A.-C. LACOSTE
Directorate-General for Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection, Paris, France
E-mail: andre-claude.lacoste@asn.minefi.gouv.fr
Abstract
The French national regulatory control system for radioactive sources has been in place for more than 50 years and was recently updated. This system relies on a licensing process for the manufacturer, vendor or user of radioactive sources and a registering process of individual sealed radioactive sources. One of the key requirements is for a vendor to recover the sealed sources it has sold. France has the technical capabilities to detect and then secure orphan sources. Emergency preparedness provisions and emergency response teams are in place to deal both with the source itself and also with its consequences for public health. France is willing to organize in the second half of 2004 an international conference on the security of radioactive sources, to review the effectiveness of actions already undertaken or arising from the present conference, and to define any relevant complementary measures.
1. INTRODUCTION
As the head of the French nuclear safety authority (DGSNR), I welcome the opportunity to present a very brief overview of French experience in regulating and dealing with radioactive sources, and French proposals for potential international improvements in these areas.
France has long been aware of the need to maintain control over radioactive sources to protect public health and the environment. A regulatory body dedicated to this goal was established more than 50 years ago. From an international standpoint, France has been promoting a greater awareness of this issue for many years. The Conference on the Safety of Radiation Sources and the Security of Radioactive Materials, held in Dijon in 1998, is a perfect example of a French initiative.
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This paper focuses on three topics:
— The French national regulatory system for radioactive sources,
— Dealing with orphan sources and emergencies,
— International initiatives supported by France.
2. FRENCH NATIONAL REGULATORY SYSTEM FOR RADIOACTIVE SOURCES
The French regulatory system for radioactive sources has been in place for 50 years and was recently updated to take into account the 1996 European directive laying down basic safety standards for the protection of the health of workers and the general public against the dangers arising from ionizing radiation.
The system regulates the whole life cycle of a radioactive source, from its manufacture (or import into France) until its disposal (or export out of France).
Of course, low risk sources are exempted from this system, as the European directive allows for this.
I wish to emphasize three main features of the French system:
First, it puts into force a licensing process. A licence is required to manufacture, possess, use, sell, import or export radioactive sources, and my organization (DGSNR) issues most of these licences. The licensing process includes the review of basic provisions against source theft (for example the storage of sources in a safe while they are not in use), and the review of the user’s source inventory. Provisions designed for radiation safety, such as restriction of access to trained workers, storage in a cabinet or safe of unused sources, or wall shielding, contribute to source security.
Second, sealed source transfers between vendors and users or between users are registered. This registration:
— Allows for the verification that the buyer has the required licence.
— Is an input to a national registry of radioactive sources. The Institute for Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety (IRSN) is in charge of process-ing the registration and maintainprocess-ing the registry.
Third and last, a vendor is required under the law to recover used sealed sources on the request of the user or ten years after the source was first registered. This requirement is designed to limit the potential for sources becoming orphaned.
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Furthermore, a draft European directive on the control of high activity sealed radioactive sources, based on the above mentioned principles, is being prepared.
3. DEALING WITH ORPHAN SOURCES AND EMERGENCIES France owns and operates specific equipment to detect radioactive sources which were never or are no longer under regulatory control. The Atomic Energy Commission (CEA), the IRSN and some private companies have developed capabilities and experience in this field, for example by installing equipment at some border crossings or by performing aerial surveys by helicopter.
Despite the procedures and features in place to prevent them, incidents or accidents involving radioactive sources may occur. France has capabilities for dealing with such accidents and relies firstly on general provisions such as specifically trained fire-fighters located in different areas around the country, and secondly on specialized teams and equipment operated mainly by the CEA and the IRSN. If such an accident compromises worker or public health, internationally known medical experts and facilities are available, and the IAEA has previously used these resources.
4. INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES SUPPORTED BY FRANCE France fully supports the IAEA’s action plan for strengthening the safety and security of the most dangerous radioactive sources. In particular, the widest application of the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, drawn up under IAEA auspices, is and will remain a priority. Actions should be developed within this framework to assist States to establish or strengthen national control systems. It is the responsibility of each State to put the appropriate infrastructure in place for the purpose of controlling the production, distribution and use of radioactive sources.
Although the IAEA’s action plan has identified short and medium term actions, additional efforts can still be made. Conscious of the risk represented by the malevolent use of radioactive sources, France wishes to give this issue a specific place within the framework of its chairing of the G8. It considers that actions taken to manage radioactive sources safely and with complete security can be strengthened, complemented and expanded, in both the medium and the long term. The prevention of acts of radiological terrorism is an issue that calls for a collective awareness of this risk, and the introduction of international
mechanisms that reinforce international co-operation in this area to support and complement the IAEA’s actions.
France therefore suggests that this issue be given political impetus, and proposes the following guidelines:
(a) International action to list the most dangerous sources distributed worldwide, locate them and make them secure, where necessary. More specifically, the IAEA campaigns to locate orphan radioactive sources could be intensified, particularly in the more vulnerable States. This calls for full co-operation between the principal States that have in the past exported powerful radioactive sources, so that these campaigns can be better targeted.
(b) Development in international co-operation towards international commitments on the safety and security of sources, the exact form of which remains to be determined. By way of an example, the principal States producing and exporting radioactive sources (fewer than ten) could make a political commitment to manage the sources they produce properly, both domestically and on export. This commitment could take the form of Guidelines for the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, corresponding to the application of certain provisions in the Code of Conduct. The model used could be the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium drawn up and adopted under the aegis of the IAEA by certain countries holding stocks of that material.
(c) In the longer term, and when the Code of Conduct is widely applied, the IAEA could be entrusted with the task of maintaining a register of the transnational movements of the most dangerous radioactive sources, and of alerting the international community to any anomalies recorded. The information for this register would be provided by the exporting and importing States, using mechanisms still to be defined.
(d) Finally, France, which in 1998 organized the first international conference on the safety and security of radioactive sources, suggests that it organize, in the second half of 2004, what would be the fourth international conference on this subject, after the Dijon conference, the Conference of National Regulatory Authorities with Competence in the Safety of Radiation Sources and the Security of Radioactive Materials, held in Buenos Aires in 2001, and the present conference in Vienna. This 2004 conference would be an opportunity to update the record of action undertaken, and would also allow participants to examine the new guidelines, should the proposals I have just described be adopted.
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