Biens publics et valorisation immobilière

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Biens publics et valorisation immobilière

Christophe Beckerich

To cite this version:

Christophe Beckerich. Biens publics et valorisation immobilière. Economies et finances. Université

Lumière - Lyon 2, 2000. Français. ฀tel-02097151฀

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Je remercie Madame Marie-Andrée BUISSON pour avoir accepté d’encadrer ce travail, pour la confiance qu’elle m’a témoignée et pour les conseils qu’elle m’a prodigués tout au long de ces années.

Je voudrais témoigner ma gratitude au Professeur Alain BONNAFOUS pour avoir accepté, en fin de parcours, de relayer Madame Marie-Andrée BUISSON comme directeur de thèse. Je tiens à le remercier également pour avoir eu un œil toujours bienveillant sur mes travaux.

Je tiens à remercier le Professeur François GARDE et Monsieur Alain GUENGANT, rapporteurs de ma thèse, et le Professeur Guy GILBERT pour l’honneur qu’ils me font de participer à mon jury.

Je remercie Bruno FAIVRE D’ARCIER pour avoir suscité mon intérêt pour l’aménagement de l’espace public urbain. J’exprime également mes remerciements à l’ensemble des membres du LET pour leur accueil et leur aide.

Que Michel Le Nir trouve ici l’expression de ma reconnaissance pour la confiance qu’il m’a accordée. Que Sophie BOURGEAY soit remerciée pour son soutien et son aide à un moment clé de la rédaction.

Je voudrais témoigner à Florence LACAILLE ma profonde gratitude pour ses conseils, son

soutien, son écoute et ses encouragements tout au long de ce travail.

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The optimal structure of the public sector was found to be one in which there was a level of government (or a collective decision-making mechanism) for each

jurisdiction over which the consumption of a public good could be defined (Oates, 1972, p. 42).

The local public goods are not supplied by flying individuals. The services are provided at some specific locations and the beneficiaries of the services reside at some other specific locations. This follow from the fact that residence requires space, and therefore, the individuals are spread out geographically. Thus, the provision of local public goods is associated with specific costs, such as

transportation to the facility supplying the local public goods, or decreasing level of service with distance between the public facility and the beneficiaries’

residential location (HOCHMAN et alii, 1995, p. 1227)

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Given a strong appetite for land, so that the holdings of land vary greatly with income, the wealthier are affected relatively less by the costs of commuting because they spread these costs over larger sites. Consequently, the rich are price-oriented whereas the poor are location-oriented. Less accessibility being bought with increasing income, accessibility being bought with increasing

income, acessibility behaves as an inferior good. This is a possible explanation of the paradox encountered in American cities, of the poor living on expensive

central land and the rich on cheaper peripheral land (ALONSO, 1964, p. 109).

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The consumer-voter may be viewed as picking that community which best satisfies his preferences pattern for public goods. At the central level the

preferences of the consumer-voter are given, and the government tries to adjust to the pattern of those preferences, whereas at the local level various

governments have their revenue and expenditure more or less fixed. Given these

revenue and expenditure patterns, the consumer-voter moves to that community

whose local government best satisfies his set of preferences. The greater the

number of communities and the greater the variance among them, the closer the consumer will come to fully realizing his preference position (TIEBOUT, 1956, p.

418).

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In several important studies of tax capitalization expenditures on various local public benefits have been used to proxy the quantity and quality of public services. It is widely recognized that such measures are deficient because of untenable assumption that output can be measured by expenditures on inputs (ROSEN et FULLERTON, 1977, p. 433).

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There are several reasons why this might be the case: educational factor prices

might differ among communities, educational production function might differ

among communities, and endowments of non market inputs might differ among

communities. The main point is that the value of inputs is not likely to be a good

measure of output in this context (ROSEN et FULLERTON, 1977, p. 435).

Clearly, the tests are not a perfect measure. For example, the expected value added by the school system may be a more important factor than its overall quality. More importanly, examination results certainly cannot be guaranteed to summarize adequately the whole vector of characteristics that determine

perceived school quality. (ROSEN et FULLERTON, 1977, p. 435).

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Local governments in the area around major cities frequently are in competition with each other for residents. The individual deciding where to live take into account the private effects upon him of the bundle of government services and taxes in each suburb. In this case, the decision is a private decision, the bulk of cost of which falls upon the person making (TULLOCK, 1971, p. 917). With the growing urbanization of society, there is some reason to believe that the Tiebout hypothesis may be relevant to the real world : individuals working in a central city frequently have a wide choice of suburban communities in which to reside, and the quality of the local public schools, for instance, may be of real importance in the choice of a community of residence. If this is true, the outputs of publics services (as well as taxes) should influence the attraction of a community to potential residents and should thereby affect local property values (OATES, 1969, p. 958).

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We argue that Oates restated Tiebout’s model into a simpler question of whether households have preferences for a tax-service mix. This formulation does not consider whether the supply of public service combinations approaches the elasticity required for the model to yield Tiebout’s analogue to the perfectly

competitive solution. Oates verified that consumer demand conforms to Tiebout’s hypothesis (EDEL et SCLAR, 1974, p. 942).

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Oates (1969) and Brueckner (1979) focus on the demand for local public services and predict that local services and property taxes will be capitalized into houses values. Edel and Sclar (1974), Hamilton (1975) and Epple, Zelenitz and Vissher (1978) focus on supply responses to rent differentials and predict the

disappearance of this capitalization (YINGER, 1982, p. 918).

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The intuitive argument for external capitalization is quite simple. Suppose that a project is built in one community designed to make people better off there. Now, if people in all communities have similar tastes and are free to move among the communities, outsiders will necessarily be attracted to the project-building

community. And they will continue to move until the welfare incentive disappears.

The only factor which can stop this movement is a differential location cost, that

is, an increase in land rents in the project-building community (Starrett, 1981,

p. 307).

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L’innovation technique principale consiste à se détacher de l’approche

traditionnelle selon laquelle les biens sont les arguments directs de l’utilité et à supposer au lieu de cela que ce sont des propriétés ou des caractéristiques des biens dont dérive l’utilité. Nous admettons que la consommation est une activité dans laquelle les biens, seuls ou en combinaison, sont des facteurs et dans

laquelle le produit est une série de caractéristiques. L’utilité ou l’ordonnancement des préférences sont supposés classer des séries de caractéristiques et ne

classer des séries de biens qu’indirectement à travers les caractéristiques qu’ils possèdent (LANCASTER, 1966 cité par GOFFETTE-NAGOT, 1994).

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En définitive, même si les risques de voir le marché du logement s’écarter de l’équilibre semblent nombreux, les erreurs dans les estimations de la disposition à payer ne revêtent souvent qu’un caractère aléatoire. Seul un marché orienté dans une même direction (ou anticipé comme tel) pourrait provoquer un

ajustement incomplet (ou une totale adaptation à des prévisions changeantes) et introduire un biais systématique (SOGUEL, 1994, p. 44).

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