Early evidence (Speisman et al., 1964; Lazarus & Alfert, 1964) supporting the premise of appraisal theories that the meaning attributed to a potentially emotional event determines the emotional response has been backed up by numerous studies in recent times (e.g. Scherer, 1993; Smith & Lazarus, 1993). However, the focus of empirical and theoretical work in appraisal theory so far has been more on establishing the dimensions that underlie emotion differentiation and less on
discovering the underlying processes of appraisal that give rise to emotion. Appraisal theory has been criticised for overemphasising cognitively complex, conscious processes involved in emotion elicitation, which is largely a result of its reliance on self-report studies for empirical support. Even though most appraisal theorists acknowledge that appraisal processes can take place automatically, they have only recently begun to formulate appraisal as a multi-level process (Leventhal & Scherer, 1987; Smith et al., 1996; Smith & Kirby, in press).
Empirical evidence buttressing the small number of recently proposed multilevel emotion models is, however, limited. Most evidence which can be, albeit
speculatively, related to such models stems from brain imagery and lesion studies, showing the differential involvement of subcortical and cortical structures in emotion perception as well as emotion generation. Obviously, the nature of the incoming information determines to a large extent which mode dominates emotion processing, as illustrated by the brain studies in which amygdala regions showed activity in response to perceptual stimuli, but not to stimuli that contained purely semantic, or other cognitively complex, emotional information. Such neuroscientific evidence suggests that in the latter case low level appraisal does not occur; the emotional response is entirely driven by appraisals performed at a conceptual, or higher, level of processing. Further neuroscience evidence indicates a central role for the prefrontal cortices in emotion processing, in particular with respect to regulating subcortical activity, as well as dealing with complex information more “suited” to schematic or higher level processing.
Both bottom-up and top-down emotion processes, mediated by interactions between cortical and subcortical brain regions, are indicated by the high interconnectivity
between prefrontal structures and structures of the limbic system. Simply put, the bottom-up processes in emotion comprise subcortical activity (including amygdaloid activity), presumably corresponding to cognitively simple, perceptually-based appraisal processes. These processes are regulated in a top-down manner by more complex cognitive processing in cortical structures such as those around the prefrontal areas. Several theorists argue that emotional stimuli are predominantly processed at a low level to “prepare” the organism for action as fast as possible, as a fast reaction is beneficial to survival (e.g. LeDoux, Öhman, Robinson). Models such as those of Öhman and Robinson emphasise the bottom-up, pre-attentive detection of
significance/threat, which provokes a focusing of attention and further, higher level evaluations of the event.
Conversely, low-level appraisal might equally be primed by higher level processes acting in a down fashion. Leventhal and Scherer (1987, p.21) suggest that top-down effects of conceptual processing may sensitise classes of schemata relevant to situations that are related at more abstract or semantic levels. They provide the example of hearing a noise that fails to match the schemata of noises normally encountered upon entering one’s home, with the result of priming sensory-motor processing and strengthening the fear response. Frijda (1993) provides a similar example: “Emotions indeed rarely have the one-shot, immediate, and fast character of the paradigmatic case of being startled by a crackle in the solitary woods. And even there one has been walking around with all sort of expectations against which the crackle is perceived” (p.382). Thus, the potentially threatening implications of being alone in the woods facilitate or enhance low level appraisal of the crackle by priming appraisals of e.g. obstructiveness, threat or by allotting more than the usual share of attention to the stimulus. Such processes have not been described nor specified in much detail in the process models reviewed above, and merit further attention.
Related to the issue of bottom-up and top-down processing is the issue of dominance of either level in the preparation and production of a response, particularly if the appraisals performed at different levels conflict. Posner and Snyder (1975) proposed that, at least for cognitive tasks, the relative dominance of automatic or conscious processes is a function of time; if little time is available to respond to a stimulus, the response will be determined by automatic processes. If more processing time is
available, conscious processes will override automatic processes and hence determine the response. Neely (1977) provided some evidence in favour of this proposition.
Comparable research presenting emotion-relevant stimuli (i.e. threat-related words) showed that when the relevance of the stimulus was high enough (as are certain threat-related words to anxious people), automatic processing impinged on controlled processing. So, relevance might be a more important factor than time in determining the dominance of either level in emotion processing. Other research has shown automatic persistence for fear-related stimuli other than words, and according to Öhman and collaborators, particularly biologically fear-relevant stimuli compared to other stimuli. The question remains as to whether biologically fear-relevant stimuli are unique, or whether such effects generalise to any personally relevant stimuli or, indeed, stimuli appraised highly on other appraisal dimensions.
CHAPTER 2
METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES IN STUDYING MULTILEVEL APPRAISAL MODELS AND AIMS OF PRESENT STUDIES