Multilevel appraisal theories

1.4.5a. Levels of processing in appraisal: Leventhal and Scherer

As a contribution to the “cognition-vs.-emotion” debate initiated by Lazarus and Zajonc (see above), Leventhal and Scherer (1987) combined their respective approaches: On the one hand Leventhal’s (1979, 1984) perceptual-motor theory, suggesting that emotions are produced by the constructive activity of a

multi-component, hierarchical processing system, on the other hand, Scherer’s (e.g. 1984a) component process theory, arguing for emotion elicitation and differentiation through a sequence of stimulus evaluation or appraisal “checks” (SECs). Specifically, they suggested that the different appraisal checks can occur at the three different levels described above – sensory-motor, schematic, and conceptual. Table 1 reproduces the central figure from Leventhal and Scherer (1987, p. 17) suggesting a preliminary model of appraisal occurring at different levels of processing.

Table 1.1. Levels of processing for Stimulus Evaluation Checks

Novelty Pleasantness Goal/need

Basic needs Available energy (Empathic adaptation?) Note: Reproduced from Leventhal and Scherer, 1987, p.17

Scherer’s suggestion that the appraisal checks take place in a fixed sequence, and that the number of checks as well as the complexity of the checks increases over the life course of an individual, still holds for, and in fact is even more clearly instantiated in,

the processing levels account. For instance, whilst a newborn infant would respond to a sudden loud noise, presumably due to an appraisal of novelty performed at a

sensory-motor level, newborns are not cognitively “equipped” to perform more complex evaluations such as that of norm/self compatibility, or evaluations of novelty based upon conceptual processing as with the detection of probability violation (e.g. a stranger entering the room walking on his hands). In adult processing, where all of the levels and all of the checks are presumed to be involved in appraisal processing most of the time, the different processing levels are assumed to affect the resulting

emotional response in line with the original predictions made by Scherer (1984a, b).

However, the authors acknowledge that development changes the ease and frequency of use of processing levels and the extent to which a specific level plays a dominant role in emotion processing. With age, schematic and conceptual processing become more accessible, whereupon Leventhal and Scherer propose that most emotion processing is initiated at the schematic level. Leventhal and Scherer’s proposition was the first to recognise the need to address different levels of processing in

emotion-antecedent appraisal, and has subsequently been adopted and extended upon by Smith and colleagues (1996).

1.4.5b. Towards a general process model of appraisal: Smith and colleagues Recently, Smith and collaborators (Smith, Griner, Kirby, & Scott, 1996; Smith &

Kirby, in press) have described an ongoing effort to reformulate the basic concepts suggested by Leventhal and Scherer (1987) by constructing a preliminary version of an appraisal process model. As with Öhman, they emphasise the functional role of emotion in motivating and regulating attention, and argue that since emotion alerts the organism to relevant information, the scanning or monitoring of the environment must occur outside attention. If this evaluative scanning process were attentional, then the constant demand upon attentional resources would be too high, restricting the

resources available for other ongoing processes. In the model, the authors emphasise two modes of appraisal processing, namely associative processing and reasoning. As in the case of the automatic/controlled distinction made by Shiffrin and Schneider (e.g. 1977) and in general agreement with Leventhal and Scherer (1987), the two modes proposed by Smith et al. are not completely independent of one another, but are assumed to interact in several ways. Most important in this context is the creation of emotional memories in the associative mode through the process of learning from

experience by reasoning. Conversely, when existing memory structures (schemata) are sufficiently activated by incoming sensory data, the information they represent becomes available to reasoning.

The appraisal information output from the conceptual and schematic modes (in addition to perceptual information, which in this model accounts for direct, probably innate, appraisals carried by pain stimuli or perhaps fear-relevant facial expressions as proposed by Öhman) is monitored by “appraisal detectors”. The detectors combine appraisal information from both processing modes, on the basis of which a specific emotional response is generated. The detector is not considered as an active processor which computes information, but rather, as the name implies, as an information detector and response selector, which combines the appraisal outcomes from

associative and reasoning appraisal processes and initiates the appropriate emotional response. Attention is regulated by the registering of a subjective feeling state (resulting from appraisal outcomes), when sufficiently intense, in conscious, focal awareness. Furthermore, Smith and colleagues assume that the two processing modes are constantly involved in the activation and priming of memory, and the detectors continuously monitor the outputs of the two processing modes, hence outputting emotional responses all the time, although the person often is not aware of this constant appraisal monitoring. Only at the moment an activity threshold in the appraisal detector is surpassed, the appraisal information becomes accessible to reasoning and awareness, which often is related to a full-blown emotion, including marked changes in the components of emotional responding.

1.4.5c. Robinson’s model

Inspired by the recent findings on the specific relation of the amygdala to fear

responses, Robinson (1998) has proposed a model in which two preattentive modules independently classify a perceived stimulus in terms of 1) its potential goodness or badness and 2) whether it is personally threatening or not (and hence whether it requires urgent action, see Öhman for a similar view). These two detection mechanisms serve to allocate attention to the ensuing conscious appraisal of the stimulus. In addition, Robinson states that the preattentive detection of urgency, but not valence, is linked to activity of the sympathetic nervous system, due to its close relation to motor preparation. In the model, the preattentive/unconscious detection of

urgency is, by itself, able to trigger fear/anxiety automatically, before the stimulus is appraised consciously, but nevertheless only after focal attention has been deployed to the stimulus. Compared to other emotions, the emotion of fear is thus unique in that it can be elicited preattentively, purely on the basis of a detected threat. The valence detection mechanism, on the other hand, directly feeds into conscious appraisal, hence preceding and triggering primary and secondary appraisal (cf. Lazarus, e.g. 1991). To summarise the salient aspects of Robinson's model, the emotion of fear/anxiety can be elicited without conscious appraisal of the stimulus, due to the direct input of the urgency detection. However, the great bulk of emotion-antecedent appraisal would take the form of conscious evaluation of the stimulus in terms of their ultimate relevance to the individuals’ well-being and their ability to cope with the stimulus.