Initial conditions

The SEG will contain a description of the plant initial conditions for the start of the scenario. This information can be passed to the candidate in several ways, e.g. by the instructor carrying out a start of shift handover to the candidate for the position that the candidate is going to be assessed on by the simulator instructor, using a pre-prepared shift log can carry out a brief of current reactor conditions and answer any questions that the candidate may ask on the current plant state, as per a normal MCR handover. Identifying any pre-existing conditions that the SEG requires highlighting to the candidate.

The initial brief might include such information as:

 Reactor power and generator load;

 On-going operations, such as raising power after a long outage;

 Heat sink conditions if the reactor is shut down;

 Control rod or other reactivity management control activities (device status, time and day of occurrence, simulated for the scenario);

 PSCC (Plant Status Configuration Control) equipment out of service or aligned in an unusual manner;

 Maintenance or testing in progress or imminent on the plant;

 Equipment tagged out as a precautionary measure but available for service if required;

 Shift crew and support staff available to assist MCR during the scenario.

Initial plant conditions should be varied between scenarios, and not all plant equipment out of service should have an impact on the scenario. Telephone calls and alarm distractors can be utilized to make the exercises subtlety different on each running, without impacting on the main objectives of the assessment. This will minimize the possibility of inadvertently revealing to the candidate the format of the scenario or the systems they will be tested on during the scenario.

The Candidate Action Checklist (CAC) during the SEG scenario development helps provide a structure for the candidate’s expected actions to be documented at the points of the exercise at which they are expected to occur. They can be in an easily referenced, pre-determined format in the SEG, such as a table or checklist. These critical actions can form a part of any assessment pro-forma if one is to be produced and utilized by the assessors to support their observations. Assessment criteria includes such candidate actions and behaviours as described in the 5 Operator fundamentals including:

 Operators monitor plant operations and conditions closely;

 Operators control pant evolutions precisely;

 Operators establish a bias for a conservative approach to plant operations;

 Operators work effectively as a team;

 Operators have a solid understanding (knowledge)of plant design and system inter-relationships.

Under these 5 Operator Fundamentals headings all operator MCR actions and behaviours, such as those listed below, can be assembled to be assessed on an assessment pro-forma.

6.1.7.1. Monitor to include

 Increased frequency of monitoring of key parameters during transients;

 Identify adverse parameter and equipment trends;

 Validate expected system response, accuracy and proper function of indications.

6.1.7.2. Control to include

 Establishing limits to control key parameters within specified bands and rate changes;

 Anticipate automatic trips and equipment protective features, pre-emptively taking manual actions or ensuring an expected automatic trip occurs where appropriate;

 Verify that indications and initial plant conditions are appropriate for the procedure to be used before implementing;

 Operators know the objective of the procedure and the basis for procedure steps before implementing;

 Verify and report automatic system actuations or responses, including operator actions if the plant has not responded as expected.

6.1.7.3. Conservatism to include

 Ensuring equipment required to support effective plant operation is available and operating properly;

 Manage scheduled activities and emergent work to avoid simultaneous evolutions overloading control room staff and hampering plant monitoring;

 Question conditions and situations that are out of the ordinary, un-expected or could erode safety margins;

 Set Conservative bands for critical parameters to ensure safe margins to undesirable states are maintained;

 Establish contingency plans, commensurate with the associated risk, to mitigate/ manage potential adverse consequences during plant evolutions.

6.1.7.4. Teamwork (including leadership and workload management) to include

 Ask questions to gain information and a clear understanding; Question inappropriate actions of other team members;

 Clearly communicate important information on plant conditions, actions taken and present position;

 Resolve conflicts to achieve the best solution and improve team effectiveness;

 Roles and responsibilities identified, accepted and followed through. Supporting other team members when the need arises;

 Be critical of own and team performance to identify performance improvements;

 Team apply diagnostic process to plant abnormality/transient, implement abnormal and emergency plant procedures when required and apply systematic decision-making

processes if normal and/or emergency operating procedures no longer apply or deal fully with the situation;

 Independent oversight maintained on the plant and crew to ensure safety functions and margins are maintained and mitigation strategies implemented by the team are done so effectively (have the desired effect).

6.1.7.5. Knowledge: Solid Understanding to include

 Before operating a component, operators confirm an understanding of its function and its interactions with other components and systems;

 Operators understand the risk associated with plant configuration, including the collective risk of having multiple and/or diverse components out of service;

 Operators have a strong understanding of basic core fundamentals in reactor theory, electrical theory and thermodynamics, etc.;

 Operators apply this knowledge to anticipate expected responses as they operate the plant;

 Operators discuss expected system and parameter changes and their basis during pre-job briefing.

6.1.7.6. Debrief: open questioning techniques

At the end of the assessment scenario the assessors will discuss their observations and benchmark this against the required standard. Actions undertaken by the candidate can be observed during the scenario, the rationale behind decisions made, the student’s situational awareness and mental model, will not always be evident from the observation. This can be further explored by using open questioning techniques to allow the candidate to fully explain his thoughts and reasoning behind any course of action taken. With this extra information the assessors can then go away and make a more informed decision on the candidate’s performance.

Considered open questioning techniques can be used to further explore the candidates understanding on such things as:

 The rationale for taking the expected or an un-expected action during the scenario;

 Check the students understanding of the plant conditions initially and as they evolved throughout the scenario;

 Procedures followed and any further steps/procedures considered to place the plant in a known safe state;

 Explain their understanding of the event or transient where the expected actions were not taken by them;

 Whether the procedures available were adequate in dealing with the situation and what else could they have considered mitigating the effects.

To aid debrief process it can be advantageous to have pre-planned questions prepared in the SEG, associated to each of the defined assessment objectives. The candidates will have been briefed fully as to how the assessment process is applied, during the lead up to their assessment.

This process should be adhered to on each occasion by the assessors, with the candidate expecting the formal debrief and questioning, to check their understanding, followed by some time for the assessors to consider/discuss their judgement in private, and the candidate then being called back for the decision.

Following this routine for debrief, the candidates will respond normally and not become defensive because they suspect they may have made an error.

In some cases, questioning may reveal that the simulator assessors may have missed something during their observations, exercise itself may not have acted as expected, indications did not occur as planned or that role players did not provide the required information when requested. This input will be useful to assess the candidates’ performance fairly and make amendments to the exercise if required before running it again. In some cases, questioning has revealed that a seemingly strong performance observed from the floor team was in fact not as it seemed. On questioning of the team, it becomes evident that the event had led the team and they were purely responding to what they could see and using the Surveillances/SOIs (station operating instructions) to cope with the situation but their reasoning, situational awareness and decision making were not in fact ahead of the event. They were instead reacting to/led by the transient.