98. Assessing the options and their pros and cons, implies an underlying choice of relevant elements, which will guide the analysis and the comparison of options. Among the cross-cutting factors considered in the previous section, two stand out as primary deciding factors in the consideration of multilateral approaches, namely ‘assurance of non-proliferation’ and ‘assur-ance of supply and services’. Both are recognized overall objectives for governments and for the NPT community. In practice, each of these two objectives can seldom be achieved fully on its own. History has shown that it is even more difficult to find an optimum arrangement that will satisfy both objectives at the same time. As a matter of fact, multilateral approaches could be a way to satisfy both objectives.
Key Elements
99. The non-proliferation value (label A) of a multilateral arrangement is measured by the various proliferation risks associated with nuclear facilities, whether national or multilateral. These risks include the following:
(a) Diversion of materials from an MNA is primarily related to the level of multilateral involvement in its functioning. Because of the different nationalities and interests that exist in a multinational team, it is reason-able to assume that a deeper involvement of such a team ensures a diminishing risk of diversion — provided that there is no collusion.
(b) Breakout scenarios and clandestine parallel programmes are related to the siting of the MNA facility in a country that is not a technology holder.
The risk level for the breakout scenario depends upon the effectiveness of contractual enforcement provisions. The risk of a clandestine programme is increased because of the cover provided by the declared facility (i.e. know-how, procurement, R&D and obscuring enriched uranium traces). However, with effective safeguards and an AP in place, these risks could be mitigated.
(c) Diffusion of proscribed or sensitive technologies from MNAs to unau-thorized entities is predominantly related to the participants degree of
access to these technologies. More extensive access to sensitive technol-ogies increases the risk of their diffusion.
(d) Security risks cover the risk of theft of nuclear, and especially of fissile, materials and depend upon the effectiveness of the facility’s physical protection system. A well guarded MNA, which replaces a wider dis-persion of sensitive fuel cycle facilities, has a clear advantage in that respect.
100. The assurance of supply value (label B) of a multilateral arrangement is measured by the associated incentives. They include the following:
(a) Guarantees. The political, commercial, legal and technical credibility of the guarantees provided by suppliers, governments and international organizations.
(b) Economics. Economic benefits that would be gained by countries partici-pating in multilateral arrangements. Examples could include competitive fuel service costs resulting from the basic advantages of MNA, such as economies of scale, indirect start-up cost savings, or other economical incentives driven by political considerations.
(c) Political and public acceptance. In some instances, MNAs may lead to a wider acceptance of a nuclear project in the host country. In others, e.g.
final disposal, the impact could well be negative for the host country, although beneficial for others.
(d) Security and safety. To enhance acceptance, any nuclear project, whether national or international, must satisfy proper standards of material security (that is accountability and physical protection), and of nuclear safety for the design and operation of facilities. Here also, the multilat-eral dimension provides an additional level of confidence, thereby indirectly improving the assurance of supply related to such facilities.
Other Elements
101. While ‘assurance of non-proliferation’ or ‘assurance of supply and services’ are the key elements of assessment, other elements — or issues of interest — are important, mainly insofar as they contribute to the two key elements. They include:
102. Siting — Choice of host country (label C). There are three basic options for hosting fuel cycle facilities under multilateral arrangements:
(a) Special arrangements — legal structures limiting national jurisdiction on the site of MNA fuel cycle facility (“extraterritorial” status);
(b) States that are already technology holders;
(c) States that are not technology holders.
The nature of safeguards agreements applicable to a location would also be an important factor. Furthermore, the host country will have to be acceptable to partner countries.
103. Access to technology (label D). Multilateral options might also vary in the extent of access to technology that they permit:
(a) Full access;
(b) Assembly and maintenance know-how;
(c) Operational know-how;
(d) None.
104. Multilateral involvement (label E). Multilateral options may also offer various levels of involvement for the participating States:
(a) Minimum: Supply only arrangement;
(b) Ownership: Sharing ownership of the facility;
(c) Management: Taking part in the management of the facility;
(d) Operation: Participating in the operation of the facility;
(e) Maximum: Joint research and development, design and construction of facilities.
105. Special safeguards provisions (label F). Each multilateral option should have safeguards provisions that define the measures to be taken to ensure that no proliferation occurs. Such measures might include:
(a) Expanded facility specific safeguards agreement, covering not only nuclear materials, but also functionally essential components of an MNA facility;
(b) Additional Protocol;
(c) Special safeguards arrangements;
(d) ‘Continuity of safeguards’ for the facility and the nuclear material and components in connection with the breakout scenario, breach of contract, or a voluntary dissolution of the arrangement.
106. Non-nuclear inducements (label G). These may prove vital in securing the willingness of certain States to restrict or forego the possession of indigenous nuclear fuel cycle facilities. Incentives may include:
(a) Trade benefits;
(b) Security arrangements (regional/international);
(c) Security guarantees/assurances;
(d) Assistance in the development of the (non-nuclear) energy sector.
Such incentives would be country specific. An understanding is needed as to what factors are applicable to the partner State and what factors are applica-ble to the host State, since they would differ for each.
107. Finally, it can be noted that with the help of such elements, multilateral options can be compared among themselves, as well as with purely national arrangements.