷⁴⁵ Grotius calls this basic possession “the privilege of lawfully using common property.”⁷⁴⁶ This does not exclude others from a similar use of the same object, before or after possession. It further implies that one must leave nature in the same condition as one finds it so that it can be used by others.⁷⁴⁷ Since the same object cannot be used by more than one person in the same manner at the same time, at the very least, “All things belonged to him who had possession of them.”⁷⁴⁸ If Locke had used any of those theories, Grotius’s seizure would have been more similar to Locke’s labour theory. I thus join Tuck (1979), who says that even if Pufendorf’s state of nature provides a clearer idea of common property, it is still more a repudiation than a defence of Grotius’s attempt to construct a natural rights theory.⁷⁴⁹ It undermines the crucial element of Grotius’s original theory that for the primitive right of possession from the common, there was no need for any sort of prior agreement. Locke also develops a theory of labour that does not require prior agreement for property rights.