A. NILSSON
Department of Nuclear Safety and Security, International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna
E-mail: a.nilsson@iaea.org
Abstract
The paper discusses the IAEA plan of action to protect against nuclear terrorism, the nature of the threat of a radiological dispersal device, international instruments for the prevention of nuclear terrorism, recent progress and perspectives for future action.
1. BACKGROUND
Nuclear security is not a new subject. It started with the awareness that nuclear material, if coming into the wrong hands, could be used in nuclear explosive devices, and it has given rise to countermeasures such as nuclear material control and physical protection. For other radioactive materials, including sources, the traditional approach has been to consider security as an integral part of safety, i.e. for the radiation protection of workers and for public safety. The events of 11 September 2001 triggered a reconsideration of the risks for, and consequences of, terrorist acts involving nuclear or other radioactive materials.The dangers of radiological dispersal devices (RDDs) were recognized.
In addition to records of past events in which there was a threat or risk of the dispersal of radioactivity, the IAEA’s Illicit Trafficking Database contains some 470 confirmed cases of illicit nuclear trafficking. We have reasons to believe that the reports to the IAEA cover only a part of all trafficking cases.
It is noteworthy that a majority of the cases appear to involve a criminal element. The purpose, however, is unknown — financial, environmental or malevolent use. All in all, the possibility that terrorists would use radioactive materials for malevolent purposes cannot be ignored.
This conference will focus specifically on the security of radioactive sources.
Thus the conference programme does not include nuclear material, spent fuel, waste, nuclear installations or transports, which will have to be considered in a comprehensive approach to nuclear security. Otherwise, there may be security gaps that could be exploited by terrorists or other subnational groups.
27
2. IAEA PLAN OF ACTION TO PROTECT AGAINST NUCLEAR TERRORISM
In March 2002, the IAEA Board of Governors approved specific proposals to protect against terrorism involving nuclear or other radioactive materials. The plan of action contained eight Activity Areas, recognizing that a comprehensive approach to nuclear security is warranted. A global theme of the plan is to cover prevention, detection and response either for nuclear material, or for other radioactive materials or sources. Sustainable security systems rely on prevention and proper protection of the material in question.
However, should prevention fail, measures must be in place to detect any theft, locally or at borders, and to respond to thefts or seizures of such materials, or to threats of such acts. The programme is advancing with a multitrack approach, namely the building of a framework of standards, guides and codes, making available to States a modular system of assessment or evaluation services, technical expertise, security upgrades, methodology development and training.
More than 25 States contribute to the implementation of the programme with in-kind or financial contributions.
3. THE RDD — A WEAPON OF MASS DESTRUCTION OR DISRUPTION?
Let me now touch on some specific questions relative to using a radioactive source in an RDD. Millions of sources, in a large variety, are used daily, in all countries, in useful non-nuclear applications. But only a minor fraction of these sources contain radioactive isotopes in quantities and forms that would pose a terrorist threat. This conference will consider the factors that contribute to making a radioactive source attractive to terrorists, including its activity, availability and dispersal properties, and how to build an effective protection system for the sources. In doing so, the conference will also encounter studies which report that even the very strong sources may not be very ‘useful’ as weapons of mass destruction, since the number of immediate deaths from radiation would be very low, if any. The conventional explosion needed to set off an RDD would most probably inflict a much greater number of casualties. However, the resulting disruption would in all likelihood be major, possibly also fuelled by media reports. The fear of radioactivity could create panic, with associated disarray in the society. The dispersed radioactivity would require decontamination, costly and time consuming, and even limited radiation doses could cause long term health effects, and most certainly long lasting anxiety or psychological disturbances. It should be noted that these
secondary, longer term, effects of an RDD explosion — the disruption — could be substantial and very difficult to restitute.
The willingness of terrorists to sacrifice their own lives to achieve their aims creates a new dimension in the fight against terrorism. However, since the radiation level of an unshielded strong source is very high, it should be considered that radiation sickness might occur early enough to make the adaptation of the source into an explosive device difficult. If the adaptation required heavy shielding, terrorists might find the source less attractive, owing to the resulting decrease in dispersal. Some high risk sources, however, may not require such shielding, thus making them more attractive. Other factors to consider are source mobility, and the physical and chemical form of the isotope.
This conference provides an opportunity to review these and other factors that contribute to the assessment of threats and risks, and the potential consequences of a terrorist event. As is the case for the security of nuclear material, a threat assessment could and should be the basis for a graded approach to the physical protection of sources and for helping to target the strongest security to where it is most needed.
While nuclear security clearly remains a national responsibility, it is not a matter of exclusively national concern. An attack on a nuclear facility, the use of stolen nuclear material in a crude or improvised nuclear explosive device, or the use of radioactive material in a dispersion device, would have global consequences. Any such event would undermine confidence in nuclear technology.
4. INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS
Let me touch on the international instruments that are recognized to contribute to the prevention of nuclear terrorism. The list of twelve international instruments related to the prevention and suppression of international terrorism includes the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. Ongoing efforts aim at strengthening this convention, inter alia, to broaden its scope to include the protection of nuclear material in domestic use, storage and transport. Also on the list is the International Convention on the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, which establishes as an offence the delivery, etc., of a weapon or device through which there is a release, dissemination or impact of radiation or radioactive material.
Furthermore, the draft Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism contains obligations to make punishable offences all malevolent acts involving nuclear and other radioactive materials. The Non-Proliferation Treaty is also recognized for its contributions to nuclear security.
PREVENTING THE RADIOLOGICAL DISPERSAL DEVICE 29
At a lower level, not legally binding but approved by the IAEA Board of Governors and the IAEA General Conference, are the Physical Protection Objectives and Fundamental Principles, referred to as Security Fundamentals, and the International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources, as well as the more recent Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, which is now being revised. These instruments provide an important basis for an internationally accepted platform for continued work on nuclear security.
5. RECENT PROGRESS AND LOOKING FORWARD
Now, where do we stand with our efforts to improve nuclear security? To date, the IAEA has carried out a large number of assessment missions and has provided technical advice and training for nuclear authorities, operators and law enforcement staff, contributing to improved nuclear security in Member States. Among the many ongoing initiatives, I wish to mention the regional and national training programmes to combat illicit trafficking, the efforts to improve and promote the development of detection instruments, and the measures to improve responses to seizures or thefts of radioactive material.
Activities to locate and secure abandoned or lost sources, as well as to respond promptly to assistance requests when radioactive sources are seized in trafficking or are reported stolen, are important.
The IAEA, in pursuing its programme for protection against nuclear terrorism, provides a focal point for international efforts to improve nuclear security. The many ongoing activities depend on the active interaction with Member States and other international organizations. To further improve and strengthen our co-operation with Member States, we seek to establish Nuclear Security Support and Co-operation Programmes. By working together, co-ordinating our activities and pooling the available resources, we can make the world more secure, and nuclear applications, including the use of radioactive sources, will be for beneficial purposes only.
6. SUMMARY
We hope that this conference will help identify the additional measures that are needed, recognizing, inter alia, the need for a consistent and coherent approach to nuclear security. In doing so, the conference may reflect on the need to develop, promote and implement a security culture, a comprehensive and internationally accepted nuclear security framework, strengthened
international co-operation and co-ordination, and education of the general public and the media concerning the benefits and risks associated with radioactive sources, and last but not least, while recognizing the need for and maintaining confidentiality of sensitive information, to improve communi-cation to the general public, with the aim of generating confidence that nuclear security is an issue being addressed with the required attention.
It is also our hope that this conference will bring about or trigger the work needed to obtain a clearer picture of the threat of an RDD and of how to prevent that threat from materializing.
PREVENTING THE RADIOLOGICAL DISPERSAL DEVICE 31