C o n t e x t — c h a l l e n g e s a n d o p p o r t u n i t i e s
Reflecting the intrinsic political nature of decentralisation reforms, the alliance of opposition forces that took power from the Ethiopia’s communist military government in 1991 opted for the compromise of federalism to accommodate the country’s huge ethnic diversity. Under the Ethiopian constitution, each ethnic group is entitled to form its own regional state; the consti-tution does not specify the role of the lower tiers of elected local authority, i.e. the woredas (districts) and kebeles (wards). In principle, the regions enjoy substantial political, fiscal and administrative autonomy, including expenditure responsibilities for education, health, water, roads and sanitation.
Conditions in Ethiopia are such that polit-ical, administrative and fiscal centralisa-tion remains the norm. In terms of political decentralisation, the ruling party domi-nates all aspects of public life and has, over time, extended its control to regional and sub-national levels. Because of the lack of competition at the local level, most council members belong to the ruling party, and are therefore loyal to the party lead-ers rather than to their constituencies.
Legal constraints on civil society further hinder the ability to hold local govern-ments accountable. These conditions cre-ate a huge gap between citizens and stcre-ate, including at the local level.
As far as administrative decentralisation is concerned, top-down approaches prevail, reflected in (i) the predominance of decon-centrated units of the central government (at the woreda level) in providing services, (ii) central control over expenditures and (iii) upward accountability towards sectoral ministries. This situation is compounded by lim-ited fiscal decentralisation, as regions have only a narrow tax base and largely depend on central government transfers; these tend to be heavily controlled from an expenditure side in terms of earmarks, standards and other administrative restrictions.
This system of centralised federalism has proved to be largely effective in mitigating conflict and fostering national unity. It has provided a means for dealing with ethnic diversity and related aspirations to self-rule. Political stability and the choice of an authoritarian devel-opmental state model have led to impressive economic growth, progress on key Millennium Development Goals and decent public financial management (down to the lower levels). The flip side is that the system does not create much room for genuine local democracy and pol-icy experimentation at the sub-national level. The omnipresence of the central government in areas that formally belong to regional/local authorities means that the latter have very T H E C A S E I N A N U T S H E L L
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ollowing its long civil war, Ethiopia was constitutionally transformed from a centralised unitary state into a federation. On paper, this post-conflict settlement created a highly decentralised system with nine ethnic-based regional state governments along with districts (woredas). In practice, centralism prevails, reflected in the dominance of the ruling party, top-down state administration and limited own revenues at the sub-national level. This system has brought benefits (e.g. stability, economic development) but has also reduced the scope for local democracy, sub-national policy experimentation and downward accountability to citizens. It is possible, however, even within such a restricted political environment, to create space for improved local governance — as demonstrated by the Ethiopia Social Accountability Programme supported by the European Union. The delegation seeks to use the Civil Society Organisation–Local Authority Thematic Programme to scale up the process of social accountability by reaching out to regional governments and bringing the elected local authorities into the process as a direct entry point for citizen engagement.limited space and capacity to define their own development policies, determine their budg-etary allocations and ensure downward accountability.
Even in closed environments there are windows of opportunity to make progress on govern-ance. As a development state, the government has an interest to ensure ‘buy-in’ from the people for its national policies. While control remains the main preoccupation, there is also an interest in ensuring enhanced service delivery at the local level — amongst others, through adequate mechanisms for citizen participation, transparency and accountability. The recent protest movements on the lack of liberty and inclusive policies that affected several regions put additional pressure on central-level authorities to relax their grip on society and allow for more responsive systems of local governance.
P r o p o s e d i n n o v a t i o n s
From a geopolitical and security perspective, Ethiopia is an important European Union (EU) partner and ally in a complex region. It receives substantial amounts of aid, reflecting both the country’s needs and the government’s overall good performance in development.
Ethiopia’s track record on democracy and human rights is a major concern, yet the EU has to reconcile action on this front with its wider interests. In practice, the political environment is highly restrictive and windows of opportunity to promote a governance agenda — including at the local level — have to be carefully explored and put to use.
An interesting example is the Ethiopia Social Accountability Programme (ESAP-2). As part of a wider programme aimed at supporting decentralised service provision, the programme has managed to align the interests of the federal government (better service delivery and extended control over the local level) with the enhancement of local governance through citizen participation and multi-actor dialogue. This process of developing more construc-tive state-society relations has been facilitated by VNG International — the International Cooperation Agency of the Association of Netherlands Municipalities — and local civil society organisations (CSOs). It has yielded important results in terms of creating dialogue and feed-back mechanisms for communities as well as enhancing social accountability, particularly between service providers (i.e. the deconcentrated units) and citizens.
The EU delegation is now considering how best to mainstream concerns with decentralisa-tion and local governance in its focal sectors of health, agriculture/food security and roads/
energy, where achieving development outcomes largely depends on an effective intergovern-mental system and a functioning local public sector. The EU delegation also seeks to make strategic use of the local authority (LA) component of the CSO-LA Thematic Programme, which has been awarded EUR 5 million (combined 2015–2016 allocation). However, it quickly became clear that the political environment in Ethiopia does not lend itself to an open and competitive call for proposals directly oriented towards enhancing the developmental role of LAs. Instead, the thematic line could better be used for deepening the processes, tools and achievements of ESAP-2, which is due to end in June 2016, in terms of social accountability.
The added value of such support would be threefold:
■ extend the mechanisms tested by ESAP-2 to the woreda councils in order to work on the critical dimension of downward accountability towards citizens;
■ scale up the ESAP experience to the regional state governments as essential governance actors;
■ promote better multi-level planning and coordination between regions and woredas.
To keep the programme manageable, the idea is to select a limited number of regions with promising dynamics through a restricted call for proposals. The support measures attached to the thematic programme could be used to facilitate dialogue with the national government on this programme concept, to engage with interested regions and to support elaboration of the proposals. The presence and experience gained by VNG International and local CSOs is an additional asset in preparing for and launching the programme.
L e s s o n s l e a r n t
■ Support democratisation from the bottom up. In closed political systems, it makes little sense to adopt normative approaches to promoting governance. The way forward is to ‘go with the grain’, to invest in understanding societal dynamics and to exploit windows of opportunity to make progress. This approach has been the key to ESAP’s success. The EU delegation’s choice to build on this accomplishment through the CSO-LA Thematic Programme follows the same logic. It may help empower regional and local authorities to assume a stronger developmental role while nurturing a broader culture of accounta-bility at the local level.
■ Accept that institutional change takes time. Ensuring an effective chain of account-ability in a centralised federal system like Ethiopia’s is inevitably a long-term process. It involves changes in attitudes; opportunities to experiment and learn; and new processes, tools and capacities at various levels. The institutionalisation of the ESAP-2 mechanisms will take several years. In this context, the thematic programme can contribute, together with other EU initiatives in focal sectors, to maintain the momentum created by ESAP-2 and lay the foundations for downward accountability in the long run.
■ Recognise the critical role of knowledge and process facilitation. Supporting social change in restricted environments depends on local knowledge (e.g. on the different account-ability dimensions in decentralised service provision) as well as on the active involvement of process facilitators that can broker workable solutions for all parties involved.