A.Yu. Rumyantsev
Minister of the Russian Federation for Atomic Energy, Moscow, Russian Federation
The urgency of the issue to be discussed in the framework of this conference is obvious. Despite the fact that the history of the development and use of radioisotope products is just a little over 50 years of age, the range of present applications is quite diverse. They cover industry and power production, metallurgy and geology, mining and the environment, meteorology and agriculture, and the chemical, oil and gas industries.
I would like also to mention separately one more field of use of isotope products, which is medicine. Wide use is made of radioactive substances and other ionization sources for diagnostics, medical treatment and research purposes. Radioisotope methods are widely used in diagnostics and therapy.
They are most efficient in evaluating structural and functional changes of different organs. Thus the list of radiopharmaceuticals used in medicine is getting longer every day.
It is obvious that the range and field of use of different radionuclide sources in contemporary life are expanding: radionuclide sources of electric power (radioisotope thermoelectric generators, or RTGs); autonomous power supplies for various kinds of equipment in remote and difficult to reach areas (radio and light beacons, meteorological stations); radiation technological units for the sterilization of medical products, and the processing of agricultural products and industrial and domestic waste; equipment for actinotherapy;
different devices for the control of technological processes (measurement of density, level and thickness); and devices for non-destructive control (gamma defect detectors) and for analysing the content of materials.
It goes without saying that the issue of safe and secure management of these kinds of products throughout their life cycle, beginning with their manufacture and up to their disposal, remains a key issue.
The Russian Federation, as one of the major manufacturers and consumers, as well as an exporter and importer, of ionizing radiation sources, has always taken great care with all the safety and security aspects of managing this kind of product. The same is true of the former Soviet Union. This attention to safety and security arises from a developed legal base, including provision
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for action against the illegal purchase, storage, use, transfer or destruction of radioactive materials.
The licensing of activities in the field of radioactive substance management stands in the way of uncontrolled proliferation of radioactive substances and radiation sources. The licence holder is obliged, among other things, to properly dispose of radioactive substances which are of no further use, to be accountable for the control, safe storage and physical protection of radiation sources, etc.
At the same time, in discussing the issue of the safe and secure use of isotope products in the ‘global’ sense, we must admit the obvious: this is an issue of urgency for a number of reasons.
One reason is the threat posed by different terrorist organizations in the world, and another the disintegration of the former Soviet Union that led to a loss of control over sources, and in some cases to the loss of sources as such. An example is the unauthorized opening of RTGs by members of the local populations in Kazakhstan and Georgia to obtain non-ferrous metals. For some, the dose that they were exposed to turned out to be too high.
In addition, after the break-up of the former Soviet Union, new government control systems for the location and transport of radioactive and nuclear materials in the separate independent States had to be developed afresh, which allowed an opportunity for a variety of unprecedented criminal offences, including those with radioactive sources.
Growing terrorism also led the world community to re-evaluate the threat of the use of biological, chemical and radiological materials by different terrorist organizations, religious extremists and criminals. As a direct result, a tripartite initiative (Russian Federation–USA–IAEA) to increase the level of safety and security of radioactive sources was established. Its purpose is to develop appropriate control over used sources, as well as to search for, remove and convert to a safe condition orphaned sources on the territory of the Commonwealth of Independent States.
The level of risk connected with the use of radioactive materials can be estimated in terms of the threats of acts of radiological terrorism and thefts of radioactive materials. However, at present there is no proof and there are no complete data on illegal trafficking of radioactive materials or on cases of
‘radioactive blackmail’. According to IAEA information, since 1993, 201 cases of illegal sale of radioactive sources have been registered, including sources used in medicine and industry.
The world is concerned and wishes to protect itself. Understanding this requires the consolidation of efforts in the field of international co-operation that we are discussing today. The strategy of joint action against attempted acts of radiological terrorism obviously needs to be based on systematic analysis of
RUMYANTSEV
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all the aspects of the safe use of radioactive sources, as well as a critical review of the experience accumulated by the world community in non-proliferation.
All this can be and must be taken into account when setting up international and national safety systems for the use of radioactive sources and for effective response systems against radiological terrorism.
Illegal trafficking of ionizing radiation sources can pose a threat to national security, public health and the global environment. All this requires us to expand collaboration and strengthen international co-operation with regard to cross-border traffic of radioactive materials, the operation of highly hazardous radiation units, the exchange of information between States and international organizations and the updating of antiterrorist laws.
As for national systems, those are to be based, in the first place, on the adherence to and respect for international agreements and conventions, as well as national legislature. Radioactive materials management must include accountability, licensing and issuing of special permits for activities involving radiation sources; control over export–import operations; and the involvement of law enforcement agencies, intelligence and border control. A number of States are facing the urgent issue of creating a legal basis that would regulate the use, location and disposal of radioactive sources. The safe use of sources and a guarantee of their safety can be secured only by having legal and technical documentation, including international conventions and precise instructions to consumers on the registration of the sources and their further management.
The IAEA has accumulated positive experience in consolidating international efforts and supporting the development of legal instruments on different aspects of the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Taking this into account, the IAEA’s key role in assisting Member States with regard to setting up national infrastructures for the management of potentially hazardous radioactive sources is incontestable.
Appropriate attention must be focused on the development of a set of measures to eliminate the consequences of possible terrorist acts involving the use of devices based on radioactive sources. I believe that the response system being developed must minimize not only the direct radiological consequences, but also the indirect psychological, medical, social and economic consequences.
Our tragic experience of a large scale accident illustrates the fact that society is extremely sensitive to any radiation risks and is prone to various phobias, foremost among them radiophobia.
Phobias are caused by a lack of knowledge or by plain ignorance.
Ignorance is caused by a lack of curiosity and by laziness. Hardly anyone among non-professionals will go to a library to read the contemporary literature on radiology. It is much easier to read a biased newspaper article.
Specialists in psychology believe that phobias are contagious, and that it is
possible, through manipulation, to create a negative impact on the health of a lot of people. And here I would like to touch upon another important issue directly linked to the issue of the safe and secure use of ionizing radiation sources.
The attitude to radiation ought to be characterized by vigilance in response to real danger, and much depends on information supply and awareness. To exaggerate the threat of radiological terrorism may also have a negative impact on the scale of use of irradiation sources.
When the population receives minimal information but hears plenty of rumours, and as a result develops superstitions, then, on the one hand, we get radiophobia, and on the other, irresponsible behaviour. What we need is a large scale, civilized information system for society on all the range of issues concerning the safe use of ionizing radiation sources, which will help to preclude the possibility of their unauthorized use.
The way to do this is traditional: it involves the mass media, i.e. press, radio and TV; the introduction of specialized educational programmes in schools and colleges; and round tables with the participation of community representatives, scientists, industry people, etc. This issue must be addressed by involving international organizations, such as the IAEA and the World Health Organization, as well as national institutions such as academies of science.
Our idea of the scale and possible consequences of radiological terrorism defines the priorities and the efforts that are undertaken today for the purpose of increased safety in using radionuclide sources in the Russian Federation. The first steps in this direction are being taken in the framework of agreements between the US Department of Energy and the Ministry of the Russian Federation for Atomic Energy.
I believe that it will be no mistake to express my confidence in this conference, organized by the IAEA, the US and Russian Governments, and a number of other international organizations. I am sure that it is just the beginning of a fruitful international co-operation in this field, as well as a strong stimulus for everyone.
RUMYANTSEV
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INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL POLICE ORGANIZATION
D. Powers
Public Safety and Terrorism Sub-Directorate, International Criminal Police Organization, Lyon
The International Criminal Police Organization (ICPO-Interpol) is the only global police organization. Created in 1923, it currently has 181 Member States. Interpol’s General Secretariat has its headquarters in Lyon, France, and is the central operational body of the organization. It is comprised of over four hundred employees whose primary duty is to provide a neutral and central site for the exchange of key police information relating particularly to transnational criminal activity.
With respect to the particular emphasis of this conference, Interpol has managed a series of initiatives in support of the fight against international illicit trafficking in radioactive materials. Among these initiatives was the creation of working groups to discuss this subject in a search for the best practices in prevention, identification and investigation of trafficking in these materials. As a result, several key issues were identified as essential to making international co-operation both more efficient and more effective.
First, the multiagency approach. Interpol recognizes the importance of maintaining a programme of joint initiatives between law enforcement, the IAEA and the World Customs Organization (WCO). Police officers, together with customs officials and nuclear regulatory authorities, have been participating in relevant training courses, meetings, conferences and seminars co-sponsored by Interpol and the WCO and organized by the IAEA. Another result of these joint initiatives are the three recently published technical documents on preventing, detecting and responding to events involving the trafficking in or criminal use of radioactive materials.
Second, standardized international co-operation. We are continuing our efforts to promote the exchange of relevant information among the different databases that belong to various international organizations in this field. This co-operation also includes the consistent reporting of serious incidents by the responsible agencies within the Member States to their corresponding international organizations. It is only with standard and regular global reporting that we can ensure the most accurate crime mapping of this problem.
And it is only with an accurate mapping of the problem that together we can design the most effective responses globally, regionally and nationally.
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Finally, training of enforcement officers. Training courses are of capital importance. In order to be highly effective in confronting the smuggling of radioactive material, we should be as technically proficient as possible, at the national as well as the international level.
It is understood that each international organization has a different point of view of the problem and a different way of dealing with it within the scope of its particular purpose, mandate or capabilities. However, these multiagency forums act as a force multiplier and constitute a unique and dynamic platform to confront the problem.
Apart from the efforts made by police and customs officials in identifying and preventing the use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists, the IAEA has been very successful through its actions in helping to prevent the loss of control over radioactive material. However, as the terrorist threat remains significant, we must continue our vigilance. Effective preventive measures have been undertaken and the IAEA has played an outstanding role in this connection.
Whether it be through use of our 24 hour command centre, our vast criminal intelligence database, our ability to gather and disseminate focused analytical criminal data to our Member States, or our ongoing training programme, Interpol is uniquely positioned to positively contribute to law enforcement efforts in combating the threatened or actual malevolent use of radioactive materials. Interpol very much appreciates the close working relationship that has been developed over the years with the various institutions represented here today. Interpol assures you of its future co-operation in this endeavour.
POWERS
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AND FACILITATION
R. Mellwig
Deputy Director, Compliance and Facilitation, World Customs Organization, Brussels
The World Customs Organization (WCO) is an intergovernmental organization representing 161 customs administrations worldwide. In June 2002 the membership of the WCO passed the Resolution on Security and Facilitation of the International Trade Supply Chain. This Resolution represents a new dimension for governments and their customs administrations. Every country is now faced with the challenge of protecting its national territory from acts of terrorism and organized crime while making every effort to facilitate legitimate trade. This initiative, which is supported by the G8 countries, the International Maritime Organization, the IAEA, the International Chamber of Commerce, the International Criminal Police Organization, the World Shipping Council, the International Chamber of Shipping and many other international bodies, is helping to safeguard national territories and create a new international framework for safe and secure international trade. As part of this process, customs administrations must be recognized as being one of the key agencies, since their special competence at the frontier is needed in managing the risks relating to passengers and freight moving internationally.
National legislative reforms covering specific antiterrorism legislation, advance passenger/cargo information, organized crime and money laundering are being pursued by the governments of our Members. The WCO administers international conventions, guidelines and best practice models for use by governments when drafting or reviewing legislation.
Existing procedures developed by the WCO that are being adapted to take into account antiterrorism requirements include:
—Revised WCO Kyoto Convention. Provides an international standard and framework for customs procedures applying risk management.
—WCO Customs Data Model and Unique Consignment Reference. Provides a world standard for transmitting, tracking and tracing consignments.
—WCO Guidelines for Advance Passenger Information. Assists in the management of risks associated with the movement of air passengers.
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—A modern multilateral instrument on mutual administrative assistance.
Provides the legal basis for administrative assistance between customs administrations and the sharing of information for security screening.
Moving to the area of specific co-operation between the WCO and the IAEA, I would like to point out that the two organizations have been in close co-operation since 1995. The partnership was formalized by the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding in 1998. The two organizations have jointly developed a number of initiatives:
— A WCO Council Recommendation concerning action against illicit cross-border movement of nuclear and hazardous material was concluded in June 1997.
— At the operational level, the Customs Enforcement Network (CEN) global database now has a separate recordation for nuclear and hazardous materials. A number of significant seizures have been reported and ‘alerts’ disseminated globally.
— Training material and an Enforcement Module on Nuclear and other Radioactive Materials have been developed for customs trainers.
— Training courses covering the technical aspects of the subject have been delivered.
The WCO Secretariat will continue to provide technical assistance and training in line with the availability of its human resources. We will continue to co-operate with the IAEA and other relevant international organizations. I thank the organizers for inviting the WCO to take part in this important meeting. We are honoured to be one of the co-operating organizations of this initiative. I wish the meeting every success.
MELLWIG
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F. De Esteban
Directorate General for Energy and Transport, European Commission, Brussels
The European Commission considers the organization of this international conference to be an excellent initiative, given that both the safety and the security of radioactive sources are an ongoing concern for the European Union.
In our Member States, the use of radioactive sources is subject to the requirements set out by the radiation protection legislation adopted pursuant to Chapter III of the Euratom Treaty. That the Commission’s approach to enhancing safety in the Union is fully in line with the Euratom Treaty was supported by the recent European Court of Justice decision that radiation protection cannot be separated from the safety of sources of radioactivity.
The Commission has carried out several actions aimed at minimizing the risk to the public as well as to the environment arising from the use of radioactive sources.
Within the framework of its activities in the field of radioactive waste management, the Commission published in 2000 a study on the management and disposal of disused sealed radioactive sources. The report estimated that approximately 500 000 sealed sources have been supplied during the past 50 years to operators in the Union’s current 15 Member States. Of these 500 000 sources, approximately 110 000 are currently in use.
The risks associated with the planned use of these sources are well known, and regulations can be laid down. However, actions directed to malevolent uses can, unfortunately, still occur. Only strict control will increase the security of radioactive sources. The sources at greatest risk of being lost from regulatory control are disused sources held in local storage at the users’
premises, waiting for final disposal or return to the manufacturer. The study estimates that there are about 30 000 such sources throughout the present European Union. This number is expected to increase with the forthcoming enlargement. Consequently, the attention of the Commission is particularly focused on sources over which, for various reasons, control has been lost. These orphan sources present an important risk. Several accidents or incidents involving them occur every year around the world.
In some instances, national authorities have to deal with cases of
In some instances, national authorities have to deal with cases of