New initiatives

In the opening addresses to this conference it was stated that the world faces new international initiatives on recovering and recycling orphan sources and strengthening national systems of control. Recently, the Ministry of the Russian Federation for Atomic Energy, the US Department of Energy and the IAEA reached an agreement for a new initiative termed Securing and Managing Radioactive Sources. This tripartite project, which is being organized and managed by the IAEA, aims at securing radioactive sources in the newly independent States of the former Soviet Union. Its objectives are: developing an inventory of relevant sources, and their actual or likely location; locating the sources; recovering them; storing them in a secure manner; and recycling them.

This tripartite initiative is a good example of international co-operation for the recovery and recycling of orphan sources.

It is evident that a number of actions are urgently needed: registers for tracking sources should be set up; programmes for recovering orphan sources should be launched; regulations limiting the export of high risk sources to States that have effective controls should be established; notification require-ments to recipient States of exports should be implemented; measures to penalize theft or misuse of radioactive sources should be instituted; physical protection measures and access controls for high risk sources should be set up;

and legislation to ensure the safe and secure disposal of high risk spent sealed sources should be passed.

In planning these new initiatives, it is perhaps convenient from a logical point of view to divide the issues between those already existing, for which retrospective remedial measures are required, and those that are related to the future, for which prospective actions are needed.

—Retrospectively, existing high risk radioactive sources that are not under secure and regulated control, including orphan sources, raise serious security and safety concerns. Action is required to locate, recover and secure powerful radioactive sources still at large and to control other sources. Therefore, an international initiative aimed at facilitating the location, recovery and securing of such radioactive sources throughout the world needs to be launched, perhaps under the aegis of the IAEA, with particular emphasis on sources with the potential for posing a

significant radiological risk. The recent tripartite initiative of the Governments of the Russian Federation and the United States of America and the IAEA launched with similar objectives in countries of the former Soviet Union could serve as a model.

—Prospectively, effective national infrastructures for the safe and secure management of vulnerable and dangerous radioactive sources are essential for ensuring the long term security and control of such sources. In order to promote the establishment and maintenance of such infrastructures, States should make a concerted effort to observe closely the principles contained in the Code of Conduct and the requirements of the BSS. Therefore, an international initiative to encourage and assist governments in their efforts to establish such infrastructures needs to be launched, perhaps under the aegis of the IAEA. The IAEA Model Project could serve as a model.

The retrospective initiatives may include actions aimed at:

— Considering how best to globalize the efforts relating to the security of existing high risk radioactive sources and, with this objective, brokering partnerships among States;

— Identifying, locating and assessing the security of radioactive sources, with emphasis on high risk vulnerable sources (aerial searches are one possi-bility; in Georgia this was done by the IAEA with the help of France);

— Applying existing international guidance, such as that given in IAEA-TECDOC-1355, and national design basis threat methodologies, to determine upgraded security needs;

— Appraising existing security measures for radioactive sources, based, for example, on IAEA-TECDOC-1355;

— Transporting, consolidating, conditioning, storing, returning or disposing of existing sources in a secure manner;

— Establishing a confidential repository of information related to existing radioactive sources;

— Combating illicit trafficking of radioactive sources by establishing effective measures to detect, interdict and respond to incidents of theft, illicit possession and illicit trafficking, and providing assessment and advisory services on border monitoring, training and technical support, including state of the art detection equipment.

The prospective phase may for instance include the following initiatives:

— Developing a co-ordinated overall international strategy for the provision of assistance to States where high risk vulnerable sources are used, stored

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or transported based on each State’s particular needs. This may include undertaking national strategy missions, upon request, in order to: appraise the State’s legislative and regulatory control of sources; assist in devel-oping or improving legislative and regulatory infrastructure, and imple-menting a national plan of action for improved management of radioactive sources throughout their life cycle.

— Revising the IAEA Regulatory Authority Information System (RAIS) in order to meet the management and record keeping needs of a regulatory authority and (particularly) to facilitate States’ implementation of the Code of Conduct and the BSS requirements, and the provision of RAIS and necessary supporting software and hardware to States in order to assist in the regulatory control of radioactive sources, particularly those posing a high risk.

— Assisting States in the implementation of the Code of Conduct and the BSS, including: encouraging States to adhere to the Code of Conduct;

assessing the degree of implementation of the Code of Conduct and the BSS by States, with a focus on the elements that are of greatest relevance in preventing malevolent use; dialoguing with manufacturers and suppliers of radioactive sources, regulatory bodies and users on the appropriate means of controlling the export, use and return of radioactive sources consistent with the implementation of the Code of Conduct; and assisting manufacturers and suppliers of radioactive sources in the devel-opment of an appropriate Code of Practice that defines their roles and responsibilities during the life cycle of high risk sources.

— Developing and establishing recommendations, guidance, norms and standards, including: an international security oriented categorization of radioactive sources (see IAEA-TECDOC-1344)⁶, which is particularly important in that it provides a basis for the definition of the scope of the Code of Conduct; technical documents to give interim guidance on the security of radioactive sources (see, for example, IAEA-TECDOC-1355);

standardized formats for national registers of radioactive sources, facili-tating the efficient exchange of information between States; internation-ally agreed procedures for importing and exporting radioactive sources; a standardized format for the authorization of radioactive sources to facili-tate the exchange of information between Member Sfacili-tates, particularly with respect to import/export controls, complementing both the IAEA Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material (TS-R-1) and the security requirements for transports of nuclear material that are currently provided in IAEA INFCIRC/225/Rev. 4; methodologies for

6As reported in GOV/2003/38.

assessing threats to, and vulnerabilities of radioactive materials consign-ments as potential targets for terrorist acts; procedures to permit appraisals of security measures for radioactive sources; guidance to enable States to perform their own assessments of their degree of control over radioactive sources; implementation of the BSS security require-ments for specific practices involving the use of radioactive sources, including gauges, well logging and research; and supporting the work of other organizations such as the International Organization for Standardization in the development of standards for source design, construction and testing to take into account concerns related to malevo-lent use of high risk sources.

— Promoting research and development, in co-operation with national labo-ratories and radioactive source manufacturers, in areas such as: feasibility of source design and institutional measures that will minimize the conse-quences of malevolent use; and disposal options for sealed sources, including establishing and gaining international consensus on standards for borehole disposal, assessment methods and approaches to demon-strate compliance with standards, demonstration of the feasibility of the technology, and assistance to Member States on development and licensing of facilities.

— Providing direct technical services, advice and assistance to States, in order to deal with the legacy, and further generation, of high activity disused radioactive sources, in areas such as: the development, certification and use of shipping containers for the safe return of disused or conditioned radioactive sources; the design and construction of operational areas for handling and conditioning spent high activity radioactive sources; the design and construction of long term storage containers for radioactive sources; and the conditioning of long lived radioactive sources.

All these new initiatives, however, will only be fully effective if the Code of Conduct becomes a binding undertaking among States. First, the Code should be reviewed in order to adapt it to the new security dimensions of the problem. Then, all countries should be encouraged to strengthen controls on radioactive sources by observing the revised Code of Conduct.

5. CONCLUSION

Our dilemma with security issues related to radioactive sources is one of equilibrium. On the one hand, we should not overreact: people need radio-active sources; if we overreact we fall into the terrorists’ trap. On the other

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hand, we have to show responsibility in the face of the transformed threats posed by radioactive sources.

In his address to the IAEA’s 2002 General Conference, the US Secretary of Energy stated: “…the role of the IAEA is absolutely critical to ensuring the success…for our work on Radiological Dispersal Devices.” He went on to add:

“…I call on all states to join the United States in working with the IAEA to address the threat posed by the potential misuse of radiological materials. I am proposing an international conference to discuss how the international community can build on the tripartite initiative launched by the United States, Russia, and the IAEA to extend our efforts globally.”

The IAEA promptly followed up this advice and organized this confer-ence. The objective is to foster a wide exchange of information intended to identify the key issues connected with the threat posed by the potential misuse of radioactive materials with malevolent purposes and ways to address them. I expect that it will serve to share knowledge and experience about the problem and search for possible solutions to reach a common understanding on the nature of the threat, on ways to diminish the likelihood of occurrence of such malevolent events, and on the necessary preparedness and response to deal with them should they occur. I also hope that it will offer a new opportunity to the large number of decision makers and experts attending it, and representing so many countries, to take stock of the new security threats posed by radio-active sources and to decide on renewed international actions and therefore develop suggestions for further action by national authorities and international organizations.

Should this conference reach substantive findings, they would certainly serve as a basis for a renewed action plan for the benefit of the international community.