Locke’s broad definition of property

Like most modern interpreters,⁶⁴² I confirm that Locke’s definition and use of the word property covers both the broad sense of the term as well as the narrow. Property for Locke has several meanings. The Narrow sense implies material objects. Locke uses the following expressions: “material possessions,” “goods,” “estates,” or “units of the conveniences or necessities of life.”

The government cannot take liberties or property without consent because its purpose is the preservation of property: “The supreme power cannot take from any man any part of his property without his own consent: for the preservation of property being the end of government” (Locke II, 138, emphasis added). Locke also writes of “the end of government itself, which is the public good and preservation of property” (Locke II, 239, emphasis added).

This material sense appears in the traditional interpretation of Locke by Macpherson and his followers. They hold that Locke was a materialist who sought to remove natural law limits to allow limitless capitalist accumulation of property. Macpherson (1962) interprets Locke’s text as a “defense of expanding property.”⁶⁴³ Strauss (1953) adds that for Locke, the first aim of the government is the protection of the “different and unequal faculties of acquiring property.”⁶⁴⁴ They claim that Locke does not answer the unequal possession of property created after the use of money⁶⁴⁵ and demonstrate that Locke provided few examples of limitations on government in the interest of property. They claim material property was of primary importance to Locke.⁶⁴⁶

I argue in this thesis⁶⁴⁷ that Locke is aware of the unequal situation and finds the measurement of levels of labour to be fair. Money can enlarge possessions to meet needs of security and comfort above mere preservation, which can lead to unequal possessions. This is natural, and Locke’s focus was on a different equality. He clearly focuses on the equal opportunity of self-preservation or self-government and to pursue harmless desires without interference (Locke

641 See tacit consent, p. 44.

642 See e.g., Gough, (1950), 85; Goldwin, (1987), 496; Perry, (1978), 49; Laslett, (1963), 115-117; Macpherson, (1962), 198, 230, 247-250.

643 Macpherson, (1962), 257, 261.

644 Strauss, (1953), 245, 247. For a detailed discussion, see Mansfield, (1993), Ch. 24, 148, 185, 189, 191, 200, 201-203, 205-206, 209; see also 186-192, 211, 220, 237, 258-259, 261, 288. For a good refutation of this theory, see Ryan, (1965), 247.

645 Macpherson, (1962), 211.

646 Macpherson, (1962), 195. See more references on the modern debate on the inequality of possessions on p.

41.

647 See the use of money on p. 34 and the modern debate on the inequality of possessions on p. 41.

119 II, 54). ⁶⁴⁸

The references demonstrating the protection of property derive from the aim of the government, which is the preservation of property in the wider sense, including life, liberties, health, and possessions (Locke II, 6) of the public good. It cannot refer only to material possessions, as Locke made clear.

Locke’s traditional interpreters place his focus on the importance of property in the narrow sense—mere material possessions: “The great and chief end, therefore, of men’s uniting into commonwealths, and putting themselves under government, is the preservation of their property. To which in the state of nature there are many things wanting” (Locke II, 124, emphasis added). Against this narrow understanding of Locke, I urge a careful reading of Locke’s own words.

A review of paragraph 124 and the “great and chief” importance of property preservation requires a reading of paragraph 123, in which Locke asks a simple question. If the state of nature is so free and liberating, what would be the reason for men to “part with this freedom”

and ‘subject himself to the dominion and control of any other power?” For Locke, the answer is that the state of nature, as long as it is ruled by a

“greater part” of “no strict observers of equity and justice,” it remains “unsafe” and “very insecure.” Forming societies only improves the protection of property rights in the wider sense, literally covering “lives,” “liberties,” and the “estates”—property in the wider sense.

(Locke II, 123, emphasis added)⁶⁴⁹

As a clear indication that paragraph 124 is an answer to the previous question in paragraph 123, I refer the reader to Locke’s use of the word “therefore” immediately after “great and chief end” (Locke II, 124). One can see thus that the chief importance of the preservation of property by the government is the answer to the insecurity of the state of nature deriving from the fact that greater part of people within it are not observers of equity and justice. To give away liberties given in the state of nature, men wanted more security for their property rights in the wide sense: “lives, liberties and estates, which I call by the general name, property”

(Locke II, 123, emphasis added).

It is thus the protection of property in the wide sense that is for Locke the very basis of society formation (see also Locke II, 7, 124). As additional support in the Second Treatise, Locke says that no man would join a society and give up important rights and liberties for anything less than the amelioration of his quality of life or property in the wide sense (Locke II, 131).⁶⁵⁰ It is on this basis that Macpherson concludes that for Locke, only property owners in material terms are rational, which justifies a society divided by class.

648 See the modern debate on the inequality of possessions on p. 41 and equality on p. 79.

649 “Sec. 123. IF man in the state of nature be so free, as has been said; if he be absolute lord of his own person and possessions, equal to the greatest, and subject to no body, why will he part with his freedom? why will he give up this empire, and subject himself to the dominion and controul of any other power? To which it is obvious to answer, that though in the state of nature he hath such a right, yet the enjoyment of it is very uncertain, and constantly exposed to the invasion of others: for all being kings as much as he, every man his equal, and the greater part no strict observers of equity and justice, the enjoyment of the property he has in this state is very unsafe, very unsecure. This makes him willing to quit a condition, which, however free, is full of fears and continual dangers: and it is not without reason, that he seeks out, and is willing to join in society with others, who are already united, or have a mind to unite, for the mutual preservation of their lives, liberties and estates, which I call by the general name, property.” (Locke II, 123, emphasis added)

650 See p. 107.

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Locke also discusses the wider sense using the following expressions: “By property I must be understood here, as in other places, to mean that property which men have in their persons as well as goods” (Locke II, 173, emphasis added).⁶⁵¹ It seems clear that for Locke, property represents all that is owned by the person: his right to life, liberties, labour, and bodily movements. Locke’s wider use of the word property is supported by most schools of interpretation, opposing Macpherson and his followers.

Tully (1980) notes that “Locke means by ‘property’ . . . any sort of right, the nature of which is that it cannot be taken without a man’s consent.”⁶⁵² He explains that to Locke, property is

“‘a right to any things” and injustice is “the Invasion or Violation of that right”. Therefore,

“Where there is no Property, there is no Injustice.”⁶⁵³

Simmons (1992) agrees and says that most literature on Locke’s theory of property is based on his wide definition of property, the moral “right to anything.”⁶⁵⁴ Simmons demonstrates that for Locke, property is whatever one owns.⁶⁵⁵ Most modern interpreters claim Locke uses both a “broad” and a “narrow” meaning of property. This has created much confusion among interpreters.⁶⁵⁶

This 17^th- century definition of property includes “that which is proper to a person” (proprium alicui, suum) or “that which belongs to somebody,” including movements and liberties.

Hobbes translates suum cuique tribuere to be “property” and states that “those that are dearest to a man are his own life, and limbs; …and after them riches and means of living.”⁶⁵⁷

Grotius and Pufendorf also define “own” in a wider sense to include “life,” liberty,” “person,”

“goods,” and “estate.” For Grotius, the first things that belong to a person in the state of nature are his life, limb, and liberty:

“For the end of society is to form a common and united aid to preserve to everyone his own. Which may easily be understood to have obtained, before what is now called property was introduced. For the free use of life and limbs was so much the right of every one, that it could not be infringed or attacked without injustice. So the use of the common productions of nature was the right of the first occupier, and for anyone to rob him of that was manifest injustice.”⁶⁵⁸

Grotius says the aim of society is the preservation of property, including life and limb. He emphasises that the “free use” of life and limb is a right of all. Thus, Locke’s predecessors also thought property in the wider sense includes life and limb.

Grotius further adds, “God has given life to man, not to destroy, but to preserve it; assigning to him for this purpose a right to the free enjoyment of personal liberty, reputation, and the

651 See also Locke II, 27, 30, 31.

652 Emphasis added. Tully, (1980), 115-116. Tully adds that Locke’s definition in the Essay serves the same purpose (Locke, IV, III, 18).

653 Tully, (1980), 104-125. See also p. 115.

654 Simmons, (1992), 226. For other modern confirmation, see Perry, (1978), 49; Rapaczynski, (1987), 180;

Seliger, (1968), 165-166; Tully, (1980), 7, 113-116; Laslett, (1963), 115-116.

655 See Olivecronna, (1974), Appropriation in state of nature, 218-219; (1974) “Locke’s theory of Appropriation”, 222-225; Tully, (1980), 7, 112. See also Simmons, (1992), 226.

656 Simmons, (1992), 226.

657Hobbes, (1651-1668), Ch. 15, 94 and the entire Ch. 30 (emphasis added). The term “propriety” was employed specifically by Hobbes and Filmer to refer to “that which is proper to a person” (proprium alicui, suum) or “that which belongs to somebody.”

658 Grotius, (1625), War and Peace, Bk. I, Ch. 2, Sec. 1, Para 5, emphasis added.

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control over his own actions” (emphasis added).⁶⁵⁹ Grotius includes in his wide definition reputation and control over actions. This is important because it demonstrates that harm to another person’s ability to preserve and govern self without intervention is only possible if that ability is something one owns. Damaging reputation reduces a person’s ability to freely preserve and govern self; there is a personal right to freely enjoy what we own. “The objects over which sovereignty may be exercised are of a twofold description, embracing both persons and things.”⁶⁶⁰ Grotius’s suum is property in the wide sense. For Grotius, the actions of a person are considered his own in the same sense as life and liberty.⁶⁶¹ Grotius thus gives a wide definition of the suum, covering the right to life, liberty, reputation, and actions.

Pufendorf similarly defines the suum cuique tribuere to include life, liberty, and estate:

“[A]ccording to the Dictates of his Conscience, it follows from thence, that the People have as natural and as unquestionable a Right to defend, their Lives, their Estates, and Liberties against the Attempts of a Tyrant. This Right is even …the strongest of all Obligations, or rather, that which is the Foundation and Source of all others; I mean, the indispensable Necessity that obliges every Man to follow the Light of his own Conscience.” (emphasis added)⁶⁶²

Pufendorf’s terminology is similar to Locke’s (see Locke II, 123). This right is even mentioned as the strongest of all obligations of reason. Locke clearly uses the broad meaning of property to include not only estates but also life, liberties, movements, and actions (Locke II, 44, 123, 173, 239). For Locke, every person is the owner of his own property. To better explain the concept of being the proprietor of self, see the analysis of the suum cuique tribuere below.