Kosovo actions

Propaganda against Kosovo’s political elites was constantly being intensified, especially by the SRS but also by other SFRY politicians. The Albanian political elites in Kosovo were blamed for "being part of" or at least for "allowing" the organization of the student demonstrations. As a result, the tendency of Albanian political elites to try to look "more Catholic than the Pope" or more pro-Yugoslav than the Serbs was on full display in every session after the March and April demonstrations. Archival documents show that the strongest accusations against the illegal groups or the Republic of Albania, which were categorized as "the enemies," came especially from the Albanian political elites in the SFRY. Ali Shukriu, for example, stated that the biggest mistake was that the "SFRY's cooperation with Albania was allowed to be implemented exclusively through Kosovo"

(May 5, 1981, Tanjug). He also stated that the damages to public or social properties were to be considered as an attack on the system and "those students who were violent will have to pay for it" (AK LoCPC/1981/81). Mahmut Bakalli, in a press conference with international journalists held April 18, 1981, said "we are aware" that cooperation between Kosovo and Albania serves the interests of good neighborly relations between the SFRY and Albania, but we will not allow "anyone to manipulate us and provoke hatred among Serbs and Albanians in the SFRY" (AK Rilindja, April 19, 1981). Xhavit Nimani also

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expressed interest in cooperating as long as the cultural exchanges and cooperation between Albanians in Kosovo and those in Albania did not lead to bigger inter-ethnic troubles in the SFRY (AK Rilindja, April 22, 1981). Fadil Hoxha, while saying that Yugoslavia had learned lessons from the behavior of Tirana, added, however, that "we don't want to stop cooperation" (April 1981, Radio Prishtina). He also added that Albania, as the poorest country in Europe, had more political prisoners than the SFRY, even though the SFRY was ten times larger than Albania (AK Rilindja, April 28, 1981). However, their Serbian colleagues from the Kosovo LoC, such as Miloš Minić, were also critical, saying that Albania had openly defended the Kosovans’ demand for a "Republic." Thus, according to Minić, they had committed the unpardonable offense of interfering in the SFRY's internal affairs. This was considered as a serious attack on SFRY-Albania relations. Minić accused Albania, in its relations with the SFRY, of following a two-faced policy: the first was a tendency to cooperate in economic and cultural developments when this was in their interest, while the second was developing hostile, irredentist and nationalist policies against the SFRY (Tanjug 8th of May 1981).

Sinan Hasani's interview in RTV Prishtina was published by Tanjug as well as in Rilindja. Yugoslavia was ready for cooperation with Albania, but first, according to Hasani, they should: "stop interfering in the SFRY's internal affairs, put aside territorial aspirations, stop abusing the SFRY's openness vis-à-vis neighbors, halt the propaganda campaign against the SFRY, start to respect the rights of Macedonian minorities in Albania, and share responsibility for the current state of the relations between Albania and the SFRY" (Tanjug, November 17-18. 1981, and Rilindja, November 18-19, 1981). Accusations by political and academic elites of the SFRY against the Republic of Albania were numerous. During April and May 1981 alone, on the pages of Rilindja, the Republic of Albania was explicitly accused of the following: "interfering in the SFRY's internal affairs" on 55 different pages of Rilindja, "Albania's territorial intentions toward the SFRY" on 19 different pages,

"indoctrination, irredentist, nationalist, and subversive-propagandistic actions" on 32 different pages, "engagement, support and defending the demonstrations and demonstrators" on 9 different pages, "Albania's socio-economic system and foreign policy vis-à-vis Yugoslavia" on 25 different pages, "promoting national hate" on 12 different pages, and "misusing bilateral relations and lack of reciprocity" on 17 different pages. The politicians who spoke out against Albania included the main political figures of the SFRY

151 as well as the main Albanian political figures in the SFRY, including S. Dolance, L. Moisov, L. Koliševski, P. Stambolić, M. Minić, D. Vidić, D. Ristić, A. Shukria, Xh. Nimani, A.

Vllasi, F. Hoxha, M. Maliqi, M. Bakalli, M. Sefedini and others (AMFA 1141/1981).

On the other hand, despite all of their efforts and measures taken, the Kosovo

"progressivists" were constantly accused by the SRS and other SFRY republics of tolerating the development of illegal groups and fostering nationalist and irredentist feelings. In addition to these criticisms, their inability to manage the situation was also widely denounced. Rumors persisted that even the members of the families of communist leaders were involved in the demonstrations. Public debates allegedly revealed that separatism and nationalism were not just in the streets. Instead, they were coming from the streets straight to Fadil Hoxha, Mahmut Bakalli, Azem Vllasi, et al. As a result, Mahmut Bakalli resigned, saying that "it is one thing to be accused of being irresponsible and an entirely different thing to be accused of being part of a problem" (AK LoCPC/1981/90), whereas in the SFRY meeting, Fadil Hoxha informed the officials that he had spoken to his son (Sharr) about the ongoing accusations regarding his participation in the demonstrations. While trying to portray him as a good communist and member of the Party, Hoxha explained that he worked in Obiliq and when going home from work, he was very scared, given that he hadn’t been able to find any policeman to take him home. Hoxha pointed out that his son described the situation "as very scary" and that the majority of people were being manipulated (AJ 803/498). While the accusation of "Albanians in general" was ongoing, the process of

"differentiation," according to Sinan Hasani, was integrated into "every pore of life in the province." In Kosovo alone, the Party excluded 1,639 people from the LoC, dismissed 278 teachers from their teaching activities, expelled 890 students from the university, and fired 457 workers from the factories, while another 902 were arrested (AK, Rilindja, September 18, 1981). Brutal actions were also being undertaken in the name of "differentiation" vis-à-vis the families of those who had been "differentiated." Faton Abazi, whose brother was first arrested and then, according to the police station report, had killed himself by jumping from the fourth floor, explained how after this event his family had faced carefully prepared state sanctions. People who visited or spoke with him or his family were stopped in the streets and asked, "Why are you talking to them…they are traitors and anti-revolutionaries,"

etc. "The life of our parents was over after that," states Abazi (Abazi; March 2017). Life for the entire family took a different direction. Even though the regime had committed a crime

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by killing (or at least causing the death of) Faton's brother, they did not allow his family to live in peace afterward. Faton was a good student but was never allowed to complete his university degree or have any other profession (Abazi; March 2017). Despite all of the measures taken against Kosovo's population, Albanian communist leaders were still blamed by Serbs for inadequate implementation of the differentiation process. Archival material and my interviews reveal that after a while the Albanian communist elites were somehow convinced that the intentions of their "brothers in unity" did not jibe with what was written in the communist books. Various meeting minutes show Fadil Hoxha's frustration with his SFRY colleagues, asking them not to allow the differentiation of "our professors because it will cause a lot of damage…we do have good professors and academics who are with us, who are for this SFRY and its principles, etc." (AJ 803/498). Even though a few months earlier Fadil Hoxha had been insisting on implementing the "differentiation" process, when the positions of "progressivists" were threatened by this process, he began to realize that it was "very important to clarify things related to this differentiation" (ibid.). Later on, Fadil Hoxha complained in numerous meetings at the federation level about the pressure and propaganda coming from the SRS and the Serbian side in general. While confirming his willingness to contribute to the country (SFRY), he said that "now we have come to another point." With regard to Kosovo, Hoxha complained that everyone was writing whatever they wanted and no one was intervening. Everyone talked about helping Kosovo, but contrary to that, certain people (referring to the Serbs) were posing unpleasant questions about the failure of Kosovo leadership. Hoxha pointed out to his colleagues that Kosovo could also pose questions such as how many Albanians from the SFRY had emigrated to Albania or Turkey or what happened during the Ranković era, but where would these questions lead?

Thus, instead of "opening all doors," Hoxha called for all parties to cease engaging in rancorous debate and take steps to ease the tense atmosphere. During the 92nd session of the Presidency of the SFRY, which was held September 23, 1981, Fadil Hoxha also took a stand that people should not be sentenced so harshly, getting eight years simply for participating in demonstrations. He notified his colleagues that he too was a revolutionary activist and when some of his friends got 3-4 years in prison that was terrible..."imagine now what they think about the system." (AJ 803/498). Despite Fadil Hoxha's frustrations, Serbian politicians and some influential Serbian citizens used every opportunity to react and did their utmost to convince the Serbian political elites in the SRS and the SFRY that Serbs

153 in Kosovo were being treated unfairly and that the Kosovo leadership was to be blamed for allowing this. The Serbian leadership, after conducting its own "analysis," came to the conclusion that the "irredentists are among the Kosovo leadership" (AJ 803/498).

Family members of the Kosovo leadership were regularly accused of having participated in the demonstrations. Given that these reports were also sent to the Presidency of the SFRY, at one point Fadil Hoxha said that if they believed this, "I have no place here anymore." In the middle of this chaos, the Republic of Montenegro was pressuring the SFRY Presidency to change the law concerning the display of the Albanian flag, and Macedonian representatives, led by Lazar Koliševski, added that the issue of the anthem had not yet been resolved either. Fadil Hoxha provided historical explanations for why the flag of the Albanian "narodnost" was affiliated with Albania, and why he was also against taking the initiative to change symbols, arguing that to do so might provoke even more tensions in Kosovo. Montenegrins and Macedonians did not agree with Hoxha's explanations; their response was that "we know Tito made these decisions, but now things have changed" and that this issue must end as well (AJ 803/498). Heated debates were taking place even at the Party level. In his 1981 speech during the political activity in Kosovo, among other things Fadil Hoxha noted that Kosovo had the same equal rights in the SFRY organs and institutions as one of the SFRY constituents. Dragoslav Draža Marković, a communist leader of the SRS, and at that time president of the Federal Assembly of the SFRY, immediately retorted that the current position of Kosovo as one of the SFRY constituents was no longer sustainable for the SRS. Finally, in November 1981, F. Hoxha, during an SFRY Presidency meeting, asked his colleagues: What do you want from Kosovo? Why is the SRS not letting the Kosovo political elites stabilize the situation?

When Albanian security agents were asked why things were moving slowly and what was going on, they would constantly respond that "we can't get anything done; things are tied up in cooperation with the SFRY and Serbian people that are ‘helping' us here!” Hoxha reacted by stating that the help of the other SFRY bodies was appreciated but that the Kosovo leaders did not want to permit misinformation that accused Albanian society as a whole of nationalism. He also asked, "Who will defend us if this presidency does not?" (AJ 803/498). However, Albanian communist elites started expressing their concerns only when they were being blamed and suspected. Throughout 1982 as well, Fadil Hoxha continuously reported at the federal level about the extremely volatile political situation in Kosovo, as

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well as the decrease of production levels in the factories and the lack of enthusiasm about the future. Albanian communist elites called for empowerment while complaining that the Serbian officers of the Secretariat for Internal Affairs were pushing for "differentiation" of cadres which, these elites said, were considered as "ours" and had "fought for us" at the university and other public institutions.

The anxiety of the Albanian communist leaders in Kosovo was palpable. They were being accused of being "traitors" by the Republic of Albania and of being supporters of illegal groups by their SFRY communist colleagues. Hoxha also mentioned his fears of assassination, saying that "so far no one was assassinated, but every moment we are waiting in fear to see which one of us will be liquidated" (AJ 803/498). Attacks against the Albanian communist elites in the SFRY continued for a long period as did the accusations against illegal groups and the Republic of Albania. During the first six months of 1982, for example, 92 articles were published in the Yugoslav press. The largest number of them were published in Rilindja (28 articles), followed by Politika (25), Borba (19), Flaka e Vëllazërimit (9), Oslobođenje (7), Novosti (2) and NIN (2). The content of all these articles was dominated by aggressive speeches against "counter-revolutionaries" and the Republic of Albania. These articles were written by SFRY politicians, especially from the SRS but also by Kosovo Serbs (AMFA 1012/1982). The SFRY politicians concluded that except for cooperation concerning economic relations, which were federal matters, all other protocols of cooperation between cultural and educational institutions of Kosovo with Albania should cease (Tanjug, May 12, 1981).