Interdiction of natural law violation and its consequences

For Locke, the natural law was given for our better protection and peaceful preservation (Locke II, 7). Not following it goes against the safe preservation of mankind. Locke writes,

“In transgressing the law of nature, the offender declares himself to live by another rule than that of reason and common equity” (Locke II, 8, emphasis added). Reason thus guides the

“common equity” or the morality of the law of nature. Going against reason is dangerous to mankind and its preservation. Locke considers reason to be “that measure God has set to the actions of men, for their mutual security” (emphasis added, see below):

“And thus, in the state of nature, one man comes by a power over another; but yet no absolute or arbitrary power, to use a criminal, when he has got him in his hands, according to the passionate heats, or boundless extravagancy of his own will; but only to retribute to him, so far as calm reason and conscience dictate, what is proportionate to his transgression, which is so much as may serve for reparation and restraint: for these two are the only reasons, why one man may lawfully do harm to another, which is that we call punishment. In transgressing the law of nature, the offender declares himself to live by another rule than that of reason and common equity, which is that measure God has set to the actions of men, for their mutual security; and so he becomes dangerous to mankind, the tye, which is to secure them from injury and violence, being slighted and broken by him. Which being a trespass against the whole species, and the peace and safety of it, provided for by the law of nature, every man upon this score, by the right he hath to preserve mankind in general, may restrain, or where it is necessary, destroy things noxious to them . . . .” (Locke II, 8, emphasis added)

According to Locke, not following the law of nature goes against reason and common equity, the same measures given by the Creator to all men for their mutual protection and long-term preservation. Natural law entails using reason for the common equity of all mankind, for “the peace and preservation of all mankind” (Locke II, 7). Any offender of natural law puts at risk this peace and becomes a danger to mankind.

Locke adds,

“Besides the crime which consists in violating the law, and varying from the right rule of reason, whereby a man so far becomes degenerate, and declares himself to quit the principles of human nature, and to be a noxious creature, there is commonly injury done to some person or other, and some other man receives damage by his transgression: . . . a particular right to seek reparation from him that has done it: and any other person, who finds it just, may also join with him that is injured, and assist him in recovering from the offender so much as may make satisfaction for the harm he has suffered.” (Locke II, 10, emphasis added)

It is a crime to violate natural law and distance the self from the right guidance of reason. This violation means that one discards the principles of human nature while becoming a danger to

304 Locke II, 6. See also Locke II, 128 and p. 96.

305 See full discussion in the chapter on limits on p. 245.

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others. The transgression of the natural law makes the person a danger to mankind; some may be harmed by acts that violate the natural law. Violating the law of nature is clearly stated by Locke as “varying from the right rule of reason,” “quit[ting] the principles of human nature,”

or becoming a dangerous creature (Locke II, 10).

Locke explains that a man transgressing the law of nature is a danger to mankind and its peaceful preservation. A man who does not follow reason, the same “common rule and measure God has given to mankind,” goes against the human species. Not following reason places one in a state of war against the rest of mankind.

Locke states that there are

“two distinct rights, the one of punishing the crime for restraint, and preventing the like offence. . . . [H]e who has suffered the damage has a right to demand in his own name, and he alone can remit: the damnified person has this power of appropriating to himself the goods or service of the offender, by right of self-preservation, as every man has a power to punish the crime, to prevent its being committed again, by the right he has of preserving all mankind, and doing all reasonable things he can in order to that end: . . . a criminal, who having renounced reason, the common rule and measure God hath given to mankind, hath, by the unjust violence and slaughter he hath committed upon one, declared war against all mankind, and therefore may be destroyed as a lion or a tiger, one of those wild savage beasts, with whom men can have no society nor security.” (Locke II, 11, emphasis added)

The same is noted in Sec. 16: “because such men are not under the ties of the common law of reason, have no other rule, but that of force and violence, and so may be treated as beasts of prey, those dangerous and noxious creatures” (Locke II, 16). Thus, for Locke, without the common law of reason, there must be only a conflict of desires resulting in violence. Men who do not use reason might be dangerous to the rest of mankind because in following their own interests, they might harm others through unjust violence. Locke then writes, “for, by the fundamental law of nature, man being to be preserved as much as possible, when all cannot be preserved, the safety of the innocent is to be preferred” (Locke II, 16, emphasis added).

Freedom is granted by the use of reason and free choice. Locke says that it is not at all liberating to remove reason from the definition of human. He insists that such a removal can only make men like wild animals only governed by passions and desires.

“The freedom then of man, and liberty of acting according to his own will, is grounded on his having reason, which is able to instruct him in that law he is to govern himself by, and make him know how far he is left to the freedom of his own will. To turn him loose to an unrestrained liberty, before he has reason to guide him, is not the allowing him the privilege of his nature to be free; but to thrust him out amongst brutes, and abandon him to a state as wretched, and as much beneath that of a man, as theirs.” (Locke II, 63, emphasis added)

Locke considers a person who renounces reason to be “revolting” against his “own kind” and as such descends to the level of beasts that harm each other for their own gain (Locke II, 11).

“[F]or quitting reason, which is the rule given between man and man, and using force, the way of beasts, he becomes liable” (Locke II, 181). Locke is thus clear as to the consequences of not following the law of nature and causing harm: It brings men to the same level as wild beasts, inconsistent with the safe protection of mankind. It makes one a danger to mankind such that not only the victim but also the rest of mankind reacts to being placed in danger and

61 seeks reparation.³⁰⁶ Further, Locke states,

“[T]he aggressor makes of his own life, when he puts himself into the state of war with another: for having quitted reason, which God hath given to be the rule between man and man, and the common bond whereby human kind is united into one fellowship and society; and having renounced the way of peace which that teaches, and made use of the force of war, to compass his unjust ends upon another, where he has no right.” (Locke II, 172, emphasis added)³⁰⁷

Dunn (1969) concludes that Locke’s state of nature

“is a state of equality and a state of freedom (Locke II, 4)...But thought it is a state of liberty it is not a state of licence; thought apolitical, it is not amoral (Locke II, 6).

The reason why men are equal is their shared position in a normative order, the order of creation. If they infringe the norms of that order, they forfeit their normative status of equality. Indeed they lower their status to that of lower members of this order- they become normatively beasts and may be treated accordingly by other men.” (Locke II, 8, 10, 16, 163, 172)³⁰⁸

Those passages demonstrating the consequences for those who do not follow reason may make Locke seem cruel, seeking the preservation of rational humans while deeming the rest to be “dangerous beasts” to be “destroyed” (Locke II, 11). Yet even the traditional school of interpretation, which mostly admits the morality in Locke’s state of nature (compared to Hobbes), has not presented this argument.³⁰⁹ I argue that those passages specifically refer to

“criminals,” “murderers” who have renounced reason to use unjust violence and “slaughter”

others while risking the preservation of innocents. Locke’s strong vocabulary concerns a state of war³¹⁰ whereby the offender uses “force without right upon a man’s person” (Locke II, 19) or “where it is necessary” (Locke II, 8) as self defence by the right of “self-preservation” to

“prevent it being committed”; in other words, in “preventing the like offence” (Locke II, 11).

The first action to be done against murderers is restraint. Locke notes that “all men may be restrained from invading others rights. . . . preserve the innocent and restrain offenders”

(Locke II, 7).³¹¹ Further, one cannot treat a criminal arbitrarily, even for punishment, “but only to retribute to him, so far as calm reason and conscience dictate, what is proportionate to his transgression, which is so much as may serve for reparation and restraint” (Locke II, 8, emphasis added). The purpose is only to restrain the criminal, in proportion to the transgression done and in accordance with the dictate of reason.

When Locke speaks of the state of war, he explains that “when the actual force is over, the state of war ceases between those that are in society, and are equally on both sides subjected to the fair determination of the law” (Locke II, 20). Here, Locke suggests that the right of the victim to treat the aggressor with similar force to prevent further aggression ended when the

306 For support of this difference between animal and men, see Grotius’s understanding, p. 174.

307 Locke II, 172. See also Locke II, 163, on p. 94.

308 Dunn, (1969), 106-107.

309 Even Macpherson, (1962), 246 finds morality in Locke’s state of nature (p. 67). For a detailed analysis of modern morality within Locke’s state of nature, see p. 79.

310 “[B]y the unjust violence and slaughter he hath committed upon one, declared war against all mankind, and therefore may be destroyed as a lion or a tiger, one of those wild savage beasts, with whom men can have no society nor security” (Locke II, 11, emphasis added). Man “made use of the force of war, to compass his unjust ends upon another” (Locke II, 172).

311 Locke II, 7. This vocabulary is also used in Locke II, 8, 11.

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actual use of force ceased, or when “the aggressor offers peace, and desires reconciliation”

(Locke II, 20). Then, both parties have to seek a “fair determination of the law.”

Additionally, for Locke, the most fundamental natural law is the preservation of all mankind (Locke II, 7): “and the fundamental law of nature being the preservation of mankind, no human sanction can be good, or valid against it” (Locke II, 135, emphasis added). Destruction of life, even the wicked and animals (as seen later in Locke II, 6, 16, 159), is contrary to the purpose of natural law, which seeks the preservation of the whole.

To Locke, the preservation of every person in society is fundamental: “as the first and fundamental natural law, which is to govern even the legislative itself, is the preservation of the society, and as far as will consist with the public good) of every person in it” (Locke II, 134, emphasis added). Further “[this] nature . . . willeth the preservation of all mankind as much as is possible” (Locke II, 182, emphasis added).

According to Locke, it is clear that all members of society are to be preserved by the government “as much as may be.” Locke also clearly states that even the guilty members of society who have harmed others are to be preserved, as long as it is no injustice to the innocent members. Sec. 159 notes “[t]hat as much as may be, all the members of the society are to be preserved . . . for the end of government being the preservation of all, as much as may be, even the guilty are to be spared, where it can prove no prejudice to the innocent….”

(Locke II, 159, emphasis added).

Locke also writes that “for, by the fundamental law of nature, man being to be preserved as much as possible, when all cannot be preserved, the safety of the innocent is to be preferred”

(Locke II, 16, emphasis added).No one can destroy any life, including self, others, or any other form of life in possession, for the Creator made all: “But though this be a state of liberty, yet it is not a state of license: though man in that state have an uncontrollable liberty to dispose of his person or possessions, yet he has not liberty to destroy himself, or so much as any creature in his possession” (Locke II, 6). Locke further noted that “[n]o body can give more power than he has himself; and he that cannot take away his own life, cannot give another power over it” (Locke II, 23).

Locke’s discussion on slavery also demonstrates his view on the right to arbitrarily destroy another. Liberty is linked to self-preservation, and one cannot give to anyone this power:

“This freedom from absolute, arbitrary power, is so necessary to, and closely joined with a man's preservation, that he cannot part with it, but by what forfeits his preservation and life together: for a man, not having the power of his own life, cannot, by compact, or his own consent, enslave himself to any one, nor put himself under the absolute, arbitrary power of another, to take away his life, when he pleases. No body can give more power than he has himself; and he that cannot take away his own life, cannot give another power over it.” (Locke II, 23, emphasis added).³¹²

Sec. 171 of the Second Treatise notes that

“the end and measure of this power, when in every man's hands in the state of nature, being the preservation of all of his society, that is, all mankind in general, it can have no other end or measure, when in the hands of the magistrate, but to preserve the members of that society in their lives, liberties, and possessions; and so

312 Emphasis added. See citations on p. 126.

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cannot be an absolute, arbitrary power over their lives and fortunes, which are as much as possible to be preserved.” (Locke II, 171, emphasis added)³¹³

If possible, no government should have arbitrary power over life, liberty, or possessions of individuals that are to be preserved. In addition, by virtue of men being equal in their common capacity to reason, humans should not destroy the life of another or harm another’s “liberty, health, limb, or possessions” (Locke II, 6). Locke continues that in “being furnished with like faculties, sharing all in one community of nature, there cannot be supposed any such subordination among us, that may authorize us to destroy one another, as if we were made for one another’s…” (Locke II, 6, emphasis added; Locke II, 23, 171).³¹⁴ Locke goes further and suggests that men should not only preserve themselves but also participate in the preservation of the rest of mankind when their own preservation is not in competition (Locke II, 6).³¹⁵ Locke, in his state of nature, allows a certain freedom of aggression because all have the equal right to self-preservation, and no one may destroy another for pleasure (including animal life) (Locke II, 6). But the aggression must only restrain the criminal in proportion to the transgression and in accordance with the dictate of reason (Locke II, 8). As demonstrated in the introduction, Locke is known as a great supporter of individual rights against tyranny.³¹⁶ His most fundamental law of nature is the preservation of mankind and each person in it and avoiding doing harm (Locke II, 7, 134, 182, 16, 159). I intend to demonstrate within this thesis that Locke’s state of nature is moral and appeals to the obligation to preserve not only the self, but when not in competition, others.³¹⁷ The purpose of this thesis is to reveal Locke’s morality for the good of all persons not only within the state of nature but also with his use of reason.³¹⁸

Dunn (1969) writes that Locke does not suggest that men may kill the wicked: “[I]ndeed they are obliged not to do so, . . . both because the law of nature enjoins the preservation of all men

‘as much as possible’.”³¹⁹ He explains that for Locke, killing the wicked also goes against Locke’s general prohibition of the waste of natural resources. Dunn points to Locke’s statement that the safety of the innocent and even the wicked is preferable (as long as preserving the wicked does not conflict with preserving the innocent).³²⁰ Dunn also says that Locke could not have desired the destruction of any human, even the wicked, unless it was to prevent like aggression on the innocent. This would be against the purpose of natural law, which seeks the preservation of all mankind and “every person in it” (Locke II, 134).³²¹