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III. Locke’s state of nature

3.5 Locke’s concept of property within the state of nature

3.5.6 The function of property: Enjoyment

For Locke, property is given to us “to enjoy” (Locke II, 31): “as much as anyone can make use of to any advantage of life before it spoils; so much he may by his labour fix a property in.

Whatever is beyond this is more than his share and belongs to others. Nothing was made by God for man to spoil or destroy” (Locke II, 31, emphasis added).

What is covered under this enjoyment of property? Locke includes more than necessities of life; he includes comfort and conveniences: “God, who hath given the world to men in common, hath also given them reason to make use of it to the best advantage of life, and convenience. The earth, and all that is therein, is given to men for the support and comfort of their being” (Locke II, 26, emphasis added).

Further, Locke writes, “God gave the world to men . . . for . . . the greatest conveniences of life they were capable to draw from it” (Locke II, 34), that it “might serve to afford him conveniences of life” (Locke II, 37, emphasis added). These “which made up the great part of what he applied to the support or comfort of his being, when invention and arts had improved the conveniences of life, was perfectly his own, and did not belong in common to others”

(Locke II, 44, emphasis added). It includes “necessity, convenience, and inclination to drive

754 “Man’s Property in the Creatures, was founded upon the right he had, to make use of those things, that were necessary or useful to his Being ....Was it a Robbery thus to assume to himself what belonged to all in Common”

(Locke I, 86, emphasis added). Simmons, (1992), Ch. 5.

755 For good discussions see Waldron, (1979), 324-326;and Olivecrona, (1974), ‘Appropriation in the state of Nature’, 221-222 and; ‘Locke’s theory of Appropriation’, 221-222.

756 Grotius, (1625), War and Peace, Bk. II, Ch. 2, Sec. 2, Para. 1, emphasis added.

757 “Such is the constitution of man’s body that it cannot live from its own substance, but has need of substances gathered from outside....Man makes use of other created things by the will of God, which is gathered from the fact that man cannot maintain himself without the use of them....And since God has given life to man, He is understood also to have granted him the use of those things without which His gift cannot be maintained”

(emphasis added). Pufendorf, (1749), The law of nature and of nations, Bk. I, Ch. 2, Para. 524-525.

758 See additional analysis on necessity of labour, p. 143.

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him into society, as well as fitted him with understanding and language to continue and enjoy it” (Locke II, 77, emphasis added). This demonstrates not only the desire for preservation but also the desire for comfort and convenience.

The modern consensus is that property is not only for preservation but also for comfort and convenience.759 Pangle notes that unlimited ownership is not necessarily sinful,760 but I point to Locke’s references to natural law limits.761 Simmons (1992) also demonstrates textual evidence that unlimited ownership clearly deprives others of an equivalent opportunity and produces a waste of labour (Locke II, 46, 51; See also Locke I, 41).762

Convenience and comfort are also recognized by Locke’s predecessors. Grotius included convenience of life and not just pure necessity:

“Since the common right to things has been established, the common right to actions follows next in order, and this right is either absolute, or established by the supposition of a general agreement amongst mankind. Now all men have absolutely a right to do such or such acts as are necessary to provide whatever is essential to the existence or convenience of life. CONVENIENCE is included in this right; for there is no occasion here to imagine an existence of the same necessity as was requisite to authorize the seizing of another’s property.”763

Here, Grotius demonstrates that there is nothing wrong with seeking comfort and convenience as long as no one is harmed. Grotius also states,

“Since we ourselves are corporeal entities, other bodies are naturally able to benefit or injure us... He who bestowed upon living creatures [such as man] their very existence, bestowed also the things necessary for existence. Some of these things, indeed, are necessary to being, while others are necessary only to well-being; or, one might say that they relate respectively to safety and to comfort.” (emphasis added)764

Thus, “to enjoy” covers comfort and convenience as well as necessities of life.

3.5.6.1 True happiness via rational pursuit and the suspension of appetites765

Enjoyment for Locke means more than the pleasures of self-preservation and the conveniences and comfort of life. Locke discusses this more in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding.766 For Locke, morality can only be expected of rational creatures if it brings them personal pleasure. 767 Forde (2001) confirms that for Locke, “moral behavior cannot be reasonably expected of human beings (or any rational beings) unless he makes it worth their while in terms of pleasure or happiness.”768 This happiness can be the highest degree of

759 For modern agreement and discussion, see Myers, (1995), 638 and Simmons, (1992), Ch. 5.

760 Simmons, (1992), Ch. 5, citing Pangle, (1988), 162.

761 See the chapter on natural law limits on p .210.

762 Simmons, (1992), Ch. 5.

763 Grotius, (1625), War and Peace, Bk. II, Ch. 2, Sec. 28, emphasis added.

764 Grotius, (1868 ed. ), De iure, “Prolegomena”, 11.

765 For full citations of Locke demonstrating the same meaning of enjoyment as a rational suspension of appetites see my analysis of Locke’s text on human understanding p. 193.

For further important support on the same see my analysis of Aristotle’s meaning of pleasure as a state of the soul versus bodily pleasures p. 202

766 See detailed analysis on p. 191.

767 Locke, (1689), Human understanding, Bk. II, Ch. 27. Para. 18.

768 Locke, (1689), Human understanding , Bk. II, Ch. 21. Para. 62.

139 pleasure.769

To Locke, happiness must be sincere from within and not related to an external thing such as alcohol: “[T]he highest perfection of intellectual nature lies in a careful and constant pursuit of true and solid happiness,” taking care “that we mistake not imaginary for real happiness.”770 He explains that drunkenness and profligacy are invalid.771

To Locke, it is also clear that pleasure is not about satisfaction of bodily desires but about limiting those selfish desires using moral choice: Locke says it is our duty is to suspend selfish desires until we have deliberated properly upon real happiness and determined which path will take us there772: “[W]e are, by the necessity of preferring and pursuing true happiness as our greatest good, obliged to suspend the satisfaction of our desires in particular cases” (emphasis added).773

In other words, a man must consult reason and natural law limits before he can know whether an act may harm someone. Only a calculated act under the limitations of reason can lead to true everlasting joy. Locke is clear that true happiness is not about following selfish desires but actually suspending, restraining, and governing them by observing reason and natural law limits:

“Government of our passions the right improvement of liberty. But if any extreme disturbance (as sometimes it happens) possesses our whole mind, as when the pain of the rack, an impetuous uneasiness, as of love, anger, or any other violent passion, running away with us, allows us not the liberty of thought, and we are not masters enough of our own minds to consider thoroughly and examine fairly;….But the forbearance of a too hasty compliance with our desires, the moderation and restraint of our passions, so that our understandings may be free to examine, and reason unbiased give its judgment.”774

Suspending desires deriving from violent passions such as love and anger is necessary for a true deliberation of unbiased reason to avoid harm to others.

According to Locke, moral limits restrain the untamed appetites of self-desire: “Moral laws are set as a curb and restraint to these exorbitant desires, which they cannot be but by rewards and punishments that will overbalance the satisfaction any one shall propose to

769 Locke, (1689), Human understanding, Bk. II, Ch. 21, Para. 42, 55, 56, 62.

“All desire happiness. If it be further asked,--What it is moves desire? I answer,-- happiness, and that alone. . . . Para 55. …though all men desire happiness, yet their wills carry them so contrarily; and consequently some of them to what is evil. . . .

56. All men seek happiness, but not of the same sort. The mind has a different relish, as well as the palate; and you will as fruitlessly endeavor to delight all men with riches or… so the greatest happiness consists in the having those things which produce the greatest pleasure, and in the absence of those which cause any disturbance, any pain. Now these, to different men, are very different things . . .

62. … the will, free from the determination of such desires, is left to the pursuit of nearer satisfactions, and to the removal of those uneasinesses which it then feels, in its want of and longings after them.”

Locke, (1689), Human understanding, Bk. II, Ch. 22, emphasis added.

770 Locke, (1689), Human understanding, Bk. II, Ch. 21, Para. 51; Bk. II. Ch. 21. Para; 52, 56, 60; Bk. II, Ch. 20, Para. 2.

771 Locke, (1689), Human understanding, Bk. II, Ch. 21, Para. 35; Bk. II, Ch. 32, Para. 17.

772 Locke, (1689), Human understanding , Bk. II, Ch. 21, Para. 47-53, 67.

773 See Locke, (1689), Human understanding, Bk. II, Ch. 21. Para. 52-56; Locke, (1693), Education, Para. 33, 38, 107 (see p. 191 and following).

774 Locke, (1689), Human understanding, Bk. II, Ch. 21, Para. 54, emphasis added.

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himself in the breach of the law” (emphasis added).775 Locke further says that mankind ought to be educated as to desires and learn to take pleasure in the industry that leads to real happiness.776 Everyone must conform their tastes to “the true intrinsic good or ill that is in things.”777

3.5.6.2 Conclusions on Locke’s property from the common

For Locke, in the state of nature, the property of a person is defined widely to cover “lives, liberties and estates, which I shall call by the general name, property” (Locke II, 123, emphasis added, Locke II, 173).778

Locke explains that his natural property rights are based on the need for self-preservation and ownership. It is impossible to imagine a creator cruel enough to put us on earth with an impulse to live and then punish us by prohibiting us from trying to survive. He explains that God could not have put mankind in such a situation that for the purpose of self-preservation the law of nature would have to be broken (Locke II, 26 and 35).

In Locke’s state of nature, men have rights of property in objects from the common, used for self-preservation and convenience; man can add value to this property through labour.779 Anything more requires human will and regulation (Locke II, 122). However, those agreements are still subject to the guidance of the superior law of nature. Any human regulation of the positive law of property rights is to be interpreted in accordance with the universal and perpetual natural law, aligning it with men’s needs of the time.780 Locke uses labour as a central means to acquire property. With the help of labour, Locke proves that men could have property rights via natural law, without the need for human consent. Locke bases it on the presupposition that our actions and labour are our own.

Locke creates restricted property rights in objects and land to which man can add value by annexing something of his own. However, those specific property rights are strictly limited by the natural law premise of no injury to others. These limitations are inferred from the rights of each to posses his own sphere and the obligation not to damage the sphere of others.781