After the demonstrations in Kosovo

The Central Committee of the Union of Communists of Serbia accused Kosovo's intelligence services and, especially, Albanian communist elites, of allowing these "forces"

to organize protests. The SRS communist elite’s take on the protests was: Now, when the Albanian "narodnost" is marking new achievements, the reactionary forces are even wilder and becoming ever more chauvinist (AJ, 837/II-4-b-35). Kosovo authorities assured the federal authorities that the SFRY's laws would be respected and that necessary measures would be taken against the "betrayers of the nation" and the initiators of inter-ethnic hatred that tended to destabilize the SFRY (ibid). The highest ranks of the communist elites in Kosovo raised their voices against the protests. The daily newspaper "Rilindja" was also criticized for offering its congratulations to the Kosovars on the 28th of November (the anniversary of the Republic of Albania's gaining independence). The student protests were categorized as "not spontaneous, but organized by the enemy." Protestors were reported to have been armed, even though state officials reported that the demonstrations mainly involved high school students. The committee decided to take measures against all who had organized and participated in the movements (AK LoCPC/1968/7). After the protests, political leaders calmed the situation by taking measures against those labeled as "the

85 organizers" and a few participants, while at the same time assuring citizens that "good things were in the making." In the period following the demonstrations, not more than two or at most three people were allowed to walk together in the streets. It is worth noting that on November 28, 1968 both Fehmi Agani and Rrezak Shala escaped to Turkey, returning only when the situation had returned to normal. Certain voices – particularly those of Serbs – within the LCY continued to blame the Albanian communist leadership for allowing, or even inciting, the organization of these protests in Kosovo. Albanian communists rejected these "insults" in a letter sent to Tito saying that "you might have been misinformed… but there have been also some demands that we cannot consider chauvinist, such as "Long Live Tito," "Long Live Fadil," " We Want a University" (AJ 837/II-4-b-35).

In a closed meeting with the LCY political structures, Veli Deva criticized his Serbian communist colleagues, saying that Serbian propaganda was "very high, while Kosovo leadership is very surprised that there are no reactions from the central level. Fadil Hoxha was attacked and none of you reacted." Hearing the voices of "brotherhood and support" from Serbs and Montenegrins would have been very important for "us," accused Deva (AS Đ-2/71/1968).

Two days after the demonstrations, Tito held a press conference with local and international journalists. From his statement published in Rilindja on December 2, one can observe Tito's tendency to minimize the effects of these events. In addition, he also managed to "attack" both of his targets, SRS and Republic of Albania. Of course, Tito did not "attack"

them openly, but he said: "I think that these events are being dramatized enormously – they were not like some (alluding to Serbs) tend to think." He also claimed: "the enemy (alluding to the Republic of Albania) is still present there and they had a finger in these events."

Meanwhile, in a manner similar to the case of the demonstrations in Belgrade, he somehow

"justified" the students with the words "some shelves and windows were broken as happens every day in the West" (AK Rilindja/1968). Enver Hoxha sent his response to the events immediately, claiming: "Albania had no part in these demonstrations…the Titoists know this, and still, they made it up." Even with regard to the slogans that concerned him, Enver Hoxha claimed that they came from "SFRY agent provocateurs that were embedded in the protests" (CAA 10/1968/238).

Archival documents also show that Serbs and Albanian members of the LoC argued about suspicions that even the children of political leaders participated in the

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demonstrations and how the rise of Serbian nationalism had provoked or forced the Albanian student movement. Archival materials show that during this period each group began spreading different propaganda to justify their actions. Serbian and Albanian political leaders did not hesitate to report these cases even during the highest level meetings of the LCY. For example, in a meeting of the Presidency of the LoC, Xhavit Nimani¹⁰⁵ reported how police had caught a Serbian student in the middle of the night shouting "Long live Enver Hoxha," then "Long live Fadil and Veli Deva." The Serbian elites blamed the Albanian provincial leadership for organizing the demonstrations. After the demonstrations, accusations such as "someone is playing dangerous political games, but they won’t suit anyone" were also heard among Albanian and Serbian communists. During December 1968, Serbian newspapers were full of articles and headlines such as "the organizers of the demonstrations are provocateurs that tried to stab us in the back," "direct threat to brotherhood and unity," "chauvinist attacks in Tetovo" (Borba; December 1968), "the enemy has shown his face," "investigations of all those that organized protests" (Politika;

December 1968), "nationalism is anti-communism" or "illusions about Albania" (Večernje Novosti; December 1968). These propagandistic media actions provoked a nationalistic response, particularly among those Serbs and Montenegrins living in Kosovo. As a result, in January 1969 the information service of Serbia started receiving anonymous letters from Serbian people living in villages in Kosovo (such as the one from the village of Bustranja).

Kosovo Serbs were asking for help from their "Serbian brothers...we are not safe…Albanians are burning our houses…" (AJ, 837/II-4-b-35). However, no burned houses were reported by any other source during this period. Nevertheless, ethnic tensions grew after 1968, and Kosovo Serbs reported feeling insecure. The Kosovo political elites took this into account and tried to control the situation by preventing its escalation, at least for a while.

It was obvious that the demonstrations of that time were at least allowed to be organized by the political elites of Kosovo. The political situation of that specific time needed these movements to justify or push forward the Kosovo Albanians’ demands for a

"Republic," as something that people were asking for. However, when the demands for

"Republic" status were presented to Tito by a delegation of the LoC of Kosovo, he rejected

105 Xhavit Nimani was a chairman of the Presidency of the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosova.

87 them by claiming that "Republic is not the only factor which solves problems" (AK Rilindja 04 November 1968).

Even if the students were just actors, they cannot be considered as manipulated puppets, given that ultimately the situation can be described as win-win, both for the students who were successful in having their demands heard and for the political elites, who got the attention of Tito as well as a new constitution. These protests in the context of Kosovo created a sense of unity among students, intellectuals, and political elites. As a result, the unresolved problems of Kosovo Albanians were brought up and, what was most important, these demands (a university, language, cultural freedom, etc) were accepted as legitimate by the LCY. The 1968 student demonstrations were the first contributions of institutions of higher learning to the political independence of Albanians in Kosovo. This was the first time the students‘ slogan cum demand "Duam universitet (We Want a University)" appeared (AJ 837/II-4-b-35).

At the ninth congress of the Party in 1969, Tito included two requests for national equality: the first was the use of national symbols and the second was the University of Prishtina. The biggest historical achievement of these protests was the creation of the UP in 1970 (Buxhovi: Jan 2016). These demonstrations also led to the 1968 and 1971 amendments to the SFRY Constitution allowing autonomous provinces more local control and input. In practice, this meant that Kosovo's leadership functioned without almost any interference from the SRS or the SFRY federal government (Vickers 1998: 169-170). The Albanian language became official, and this was an enormous advantage for Kosovo Albanians. The governmental administration of the province primarily functioned in the Albanian language.

This left Serbs and other Slavic-speaking populations in Kosovo uninformed about important issues going on in the province. Compared to the past, Albanian literature and culture flourished as never before in Kosovo, paving the way for deeper Albanian cultural growth.