Optimal Strategies in Zero-Sum Repeated Games with Incomplete Information: The Dependent Case

That is, we provide a recursive formula for the values of the dual games, from which we deduce the computation of explicit optimal strategies for the players in the repeated game

Gossner and Tomala [GT04b] prove that the max min of the repeated game (where player i is minimizing) is the highest payoff obtained by using two correlation systems Z 1 and Z 2

relationship that exist in-between the image intensity and the variance of the DR image noise. Model parameters are then use as input of a classifier learned so as to

However, the voltage clamp experiments (e.g. Harris 1981, Cristiane del Corso et al 2006, Desplantez et al 2004) have shown that GJCs exhibit a non-linear voltage and time dependence

LEVEL 5: ABSORBING PAYOFF GAMES WITH VECTOR PAYOFFS While in a standard two-person zero-sum stochastic game one can replace the payoffs, once an absorbing state is reached, by

Figure 131: maximum total force as a function of indentation speed for all the tests performed at an edge location.. Figure 132: maximum total force as a function of indentation

Given the zigzag-encoded errors, the number of

The main differences with respect to our work are: (i) the target language is closer to the session π-calculus having branch and select constructs (instead of having just one